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Abstract  
This thesis starts by observing that banks are central to derivatives markets. It 
then asks two interrelated questions. First, what is it about banks that allows them 
to be the heart of derivatives markets? Second, what is it about bank-traded 
derivatives that has allowed them to become such widely and heavily traded 
financial instruments? Both questions are approached, above all, as theoretical 
problems. Existing theories of banks tend not to treat banks as derivatives dealers, 
and existing derivatives theories tend not to treat derivatives as a banking 
activity. To answer the questions this thesis deploys a political economy 
approach, drawing heavily on Marxist method and theory, which entails 
analysing theoretically the evolution of banks and their role in derivatives 
markets. Specifically, it shows that banks have become securities and derivatives 
dealers in addition to their commercial banking activities.  
The thesis builds a logical and historical account of the evolution of banking that 
culminates in a theoretical understanding of banks’ role as derivatives dealers. 
Banks are making derivatives markets for themselves both by standing ready to 
buy and sell and by providing the infrastructure of the market. The analysis 
shows theoretically how derivatives themselves are made by banks and how they 
are suited to trading: i.e., repeated buying and selling with the aim of profiting 
from price changes. The theoretical analysis is then enriched with an examination 
of banks’ more detailed practices in derivatives markets such as contractual and 
clearing practices and the use of valuation models. In short, by analysing 
derivatives as a banking activity and building a theoretical explanation for the 
evolution and role of banks this thesis explains theoretically the interconnection 
between banks and derivatives, and on this basis gains an insight into aspects of 
the broader economy such as the uses of risk management and the regulation of 
banks.  
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1 Introduction 
 
‘…on [each of the] the major trading floors of the global banks 
where we conducted our research between 200 and 800 traders 
were engaged in trading. … The traders take their own ‘positions’ 
in the market while also offering trades to other market 
participants, thereby bringing liquidity to the market and 
sustaining it. … deals via these channels [go] up to a hundred 
million dollars and more. … [A]ll traders on the floors have a 
range of technology at their disposal; most conspicuously, the up 
to five computer screens, which display the market and serve to 
conduct trading. When traders arrive in the morning they strap 
themselves to their seats, figuratively speaking, they bring up their 
screens, and from then on their eyes will be glued to these screens, 
their visual regard captured by it even when they talk or shout to 
each other, their bodies and the screen world melting together in 
what appears to be total immersion in the action in which they are 
taking part.’ (Knorr-Cetina and Preda, 2005: 43-4) 
1.1 Introduction 
It is sometimes claimed that derivatives allow risk-sharing via ‘the market’; with 
no mention of ‘global banks’ or how or by whom these markets are made. Yet in 
the popular imagination, in the statistics released by international bodies such as 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and not least in the financial crisis 
which began in 2007-8, derivatives are associated above all with banks, and with 
banks undertaking (frenzied) trading in financial instruments.
1
 This dissertation 
asks what it is about banks that has led them to the very heart of derivatives 
markets, and what is it about the derivatives that they trade that has led to them 
becoming overwhelmingly used for trading financial instruments? 
                                                 
1
 I also have personal experience of working for a major Swiss bank for almost 12 years and, like 
many thousands of other bank employees, never once made a loan or took in a deposit; I did, on 
the other hand, deal every day with portfolios of hundreds of thousands of derivatives. 
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The last 30 years have seen extraordinary growth in the scale and scope of 
derivatives activity and banks, repeatedly buying and selling financial 
derivatives, are at the heart of this expansion. Prior to the early 1990s the word 
‘derivative’ did not even appear in regulatory documents in the UK and US,2 and 
statistics for the global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market only began to 
be collected in the late 1980s (ISDA, 2010d). By 2011 there were approximately 
US$700 trillion of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (measured by notional 
outstanding amount), and by comparing the amount of turnover per day it appears 
that the amount traded per day of exchange-traded derivatives (ETD) is of a 
similar order of magnitude (BIS, 2010b, 2011), Banks have been central to this 
process, taking on new activities dealing in both securities and derivatives and 
standing at the centre of these markets as market-makers (Duffie, 2010). Banks as 
derivatives dealers have made markets in two senses: they ‘stand ready to buy 
and sell’ (Levi, 2005: 563) and they provide much of the infrastructure of 
markets.  
Banks’ centrality to these markets is a puzzle, and perhaps above all a theoretical 
puzzle. Existing theories of banks tend not to treat them as derivatives dealers, 
and existing theories of derivatives tend not to treat them as a banking activity. 
Neither orthodox nor heterodox economics approach derivatives markets as a 
problem of banking theory. Yet to understand derivatives’ place in and effect on 
the wider economy, and to understand the detailed practices in derivatives 
markets we need first to understand what derivatives are and how they came to be 
a banking activity. There is therefore a gap in the theory, which this thesis 
addresses to offer a theoretical base that will aid future empirical work. The rest 
of this chapter, and to some degree the next, show that if derivatives today are to 
be understood it is necessary to know how banks came to be central to them. This 
requires a theory of the evolution of banks and their role in derivatives markets.  
In order to build such a theory it is necessary to use a method that can address the 
development of banking: first, how banking and finance have developed from the 
                                                 
2
 Swan notes: ‘Apparently, market participants began to apply the term to futures and options in 
the early 1980s, but the first “legal” use of the term is found in [a] 1982 New York Federal Court 
case’ (Swan, 2000: 5) The House and Senate Conference Committee considering the 1992 Futures 
Trading Practices Act finally used the term ‘derivative’ in a regulatory context. (Swan, 2000: 9-
10)  
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workings of capitalism itself, and second, how the banking system has developed 
to take on new activities such as securities and derivatives dealing. Political 
economy, with, amongst other things, an emphasis on processes and not static 
equilibria, is uniquely suited to theorising such a process of development. Here a 
political economy approach is used that draws heavily on Marxism and historical 
materialism.
3
 This theoretical core is then augmented drawing upon literature 
from the social studies of finance (SSF).   
Applying such an approach to banks in derivatives markets is original in itself, 
but more importantly, this original viewpoint provides insights that are not to be 
found in other investigations of the development of derivatives markets. 
Approaching derivatives theory using Marxist political economy turns much 
standard analysis on its head – or rather puts it on its feet. As far as the author can 
tell, this thesis is the first work of this kind that builds a theory of banking in 
order to explain banks’ centrality to derivatives trading, and then draws upon this 
theory to explain how the material practices of banks in making derivatives 
markets impacts on the continuing process of the latters’ development their and 
changing character.  
The theory developed here takes classical Marxist political economy as a starting 
point, and above all Marx’s and Hilferding’s analysis of the emergence of 
commercial banking from capitalists engaged in exchange (Marx, 1976, 1981; 
Hilferding, 1910). First, this basis must be reassessed and refined in light of the 
new activities of banks, in particular derivatives dealing. Second, it must be 
extended to incorporate first securities dealing and then derivatives dealing. 
Careful examination of banking theory allows identification of the evolving 
essence of banks and the attributes they need, first to emerge as specialists among 
other merchants and then to extend their activities. Derivatives dealing has 
changed banks, and demands an updating of our theory of banks, their 
specialisms and their activities. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide this update and 
extend the classical Marxist theory of banks. 
In developing a theory of banks as derivatives dealers, this thesis must also draw 
on other disciplines, including those of economists outside the Marxist tradition 
                                                 
3
 ‘Marx’s method focuses on historical change’ (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2004: 8) 
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and especially economic sociologists. Their insights are incorporated at an 
abstract level, for example highlighting the importance and construction of 
virtuality in derivatives markets; they are also incorporated more concretely when 
the thesis turns to more detailed manifestations of banks’ activities. Specifically, 
the evolution and role of international bank regulation, of valuation models and 
risk management and of legal contracts and clearing arrangements are examined. 
Sociologists in particular have contributed close study of the social and economic 
relations which make up the practice in these areas. These practices emerge from, 
and are placed in the context of the theoretical framework developed in the first 
half of the thesis, and this allows clearer identification of their economic roots 
and motivations, and in turn richer understanding of how they develop and their 
effects. These chapters also draw on an examination of more empirical material 
such as bank regulation, legal documentation in derivatives markets, dealer 
banks’ practices in the back office and in risk management, and the mechanics of 
derivative valuation models. 
The rest of this chapter sets out in more detail the need for a theory of the 
evolution and role of banks in order to understand derivatives markets. Section 
1.2 explores the main empirical characteristics of these markets, starting with 
their enormous size and rapid recent growth. The late 1980s began a qualitatively 
different period for derivatives. Inspection of aggregate derivatives statistics since 
this time reveals the centrality of banks and the financial nature of the derivatives 
being traded. With this revelation it becomes necessary to understand the 
processes of development that led to banks becoming derivatives dealers and 
their influence on the growth and evolving character of derivatives markets, 
which the rest of this thesis discusses. 
Section 1.3 probes the nature of derivatives as a claim that allows trading, which 
is taken in this thesis to mean buying and selling in order to profit from a change 
in price. The section begins to explore this by comparing first commodity 
exchange with physically-settled derivatives, and then physically-settled with 
cash-settled derivatives. In doing this it shows how there is a qualitative 
difference between buying and selling a commodity and trading a derivative, and 
that the derivative form allows larger quantities of derivatives trading. This view 
1 - Introduction  
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of the nature of derivatives is contrasted with that of neoclassical economics, 
which sees them as completing markets in an underlying asset.  
Section 1.4 illustrates some of these features by examining more closely the 
mechanics of interest-rate swaps and the evolution of the credit derivatives 
markets. Section 1.5 concludes and introduces the rest of the thesis.  
1.2 Growth in derivatives markets and the role of banks 
1.2.1 Growth in derivatives markets since the late 1980s 
Derivatives markets are often split into over-the-counter (OTC) and exchange-
traded derivatives (ETD); a snapshot of the markets shows just how large both 
have become. Many common measures of economic activity such as gross 
domestic product (GDP), corporate profits, etc. are not directly comparable with 
the measures of derivatives markets (e.g. those provided by BIS statistics). 
Problems include mixing stocks and flows, mixing gross and net, and mixing 
leveraged and non-leveraged instruments. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain an 
initial understanding of the scale of derivatives activity by casual comparison of 
the statistics and other well-established economic variables. Table 1.1, below, 
shows estimated global GDP for 2010 at US$2 trillion. A slightly more 
meaningful comparison can be made to aggregates of other financial assets: 
global stock market capitalisation was estimated as US$55 trillion and the total 
for bonds, equities and bank assets as US$250.4 trillion
 
(IMF, Sep 2009).  
As can be seen, the statistics for derivatives are enormous by comparison. The 
statistics most commonly used to measure the size of the derivatives market, 
shown in the bottom half of Table 1.1, are those of the BIS.
4
 Average daily 
exchange traded turnover, which is a subset of all ETD, was US$8.1 trillion.
5
 
Comparing OTC and ETD market measures is tricky, but if turnover in OTC 
seems slightly lower than in ETD markets it is nevertheless of a similar order of 
magnitude: average daily turnover just in interest rate (IR) and foreign exchange 
                                                 
4
 Published in the ‘Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics’, (including the BIS quarterly ‘Statistics 
on Exchange Traded Derivatives’) and the BIS ‘Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign 
Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity’. 
5
 BIS statistics for Exchange-traded derivatives do not include all product types and hence these 
aggregates underestimate the total for all ETD contracts. Similarly the turnover statistics for OTC 
derivatives are for interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives only. 
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(FX) OTC derivatives was US$4.5 trillion (this excludes other types of OTC 
derivatives such as credit derivatives, equity derivatives and so on for which data 
is not available). Both of these are multiples of global GDP/day. The gross global 
market value of OTC derivatives outstanding at the end of 2010 was US$21 
trillion compared to a stock market capitalisation of US$55 trillion, while the 
biggest and most commonly-quoted statistic of all, the OTC notional amount 
outstanding, was US$600 trillion, more than double aggregate global bonds, 
equities and bank assets. Even considering the multiple problems of 
measurement, the derivatives markets is at least comparable in size to the 
traditional financial sector.
6
 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of the global economy and derivatives markets 
at end 2010 
Measure US$ amount (trillions) Stock/ 
flow 
Source 
(see 
below) 
Global GDP 63/year 
0.17/day
†
 
Flow 1 
Global Stock Market Capitalisation 55 Stock 1 
Global Bonds, Equities and Bank Assets 250 Stock 1 
OTC Notional Outstanding 601 Stock 2 
OTC Gross Market Value 21 Stock 2 
OTC IR and FX Turnover
††
 4.5/day Flow 3 
ETD Turnover (Q4 2010) 8.1/day Flow 3 
ETD Outstanding 83 Stock 2 
 
† Assumes 365 days/year. 
†† Global foreign exchange market turnover excluding ‘spot’ = 2.49tnUSD/day (source: BIS, 
2010b:Table 2). Global OTC interest rate derivatives market turnover  = 2.057tnUSD/day (source: 
BIS, 2010b:Table 6).  
 
Sources: 1. IMF (2011), 2. BIS (2011), 3. (BIS, 2010b)  
 
More important than this snapshot, however, is the growth that derivatives 
markets have undergone, and the data available for OTC markets provides a 
measure of this growth. Statistics on OTC notional amounts outstanding  
collected by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) since 
                                                 
6
 Moreover the OTC and ETD market are broadly, similarly active. OTC markets can appear 
larger than ETD markets because of the extraordinarily large notional outstanding amounts. 
Whilst the measure of notional amount outstanding has its virtues, it should be borne in mind that 
offsetting trades in OTC markets are not automatically terminated (recent trade compression 
exercises and central clearing notwithstanding), while they generally are on exchanges, leading to 
a lower notional outstanding figure. For this reason turnover is perhaps the most appropriate 
measure for comparison of the scale of OTC and ETD market activity.  
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1987 have been generally superseded since 1998 by those from the BIS, although 
the two surveys are broadly comparable.
7
 (ISDA, 2008) Figure 1.1 below shows 
extraordinary growth since 1987. The data is presented on two axes to show how 
the rate of growth from 1987 to 1997 was every bit as startling at that from 1998-
2008. In fact notional outstanding doubles every two or three years for most of 
the period, slowing only with the onset of the financial crisis in 2007-8.
8
 
Figure 1.1: Growth in OTC Notional Outstanding from 1987-2010 (ISDA) 
 
Source: (ISDA, 2010d) 
Globally-consolidated publicly-available data on OTC derivatives only stretches 
back to the late 1980s; this start date can be seen as instructive. While it would of 
course be preferable to be able to access data from before then, it also seems 
likely that data becomes available at this point because a dramatic change was 
under way in financial markets, and in derivatives markets in particular. Hence 
the start date is of great interest and, together with a variety of other evidence – 
not least regulatory change in the same period – supports an argument that 
                                                 
7
 ISDA data is presented in Figure 1-2 because it is available for a longer time frame. In the 
majority of this Chapter the BIS survey is used. The BIS total notional outstanding in 2011 is 
approximately US$700 trillion compared to just over US$450 trillion from ISDA. The difference 
lies mainly in their treatment of intra-dealer exposures and centrally cleared derivatives. See 
ISDA Research Note Number 1 for more details of the differences between the two data sets. 
(ISDA, 2008) 
8
 As is discussed further below this has largely been because of an increase in co-ordinated 
actions to eliminate offsetting trades between dealers 
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something qualitatively different began to happen to derivatives trading in the 
mid-1980s. 
1.2.2 Banks 
Further examination of the OTC derivatives statistics reveals large international 
banks at the heart of these markets. This thesis argues that their role in the 
economy, and indeed their essence, as specialists in creating, sustaining, and 
profiting from claims to monetary value means that they are equipped with many 
of the attributes required for making derivatives markets and have shaped these 
markets in their favour. The theory develops a logic to explain the expansion of 
bank activities to include first securities and then derivatives dealing.
9
  
Contrary to neoclassical economic theory, markets do not naturally spring up 
from the spontaneous interaction of commodity owners. (Lapavitsas, 2003) They 
require coordination and infrastructure. With exchange-traded derivatives, some 
of this is provided by the exchange, with OTC derivatives, banks fill this role. 
Banks become market-makers in two ways: first, they serve as the central point in 
the trading of derivatives and ‘stand ready to buy and sell’ (Levi, 2005: 563) to 
make prices for the user; and second, they build the market infrastructure.  
It is in their standing ready to buy and sell that banks’ centrality to these markets 
is revealed. Banks as derivatives dealers are one counterpart to the overwhelming 
majority of all OTC derivatives. Returning to the BIS statistics, an examination of 
the sampling methods used by the BIS, and indeed ISDA, for their surveys 
reveals the central role of dealers. Subsequent analysis reveals how concentrated 
this group of dealers is.  
The sample methodology used in both surveys polls only dealers; the results 
therefore rest upon the strong assumption that all OTC derivatives trading faces at 
least one derivatives dealer, i.e. that the many thousands of derivative end-users 
never trade with other end-users but are obliged to trade with intermediaries who 
                                                 
9
 Historically, by the mid-1980s investment banks were at the heart of securities markets and this, 
along with the regulatory environment of the time, was important in placing banks at the centre of 
burgeoning OTC markets.  
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form a relatively small and therefore inevitably influential group at the hub of 
derivatives markets. As ISDA puts it:  
The focus on Primary Members … leaves out active derivatives 
participants such as hedge funds and government sponsored 
entities. This should not be a problem, however, because such 
participants virtually always transact through dealers. Hedge funds 
do not deal directly with other hedge funds, for example, but 
through the intermediation of dealers; the same is true of 
government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae or the World 
Bank. Surveying only dealers should therefore pick up all 
significant OTC derivatives activity. (ISDA, 2008) 
While it is admittedly difficult to test this assumption, it strongly suggests that the 
vast majority of all OTC derivative transactions pass through the hands of dealer 
banks.  
The BIS survey splits derivatives users into ‘reporting dealers’, ‘other financial 
institutions’ and ‘non-financial customers’. A grid showing who is trading with 
whom can be simplified to one line, as presented in Table 1.2 below. The table 
shows that not only do dealer-to-dealer transactions account for just less than a 
third of OTC derivatives volume but, more importantly, that at least one dealer is 
a counterpart to all OTC derivatives transactions. 
Table 1.2: OTC Derivatives nominal outstanding amount by counterparty 
grouping at June 2011 
 
Counterpart Type Reporting dealers 
Other financial 
institutions 
Non-financial 
customers 
Reporting dealers 
US$206tn. 
29% 
US$401tn. 
57% 
US$51tn. 
7% 
Other financial 
institutions 
 
Assumed 
negligible 
Assumed 
negligible 
Non-financial 
customers 
  
Assumed 
negligible 
Note that approx 50 trillion USD or 7% of notional outstanding is not allocated to a counterparty 
type either because it is a commodity derivative or because it represents an adjustment between 
the semi-annual statistics and the BIS 2010 triennial survey.   
Source: (Bank for International Settlements, 2011) 
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The number of these dealers is small, particularly in relation to the overall 
number of market participants. Although ISDA lists over 200 primary members, 
the statistics for the mid-year 2010 survey were compiled from 71 responding 
institutions in 20 countries (ISDA, 2010b). The BIS surveys central banks and 
regulators in the G10 countries plus Switzerland; in 2008 the survey was based 
on data from 57 institutions (ISDA, 2008). There are many thousands of 
derivatives end-users and such a relatively small number of dealers to 
intermediate in all trades suggests a high degree of concentration.  
In fact the concentration of dealers is even higher than the survey sample size 
suggests, and it is increasing. Much less than the 50-70 institutions polled by 
ISDA and the BIS are responsible for the majority of dealer, and therefore 
derivative, activity. The top 20 of 199 firms accounted for 48% of notional 
outstanding in 1995 and 67% in 2000 (there were 54 mergers amongst these 
dealers between 1995 and 2001) (Emm and Gay, 2005: 52). The BIS reports a 
rising concentration of dealers as measured by Herfindahl index scores, in the 
vast majority of the categories it measures. (BIS, December 2009) 
A more recent snapshot shows that the top 15-20 dealers are one counterpart to an 
overwhelming majority of OTC notional outstanding. It is estimated that 82% of 
total notional outstanding in 2010 was held by the fourteen largest derivatives 
dealers, known as the G14. (ISDA, 2010b). Table 1.3 below shows the notional 
outstanding of 14 major derivatives dealers (although not exactly the G14) in 
2009.
10
 Adjusting these numbers to account for the double counting of inter-
dealer trades gives a figure that suggests that these 14 dealers account for 70% of 
notional outstanding (as the adjustment underestimates the contribution of those 
named and includes ETD business, this figure can be considered broadly 
consistent with the ISDA figure for the G14).
11
   
                                                 
10
 The list and notional outstanding was drawn up by Fitch Ratings using 10-Q filings in the US at 
6 June 2009 and annual reports at Dec 31 2008 for dealers based outside the US. 
11
 Outstanding amounts between members of the selected group are counted in both members’ 
contributions, e.g. a trade between UBS and RBS shows in both UBS and RBS returns. The total 
interdealer notional is therefore subtracted from the total contribution from those names to 
achieve a better comparison with the total outstanding. This underestimates the contribution of 
those named, as it included trades with and between all the other dealers in the BIS survey not just 
those named.    
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Table 1.3: Derivative Notional Outstanding Amounts for selected large 
derivatives dealers.  
 
† 
See footnote 11 
Source: (Fitch Ratings, 2009), (Bank for International Settlements, 2011) 
 
Data as at Dec 2008 (non-US firms and BIS aggregates); H1 2009 (US firms) 
This increasing concentration amongst derivatives dealers reflects increasing 
concentration among banks more generally. For example, Figure 1.2, below, 
shows the recent consolidation among US banking organisations, the largest 10 
banking organisations accounted for just over 50% of all banking assets in 2010 
an increase from 36% in 2000 (Adams, 2012). The events of 2008/9 have further 
concentrated activity in derivatives markets with the disappearance of Lehman 
Brothers (bankrupt) and Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch (forced mergers), all 
three of which were major derivatives dealers (US Treasury 26/10/2008, 
20/11/2008).  
 
 
Company Total Notional (US$ trillions) 
RBS Group 92.7  
JPMorgan Chase and Company 81.7  
Bank of America Corporation 78.0  
Deutsche Bank 70.2  
Barclays 67.1  
BNP Paribas 51.2  
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 47.8  
Morgan Stanley 39.3  
Credit Suisse 37.9  
Citigroup Inc. 31.5  
UBS 28.4  
Credit Agricole 23.9  
Societe Generale 21.8  
HSBC 17.3  
Subtotal for selected group 689  
BIS InterDealer  Notional (74.2)  
Adjusted total for selected group
†
  614.8 
   
BIS OTC outstanding 591.6  
BIS ETD outstanding 209.6  
 Total outstanding derivatives   876 
  
Approximate % accounted for by selected group 70% 
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Figure 1.2: Percentage share of U.S. total banking assets for largest 10, 50 
and 100 banking organisations from 2000 to 2010 
 
Source: (Adams, 2012) 
The second role that banks as derivatives dealers play as market makers is that 
they literally ‘make’ the market by providing the infrastructure. While the 
exchange provides a physical or electronic trading location and a variety of pre- 
and post-trade services for ETD, dealer banks tend to provide the corresponding 
infrastructure for OTC markets. Thus banks compete individually by providing 
dealing platforms and research,
12
 and cooperate to put much of the market 
infrastructure in place. Although OTC contract design is open to competition,
13
 
dealers have also cooperated to a great extent to standardise legal 
documentation,
14
 not least through ISDA, the organisation charged with 
                                                 
12
 E.g. UBS Investment Bank (2012)  
13
 On an exchange, dealers compete on liquidity and price provision but contracts are centrally 
designed by the exchange. Partly because dealers, as the biggest customers, have a large say in the 
affairs of the exchange and partly because the exchange aims to maximise profits by maximising 
the trading in a new contract dealers might be thought here to collude with respect to contract 
design (Fehle, 2006). Exchanges do however compete with each other in attempting to design 
contracts which will attract increased trading volumes (Santos and Scheinkman 2001). 
14
 E.g. the European Financial Markets Lawyers Group 
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coordinating legal matters in the OTC derivatives markets and dominated by the 
biggest derivatives dealers;
15
 dealers cooperate in matters of global derivative 
regulation such as the Basle Capital Accords, and organise and run clearing 
houses.
16
 
The very same dealer banks are amongst the biggest players in ETD markets. 
Although statistics are hard to come by, banks are heavily represented at the 
Futures Industry Association (FIA) in the US, of whose regular members 21 out 
of 32,
 
or 65%, are banks
 
(FIA), 2011). It is difficult to know what percentage of 
derivatives activity these banks account for, but as the remaining members are 
mainly brokers, which generally do not take a position themselves, it is 
reasonable to suggest that banks account for considerably more than 65% of ETD 
business. As big customers and clearing members of exchanges, banks are 
heavily involved in decisions concerning the management of exchanges, e.g. 
consulting and agreeing on risk-management procedures and margin levels.  
The focus on banks highlights another aspect of derivatives, namely that they are 
a promise to pay or, from the opposite perspective, a claim on another 
counterpart: ‘the parties to a derivatives contract are principally dependent upon 
each other’s creditworthiness to assure future performance’ (Bliss and 
Steigerwald, 2006: 23). This is equally true for derivatives facing a bank or those 
facing an exchange. On an exchange, various ways of enhancing the credit of the 
exchange and minimising the size of the credit exposure reduce the importance of 
the derivative’s nature as a claim –perhaps because researchers have physically-
settled ETD in mind when analysing the cash-settled OTC derivatives of today 
this aspect is often underplayed. Derivatives are first and foremost claims 
between counterparts, but the infrastructure of the market, including assumptions 
                                                 
15
 Originally named the International Swap Dealers Association. Although ISDA boasts 803 
members, 209 of these are Primary Members and in fact a smaller group appears to hold more 
power than others: apart from the executive vice chairman and CEO, the officers and directors are 
overwhelmingly employed by major derivatives dealers. Officers and directors are drawn from 
Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Morgan Stanley, BNP Paribas, UniCredit, Citi, Société 
Générale, Goldman, Sachs & Co, the D. E. Shaw Group, PIMCO, Nomura Securities Co., HSBC 
Bank plc, Standard Chartered Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays Capital, Mitsubishi UFJ 
Morgan Stanley Securities Co., BP, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, UBS AG, BlackRock, RBC 
Capital Markets and ICBC (ISDA, 2009a) 
16
 E.g. of the 20 London Clearing House board members (LCH, 2011), two full-time members 
were previously long-term employees of JPMorgan and the Bank of England, 15 are employed by 
international banks, 2 are from other exchanges and only 1 is not a banker.  
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in academic models, acts to suppress this and to emphasise their nature as 
tradable instruments. Derivatives might be thought to ‘derive their value from the 
value of the real underlying asset(s)’ (McKenzie, 2011: 205), but the underlying  
‘is a mere index used to determine the winner and loser of the transaction’ 
(McKenzie, 2011: 207). The value is in the winner being able to pay over money 
to the loser. 
1.2.3 Financial 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the rise in the role of banks in derivatives markets 
coincides with a rise in financial derivatives as banks apply the technology of 
derivatives to concentrate on their area of speciality: financial claims. Table 1.3 
above showed that the commonest counterpart to a dealer is a non-dealer 
financial firm and the second most common is another dealer; non-financial firms 
(always trading with a dealer) make up less than 10% of notional outstanding.
17
  
Moving from this snapshot to change over time, Figure 1.3, below, shows how 
the growth of total notional outstanding has come mainly from financial firms. 
Figure 1.4 reconfigures the same data to show notional outstanding as a share of 
the total: the share of non-financials has fallen over the 13 years to 2011, while 
that of financial firms has risen. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 In addition of the share attributed to non-financial firms, a large proportion will consist of 
swaps accompanying bond issuance. Typically in these cases bond issuance was in a form suited 
to selling bonds to investors and not in a form suited to the borrower, for example in a different 
currency than the borrower required. Having issued a bond in a form that did not suit the borrower 
a swap is then provided to the borrower to convert the coupon payments into the form that the 
borrower requires. It is highly debatable that this should be considered hedging or active 
derivative use by borrowers. Additionally this figure will include derivative activity by nominally 
non-financial firms that are acting in derivatives markets as financial firms.  
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Figure 1.3: OTC Notional Outstanding by Counterparty Type (BIS) – 
absolute at June 2011 
 
Source: (Bank for International Settlements, 2011) 
Figure 1.4: OTC Notional Outstanding by Counterparty Type (BIS) - % of 
total at June 2011 
Source: (Bank for International Settlements, 2011) 
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Both figures show a distinct change with the onset of the financial crisis. There 
was a slight slowdown in activity in 2008, but the change in composition is 
probably due in large part to the acceleration among dealers since the crisis of 
central clearing and trade compression (whereby trades between dealers are 
submitted to a central agent which searches for and terminates offsetting trades). 
Central clearing novates interdealer trades to a central clearer; this means a 
clearing house such as London Clearing House (LCH) steps into a trade between 
the two dealers and creates a new trade between the clearer and each dealer 
(LCH.Clearnet, 2012).  This has the effect of decreasing the notional outstanding 
that survey respondents (dealers) report with other dealers and increasing the 
amount that they report with other financial institutions (i.e. the clearing house). 
Moreover, while the BIS adjusts for double counting between dealers it does not 
(yet) adjust for the doubling of notional that accompanies the novation of one 
trade into two. Second, dealers have also accelerated trade compression. Between 
year-ends 2007 and 2010, $137 trillion of notional was removed in this way. 
(ISDA, 2010e) These initiatives were in place for years before the crisis, but 
accelerated in response to it.    
Using the same BIS data but turning from the counterparty group to the 
instrument type, Figure 1.5 below shows that financial instruments make up an 
overwhelming majority of OTC derivatives outstanding. Growth over the period 
has been dominated by IR and currency derivatives, while since the early 2000s 
credit default swaps (CDS) have also shown spectacular growth. 
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Figure 1.5: OTC Notional Outstanding by Instrument Type (ISDA) – 
absolute amounts at June 2011 
Source: (Bank for International Settlements, 2011) 
Finally, investigation of dealers’ profits from OTC derivatives confirms the 
financial nature of OTC derivatives and associates them with adjusting portfolios 
of financial claims. Bank’s derivatives-dealing profits are impossible to separate 
from their securities-dealing profits. Although high profits from derivatives 
dealing are suspected, proof is hard to come by. The profits of financial firms 
more generally have been rising (from 1970 to 2000 their share of domestic 
profits in the US rose from 20% to 40% before falling back to 36% in 2006 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2009)). Among financial firms, banks’ profits as a 
share of GDP seem have been rising in several advanced economies (dos Santos, 
2009).  
Within bank profits, however, it is difficult to isolate those from derivatives. 
Derivatives are used in many aspects of bank business; however dealer banks 
typically trade derivatives and securities together in the same organisational 
entities, e.g. fixed income currency and commodities (UBS AG, 2011: 102). As a 
result, reporting tends to mix together money markets, securities trading and 
derivatives trading. For example, while Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) disclosure provides trading revenue for the top five commercial banks and 
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trust companies in derivatives, the revenues are for derivatives and ‘cash 
instruments’ (i.e. loans and deposits and securities) combined, as shown in Table 
1.4 below for the second quarter 2011. 
Table 1.4: Trading Revenues from Cash Instruments and Derivatives, Top 5 
Commercial Banks and Trust Companies in Derivatives at June 2011 
 
 
Total 
Assets 
(USD) 
Total 
Derivatives 
(USD) 
Total trading revenue from 
cash and off balance sheet 
revenues.
† 
(USD) 
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA 1.8 tn 78.1 tn 3.021 billion 
Citibank National Assn 1.2 tn 56.1 tn 1.580 billion 
Bank of America NA 1.5 tn 53.2 tn 0.883 billion 
Goldman Sachs Bank USA 0.1 tn 47.7 tn 0.636 billion 
HSBC Bank USA National Assn 0.2 tn 3.9 tn 0.167 billion 
†
Revenue figures are for the quarter (not year-to-date) 
Source: (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2011: Table 7) 
While banks made large losses on proprietary positions at the outset of the 
financial crisis that began in 2007/8, the daily business of making markets in 
derivatives is reported to have remained profitable. This profitability was 
underpinned by a number of factors: increased volatility led to wider bid-ask 
margins for dealers; mergers and bankruptcies reduced competition; and large 
moves in markets generally led to increased activity as market participants sought 
new opportunities and closed out old ones (Leising and Hester, 2009, Mackenzie, 
2009).  
While it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from the profitability data itself, 
perhaps the most important lesson is that securities and derivatives trading are 
presented as one activity. Banks report these activities together because this is 
how their activities are organised. Even individual traders frequently combine 
securities and derivatives activities (Beunza and Stark, 2004). Instead of starting 
with derivatives as a method by which producers could fix future prices, it would 
be better for analysis to consider derivatives in light of their connection to 
securities trading.  
The interconnectedness of securities and derivatives anticipates the discussion of 
the nature of derivatives below. Here I argue that instead of fixing a future price, 
derivatives are one among several different ways of adjusting inventory. As 
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securities derive their liquidity from exchange for money in a market, resulting in 
moving prices, securities owners face moving prices and hence a moving value of 
their portfolio. In the face of this they attempt to preserve and increase the value 
of their portfolio by buying and selling. Buying and selling the securities 
themselves is one way of achieving this, and buying and selling using derivatives 
is another. Portfolio owners choose the method they hope will best conserve or 
increase the value of their portfolio, capturing price moves in securities or in 
derivatives or between the two. Banks, as dealers in both markets, stand ready to 
buy and sell at different prices, profiting from the increased trading activity and 
providing the market infrastructure.  
1.3 The nature of derivatives 
As well as examining the size, growth and overwhelmingly financial character of 
derivatives it is necessary to explore their nature and purpose a little more. This 
section first compares the exchange of commodities for money with the 
mechanisms of physically-settled derivatives and then compares physically-
settled and cash-settled derivatives. This analysis reveals the nature of the 
derivative as a claim that enables a much greater scale and scope of trading than 
is possible or practical when exchanging the underlying for money. Trading here 
means repeated buying and selling to profit from changes in price.  
1.3.1 Exchange-traded physically-settled derivatives 
Textbook accounts of derivatives often treat them as a way to trade an underlying 
commodity. Such an analysis of the similarities between derivatives and tradin in 
the underlying can be instructive, but it is analysis of the differences that most 
helps to reveal what is distinctive about the derivative form.  
Prior to the 1980s the best-known and most-traded derivatives markets were the 
agricultural commodities markets of North America, which were characterised by 
exchange-traded and physically-settled derivatives. Textbook accounts of 
derivatives often look back to these forms as typical and perhaps because of this 
they treat derivatives as a way of trading an underlying commodity. These 
definitions often discuss derivatives as means of fixing future prices for 
producers, e.g.:  
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A derivative is a contract which gives one party a claim on an 
underlying asset, or cash value of the asset, at some fixed date in 
the future. The other party is bound by the contract to meet the 
corresponding liability. A derivative is a contingent instrument 
because it consists of a version of well-established financial 
instruments (for example, currencies) or commodities (for 
example, wheat). Derivatives give both parties more flexibility 
than the exchange of the underlying asset or commodity, because 
they are sold in well established markets. … 
Consider the case of the pig farmer who knows that in six months 
time he/she will have a quantity of pork bellies to sell. The farmer 
wishes to hedge against the fluctuation in pork belly prices over 
this period. He/she can do so by selling (going short) a six month 
‘future’ in pork bellies. The future will consist of a standard 
amount of pork bellies, to be exchanged in six months time, at an 
agreed fixed price on the day the future is sold. The agent buying 
the pork belly future goes long, and is contractually bound to 
purchase the pork bellies in six months time. … The underlying or 
‘basic’ commodity is pork bellies; the futures contract is the 
contingent claim. .... The future increases the flexibility of the 
market because it is sold on an established market.  
(Heffernan, 1996: 172) 
This approach has its roots in the neoclassical orthodoxy and allocational 
efficiency of complete markets, most famously laid out by Arrow & Debreu 
(1954).
18
 According to this theory, being able to transact in the future reduces 
uncertainty and thereby increases the utility of risk-averse derivatives users 
(Copeland and Weston, 1988). Derivatives are explained as a cheaper form of the 
primitive securities that feature in standard accounts of efficient markets (Ross, 
1976).  
                                                 
18
 As Wigan (2009: 157, 2008: 13) notes, the analysis of derivatives has tended to split into a 
‘dominant dichotomy between functional and dysfunctional’, with orthodox analysis falling 
firmly into the functional. 
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This definition, however, raises questions that can form the starting point for 
analysis. Perhaps above all the question must be asked why the pig farmer needs 
a new instrument, i.e. a derivative, by which to sell his produce. The agent buying 
the pork belly future might be a food producer who would also want to hedge 
against the fluctuation in pork belly prices over this period. Why would the buyer 
and seller of agricultural produce not simply agree to a fixed price for future 
delivery of the farmer’s product, as indeed a large share of farmers and 
purchasers in advanced capitalist states do?
19
 The answer that the derivative 
‘increases the flexibility of the market’ because it is an ‘established market’ tells 
us little.  
Contrary to the implication of this and other similar definitions, selling the actual 
inventory is not the same as selling forward via a derivative. The farmer has 
several possible ways in which she could adjust her inventory, including: waiting 
until the physical commodity is ready to take to market; agreeing fixed price 
contracts with buyers for her specific produce; or selling via a variety of 
derivative products. (Working, 1953)  
What is needed here is a theory that asks not why firms hedge with derivatives 
(Judge, 2006) but why someone with an inventory would choose to engage in 
derivatives trading instead of selling their inventory? Put another way, why hedge 
with a derivative when one can sell the asset which underlies the derivative? And 
if it is not possible to sell the underlying, what is it about the derivative that 
allows it to be sold or perhaps allows the farmer to act as if it has been sold? 
Neoclassical theory starts by assuming that selling commodities and selling via a 
derivative are synonymous; however, while the similarities between the two are 
important it is the differences that reveal more about the nature of derivatives and 
lead to investigation of the consequences of these differences. 
To establish the difference between selling a commodity directly and selling via a 
derivative it is necessary to look more closely at the derivative. In a physically-
settled derivative the underlying is already an ‘homogenous abstraction’ (Cronon, 
1991: 132,  cited in MacKenzie, 2006: 14) from a particular commodity; it is a 
                                                 
19
 In the USA ‘the share of aggregate farm production under contract has stabilised at around 40 
percent’. (O'Donoghue et al., 2011: 25) 
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more general idea of pork bellies than the pork bellies of a particular farmer. The 
definition of a derivative above talks of a standard quantity but omits to mention 
that exchange-traded derivatives are also refer to a standard quality of produce. 
The agricultural produce to which commodity derivatives refer is graded and 
pooled with produce from many farmers, making one farmer’s output 
indistinguishable from that of others.
20
 Thus the agent buying the pork belly 
future will probably not take possession of the pork bellies of the pig farmer they 
trade the future with. The future is on a standard quantity of a standard quality, 
and not  the produce of a single farmer.  
The point is underlined by considering that before farmers’ produce was pooled 
to travel to market, individual farmers needed to insure their specific crop for the 
journey. However, the need for and indeed possibility of insurance disappears 
once produce is pooled and the farmer’s specific crop cannot be identified 
(Cronon 1991: 108). At this point, when insurance is no longer possible, the 
derivative becomes possible.  
As further explored in Chapter 7, it might be argued that what is being sold is not 
the ton of grain of a particular farmer but a ton of grain; a nonspecific rather than 
a specific ton of grain. As I will show, cash-settled derivatives take the concept of 
the underlying to which the derivative refers as a purely social construct even 
further, fully allowing traders to act only as if they were buying and selling the 
underlying. 
This abstraction from the farmer’s actual produce creates a basis risk for the 
producer. Strictly speaking, basis risk is ‘the difference between the futures price 
and the spot price’, although ‘usage of the word basis is somewhat loose’ and in 
practice the term is sometimes used to describe differences in any related prices. 
(Bodie et al., 2005: 805) With agricultural commodities, for example, losses can 
result if the quality of the farmers produce and differs from the quality to be 
delivered into the future (Working, 1953: 325). For example, if the farmer sells 
via a future specifying a certain quality of grain but her produce turns out not to 
                                                 
20
 For example, wheat futures were made possible when grain elevators which stored larger 
quantities of grain and pooled farmers produce were introduced and when inspections by 
reputable agents to grade the grain were introduced. (Cronon, 1991: Ch.3, MacKenzie, 2006) 
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meet the specified quality, she must sell the lower-quality commodity into the 
market as best she can, because it is not deliverable into the derivative, and must 
also purchase commodities of the required quality to honour her obligation to 
deliver into the derivative.  
So for the holder of an inventory, such as a farmer with commodities to bring to 
market, selling the inventory today or fixing a price for future delivery are 
qualitatively different from entering a derivative based on similar commodities. 
When a commodity is sold a definite and particular commodity is exchanged for 
money, whether for immediate exchange or for settlement at a later date. When a 
sale takes place via a physically-settled derivative there is an agreement to enter 
into a commodity sale in the future, but the agreement covers not a specific, 
particular commodity but a commodity fitting certain criteria, creating the 
possibility, among other things, that the commodity the seller produces does not 
fit the criteria specified in the derivative agreement.  
If derivatives are qualitatively different from commodities, what might be the 
motivation for using derivatives instead of selling the commodity itself? Working 
(1953) studied wheat farmers in America’s Pacific Northwest. When choosing 
futures contracts these farmers could choose between the closer Seattle exchange, 
which traded contracts on the soft wheat that they grew in the Northwest or the 
Chicago exchange, which traded futures contracts on hard wheat. He found that 
they preferred the Chicago contract despite the additional basis risk incurred 
because it was much more heavily traded than the Seattle contract meaning when 
the farmers wished to trade it was easier and quicker to do so. When using 
derivatives the farmers valued the ability to buy and sell easily.
21
 Derivatives 
were not for selling their produce but for repeated buying and selling to capture 
price moves, which in this thesis is referred to as trading.
22
 
                                                 
21
 Note that this conclusion is somewhat contra Working’s interpretation of his investigations. 
22
 Working’s study also highlights that the notions of hedger, speculator and arbitrager (e.g. 
Kaldor, 1940) are misleading when considering the holder of an inventory facing several ways to 
preserve or enhance the value of the inventory through exchange. These categories, and hedging 
in particular, seem to stem more from neoclassical theory than from the choices facing a holder of 
inventory. Working found that farmers made informed guesses about current and future prices 
(speculating) and if, for example, they felt prices would fall they decided amongst various ways 
(arbitrage) of selling now at those prices (hedging). The three categories are inseparable in the 
decision of how and when to buy and sell.  
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Looking again at the design of the derivative contract compared to the exchange 
of specific commodities it becomes clearer that the design of the instruments 
increases the ease of and possibilities for buying and selling. By pushing delivery 
into the future, a derivatives trader can buy without needing to take possession of 
the commodity before selling again. This is eased by the standardisation of the 
underlying, discussed above, as traders can be assured that a purchase and a sale 
are in commodities of the same quality and quantity, so there is no need to inspect 
bought and sold commodities. Additionally, standardisation of the derivative 
contract itself via standard expiry and delivery dates allows derivative contracts 
to be offset, lowering the due diligence required on each additional derivative 
contract. It also allows offsetting purchases and sales to be terminated and any 
profits or losses to be settled purely with money, allowing a much greater amount 
of derivative trading for a given amount of money to settle profits and losses.  
The processes typically used organised derivatives exchanges such as London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) illustrate these 
points. These exchanges increase profits by increasing trading volumes. First, 
derivatives exchanges design standardised contracts in standardised underlying 
reference price indices. (Bartram and Fehle, 2003) Second, the exchange steps 
between the buyer and seller and novates the contracts. Novation is the 
cancellation of the original contract between buyer and seller replacing it with 
two contracts, one between the buyer and the exchange and one between the 
seller and the exchange. If either buyer or seller go on to engage in an offsetting 
sell or buy with another counterpart, these are also novated by the exchange. This 
allows the exchange to cancel offsetting buys and sells that a user has made 
regardless of who the original counterpart was. (Bliss and Steigerwald, 2006) As 
a result there is no need for physical delivery, and gains or losses from buying 
and selling derivatives at different prices are settled purely in money. In fact for 
the vast majority of exchange-traded derivatives contracts in which the 
underlying is a deliverable asset, there is no actual physical delivery upon the 
expiration of the contract. (Lynch, 2011a: 26)  
Third, and interlinked, the exchange asks for cash collateral against outstanding 
or open trades in a process known as margining. This protects the exchange 
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against credit risk and means that user’s profits from price moves are recognised 
in cash immediately. Note that margining can create additional basis problems for 
a farmer hedging with derivatives; e.g. when prices are rising, a sell via a future 
loses money and requires a cash margin, which in theory is offset by price rises in 
her actual produce; however, until this produce is exchanged for money the 
farmer must find other sources of money to fund margin payments.  
In short, the comparison of physically-settled derivatives and commodities 
suggests that there is a qualitative difference between commodity exchange and 
trading with derivatives, and in particular between a particular and exchangeable 
commodity and the underlying to which a physically-settled derivative refers.
23
 
Moreover, in the physically-settled derivative can be seen the seeds of the more-
developed form, cash-settled financial derivatives, which dominate derivatives 
markets in the early 21
st
 century. As long as physical delivery remains a 
possibility, the derivative form remains hobbled, and linked to the underlying 
commodity. Once derivatives contracts are settled only with money in a cash-
settlement the restraints of the commodity world are removed and derivatives 
take on some of the limitless nature that is also associated with money.  
1.3.2 Cash Settlement 
The analysis turns now to the comparison of physically-settled and cash-settled 
derivatives. The difference between a cash-margined physically-settled future and 
cash settlement may appear small but it represents a qualitative change. Cash-
settled derivatives are the most developed form of derivatives and have a central 
place in analysis. Cash settlement sets derivatives free from the possibility that 
delivery of the underlying will be required. This allows trading via derivatives in 
quantities that could not practically be delivered; and it allows trading on things 
that could not practically be delivered, and even on things that could never 
possibly be delivered. Cash settlement, therefore, creates the possibility of the 
vast increases in the scale and scope of derivatives, fuelled by repeated trading to 
capture price moves, that we have seen over the last 30 years. (McKenzie, 2011: 
207)   
                                                 
23
 A further manifestation of the differences can be seen in the way that legal contracts to sell 
specific produce do not acquire a price and an exchange value, as derivatives do. 
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The first S&P 500 futures contract was a landmark moment and rested on the 
change in the legal status of the cash settlement to a legitimate investment 
practice. (MacKenzie, 2006: 172) In both the US and the UK, cash-settled 
derivatives were seen as gambling prior to the 1980s. In the US this rendered 
them illegal in many states; in the UK it made the contracts unenforceable. In 
both countries, in different ways, the law was changed to allow derivatives . In 
the UK the Financial Services Act of 1986 (legislation.gov.uk, 1986) simply 
ruled that business considered investment business under the Act could not be 
rendered void or unenforceable. (MacKenzie, 2007: 20)  
In the US, Congress voted into law the Shad-Johnson Accord in 1982, which 
effectively legalised cash-settled derivatives. The Accord circumvented the anti-
gambling laws of individual states by placing the regulation of cash-settled 
derivatives under the federally-constituted Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CTFC), there being no federal ban on wagering.
 
The Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange had supported the creation of the CFTC in 1974, and it was 
the CFTC that gave dealers the capacity to trade cash-settled derivatives – it was 
not possible to do so under either Illinois state law or the auspices of the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (MacKenzie, 2006: 170-172, Millo, 
2007).
24
 As a result of the ruling on April 21
st
 1982, the Mercantile Exchange in 
Chicago launched its S&P index futures contract.
 
 
Perhaps the clearest example of a cash-settled derivative is a contract for 
differences (CFD). ‘A CFD is simply an agreement between two parties … to pay 
each other the change in the price of an underlying asset. Depending on which 
way the price moves, one party pays the other the difference from the time the 
                                                 
24
 Regulatory oversight of derivatives in the US is complex; e.g. ‘The jurisdictional agreement, 
commonly referred to as the “Shad-Johnson Accord” was passed into law as part of both the 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1982 and the Futures Trading Act of 1982. See P.L. No. 97-303; 
96 Stat. 1409 (1982) and 97-444; 96 Stat. 2294 (1982). Under the Shad-Johnson Accord the 
CFTC retained exclusive jurisdiction over all futures contracts, including futures contracts on 
stock indices and options on futures contracts and physical commodities. The SEC, however, was 
given a special consultative and concurrent role in the approval process concerning stock index 
futures contracts … Under the Accord, the SEC also retained jurisdiction over securities, 
including options on securities (including exempted securities), options on certificates of deposit, 
options on stock indices, and options on foreign currency traded on a national securities exchange. 
Futures contracts on individual securities, other than exempted securities, are prohibited.’ (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC), 1997) 
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contract was agreed to the point where it ends’ (lexicon.ft.com). Simply put, if it 
goes up, you pay me; if it goes down, I pay you.
25
  
Because the possibility of an exchange of an asset for money at expiry is 
explicitly excluded, the underlying to a cash-settled derivative must be socially 
constructed even more clearly than in the case of physically-settled derivatives. 
The parties to the derivative must agree on a metric that will serve as the price of 
the underlying and can be used to determine the cash payment due (in contrast to 
a physical settlement, where at expiry a specified amount of money can actually 
be exchanged for a specified quality and quality of commodity). 
Both parties must be confident that the metric used as the underlying reference 
price for the derivative is free from manipulation by the other party. (MacKenzie, 
2007) Sometimes the metric is a non-market measurement in which market 
participants have faith such as an amount of rainfall in a specified, published by 
meteorological offices or even sports outcomes.
26
 Often, however, the underlying 
reference index (the price of the underlying) is itself a market price. (Toporowski, 
2000: 108) Prices in the underlying market must be collected and transformed, 
e.g. by averaging, into an index of ‘market’ price. These prices can be observed, 
or in the case of London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) are estimates of where 
trades might occur (British Bankers Association (BBA)).  
The result is a financial instrument intended for trading to capture price changes 
and not for exchange. While the analysis of physically-settled derivatives above 
remains somewhat concerned with exchanging a commodity for money and 
fixing the price, CFDs and cash-settled derivatives are more clearly about trading, 
usually excluding the very possibility of exchange. The derivative user aims to 
start and finish with money as if they have bought and sold – and to do so 
                                                 
25
 The UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) defines a CFD as follows: ‘A CfD on a share is a 
derivative product that gives the holder an economic exposure, which can be long or short, to the 
change in price of a specific share over the life of the contract. Contracts are normally open-
ended, and can be closed out by the CfD holder on demand. The contract does not give the holder 
either ownership of the referenced shares or any ownership rights, such as voting rights. Nor, 
since the contract is normally cash-settled, does it usually create any right to take delivery of the 
shares in place of cash settlement.’ (Financial Services Authority, 2007: 11) 
26
 Eatwell and Taylor (2000:101) report a bond issued by a Salt Lake City bank which paid a 
coupon that was determined by the ‘number of victories by the Utah Jazz basketball team’. 
(Eatwell and Taylor, 2000) 
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repeatedly, as I will show, rather than starting or finishing with a commodity or a 
financial instrument.
27
  
It is worth further exploring the nature of derivatives as instruments for repeated 
buying and selling to capture price moves. Toporowski (2000: 96) argues that 
derivatives are being used for hedging if ‘an uncertain parameter is fixed enabling 
a profit from some underlying to be calculated with less uncertainty’. Let St+x 
equal the spot price, i.e. the price to exchange money for commodities 
immediately, executed at time t+x. This price is fixed and known in the current 
and previous period (i.e. on completed transactions) but both volatile and 
unpredictable in the next period. Let Ft+x be the price of a forward, executed at 
time t+x to buy/sell the same asset for settlement or exchange one period later. As 
above, Ft+0 is known and fixed (todays price for forward exchange) but Ft+1 is not 
(tomorrow’s price for forward delivery). The reduction of uncertainty that 
Toporowski describes can be seen in the difference between a volatile profit 
given without hedging, i.e. by buying at the current known and fixed price and 
selling at an unknown one in the future: 
St+0 + S t+1 
and a fixed profit given by selling forward (both prices are fixed): 
St+0 + F t+0 
If on the other hand ‘profit depends on the difference between the fixed financial 
parameter and its uncertain value in the future’, derivatives are being traded for a 
profit
28
 (Toporowski, 2000: 96). The latter could easily be a description of a CFD 
                                                 
27
 Talking about the activities of Wall Street investment banks Gowan notes that: ‘Trading 
activity here does not mean long-term investment, Warren Buffet style, in this or that security, but 
buying and selling financial and real assets to exploit – not least by generating – price differences 
and price shifts.’ (Gowan, 2009: 9) Derivatives are suited to this repeated buying and selling to 
capture price moves.  
28
 Toporowski continues: ‘Such differences are likely to be even more volatile than the parameter 
itself. In other words where financial futures are used for investment the profit is not made more 
certain but may be less so’. And further that the Basel Accords’ Capital Requirements on 
derivatives are ‘implicit recognition that [derivatives] do not create greater certainty’. His analysis 
sits within a tradition of heterodox political economy (e.g. Minskyan, Marxist) of inherent 
systemic instability and in a similar vein derivatives have been defined as ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ (Buffet, 2002); part of ‘mad money’ (Strange, 1998) and associated with ‘casino 
capitalism’ (McKenzie, 2011, Strange, 1986). Heterodox treatment of derivatives tends to form a 
dysfunctional view of them (Wigan, 2009: 157, 2008: 13). 
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– a price is fixed now and trading profit depends on where the spot market price 
is at the expiry of the derivative. In this case only one parameter is fixed, and as a 
result the profit is uncertain: 
+ F t+0 S t+1  
Analysing a single trade in this way however does not go far enough. Trading for 
profit rarely involves waiting simply for the end of the contract to calculate the 
profit, as when waiting for the results of a horse race. Rather it involves buying 
and selling in an attempt to lock in a profit. It involves starting with money, 
buying and selling, and hopefully finishing with more money. Cash-settled 
derivatives, which dispense with the problems of actually taking possession of the 
underlying asset, are suited to this trading for profit.
29 
 In Toporowski’s terms, 
traders are looking for the profit available between today’s fixed financial 
parameter and the uncertain but equally fixed financial parameter of the next 
moment, i.e. the price of the derivative today and its unknown price in the next 
period. Here the (again uncertain) profit would be given by: 
F t+0 + F t+1 
There is a very large body of both academic and practitioner literature dedicated 
to mathematical derivative valuation models which purport to calculate the price 
of derivative contracts. The amount of this literature supports the idea that the 
changing price of the derivative before expiry is key, because the intention is to 
trade the derivative and not to hold it. Perhaps the most referred-to book in this 
literature is Hull’s multi-edition Options Futures and Other Derivatives, which is 
used both in universities and on trading floors. Here derivatives are defined as ‘an 
instrument whose price depends on, or is derived from, the price of another 
asset’30 (Hull, 2003: 704).  Even accepting that ‘much of [the] book is concerned 
                                                 
29
 The FT’s lexicon notes that: ‘CFDs give you the advantages of owning shares without many of 
the inconveniences’ (lexicon.ft.com), while contracts-for-difference.com states: ‘CFDs are not 
suitable for 'buy and forget' trading or long-term positions’ and ‘[c]ontracts for difference provide 
an excellent vehicle for short term trading strategies and are the preferred vehicle amongst hedge 
funds and professional traders’. The FSA’s list of reasons for trading in CFDs also suggests CFDs 
are used for trading and not for take-and-hold positions (Financial Services Authority, 2007: 12). 
30
 The price of ‘another asset’ is sometimes referred to as the reference price or underlying price 
and the asset itself as the reference or underlying asset. I explore how while there must be a 
reference price, the idea of a reference asset is more complex.  
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with the valuation of derivatives’ (Hull, 2003: 15), this is a very peculiar way of 
defining something. One is unlikely to define a tree or a chair, or even a stock or 
a bond, purely by reference to the way its price is set and not, for example, to its 
colour, its smell, its use, its mechanics and so on. On the other hand it is also 
revealing. Derivatives, it seems, are about creating a price that can be traded 
upon.
31
 
‘Cash settlement has profound … effects on financial markets’ (McKenzie, 2011: 
207), but analysis must be careful not to overemphasise the break between the 
forms of cash and physical settlement, as a result overburdening the change of 
form, wrongly making it determinate in a move from hedging to speculation. It 
can be argued that it is the move to cash settlement that decisively increases 
leverage (allowing new parties to participate in derivatives markets (Das, 2010)), 
and that is to blame for a shift from hedging to speculative behaviour in 
derivatives markets (McKenzie, 2011). While the underlying to a cash-settlement 
is clearly a social construction, as discussed above, this is also true of physically-
settled derivatives. Moreover there has been a rise in speculative behaviour in 
physically-settled markets (G20 Study Group on Commodities, 2011). The move 
to cash settlement is a qualitative and critical one and there have been 
fundamental changes in derivatives markets, yet these changes have occurred 
among a variety of interacting processes which must be incorporated into the 
analysis. 
In short, the nature of derivatives, which I have begun to explore here, is 
qualitatively different from the exchange of commodities and as a result it is not 
clear that the categories ‘hedger’ ‘speculator’ and ‘arbitrager’ are particularly 
useful when analysing derivatives. The question that arises is: what then is the 
use of derivatives? The tentative answer provided here has been as instruments 
suited to trading, i.e. for repeated buying and selling to capture price moves. The 
roots of this nature exist in physically-settled derivatives, but cash settlement 
seems to mark a qualitative change that allows this behaviour to flourish. This 
                                                 
31
 Even if the scale of the derivative valuation literature and Hull’s definition point to the 
centrality of price almost to the exclusion of everything else, it also raises the question of why a 
multiple-edition best-selling book and a vast body of academic and mathematical literature is 
required to find the price in markets that are highly traded. I return to this subject in Chapter 8. 
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thesis aims to provide the theoretical framework within which such changes 
occur. Before turning to that theoretical framework, the next section briefly helps 
to further illustrate the main points made so far by examining some features of 
credit markets and interest rate swaps.  
1.4 Interest rate swaps and credit derivatives  
Figure 1.5 above showed that single currency interest rate derivatives are the 
largest category of derivatives instruments, while credit derivatives in the form of 
credit default swaps (CDS) have shown extremely fast growth since the mid-
2000s. A closer examination of interest rate swaps, the foundation instrument in 
interest rate markets, and of credit derivatives, of which CDS have become the 
basic instrument, can help to underline some of the points made in the sections 
above regarding the nature and growth of derivatives markets over the last 30 to 
40 years. 
In particular, a brief look at interest rate swaps illustrates much about the nature 
of derivatives as a claim used for trading, and picks up some of the contradictions 
of this form. A look at the evolution of the credit derivatives market illustrates 
how it has grown and how its character has altered with this growth. 
 
1.4.1 Interest rate swaps 
As discussed above, the majority of outstanding OTC notional and the majority 
of its growth over the last 25 years has come from single currency interest rate 
derivatives. The commonest and the most typical of these is the interest rate 
swap: ‘an exchange of a fixed rate of interest on a certain notional principal for a 
floating rate of interest on the same notional principal’ (Hull, 2003: 707). Each 
party has a claim to a stream of payments from the other, known as the fixed and 
float ‘legs’.  
Figure 1.6, below, illustrates a swap. Interest rates are depicted on the y-axis, 
time on the x-axis. Floating rate payments, depicted with a dashed arrow, are here 
being received (arrows pointing upwards); the fixed leg is paid (solid arrows 
pointing down). Payment dates are specified in the derivative contract and are 
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typically regular, although fixed and floating legs may not have the same 
regularity. Once the last payment date is passed, the derivative ceases to exist and 
therefore has no value.  
The floating rate is reset periodically so that the next payment is known but the 
payments after that are subject to change and can only be estimated from the 
current level of a benchmark interest rate such as LIBOR. For example, the swap 
in Figure 1.6 below might be receiving LIBOR ‘flat’ (i.e. with no additional fixed 
spread element) vs. a fixed payment of 5%.  
Figure 1.6: Single Interest Rate Swap Illustration 
 
The most common and indeed most infamous interest rate benchmarks used for 
setting the float rate on interest rate swaps are LIBOR rates. Even a brief analysis 
shows that this is not a price in the usual sense;
32
 it acts as the price of the 
underlying to the derivative but cannot be bought and sold except via derivatives. 
It is more accurately a measurement, an index used by the derivative to determine 
the payments between counterparts. LIBOR rates are an average, excluding 
outliers, of a daily survey, of the rate at which banks say that they think they can 
borrow from each other for a range of given maturities|. No transaction needs to 
have occurred at the rates that each bank submits  (BBA, MacKenzie, 2008). It is 
a measurement by banks for banks which takes on an objectivity and which, in 
doing so, aids them in trading derivatives. Moreover, established as fact largely 
                                                 
32 E.g. ‘the amount of money or goods for which a thing is bought or sold’ (Tulloch, 1995). 
 
Time 
Interest 
Rate 
Receive floating payments – determined by observing 
the next LIBOR setting 
Pay fixed payments – determined at the outset of the 
contract 
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because of banks’ ability to trade LIBOR using swaps, it has come to be used as a 
reference interest rate right across the economy. 
The current value of the swap is calculated by finding the net present value 
(NPV) of all the known and predicted cash flows (predicted using the current 
level of the benchmark). Usually at the inception of the swap the NPV is close to 
zero, although the bank providing the swap will typically start with a small 
positive NPV by way of payment (a negative NPV for the client). The swap may 
be structured to pay exactly LIBOR vs. a fixed rate calculated from the current 
structure of interest rates and the required initial NPV. Alternatively the fixed rate 
can be set first and then payments on the float leg can be set as equal to LIBOR 
plus or minus a fixed spread calculated from current interest rates. 
If interest rates increase, the NPV of the swap for the receiver of floating rates 
also increases because the additional payments that this generates more than 
outweigh the effect of increased discounting.
33
 At this point the receiver of the 
floating rate might want to lock in his gain. To do so he must trade another swap, 
with the same counterpart or with another. In this new swap they might pay a 
floating rate, e.g. as determined periodically by LIBOR, and receive a fixed rate 
(i.e. the opposite of the first swap). Therefore across both swaps the pay and 
receive LIBOR legs will cancel each other out. Because interest rates have moved 
up, the fixed rate they receive on the new swap will be higher than the fixed rate 
they paid on the original. Therefore once all payments are netted they will have 
locked in a fixed stream of future payments which will have a positive NPV. This 
is depicted in Figure 1.7 below, where netted cash flows are in grey and 
incremental flows are in black. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 Take the simple case of one fixed and one floating cash flow paid on the same date and 
therefore discounted at the same rate. An increase in interest rates affects the discount rate for 
both equally. On the other hand, an increase in interest rates increases the payment to the float leg. 
The NPV of the swap must increase by the increased payment to the float leg discounted at the 
new rate – however high the discount rate, this cannot be negative. 
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Figure 1.7: Illustration of Offsetting Interest Rate Swaps  
 
 
Interest rate swaps provide a useful illustration of how derivatives work in 
advanced contemporary finance. By valuing fixed and contingent future cash 
flows today, derivatives users can trade derivatives to lock in profits from 
movements in a measure devised expressly for that purpose. These measures are 
overwhelmingly based on financial metrics, with banks at the heart of the matter. 
While the derivative has value today, in this way the payments are by definition 
future payments, and the value of the derivative depends on those payments being 
made. The derivative instrument being traded is and remains a claim. As I will 
show, various measures such as cash margining and collateralisation emerge to 
render these future payments more secure and hence more tradable.  
In short, swaps are typical of derivatives in that they are i) a claim on a 
counterpart for future cash flows; which are ii) determined by an index agreed on 
by the market participants. Once those future cash flows are paid, the derivative 
ceases to exist and has no residual value; iii) market participants tend to treat 
Time 
Interest 
Rate 
Time 
e.g. 5.0% 
 
e.g. 5.5% 
 
An offsetting second swap (lower) provides cashflows equal and 
opposite to the first swap (upper). If interest rates have moved in 
the time between the two transactions the trading counterpart is set 
to receive an additional series of cash flows over time (shown in 
black e.g. 0.5%).  
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these future cash flows as if they are realised by valuing them at today’s market 
value; iv) amongst other things this allows them to treat the future cash flows as 
tradable, and they trade more derivatives to capture price moves.  
1.4.2 Credit Derivatives 
Credit derivatives have enjoyed rapid growth, particularly since the mid-1990s, 
and the development of the market in many ways reflects the development of 
derivatives markets in general. There is a wide variety of different credit 
derivatives, from those associated with securitisations that were so prominent in 
the early stages of the financial crisis which began in 2007/8, to CDS on single 
corporates, on indices and on sovereigns, to highly structured vehicles such as 
Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDOs).
34
 Of more interest here than the 
structure of particular credit derivatives, however, is the evolution of the credit 
market, which in many ways reflects some of the broader trends in derivatives 
that are the subject of this thesis, most notably how they have emerged as trading 
instruments par excellence. 
The evolution of credit derivatives can be divided into the five stages by which 
they have moved from being occasional instruments by which banks laid off risk 
to a US$30 trillion  market for trading credit price (BIS, 2011). The first three 
stages begin in the late 1980s and ended in 2003, by which time CDS has 
emerged as the dominant instrument and credit markets and instruments have 
changed from a way of achieving one-off credit risk transfer to a way of actively 
trading (Smithson, 2003). The fourth stage consolidated CDS’ status as a trading 
instrument as the terms were standardised (Mengle, 2007). This analysis has been 
extended here by adding a fifth stage starting in 2009, when cash settlement was 
introduced (ISDA, 2009a, 2009b).  
The first stage, from approximately the late 1980s to the early ’90s, was a 
defensive and ad hoc stage. Banks looked for one-off opportunities to lay off 
credit risk; credit derivative instruments were limited in type, experimental and 
ad hoc (Smithson, 2003). The second stage, from approximately 1991 to the late 
                                                 
34
 As one paper notes: ‘In its complexity and its vulnerability to market volatility, the CPDO 
might be viewed as the poster child for the excesses of financial engineering in the credit market.’ 
(Gordy and Willemann, 2010: 1)  
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’90s, involved the emergence of dealers using derivatives to pass credit risk on a 
more systematic basis to a set of end investors (ibid). Early examples of 
instruments were total return swaps (TRSs) and n
th
 to default baskets.
35
 These 
were followed by synthetic securitisations of assets that traditionally would have 
remained on banks’ balance sheets. Typically these deals did not actively source 
assets but were used to create room on bank balance sheets by selling existing 
assets, actually or synthetically, to shell companies, often to reduce banks’ 
regulatory capital adequacy requirement. Note that selling the loan to a rival 
bank, with the negative implications for future business for the banks stemming 
from an on-going relationship with the client, and selling the loan to a shell 
company over which the bank often retained some control are qualitatively 
different activities.  
During the 1990s the first signs emerged of a change in the motivation behind 
banks’ credit market activity. Banks began actively sourcing assets to transform 
with derivatives before selling them on; perhaps the principle instrument at this 
time was the asset swap.
36
 With this development the banks changed from simply 
sellers of credit risk to dealers buying and selling for a mark-up. 
The third phase, from 1999 to 2003, saw credit derivatives enter a more mature 
phase. The dealer community evolved to intermediate credit risk, regulators 
issued guidance on CDS treatment, ISDA issued its first set of standard 
definitions and the credit default swap became a standard instrument and building 
block for structured desks (and the relative importance of TRS and asset swaps 
declined). (Mengle, 2007) In the previous phase transactions had been highly 
specific and the transacting counterparts would have been involved in 
considerable private negotiations to agree mutually-suitable terms. Now the 
market entered a phase in which turnover became faster. Faster deal times 
required institutional mechanisms to replace the trust which in the previous phase 
had been built in longer bilateral negotiations. Industry bodies such as ISDA 
                                                 
35
 A TRS is similar to a CFD on a security price together with a swap of the security’s coupon for 
LIBOR. An n
th
 to default instrument provides protection on the first n defaults in a defined basket 
and is similar to the equity tranche on a CDO. 
36
 In an asset swap, a bond and an interest rate swap are sold together to transform the bond’s 
fixed rate into a floating rate (or occasionally vice versa). An asset swap in effect ‘exchanges the 
[fixed] coupon on a bond for LIBOR plus a spread.’ (Hull, 2003: 700) This reduces the bond 
holders sensitivity to changes in LIBOR. 
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drew together market participants to define standard contracts that were mutually 
acceptable to buyers and sellers. This process continued through several iterations 
of the standard CDS contract, including a revised set of definitions issued by 
ISDA in 2003.
37
 
The revised definition of the standard CDS contract marked the beginning of the 
fourth phase, the contract was further standardised including standard coupon 
dates (Mengle, 2007). Trading of credit index default swaps, representing yet 
more standardisation, really took off in 2004 and has grown to be a major form of 
CDS trading.
38
 This stage has also witnessed the large-scale entry of hedge funds 
into the CDS market.  
It is possible to extend Mengle’s analysis and add a fifth stage, starting in 2009, 
when ISDA overhauled the rules for CDS and introduced both net and cash 
settlements. CDS were originally physically-settled with a defined pool of bonds 
eligible for delivery in the case of a credit that were deliverable: meaning that if 
the bond issuer defaulted (a credit event in the reference credit) the bonds of the 
defaulted borrower would have to pass between CDS counterparts (physical 
settlement). They were also settled gross, meaning that for offsetting bought and 
sold credit protection via CDS contracts, bonds would have to be passed both 
back and forth, even if between the same counterparts and exactly offsetting. As 
volumes grew in CDS markets it became clear that gross physical settlement 
would not work in the case of a major reference credit. (Helwege et al., 2009) 
There were simply too many CDS contracts in relation to the available bonds to 
permit gross physical settlement to occur in a short time period. In particular any 
rush to buy defaulting or defaulted bonds for delivery into CDS contracts would 
push their price up and reduce the effectiveness of CDS to protect buyers of 
protection against default. New standard confirmations allow for net and cash 
                                                 
37
 These changes were made in the light of increasing volume together with specific aspects of the 
contract design which encountered operation difficulties. Mengle (2007) lists three changes: 
restructuring, corporate actions such as mergers and spin-offs and sovereign moratorium and 
repudiation. 
38
 E.g. the Depository Trust & Clearing Company (DTCC) shows index CDS accounted for 32% 
vs. 58% in single name CDS notional outstanding for the week ending 2/12/2011. Although the 
DTCC does not hold details of all CDS traded it seems likely to be representative. DTCC total 
CDS notional outstanding of 27 trillion compares to a BIS total CDS outstanding at June 2011 of 
44 trillion USD.  (Deposit Trust and Clearing Corporation, 2011) 
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settlement in a process managed centrally by large dealers and investors. (ISDA, 
2009b, 2009a)  
With these developments CDS, and credit derivatives more generally, have 
become trading instruments for capturing movements in price.
39
 If they are used 
as hedges in a portfolio it is as ‘surrogate hedges’ (Das, 2010); in other words not 
as insurance against a particular asset but to profit from related price moves by 
buying and selling to compensate for losses elsewhere. For example credit 
valuation adjustment (CVA) desks are responsible for hedging the counterparty 
credit risk in derivatives books, a tricky task not only because the exposure 
moves with moves in the replacement value of the derivative but also because 
there are few or no exact hedging instruments. Instead CVA desks hedge to a 
large degree with standard CDS, the most liquid credit instrument available. 
Considerable basis risk exists between the two instruments, not least because 
counterparty losses are not deliverable into CDS auctions. CVA desks hope that 
they will be able to make trading profits on the CDS to offset losses on 
counterparty exposures.
40
 Similarly Sovereign CDS, prominent in the news 
during the Sovereign Debt phase of the financial crisis that began in 2007/8, have 
been criticised for not paying out  as ‘insurance’ to compensate buyers of 
protection in the event of default. The CEO of ISDA’s defence against these 
critics speaks volumes:  
Most importantly, the critics of the product have misunderstood 
the fundamental difference between CDS and insurance. While 
CDS is often referred to as insurance it is not. It is a traded 
financial product and thus participants can buy it and sell it any 
day regardless of whether a credit event is declared or not. 
Currently, even without a credit event in effect, an owner of 
protection can sell it and get paid about 61 percentage points of the 
notional upfront and 5 per cent of notional over the term of the 
                                                 
39
 CDS are very rarely traded by non-financial firms, posing a puzzle in mainstream accounts of 
derivatives leading to articles such as ‘The promise of credit derivatives in nonfinancial 
corporations (and why its failed to materialise)’ (Smithson and Mengle, 2006) 
40
 As counterparty credit exposures are increasingly marked-to-market using CDS price, CDS can 
act as a better hedge against balance sheet volatility than it can against event of default by the 
derivative counterpart.  
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contract, thereby monetising his gains and exiting his position. 
This price is consistent with the current Greek bond prices in the 
30s as a percentage of par. Quite unlike insurance, CDS can pay 
on any given day by unwinding the position. A credit event simply 
forces payouts on the same day.  (Voldstad, 2011) 
The use of credit derivatives has not only grown rapidly but has also changed in 
character, growing from bespoke claims against a single counterpart to a trading 
instrument whose payout is thought to come from its sale in the market. This is a 
typical derivative story. It rest on the expansion of banks’ activities to become 
derivatives dealers and the practices that they adopt to increase their profits 
through increased volume. I explain these processes in more detail in the next 
chapters. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Starting in the late 1980s, derivatives markets have grown dramatically. 
Examination of OTC markets shows that banks are at their centre, forming a 
counterpart to the overwhelming majority of OTC derivatives. OTC derivatives 
began as bespoke instruments; the second half of this thesis investigates the 
various ways in which they tend to become more standardised, as illustrated in 
this chapter, with the development of credit markets. Banks have had to manage 
their desire to increase the amount of derivatives they trade against the concurrent 
pressure of smaller margins, but overall the statistics reveal ever-increasing 
amounts of derivatives trading. A more qualitative examination of ETD reveals 
the nature of derivatives as trading instruments par excellence, that is as 
instruments designed to allow repeated buying and selling to capture price 
moves.
41
 Trading a cash-settled derivative is a qualitatively different activity 
from exchanging an asset for money, and correspondingly the underlying that a 
derivative references is qualitatively different to a commodity.  
                                                 
41
 Chapters 6, 7, and 8 place banks’ activities in OTC markets in the context of managing the 
growing scale of derivative trading. This is bound up with the forms of standardisation that occur. 
In many ways, as these chapters show, OTC derivatives increasingly resemble ETD. OTC might 
thought to be the naked or new-born form of the derivative that provides a starting point for 
analysis.  
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These are the stylised facts that a theory of derivatives must confront. To 
paraphrase Marx, the difficulty lies not in showing that derivatives are associated 
with banking, finance and trading but in discovering how, why, and by what 
means banks became associated with derivatives.
42
 This thesis addresses the 
theory of how banks evolve and become derivatives dealers, and how their 
actions as derivatives dealers have given rise to today’s derivatives. Explaining 
how banks become derivatives dealers is the key to understanding how 
derivatives markets have come to be as they are, and it is a question that is not 
addressed elsewhere.  
Mainstream economics generally places derivatives in an Arrow Debreu 
framework of allocational efficiency and points to their role in completing 
markets (Ross, 1976). This allows policy prescriptions from such major 
international institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that claim 
derivatives the sharing of risks and the shifting of risks to those best able to bear 
them. (IMF, 2002) This is at odds with the character of derivatives, where 
exchange of the underlying is impossible and activity is based not around fixing 
prices but the opposite, acting on the movement of prices to make profits. 
Moreover such a theory contains no mention at all of why it is banks that make 
these markets.  
Critical and heterodox approaches have fared better than mainstream economics. 
Economists and others have investigated the rise of derivatives in the context of 
more general developments in capitalism (e.g. LiPuma and Lee, 2005, Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2006, Wigan, 2008, 2009); while economic sociologists bring close 
study of the relations in these markets to the fore. Otherwise, Marxists have 
hardly theorised derivatives, and certainly not as a banking activity. 
Toporowski’s (2000) work in the post-Keynsian and Kaleckian tradition rightly 
places the growth of derivatives within a process of financial inflation. These 
approaches, in particular those of economic sociologists, have a considerable 
advantage over the majority of economists in that the researchers have evidently 
visited trading floors (e.g. Beunza and Stark, 2004, Godechot, 2008), interviewed 
                                                 
42
 ‘The difficulty lies, not in comprehending that money is a commodity, but in discovering how, 
why, and by what means a commodity becomes money.’ (Marx, 1976: 186) 
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traders and bankers (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003) and base their findings on 
close study of the markets at work (e.g. Knorr-Cetina and Preda, 2005). However, 
although they bring considerably more insight into derivatives than mainstream 
theories, their approaches do not confront the character of derivatives markets 
and their growth as presented above. Above all they do not theorise derivatives as 
a banking activity.   
Analysing theoretically how banks have evolved to become derivatives dealers 
and how the impact of their actions in this role has shaped derivatives markets is 
critical to understanding derivatives but it has not been addressed elsewhere. To 
address it requires a method suited to the task. Political economy, in particular 
Marxist political economy, can be used to develop logically, and from simple 
categories, a theory of banks that is capable of expanding to encompass new 
banking activities and of analysing and logically organising the historical 
development of different forms of banking to give an understanding which at 
once incorporates and penetrates these changing appearances to give deeper 
theoretical insight. More detailed insight into different forms and appearances of 
banks from other disciplines, particularly other schools of political economy and 
sociology, will help to develop more detailed understanding of the practices that 
develop within this theoretical framework and of the growth and changing 
character of derivatives markets.  
In the first part of this thesis I discuss banks and their central role in derivatives 
markets. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, covering first discounters and commercial banks 
then securities dealers and finally derivatives dealers, I develop a political 
economy theory of banks that theorises their expanding role to include them as 
derivatives dealers. The theory draws heavily on Marx and Hilferding but also 
examines a wide variety of banking literature. These chapters provide the core of 
the analysis. 
In the second part of the thesis I apply close attention to the concrete practices of 
dealers in derivatives markets to show how practices undertaken to help expand 
trading volumes become established and not only spur the growth of these 
markets but change their character. The analysis becomes more concrete and 
draws in institutional and historical material on the development of derivatives 
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markets. Beginning with the regulation of banks and derivatives markets in 
Chapter 6, I introduce historical contingency to help to explain why the evolution 
of banks’ role occurred particularly in the late 1980s. Chapter 7 investigates the 
roots and impact of developments in contracts and clearing activities on 
derivatives, and Chapter 8 turns to valuation models and risk management. The 
original contribution of the analysis, however, owes much to the methodology 
used, which I discuss in Chapter 2.  
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Introduction to Methodology 
This chapter outlines the method of analysis used in this thesis, and in doing so 
provides an overview of the analysis to follow. In particular it shows how the 
choice of method and the need to analyse derivatives as a banking activity are 
bound up together, and that the political economy approach chosen is particularly 
suited to explaining banks’ evolution, both from the basic analytical categories of 
capitalism and from commercial banking, to incorporate market making in 
securities and derivatives. The method employed draws heavily on Marxism and 
historical materialism. Applying such an approach to derivatives markets is 
original in itself, but more importantly this viewpoint provides insights that are 
not found in other investigations of derivatives markets.    
Perhaps the first thing to say about the methodology, and which is not explicitly 
explored further here, is that it assumes the existence of a reality which is the 
object of our study;
43
 i.e. reality is not something subjective constructed only in 
our thoughts. The objective world is complex and concrete, and provides the 
researcher with observable data. It is the role of theory to replicate this reality in 
thought: in other words, to try to understand it (Marx, 1973: 101).
44
 This is one 
way in which the approach can claim to be scientific: it builds a theory from 
observed data (Collins, 1982: 5).   
In order to build a theory it is necessary to use abstraction. In fact if we are trying 
to form a theory of the complex and objective world that we observe, all theory is 
necessarily an abstraction; the absurd and impossible alternative would be to 
attempt to describe reality in all its complexity, the cartographic metaphor being a 
                                                 
43 The first element of Lenin’s Elements of Dialectics is: ‘the objectivity of consideration (not examples, not 
divergencies, but the Thing-in-itself).’ (Lenin, 1965) 
44 ‘Marx claims his method starts from the ‘real concrete’ (the world as it presents itself to us) and proceeds 
through ‘abstraction’ (the intellectual activity of breaking this whole down into mental units with which we 
think about it) to the ‘thought concrete’ (the reconstituted and now understood whole present in the mind).’ 
(Ollman, 2003: 60, quoting Marx, 1904: 293-4) 
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map on a scale of 1:1. Therefore the aim of this methodology section is to 
consider the way in which these abstractions are made.
45
 
Abstractions can legitimately be made in various different ways that result in 
different insights into the real world that is being observed. First, the method here 
conceives of the world as being in perpetual motion.
46
 This means that things 
should be conceived as moments in a process, with understanding where they 
spring from and where they are headed an integral part of understanding what 
they are now, making this methodology perfectly suited to explaining how banks 
came to be derivatives dealers.  
Second, it views the world as relational. This means, first understanding 
categories in relation to other categories, as day is incomprehensible without 
night; second, it means viewing the world through social structures, as explored 
further below. More prosaically, and more relevant to derivatives, property is not 
a thing; it is a relationship, an agreement – and furthermore, if I own something 
such as a claim to the profit from a derivatives trade with a derivatives dealer, 
you do not own it. These characteristics are present but not always explicit in 
what follows.  
Third, at the core of the analysis process, as discussed below, is an examination 
of parallels between categories that have been abstracted, probing both 
similarities and differences. Categories in this view are never simply the same or 
different, but thanks in part to a consideration of different possible abstractions, 
can be both the same and different at the same time.  
                                                 
45 Marx and Marxists use the term abstraction in a number of ways to show how abstractions can be used in a 
variety of ways. It is used here in the most usual way stemming from the Latin ‘to pull from’, i.e. to pull out 
certain elements. Here it can be a noun and a verb and is a necessary part of any understanding (Ollman, 
2003: Ch 5). However abstractions can be badly drawn and used for a variety of purposes. In the 
methodology section of the Grundrisse, Marx states: ‘The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for 
example, the classes of which it is composed’ (Marx, 1973: 100). Ollman describes this as ‘ill-fitting mental 
constructs’ (Ollman, 2003: 62); abstractions are inevitable but can be illogically made. Saad-Filho (2002: 8-
15) distinguishes between ‘mental generalisations’ (i.e. ‘ill-fitting mental constructions’) and ‘real 
abstractions’. Abstractions are inevitable but care must be taken over their drawing and use.  
46 It is key to this method to understand the world as in a constant process of change and reflecting that 
constant change in analysis. As Engels said ‘motion is the mode of existence of matter’ (Anti-Duhrung 
quoted in Waddington, 1974: 37). This contrasts with much mainstream economics which deals with 
equilibrium situations, which are necessarily static. Analysis which approaches derivatives as undergoing a 
process of change provides very different insights than can be obtained by conceiving of them as static, 
unchanging over time.  
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 explores how this 
method asks how things are made at various levels, from objects themselves to 
social structures and finally theory itself. Section 2.3 explores the system of logic 
employed in this thesis. This logic is shown to govern in turn the order in which 
the presentation of the analysis should proceed (section 2.4); the treatment of 
evidence and ideas (section 2.5); and the impetus for movement through the 
analysis, in particular here the evolution of banking (section 2.6). Section 2.7 
briefly discusses the incorporation of other theory and ideas into the analysis, in 
particular the treatment of mainstream economic theories of derivatives. Section 
2.8 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 How are things made? 
One characterisation of this approach is that it asks by what process things came 
to be made, a question of obvious pertinence when asking how derivatives 
markets came to be made by banks. This question can be posed at a number of 
levels. First, by asking about the things under consideration, e.g. derivatives 
instruments, as well as the social structures within which they are made, e.g. 
derivatives markets with banks acting as dealers; and second, by asking how 
abstract objects can be made in thought. This is the main subject of this chapter 
on the methodology used in the thesis. 
In advanced capitalist economies, where derivatives are principally traded, the 
social relations that organise society are based on the exchange of products in the 
market. However, the products traded in the market do not come ready-made. 
The analysis must investigate the way in which they are exchanged and also, 
crucially, the way in which they are produced (how they come to be in the market 
in the first place) and how production and exchange interact. More specifically in 
this thesis, to ask how derivatives markets came to be as they are it is necessary 
to examine more than simply the price and the manner in which derivatives 
transactions occur (which is what much derivative theory does); we must ask how 
and between whom derivatives are ‘made’.  
An investigation of the development of banks and derivatives must also ask how 
the social structures in which these derivatives are made have come about: how 
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are derivatives markets made? Simply put, mankind has certain basic needs and 
for millennia has acted socially in order to meet them, and in doing so mankind 
has come to reproduce itself. The social structures established in the process have 
influenced how society develops, in terms of both defining and meeting needs.
47
 
This approach examines these social relations, but also looks through them to see 
how they relate to and spring from the reproduction of mankind. There are two 
implications to this: first, in addition to asking how the things being exchanged 
are made it is necessary to ask how the market itself is made. In general, how did 
it come about, how did society come to arrange itself such that it organises its 
work and its output via market exchange? (Saad-Filho, 2003). And more 
particularly here, how did derivatives markets come about? Derivatives are not 
made as tables and chairs are, but nevertheless they become property and are 
exchangeable in the market, and part of the role of this thesis is to explain how 
this comes to be. Second, the analysis must be at least cognisant of the way in 
which derivatives fit into a social structure which must, at base, meet mankind’s 
continuing and immediate needs; e.g. the production of food, clothes and 
housing. In short it must relate derivatives to production.  
Paralleling the questions above, the methodology must also consider how the 
abstract category of derivatives is created in thought. First, the previous 
paragraph talked about mankind and its reproduction; these are abstract 
categories which exist only in theory. In reality there are only individuals acting 
in the circumstances in which they find themselves, but in order for us to 
understand the mass of individuals it is necessary to create abstract categories in 
thought.
48
 Second, it is worth saying of these abstract categories that the category 
‘reproduction of mankind’ does not exist separately from social relations; rather 
reproduction occurs through social relations, which as a result are as important to 
the analysis as the reproduction that they achieve. In other words, the highly 
abstract concept of the reproduction of mankind is not somehow more important 
                                                 
47 ‘The basic laws of motion of history are those of real men, themselves producing their own material 
existence in a given social framework’ (Mandel, 1976: 18).   
48 Attempts to build theory by aggregating the actions of individuals must, unavoidably, make structural 
assumptions to avoid the impossibility of directly replicating the complexity of observable reality (Fine, 
1980: 10-11). Too often these critical abstractions remain unconsidered within such theory. Moreover such 
analysis also tends to imply individuals’ needs and responses are transhistorical. Historical materialism 
argues that actual individuals’ needs and responses to them stem from the conditions in which they find 
themselves and thererfore, amongst other things, vary over time. 
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to the analysis than the more observable social relations through which it is 
achieved and manifests. Social relations (i.e. the way in which society organises 
itself to meet its needs) are central to the approach taken in this thesis, which 
therefore draws on a mixture of economics and sociology, where sociology is 
more concerned with the detailed examination of these relations. The rest of this 
chapter discusses the construction, in thought, of derivatives. 
2.3 The overall logic of theory construction 
Abstraction is the creation of categories in thought to allow an understanding of a 
mass of observations (to, necessarily, avoid the chaos of a 1:1 map). As is 
explored below, analysis interrogates these categories, comparing and contrasting 
them with each other across different levels of abstraction and with the 
appearance of the real world. Yet these categories must be constructed in a 
scientific and logical way. Perhaps the dominant logic that must be applied is that 
elements of theory cannot be dropped into the analysis without explanation; they 
must be contained within and develop out of the analysis itself.  
This theme reasserts itself throughout the rest of this methodology section in the 
following ways. First, the analysis cannot start with complex categories. This is 
clearest when considering the category which is itself the object of investigation; 
hence an investigation of derivatives cannot be organised in such a way that it 
begins with a fully-developed category of derivatives. The analysis must move 
and expand from simpler to more complex categories which come to mirror the 
complex reality under observation more closely, and in so doing, showing how 
complex categories such as ‘derivatives’ come to be constructed in thought. The 
next subsection, on building from simple to complex categories, discusses this in 
more detail.  
Second, as the discussion here is about the attempted replication of reality in 
thought, the endogeneity of ideas themselves is also vital: ideas, as any other 
element of theory, cannot be included without explaining how they arose. This 
has two implications: first, the analysis cannot be ideal but should be materialist. 
This means that the theory should be based upon analysis of the facts as 
observed, and on the entirety of the facts as they are experienced both today and 
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historically. Crucially, any pre-selection of facts implies some preconceived ideas 
about what is and is not important; i.e. an unspecified / undeveloped theory has 
been used to select the facts.
49
 This is discussed in the section headed ‘A 
materialist approach’. Among other things, this means beginning the process of 
investigation with derivatives markets today (albeit including their history), 
which are dominated by financial derivatives and banks and not, for example, by 
ancient practices or agricultural derivative markets. Second, with regard to the 
endogeneity of ideas, and as explored at the end of this methodology section 
under the heading ‘Incorporating theory into theory’, assessment of the various 
existing theories of banks and derivatives should be located, as far as possible and 
practical, within the theory itself.
50
 ‘Everything that happens in the material 
world is to be explained from the material world itself’ (Waddington, 1974: 23), 
and this includes the generation of ideas, which must be located in careful 
observation and analysis of the material world. In particular, the theory developed 
must include not only the evolution of the role of banks but must also explain 
(other) derivative theory. 
The third application of the overall logic is that the impetus for movement from 
simple to more complex ideas must also be contained within the analysis and 
again, cannot be added without explanation.
51
 The social structures we observe 
appear to be in constant motion as new developments emerge in reaction to old 
situations, and theory too must reflect this movement. History has a role to play 
here, but must also be approached with abstraction and logic. I deal with this in 
more detail in the sub-section below headed ‘Impetus’.  
The rest of this chapter details these aspects of the methodology, always with this 
particular logic in mind – that as we build the model it is not possible to drop new 
categories in without explanation. 
                                                 
49 According to the logic of the methodology, these ideas would have their origin in the material world but 
their deployment here would not accord with the logical construction of the analysis and they would to be 
out of sequence. 
50 This includes other, existing theory as well as this theory iteslf. 
51 The third element of Lenin’s Elements of Dialiectics is: ‘the development of this thing, (phenomenon, 
respectively), its own movement, its own life’ (Lenin, 1965) 
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2.4 Building from simple to complex categories 
Given the complexity of the social structure under investigation, this analysis 
follows a logical expansion rather than a simple chain of causation. The social 
structure through which the development of society is mediated is complex, and 
for this reason simple monolinear unidirectional causality is rarely useful, as 
causality flows between different categories and can also flow in both directions 
between two categories.
 
I trace the development of banking from discounting 
bills of exchange, the issuance of banknotes and the collection of deposits in 
Chapter 3 to the trading of securities in Chapter 4 and the trading of derivatives in 
Chapter 5 (the choice of categories and the starting point are investigated further 
below). It cannot be said that each of these caused the next, nor can the embryo of 
each be found in the previous one, although both may be partly true. Nevertheless 
it is possible to trace a logical process of development through these forms of 
banking if the analysis expands from the simple categories of exchange and trade 
credit between capitalists to incorporate the increasing complexities of 
commercial banking before also taking in investment banking, and particularly 
derivatives trading. Banking in this analysis incorporates ever more activities 
without dropping its old ones, while the analysis itself progresses to concentrate 
on the new activity. In tracing the development of banking in this way the 
analysis becomes more complex and concrete.  
At the same time the process, as analysed, must be historically consistent – there 
is no escaping the fact that things developed in certain ways over time, and the 
analysis must be consistent with this. Accounting for this has two aspects: first a 
linear chronological history of the development of derivatives is subject to the 
problems described above, i.e. abstractions must be made in order not to attempt 
an impossible recounting of the concrete world in all its complexity (the 1:1 
map), and these abstractions must be carefully considered. In other words, in 
order to organise historical facts into a coherent analysis a logic must be applied, 
and in order to build a logic, historical facts must be used.  
Second, ‘investigation proceeds from what history shows to be the case to the 
conditions that must prevail if experience of that kind is to be possible’ (Sayer, 
1983: 109). This analysis does not aim to prove that things happened – they can 
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be seen to have happened - what matters is showing how they came to be, so 
history matters here because it tells us how things happened over time. The 
analysis must provide the conditions that can explain how those things came to 
be. Put another way, the facts must be organised in such a way as to build, in 
thought, a logical and historical case for how things came to be as they now are.
52
 
The question that Sayer’s quote above and this point pose is which facts must be 
so organised. and I discuss this in the next section. 
2.5 A Materialist Approach 
The abstractions we make, and their organisation according to the logic outlined 
above, must be informed by examination and knowledge of the objective reality: 
in this case, of derivatives markets. As stated briefly above, this necessarily 
means examining the whole and not just part of the thing under investigation, for 
selecting a part to study implies that a choice of abstraction has already been 
made and that we are starting the analysis with preconceived ideas and applying 
theory without explanation.  
To render this process practical, the research process will naturally be subject to 
iterations, false turnings and the revisiting of previously-established categories 
and ideas. Within these iterations there appears to be contradictory movement 
from complex, concrete reality to simple abstract concepts and from simple to 
complex concepts. There is no contradiction, however: the latter is the 
construction in thought or in analysis; the former is the extraction of facts to be 
marshalled (Marx, 1976: 102). Building the analysis in thought from concrete 
facts is inevitably an iterative and painstaking process.
53
 
The process necessarily begins with the drawing up of categories from the 
appearance of things – metaphorically we might think of moving to the discrete 
from the continuous. A key tool will be drawing parallels between categories, 
finding both commonalities and differences.
54
 Armed with these commonalities 
                                                 
52 Sayer, after Hanson, identifies this fitting of plausible conditions as ‘abduction or retroduction’ (Sayer, 
1983: 115).  
53 This description and analysis of methodology is itself an abstraction, hence while the iterations are 
described in a neat process of several steps the messy reality is a more continuous and complex process. 
54 Marx points out how this approach differs from much mainstream economics: ‘It is characteristic of the 
entire crudeness of ‘common sense’ … that where it succeeds in seeing a distinction it fails to see a unity, 
and where it sees a unity it fails to see a distinction. If ‘common sense’ establishes distinctive 
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and differences between categories it becomes possible to draw and examine 
subcategories, and in this light to redraw and examine the initial categories, and 
so on. In this section we see how a category of ‘derivatives’, divided into 
historical but also logical subcategories, is drawn, and how this leads to a re-
abstraction and re-drawing of categories to approach derivatives via the analysis 
of banks. In the next section, ‘The impetus for movement’ the category ‘banks’ 
and the subcategories thereof are re-examined to provide more substance to the 
analysis than if it remained at the level of examining appearances only.  
The first step, then, is to identify a category of things that we can call derivatives 
rather than something else. This requires examination of the entire object of 
analysis, in order not to make illogical use of theory to preselect some aspects 
before the theory has been developed, and must be applied through time as well 
as through other dimensions. As mentioned above, however, abstraction must be 
applied to history as well in order not to be faced with a chaotic cacophony of 
historical facts. An examination of history leads to the identification of exchanges 
stretching back through time that share a common nature, such that we can call 
them derivatives. 
A second step allows us to draw subcategories and to identify at least four 
different eras between which differences in the nature of derivatives can be 
observed: derivatives stretching back into ancient history, and in particular to 
feudal and slave-based societies;
55
 those in capitalism used for the exchange of 
commodities, most typically agricultural commodities; those used in capitalism 
for financial claims prior to the 1980s and based primarily on so-called physical 
delivery (Chancellor, 1999, Mixon, 2009); and finally those financial derivatives 
since the 1980s that are increasingly based on cash settlement and whose volume 
has grown at such an astonishing rate. In this way the breaking down of the 
complexity of the history of the category ‘derivatives’ can be approached in 
                                                                                                                                    
determinations, they immediately petrify surreptitiously and it is considered the most reprehensible sophistry 
to rub together these conceptual blocks in such a way that they catch fire.’ (Marx and Engels, 1961: 339, 
quoted in Ollman, 2003: 77) 
55 Marx, and historical materialism more generally, identify historical eras leading up to and including 
capitalism using a similar technique – in common are the means by which man acts socially to secure the 
reproduction of society, but differences occur in the relations of production contained therein, particularly 
with regard to the ownership of the means and objects of production. (e.g. Blackledge, 2006: Ch.4) These 
more abstract categories regarding the organisation of society, e.g. capitalism, slavery, feudalism etc, are not 
taken up in this thesis and the analysis proceeds with the basic categories and framework of analysis 
established for the capitalist mode of production. 
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thought starting with simple (sub)categories such as those identified in this 
example. 
A closer examination of these initial subcategories, however, led in the case of 
this thesis to a redrawing of the initial categorisation. The latest period of 
derivatives activity in this approach becomes ‘first amongst equals’, for a number 
of reasons. First, and most simply, it is the era to which the research question 
refers: an investigation of the social context of derivatives in light of the 
enormous surge in activity in and profits from primarily financial derivatives 
since the 1980s. Second, examination of the current most-developed form can 
give clues about more simple forms, while the converse is not true. For example 
it is not possible to extrapolate from bank deposits in the 19
th
 century to the 
international banks of today. With full knowledge of the banks of today, 
however, we can trace a historical and logical path of development from the 19
th
 
century to today. Moreover, third, by necessarily including the derivatives of 
today in examination of the facts (to have excluded them would have been to 
include theory before examining the facts) we colour our view of preceding 
forms. 
It should be noted here – and I explore this further in the next section – that this 
implies that the results of the analysis are not fixed; as new realities come into 
existence, previous analysis need revisiting in light of new developments and 
existing logical structures require re-examination (Saad-Filho, 2002: 14-15, 
Marx, 1976: 101). What the various forms have in common as an abstract 
category, e.g. as ‘derivatives’, or what might be called their essence, alters with 
each new form included in the category. Thus as, say, cash-settled derivatives 
traded by banks on a massive sale become incorporated in our category of 
‘derivatives’, our idea and understanding of ‘derivatives’ is altered. This updated 
understanding of derivatives must then be used very carefully. In particular the 
categories that we use to for analysis today must be formed from observation of 
the material world today and cannot simply be applied to past instances.
56
 
                                                 
56 This is often illustrated using the Marxist category of ‘abstract labour’. First, ‘abstract labour’ is not a 
directly observable thing; it is an abstract category in thought. Second, however, it is not a category that 
would be applicable to a society that did not include generalised wage labour, where workers can generally 
move between jobs. In such a society a person would be tied to a certain activity, labour in this case is 
specific and the concept of abstract labour would not be appropriate. (Marx, 1973: 100-109) 
2 - Methodology  
Page 62 of 303 
Given that the derivatives of today (the last of the initial categories of derivatives 
above) are first amongst equals, it is possible to draw on some of the empirical 
realities of derivatives trading in the 21
st
 century as established in the previous 
chapter, where the key findings were first, that derivatives markets are dominated 
by banks, specifically large universal banks that dominate the world of 
derivatives dealers, who form half of every OTC derivative deal registered by the 
BIS; and second, that the largest group of counterparts to derivatives dealers are 
non-bank financial firms trading financial derivatives.  
This examination therefore leads to a redrawing of the initial categories of 
abstraction. Derivatives in this thesis are, as a result, approached as a banking 
activity, and therefore an understanding of banking becomes central to the 
analysis of derivatives. The process of building and interrogating categories is 
applied to banking and builds from a simple to a more complex understanding of 
universal banks culminating in derivatives dealing. This approach to derivatives 
via banking might be considered somewhat surprising: as established above, the 
appearance of derivatives through history might be thought to offer a more 
obvious route for analysis. Yet posing the problem in this way would still require 
an explanation of the breaks or boundaries between the various eras of 
derivatives. In fact the specificities of the current era, which for now might be 
labelled ‘financialisation’ without delving any further, makes it the most 
developed form available for study and should be the starting point for the 
investigation.
57
  
The emergence of this form of banking in this analysis is the ‘general 
illumination which bathes all other colours and modifies their particularity’ in 
two ways (Marx, 1973: 107). First, to understand the current era of derivatives it 
is necessary to understand them as a banking activity. Second, there are aspects 
of derivatives that are revealed by analysing them in this most-developed form, 
which, used carefully, will help to illuminate prior forms. Thus, drawing heavily 
on Marx (1976, 1981) and Hilferding (1910), I interpret the theories of 
commercial banks and of banks as securities dealers, as outlined in Chapters 3 
                                                 
57 Analysis of financialisation continues to grow, one of the most commonly cited definitions takes 
financialisation as: ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors, and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies.’ (Epstein, 2005: 3) 
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and 4 respectively, in such a way as to accommodate banks as derivatives 
markets. This requires adaptations to previous theory to incorporate the changing 
concrete reality that is observed. 
Where should this analysis start? Identifying all banking would also take us back 
to pre-capitalist times, so a starting point for analysis must be chosen in which the 
logical and historical seeds of the current derivatives markets can be found and 
yet which provides simpler (but still historically and empirically valid) categories 
from which the analysis can proceed. This analysis of banking begins when a 
specialist in money matters starts to emerge from amongst capitalists engaged in 
commodity exchange, e.g. when a specialist discounter emerges and becomes 
involved in the extension of trade credit. This specialist becomes a bank. First, 
this starting point allows the analysis to begin with the established simple 
categories of Marx’s circuit of capital; second, the emergence of the bank as a 
specialist and the nature of its specialisation are critical to understanding the 
banks’ emergence from the workings of the capitalist system, leading to the 
development of commercial banks and the inclusion of market making in 
securities and derivatives. This starting point then is a subcategory of banking, 
and the drawing of these subcategories and their re-examination is further 
explored in the next section.  
2.6 The impetus for movement 
Having established a start and an end point for the analysis, the question of 
impetus arises; what causes the shift within the analysis from the start point to the 
end point? As established above, the analysis proceeds by abstracting categories. 
The process of moving through the analysis itself, from simple to complex and 
concrete, becomes a question of how the analysis makes the step from one 
category to the next. Consistent with the logic outlined above, i.e. with the idea 
that external or ideal categories cannot be simply dropped into the analysis, the 
impetus for movement must be located within the categories developed in the 
analysis.  
This impetus can be located within the analysis via an iterative process examining 
the commonalities and differences between categories. For example, when 
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building an analysis of banking activity, first all the things that appear to be done 
by banks can be identified as banking. Second, we can attempt some general 
grouping of these activities into categories of a limited and manageable number 
of different bank activities e.g. deposit taking and commercial lending, securities 
dealing, derivatives dealing and so on. Third, we can once again ask what these 
apparently disparate activities share, in which analysis searches for a 
commonality which provides more insight than simply saying that they are all 
activities performed by banks, e.g. we can ask why have banks and not someone 
else performed these tasks. This more analytical commonality could be called the 
‘essence’ of banking. Fourth, having identified the analytical commonality we 
can return to the different forms through which this is expressed and compare the 
categories both to themselves and to the common essence.  
In passing through these iterations, a historical and logical order to the analysis 
develops, and in undertaking the later rounds of the iteration a more meaningful 
content than ‘banking is what banks do’ emerges along with the causes of the 
movement between categories. The commonality or essence of bank activity 
cannot be separated from the forms that banking activity takes – as mentioned 
above, the reproduction of mankind cannot be separated from the social structure 
through which it takes place. The forms are the way in which the essence 
manifests itself or is expressed. Investigation of how the essence and the forms of 
activities interact provides more substantial meaning than simply studying 
appearances and, as I show below, the impetus for movement throughout the 
analysis. I have already explained above how the essence itself is transformed 
over time by emergent new forms. 
The commonality that emerges connecting various banking activities (forms) is 
that banks deal in claims to monetary value, buying and selling, swapping and 
transforming them. By issuing and sustaining claims to monetary value they 
allow activities that would not otherwise be possible, and they take a share of 
profits generated from these activities. These claims to value are apparent in 
different forms of banking, whether discounted bills of exchange, claims to 
deposited money, claims to coupons from borrowers, as in securities, or claims 
that are contingent upon underlying reference assets, as in derivatives. The 
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various forms of claim that banks issue come to act as property, yet this cannot 
occur simply because banks wish it to be so, nor are the claims that emerge 
independent of the way in which society more generally develops. Property in 
general is a social relation, an agreement among members of a community 
regarding who is entitled to use what (and who is not). This can sometimes be 
difficult to discern in the case of material goods, where things tend to appear as a 
relation between objects and people (this is my table, your cup, etc). Financial 
property, on the other hand, is perhaps more clearly a relation – it constitutes a 
claim, usually for money, by another person. However, for this claim to become 
property it must become socially established as such, legal recognition being only 
part of this process.  
Private banknotes, for example, are the most apparent claim on the bank that 
takes on an objectivity to become property and money. Banks start issuing their 
own private banknotes because it is more efficient for capital as a whole than 
using the notes (debts) of a variety of capitalists; however banks must take on 
certain qualities and activities in order for their notes to be generally accepted and 
therefore useful as money. Once banks have managed to take on these qualities 
and claims against banks (e.g. banknotes) are used by capitalists generally as 
money, the activities of capitalists are in turn transformed. In short, banks act in 
reaction to developments in production, and in doing so both banks and society 
more generally are transformed. Claims do not easily become property either in 
practice or in theory; rather it is in the detailed process of giving content to claims 
that they can come to act as property and are shown to act as property in theory. 
This content is not simply economic; it is also necessarily social (potentially 
including legal, political and ideological elements).  
The source of the movement between categories, as the analysis expands to take 
in new banking activities, is located in inconsistencies or tensions building up in 
the forms of banking (or between the form and the essence of banking) and/or 
between forms of banking and changes in society more generally.
58
 In the 
                                                 
58 Lenin’s Elements of Dialectics no. 16: ‘the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa’ . No. 4: ‘the 
internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing’. No. 5: ‘the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the 
sum  and unity of  opposites’. No. 6: ‘the struggle, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory 
strivings, etc’. No. 15: ‘the struggle of content with form and conversely, the throwing off of the form, the 
transformation of the content’ (Lenin, 1965).  
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example of banknotes explained above, changes in the economy can stem from 
and result in growth in trade credit, which in time becomes inadequate or 
unsuited to the credit needs of the economy; the tension inherent in this provokes 
a change in activity from the banks – the emergence of banknotes – which in turn 
reflects back on wider society and provokes changes in activity there, and so on. 
Once again, by working closely with the forms of the categories, and with the 
essence or commonalities of these forms, it is possible to locate tensions and 
inconsistencies that provoke change.  
In the case of securities, these tensions came in part from changes in the form in 
which property was held, which stemmed more from the wider economy than 
from within banking itself. As a result, banking took on a new activity, namely 
securities dealing, and in turn the growth of securities markets affected the 
behaviour of corporations. In the case of derivatives, a tension can be observed in 
securities dealing itself between the part of securities dealing related to trading 
for short-term profit in financial markets and the part that relates to lending to 
companies. Eventually this tension leads to a new form of trading securities that 
surmounts the tension by discarding that part related to providing finance; i.e. the 
emergence of derivatives trading. However as I discuss in Chapter 5, derivatives 
trading itself contains tension between the desire to be a trading instrument and 
the very nature of the derivative as a bilateral contract between two parties.  
The contradiction of derivatives as untradeable claims to facilitate trading lies 
behind many of the practices that banks take up as derivatives dealers building 
the infrastructure of the market, as examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. For example, 
the increasing move to exchanges and central clearing in response to the current 
financial crisis can be seen as a response to the contradictory nature of the 
contract as an untraded, bilateral contract intended to facilitate trading. This 
contradiction is also important in the organisation of the derivatives markets in 
which banks are central, from the legal documentation to the regulatory 
environment and the emergence of valuation models and risk management.  
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2.7 Incorporating theory into theory 
The paragraphs above have stressed how elements cannot be dropped into the 
analysis without an explanation of their origins, and the same is true of theory 
itself, which must be located historically within the social structures that have 
developed to meet society’s needs. Chapter 8 does this explicitly by examining 
the use of derivative valuation theory and the risk management practices that 
have arisen in the last 30 years in the context of banks’ derivative-dealing 
activities. Throughout the thesis, however, it is also necessary to locate 
derivatives theory more generally within the analysis, and this should in the end 
include this theory and the methodology themselves.  
To some extent the location of other economic theory in analysis can be achieved 
with a comparison of this theory and that of mainstream economic analysis of 
derivatives. Perhaps the key difference between mainstream theories of 
derivatives and this analysis is that here derivatives and derivatives markets are 
approached as being made by banks. Asking how things come to be made must 
view the world as an unfolding process; what must be understood is how they 
came into being, and that must necessarily be within a social structure that is 
changing over time. This stands in direct contrast to mainstream economics with 
its focus on equilibrium, which approaches the derivative as an existing (and 
eternal) object. Little or no attention is given to its emergence; it must simply fill 
a space in and according to a mathematical model of distributive efficiency 
descended from Arrow-Debreu (1954).  
A further implication of asking how things are made is that political economy 
looks beyond appearances. Mainstream economics, on the other hand, can be 
characterised as capturing and studying appearances only, failing to penetrate 
them for a fuller understanding. This again is related to a static view of the world. 
This study of single aspects of the (unchanging) appearance of derivatives 
markets and banking does, however, facilitate the incorporation of other theory 
into a political economy analysis. As new and changing forms are analysed 
according to the logical expansion outlined above, they can be contrasted with 
single and isolated orthodox accounts of the same appearances. The analysis that 
follows develops a single theory detailing the logical development and evolution 
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of banking, capturing and incorporating its changing appearance; e.g. it explains 
banks as deposit-taking and as securities dealers. Along the way a wide range of 
orthodox accounts of various aspects of banking are cited such as deposit-taking 
or securities dealers, each describing a small part of the whole,. These accounts, 
if not always contradictory, are at best independent from each other except for a 
common reference point: a hypothetical mathematical model of complete markets 
Chapter 8 examines the uses of valuation theory and the risk management 
practices that stem from it. While these mathematical models do not look past the 
dynamics of exchange and price, they nevertheless provide a very useful tool for 
banks when trading derivatives. However these are not the uses that theorists 
usually imagine for their models, which turn out to be more useful for managing 
scale than for predicting prices or preventing losses from large price moves. To 
understand the practices and motivations of derivatives dealers using and 
developing these models, theory must first have developed from simpler to more 
complex categories, covering the expansion of banking activities to include 
derivatives dealers. In this way dealers’ motivation, above all their profit motives, 
can be seen to inform their practices. As use of the models allows growth in the 
markets their use becomes entrenched because large-scale trading would be 
impossible without them, and the models take on objectivity. The models then in 
turn affect future practice in derivatives markets, influencing both their further 
expansion and their growth. In more philosophical terms:  
The material life-activity of social man begins to produce not only a 
material but also an ideal product, begins to produce the act of 
idealisation of reality (the process of transforming the ‘material’ into 
the ‘ideal’), and then, having arisen, the ‘ideal’ becomes a critical 
component of the material life-activity of social man, and then begins 
the opposite process – the process of the materialisation 
(objectification, reification, ‘incarnation’) of the ideal. (Ilyenkov, 2012: 
158)     
Chapter 8 makes use of the studies of economic sociologists in this area, in 
particular the work of Donald MacKenzie. MacKenzie (XXXX) uses 
performativity, the idea that the economy is performing economics, to explore 
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how valuation models and risk management have impacted on derivative 
markets. In particular he explores how derivatives markets can become both more 
like theory (performativity) and less like it (counter-performativity) through the 
uses of the models by practitioners. The performativity approach challenges the 
idea that valuation theory is an objective and neutral observer of derivatives 
markets and that it does not or cannot influence them. 
Performativity provides important insights into the use of derivative valuation 
theories but it is not consistent with the approach being outlined here. 
Performativity analysis starts with derivative valuation theories, without 
attempting explicitly to explain how these theories were made. In the approach 
being used in this thesis however elements of analysis cannot be dropped in this 
way but rather must develop out of the analysis itself. In this light performativity 
provides only a part of the required analysis. Observing the form and uses of 
derivative valuation theories Chapter 8 builds on the preceding analysis of banks 
as derivatives market makers to theorise the emergence of derivative valuation 
theory and risk management. Only having understood how they emerge can the 
analysis go on to investigate they come to influence further practices. Chapter 8 
shows how the profit seeking of derivatives market makers provides them the 
incentive to increase the amount of derivatives they trade. The use of valuation 
theory and the practise of risk management are ways in which market makers can 
manage these growing quantities of derivatives. Once established these practices 
become a critical component of derivative market making, and they therefore 
come to impact its further development. Understanding these impacts is 
considerably enriched by theorising the emergence of derivative valuation and 
risk management theories and locating them in a broader theory of derivatives 
market makers and of banks.  
Although dealing less strictly with theory, Chapters 6 on regulation and Chapter 7 
on clearing and contracts are also informed by this approach. Namely using the 
theory of banks developed in the early chapters to inform analysis of banks’ 
practices, the way that these practices become established and then essential to 
continued operation of the markets and finally the way in which they shape 
further the development of new practices. The effects of this process can be seen 
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in the resulting changes in appearance of these markets, not only in their growth 
but also in their character. Chapter 6 necessarily introduces some historical 
contingency into the analysis, which must remain historical as well as logical and 
should not consist only of (pre-ordained) unfolding from the commodity form. 
The key section, dealing with the rise of the Basle Accords (BIS, 1988, 1996, 
2006, 2010) as a system of bank regulation, sees banks’ adoption of a capital 
adequacy requirement as facilitating new activities (increased financial market 
activity) which, once established, give the new capital requirements a certain 
objectivity that influences future behaviour. Again the impetus for movement in 
the analysis stems from the interaction of banks and the broader economy and 
how each changes the other in the process. Similarly Chapter 7 locates the 
practices of dealers in the development of legal contracts and clearing processes 
in the theory of dealers that proceeds it, and shows how this has resulted in 
common practices that have taken on a certain objectivity and shaped the 
development of derivatives markets further.  
2.8 Conclusion. How political economy method is useful for explaining 
derivatives 
The logical next step when locating theory with theory would be to turn from 
other theories and attempt to locate the political economy theory developed here 
within itself. This would clearly be highly complicated and is beyond the remit of 
this thesis. It can be argued that historical materialism is objectively better 
science, and is science from the perspective of the majority of people, or of the 
exploited classes or some combination of these.  
However, here it is enough to say that the task of this thesis is to explain how 
derivatives markets have come to be and, as Chapter 1 has shown, this means 
explaining logically how banks have developed over time to become derivatives 
dealers. The key points of the method outlined in this chapter are aimed at 
performing exactly this task: to study derivatives markets and banks as a process 
of development, building logically and historically from simple to more complex 
banking activities; to view this as a continual social process of ‘men, themselves 
producing their own material existence in a given social framework’ (Mandel, 
1976: 18) and in doing so altering that social framework for those that follow; 
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and to penetrate the current appearance of derivatives markets to ask how they 
have been made. In doing so, derivatives dealing is illuminated and explained as 
it cannot be – and has not previously been – illuminated and explained using 
other methods. 
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3 Discounters and commercial banks 
3.1 Introduction 
Banks collect money from around the economy that would otherwise lie idle and 
lend it to capitalists that can put it to use. The most important banks of the 21
st
 
century do much more than this, however, and in particular they are derivatives 
dealers (Duffie, 2010). In light of their new and current activities a re-
examination of how commercial banks emerge, function and take on new 
activities is required. The analysis presented here begins by explaining the 
emergence of the banker as a simple lender, corresponding broadly with the 
historical development of banking, in particular in England in the 19
th
 century. In 
doing so, this chapter outlines the logic of banking and credit money, laying the 
groundwork for the explanation of more complex banks that are also securities 
and derivatives dealers in later chapters.  
As capitalism develops from the simple circulation of money and commodities, 
credit takes on an increased role and finance specialists emerge. The analysis of 
lenders is presented in two phases. In the first phase some merchants become 
specialised lenders via the mechanism of discounting, lending their own capital to 
earn interest and developing specialist skills in the process that serve them as 
commercial and investment bankers. In the second phase, building on the first, 
commercial banks emerge and with them, credit money. Banks profit from their 
intermediary function via credit money and deposits, rather from the simpler 
lending of their own capital to earn interest.  
Banks are not simple lenders: they increase the amount of money acting as capital 
by creating loanable money capital. In order to do so, bank liabilities serve as 
money, in other words a claim to money comes to act as money. To understand 
how they manage to do this requires a theory of money. Credit and money can 
both be theorised as emerging from simple commodity exchange. Taken together, 
they form the foundations for a theory of bank credit money.  
In a logical expansion from simple exchange, a theory of banking develops that 
incorporates the emergence of both credit money and commercial banking. By 
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contrast, many other theoretical approaches to banking introduce credit money 
exogenously, and many theories of credit money do not include a theory of 
banking. The approach to banking in this thesis provides a theory of the bank as a 
particular capital, profiting from the development of specialisations vis-à-vis the 
rest of the economy.  
The essence of the bank, as developed in these chapters, is an entity creating and 
sustaining claims to monetary value that enable activities otherwise not possible 
and from which banks earn a profit. For commercial banks, these claims are 
claims to money that act as money and allow additional economic activity in a 
number of ways.
59
  
The chapter has three sections. Section 3.2 starts with the first seeds of 
specialisation; banks as discounters of trade credit. Section 3.3 examines the 
emergence of the commercial bank from these specialising merchants. Section 
3.4 explores the nature of money and bank credit money.  
3.2 From Trade credit to discounters 
The theoretical analysis of the banks of the early 21
st
 century begins with 
discounters. The motivation for starting with discounters is both logical – these 
institutions separate themselves from other merchants by specialising as financial 
specialists – and historical, discounting being an early banking activity 
(Kindleberger, 1984: 1114). The analysis of discounters here makes use of 
commodity money, which allows isolated analysis of the development of their 
core specialist attributes as lenders and the payment of interest on debt that is 
bought and sold. In the next section the specialist that emerges is the more 
complex commercial banker, complete with bank credit money.
60
  
                                                 
59 For banks as securities and derivatives dealers this essence of banks manifests differently, as 
will be seen in later chapters. 
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 This order of analysis in some ways parallels that of Volume 3 of Capital. Marx first identifies 
the money-dealing capitalist as a specialist (Ch. 19), then examines the lending of money to 
production in isolation (Ch. 21) and finally expands the analysis to take in the role of banks 
collecting money from across the economy and transforming it to loanable money capital by 
lending it to earn interest (Chs 30-32) (Marx, 1981). However, in Volume 3 there appears to be a 
more qualitative separation between money-dealing capital and interest-bearing and loanable 
money capital. 
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Banking credit emerges from, but is of a qualitatively different nature to, trade 
credit
61
 (Lapavitsas, 2003: 77, Marx, 1981: Ch. 30). Trade credit is extended 
between capitalists already linked by exchange; their preoccupation is still with 
the exchange of commodities and not the advance of money per se.
62
 A decisive 
moment in the development of capitalist activities comes when credit is instead 
provided by those lying outside the chain of production, e.g. discounters and 
banks. A fundamental change has occurred; now the lender’s aim is to make 
money from lending money and not from the exchange of commodities. This 
qualitative difference sets in motion processes of specialisation that underpin how 
banks develop and profit.  
3.2.1 The circuit of capital and trade credit 
Analysis of the emergence of the specialist begins with the established and most 
basic categories of analysis of the capitalist economy, captured in Marx’s circuits 
of production and circulation. In circulation, equivalent exchange values are 
exchanged, money for commodity, commonly denoted as:  
C-M (sale) or M-C (purchase)  where C represents commodity and M, money. 
In production, surplus labour is extracted from labour power (a commodity), 
commonly denoted as:  
C – P – C’ where P represents production and C’, commodity pregnant with 
surplus value 
Only in the coming together of production and circulation can the surplus value 
be realised. Capital is the whole, the coming together of the two, and is 
characterised by advance and repayment at a later time plus an increment. This is 
the circuit of capital as a whole, which can be represented linearly as: 
M – C – P – C’ – M’ 
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 Trade credit is ‘the credit extended by business firms to other business firms’ (Bannock et al., 
1998: 412), typically those connected by exchange. 
62
 In trade credit ‘…it is the metamorphosis of the commodity that is mediated here by way of 
credit; not only C-M, but also M-C and the actual production process’ (Marx, 1981: 613). 
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…or circularly, to better capture its ongoing continuous nature, as shown in 
Figure 3.1 below.  
Figure 3.1: The Circuit of Capital  
 
In Figure 3.2, below, the circuit of capital is recreated but now attention is 
directed to the emergence of trade credit. Where previously the completed 
commodity C’ was exchanged for money, now it is exchanged for a promise to 
pay later.
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 On the left-hand side of the figure the C’-M (or M-C’ to the buyer) 
relation is expanded to show trade credit. Here commodities, C, are sold now, in 
time t, in exchange for a promise of money later, time t+1. 
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 Trade credit can result from an ‘inelastic supply of coin’ (Kindleberger, 2000: 56), in short the 
buyer does not have money to hand until she has in turn sold the commodity (or another). The 
spread of trade credit practices is also linked to competitive pressures amongst capitalists.  
(Lapavitsas, 2003: 73) 
Figure 3-1 depicts the circuit of capital, where C is commodity, P 
production, C’ commodities containing surplus value, M money and M’ the 
original stock of money plus surplus value. Money is exchanged for 
commodities, including labour power, which enter the production process, 
producing commodities pregnant with surplus labour which can then be 
exchanged for a greater sum of money than was originally set in motion. 
M 
C C’ 
P 
M’ 
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Figure 3.2: The circuit of capital with trade credit 
 
3.2.2 Marketability as a solution to lender problems 
The temporal mismatch – commodities now for money later – that occurs for the 
provider of trade credit gives rise to two problems, both entailing the potential 
disruption of production. First, releasing commodities now in exchange for 
money later prevents money being available to the seller to begin a new 
production cycle. Second, it risks delayed or non-payment of the debt 
(Lapavitsas, 2003).
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 These general problems of liquidity and risk for the lender 
can be seen throughout the development of the credit system.  
One way of solving these problems for lenders is by making the debt – the 
buyer’s promise to pay later – marketable: the debt is sold to an outsider for 
money now. The outsider is the discounter.
65
 A discounter buys the debt from the 
lender (in the example so far, this is the seller of commodities awaiting payment) 
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 If the seller has idle money that can be used in the meantime, they can of course restart the 
production cycle, but this merely displaces the problem elsewhere. Extension of trade credit also 
diminishes the availability of these hoards for future use. 
65
 Making debt marketable is also encountered in securities markets, discussed in the next chapter.  
Instead of commodities being changed for money now, as in the original 
circuit, with trade credit they are exchanged for a promise to pay later, at 
t+1. This gives the selling capitalist two major problems: no money to 
restart the production process and the threat of non-payment. Selling the 
debt to a discounter provides a solution to both these problems. 
M 
C 
C’ 
P 
M’ Buyer 
Ct 
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Mt+1 
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and assumes the debt. The discounter buys the debt with money at a discount to 
its face value now and is paid by collecting the full face amount from the buyer of 
the commodities later. 
The discounter of trade credit, for a payment via discounting, adds efficiency to 
the overall production of commodities by addressing the two problems that arise 
for lenders, as identified above. First he allows the seller of commodities to start a 
new production cycle before payment has arrived for the last, and second, he 
removes the risk of late or non-payment (Lapavitsas, 2003: 77).  
To do this, the discounter converts the commodity buyer’s particular and 
unexchangeable promise to pay into money, a more generally acceptable form of 
value. This exchange of money (the general) for the (particular) trade credit 
resolves both problems at once: money is the generally acceptable means of 
exchange and it is a store of value in general, not exposed to the relative price 
movements of particular commodities (Marx, 1976: 193).
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Figure 3.3, below, presents the transaction as a stylised illustration; it presents the 
initial and final balance sheets of the participants and, between the balance sheets, 
the exchanges that occur. The selling capitalist, S, and a discounter each start 
with an initial endowment of 10 which they hold as commodities for sale and 
money respectively. The buyer has no initial endowment. In stage 1, the seller, S, 
sells commodities to the buyer, B, and accepts a promise of payment later (at t+1) 
in return; i.e. accepts a bill now, as shown on the left under the title ‘Stage 1: 
without discounting’. In stage 2, the selling capitalist, S, sells this debt to the 
discounter for 10 to overcome the lack of means of exchange now and the risk of 
non-payment later. The cycle is completed in stage 3, not shown below, when B, 
having sold the commodities, pays money to the discounter in settlement of the 
debt – or defaults.67 
 
 
                                                 
66
 In this section it is assumed that the discounter is using commodity money to purchase the 
promise to pay from the selling capitalist. Money as a means of payment and the use and 
emergence of credit money are discussed in the third section. 
67
 Interest payments are added to this illustration in the section ‘Profit’ below. 
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Figure 3.3: Balance Sheets and Flows of Discounter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial Endowment 
Discounter  B    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Money 10 10 Equity      
         
     S    
     Assets  Liabilities 
     Commodities 10 10 Equity 
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S 
Ct 
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Ct Discounter Mt+1 
Mt+1 
Mt+0 
Stages 2 & 3: With Discounting 
Stage 1: Without  
Discounting 
The exchanges 
Stage 1: S sells to B, exchanges commodities today (t) for payment 
later (t+1) 
Stage 2: S sells the debt to the Discounter for money today (t). 
Stage 3: B repays trade credit to the discounter at a later date (t+1) 
 
After Stage 2. 
 
Discounter    B    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Private 
Note
B
t+1 
10 10 Equity  Commodities 10 10 Private 
note
Disc
t+1 
         
         
     S    
     Assets  Liabilities 
     Money 10 10 Equity 
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3.2.3 Specialisation 
Discounters acquire three key attributes that develop as the specialist discounter 
emerges from other merchants and later as commercial and investment banking 
specialists emerge. They must judge whether the debt will be paid, taking into 
account their ability to enforce repayment; provide a means of payment; and be 
experts in the technical aspects of money-dealing. These are now explored in 
more detail. 
Turning first to discounters’ ability to judge credit risk it is necessary to note 
briefly the nature of credit relations in capital. Credit relies on an extension of 
trust – however, capitalist relations are between relative strangers. The trust 
required for capitalist credit is of a special kind and relates purely to the ability of 
the lender to secure repayment (Lapavitsas, 2003). This is grounded in the 
technical profitability of the borrower and their access to cash from other 
sources,
68
 and includes assessing the legal or extra-legal social arrangements to 
enforce the debt. This knowledge comes naturally to businesses already engaged 
in regular and/or frequent relations with each other. When an outsider provides 
credit they must be able to make similar judgements about the ability to secure 
repayment without the benefit of being in the same line of business and 
undertaking regular and frequent acts of exchange - this reinforces the importance 
of the step from interacting businesses extending credit to each other to an 
outsider providing that credit (Lapavitsas, 2003: 77).  
Second, as well as being able to judge the likelihood of repayment the lender 
must have cash to hand. Put more abstractly, the lender must be able to provide a 
generally-accepted means of payment, in the first instance of money, in exchange 
for a private and less exchangeable promise to pay.
69
 The discounter is willing to 
accept credit in exchange for money where few or no other capitalists will do so – 
the buyer’s promise to pay is not generally marketable – on the other hand the 
money the seller obtains from the discounter is generally exchangeable, allowing 
                                                 
68
 ‘If the real reflux does not take place at the right time, the borrower must look to see what other 
sources of help he can draw on to fulfil his obligations to the lender’.(Marx, 1981: 470). 
69
 The discounter provides the general in exchange for the particular. Expressing it in this way 
anticipates the next stage, in which the fully-formed commercial bank provides its own, more 
generally acceptable, promise to pay in exchange for the less-exchangeable promise to pay of the 
buyer/borrower.  
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the purchase of production inputs, and therefore the discounter must have money 
to hand. Third, the lender becomes a specialist in the technical aspects of 
handling and safeguarding money and credit.  
Two examples highlight the types of specialist that may perform this function. 
Emphasising the need for insider knowledge about the business at hand, 
merchants within an industry might emerge as financiers (Kindleberger, 1984: 
81). Those that have accumulated enough money to finance more than their own 
production cycle might prefer to lend money to other capitalists rather than, or as 
well as, employing it themselves (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007). For example, 
some transatlantic merchants became first financiers of transatlantic trade and 
then major actors in the discount and bills of the London exchange market 
(Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007). Alternatively, money-dealing specialists who 
facilitate foreign payments, safeguard money and so on are well placed to provide 
liquidity, and moreover have a good level of knowledge of the activities of those 
with whom they already have money dealings (Lapavitsas, 2003: 78).
70
  
Regardless of the origin, once they become specialists in advancing money, 
collecting information about ability to repay and enforcing that repayment, the 
process of specialisation continues. These firms leave their roots behind and 
incorporate both money-dealing and money-lending activities. For example, once 
transatlantic merchants become financiers they need to develop skills in book- 
and record-keeping, making payments, safe storage of bills and money reserves, 
and so on; in short, the skills of a money dealer. Money dealing and money 
lending effectively merge in the practice of banking (Itoh and Lapavitsas, 1999: 
70). A new financial institution has emerged.  
This self-reinforcing process of money specialisation can also be viewed from the 
perspective of other capitalists. Merchants now have no need to develop such 
money and finance skills as it becomes cheaper to employ specialists, further 
strengthening the latters’ position (the typical capitalist efficiencies from division 
                                                 
70
 Note that here we encounter for the first time a debate over the emergence of banks from 
goldsmiths or merchants, which is developed throughout this chapter. At this point only the issue 
of the necessary skills for a money specialist is raised. Historically, however, it is worth noting 
that ‘during the crucial years of the emergence of capitalism in England merchants were a more 
important source of banks’ (Kindleberger, 1984: 35) – not least because there were presumably 
many more merchants than goldsmiths.  
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of labour are at work here (e.g. Marx, 1976: Ch. 14)). The developing asymmetry 
between banker and capitalist (Lapavitsas, 2003) adds further impetus to the 
process of bank development.  
3.2.4 Discounter’s profit 
This specialisation vis-à-vis other capitalists provides the discounter’s profit, a 
share of the additional surplus value generated with the borrowed funds. The 
discounter or moneylender has three sources of profit that are related to the 
problems solved by the lender, and the specialist skills developed and used in 
doing so. First, they become the economy’s specialists in handling money, and 
the efficiencies that this affords other capitalists earn discounters a share of 
profits as money dealers (Marx, 1981: Ch. 19). Second, discounters lend from 
their own, otherwise idle, money: the exchange of a private credit (not generally 
exchangeable) for money (generally exchangeable) permits additional circuits of 
capital, producing capitalists, which earns the lender payments out of the surplus 
value generated. Third, by buying the debt the discounter removes a particular 
credit risk from the capitalist who extended trade credit, and bears that risk. 
When private credit is extended there is the possibility that it will not be repaid.
71
 
By ensuring that payment is received for a commodity sold, a new circuit is made 
possible, and the discounter is paid from the profits of this anticipated circuit. 
These three attributes address the problems of the lender and new circuits of 
capital are made possible, and the discounters are paid from the anticipated 
profits of these new circuits.
 
In fact it is impossible to disaggregate these three 
abstract notions of discounter profit; none are possible in this circumstance 
without the others. 
Figure 3.4 below returns to the illustration of the discounter in Figure 3.3 above 
with the addition of a payment of i to the discounter. Figure 3.4 shows that 
without trade credit the seller receives the cash price now; with delayed payment 
and no discounter they receive an additional amount, i. With the addition of the 
                                                 
71
 It can be noted that the removal of risk is particular to situations where the debt is marketable. 
As I show, when a simple loan is extended to the provider of trade credit the original credit risk is 
not removed from the lending capitalist’s balance sheet, although the bank also takes on credit 
risk. When a security is bought, the new lender bears the risk of the default of the ultimate 
borrower; the bank as market maker removes the risk from the security seller and bears it until 
they in turn sell the security.  
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specialist discounter this is split, with the seller receiving the cash price now 
while the specialist discounter earns i by advancing money today and being 
repaid later.  
In the second scenario, presented in Figure 3.4, the selling capitalist, S, advances 
commodities now against a promise to pay money in the future. Competition 
should ensure that the price for accepting payment in the future is greater than 
that for accepting payment now; moreover once discounting is established this 
difference equals the discount. Therefore it is possible to express the delayed 
payment from B as the sum of the cash price plus interest. When S sells the 
private credit to the discounter (as shown under ‘With Discounting’, below), the 
seller, S, receives the cash price of the commodities as the discounted price of the 
debt and the buying capitalist, B, pays the cash price plus discount, expressed 
here as the interest, i.  
Figure 3.4: Discounter’s Profit 
 
 
B 
S 
Ct 
B 
S 
Ct 
Discounter P t+0 
P+i t+1 
 
Pt+0 
No trade credit With discounting 
 No trade credit: commodities exchanged for the cash price today. 
 Without discounting : Seller receives cash price, P, plus interest, i, at t+1 
 With discounting: Seller receives cash price now by selling the debt. The 
discounter advances the cash price, P, now and receives P+i upon 
redemption of the debt at t+1 
B 
S 
Ct P+i t+1 
With trade credit, no 
discounting 
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3.2.5 Interest and interest-bearing capital 
The payment that the discounter receives is interest, and the discounter’s money 
capital when used in this way is interest-bearing capital (IBC). The form of the 
discounter’s profit at first sight differs from the basic explanation of interest, and 
it is worth taking a moment to explore this in more detail, not least because this 
discussion of the form and content of commercial banks and securities dealers 
requires it.  
For Marx, interest is specifically a share of surplus value generated. If a capitalist 
with money advances it to another capitalist, who puts it to work and then later 
repays with an increment from a portion of the profit produced, the increment is 
interest. As Marx states:  
What [the borrower] pays for with this is the use value of the [money 
advanced], the use value of its function, the function of producing a 
… profit. The part of the profit paid in this way is called interest, 
which is nothing but a particular name, a specialist title, for a part of 
the profit which the actually functioning capitalist has to pay to the 
capital’s proprietor, instead of pocketing it himself (Marx, 1981: 
460). 
Although similar, the form of the discounter’s profit does not appear to exactly 
resemble the basic forms of interest described by Marx. Several aspects appear to 
diverge from the simplest forms of interest, most notably because the interest is 
expressed as a change in the price of a marketable debt, and secondly because 
money is advanced to one capitalist and repaid by another.  
These slight differences in form are misleading, however, as can be shown by 
examining the discounter’s money capital as IBC. As Lapavitsas (1991: 307) 
states, the purchase of the discounted debt ‘…is in reality the advance of interest-
bearing capital, commanding the payment of the rate of interest as expressed in 
the discount rate’.72  
                                                 
72
 Lapavistsas, following Hilferding (1981: Ch 5), is discussing discounting using credit money, 
but the same holds for the simpler analysis with commodity money.  
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[M]oney … can be transformed into capital, and through this 
transformation it is turned from a given fixed value into a self-
valorising value capable of increasing itself. It produces profit i.e. it 
enables the capitalist to extract and appropriate for himself a certain 
quantity of unpaid labour, surplus product and surplus value. In this 
way the money receives, besides the use-value which it possesses as 
money, an additional use value, namely the ability to function as 
capital. Its use-value here consists precisely in the profit it produces 
when transformed into capital. (Marx, 1981: 459-60) 
In this light the money that the discounter uses to buy trade credit is IBC, and 
earns interest. The discounted transaction represents the advance of money to 
producing capitalists in general (capital as a whole) now for repayment later; this 
advance and repayment facilitates additional circuits of capital, thereby 
generating surplus value from which the discounter is paid – in short an M-M’ 
circuit.
73
 The discounter’s profit is from interest, and it is of secondary 
importance that interest is paid via the purchase and redemption of a promise to 
pay and involves more than one capitalist. I return to this, i.e. marketable debt, 
when considering securities trading in the next chapter, where the similarity of 
form masks a difference in content and a more complex source of profit.  
IBC is the most highly-fetishised form of capital (Marx, 1972: 453.5) that 
separates the advance of money now for return plus an increment later (i.e. M – 
M’) from the rest of the mediating circuit of capital (Marx, 1981: 468). As Figure 
3.5 below highlights, the separation from the mediating circuit means that IBC is 
not particularly concerned how or by what means it is repaid, just as long as it is 
repaid, thus the underlying process that provides repayment can be production or 
something else, and in the case of the discounter’s repayment can be from the 
                                                 
73
 In the definition of interest used above and taken from the opening paragraphs on interest-
bearing capital, Marx states that money takes on the additional use value of being able to 
‘function as capital’ and has a use-value consisting of the ‘profit that it produces when 
transformed into capital’. He continues: ‘In this capacity of potential capital, as a means to the 
production of profit, it becomes a commodity, but a commodity of a special kind. Or what 
amounts to the same thing capital becomes a commodity’ (Marx, 1981: 459-460). It follows that 
markets for capital as commodity can develop and an exchange value emerge. Indeed in the note 
to this passage Marx notes use of the term ‘dealers in the commodity of capital’ applied to the 
Bank of England. This would seem to add further support to the argument that the discount can be 
considered interest. (Marx, 1981: 459-60) 
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seller or the buyer as long as repayment is achieved.
74
 The linear notation of IBC 
– and debt more generally, i.e. M - M’ – captures its fetishised nature and 
disconnection from underlying processes.  
Figure 3.5: Circuit of capital with interest bearing capital 
 
3.2.6 Constraints 
The growth of such a credit system is constrained by the capital that discounters 
can accumulate; to break these constraints the discounter (becoming a bank) 
needs to be able to source and then leverage additional funds. Marx can be said to 
adopt ‘two approaches to the concept of interest bearing capital’ (Lapavitsas, 
1997): in one, lending occurs between ‘monied’ capitalist and ‘functioning’ 
capitalist, as largely laid out in Marx’s (1981: Chs. 21-4) analysis of IBC. At the 
current fairly simple stage in the development of the logic of banking it is 
sufficient to focus on the financial specialist’s relationship with borrowers in the 
style of monied and functioning capitalists; the monied capitalist is able to earn a 
share directly from the surplus value generated by the functioning capitalist.  
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 Indeed, as I show regarding securities trading, completion of the M-M’ circuit can also be 
completed with the sale of the debt.  
M 
C C’ 
P 
M’ 
Mt M+Mt+1 
IBC 
Interest-bearing capital is both connected to and separate from the circuit of 
production. Lenders are not particular about whether their advance is 
repaid from the sale of commodities or from elsewhere.  
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Marx’s second approach stresses the collection and recycling of idle funds 
occurring naturally in the course of production and elsewhere in the economy 
(e.g. Marx, 1976: Ch. 3, Marx, 1978) and introduces the idea of loanable money 
capital (LMC) (Marx, 1981: Chs 30-2). To overcome the constraints of the 
discounter, and for commercial banking to emerge, the analysis must expand 
from the first to the more complex second approach, turning to the ways in 
which, through the processes of specialisation already underway, a bank is able to 
make use of funds other than its own. 
3.3 Commercial banking 
This section develops an understanding of commercial banks, building on 
analysis of specialist discounters emerging from other merchants. Commercial 
banks make use of the same skills as discounters, but develop them to produce 
bank credit money, and in doing so apply them across a much larger network, 
forming a many-to-one relation on both the asset and liability sides of the balance 
sheet. Expanding the analysis from discounting shows how banks make use of 
credit money to engage in the lending of ‘circulation credit’, thus granting greater 
efficiency to the use of a given stock of commodity money. From there, banks 
systematically collect and on-lend money (Lapavitsas, 1997) which has fallen 
idle in various places and at various times in the circuit of capital (Lapavitsas, 
2000b) and elsewhere in the economy (Marx, 1981: Ch. 32).  
The section notes how some theories of banking start with this, the appearance of 
banking in its developed form, but, lacking the analytical foundations behind 
appearances, are unable to present a holistic theory of banking incorporating 
theories of both credit money and banking. In the theory presented here, credit 
money and banking are two sides of the same coin. Approaching banking in this 
way provides a theory that can be expanded to incorporate new specialities 
including derivatives dealing. This more-developed form of credit institution is 
now a bank, and cannot be analysed simply as a lender; instead the workings of 
and return to bank capital must be analysed. Among other things, this means 
analysing the way banks (and the credit system more generally)  transform idle 
money into loanable money capital (Marx, 1981: Chs. 30-32).  
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This section outlines in more detail first how the analysis expands from the 
activities of discounters using banknotes (section 3.3.1), and second, how this 
expands to the systematic collection of deposits (section 3.3.2). Third, it briefly 
discusses this approach to banking in light of other theories (section 3.3.3), before 
fourth, turning to the limits that arise on the expansion of banking from these 
activities (section 3.3.4) and fifth, the ways in which banks profit from them 
(section 3.3.5). In this way it gives content to the intermediation provided 
between lenders and borrowers and establishes the bank as a specialist, obtaining 
a return to bank capital and capable of becoming a derivatives dealer. Finally it 
examines how, from the perspective of the bank, the nature of money, interest 
and banking puts borrowing and lending outside production on the same footing 
as borrowing from or lending to production itself (section 3.3.6).  
3.3.1 Banks emerge from discounters – private bank notes and circulation 
credit 
Commercial banking and bank credit money arise logically from the processes of 
production and exchange. In the logical development outlined so far, delayed 
payment in exchange (commodities now for money later) gives rise to 
discounters. The emergence of bank credit takes up this story, turning first to 
circulation credit and the use of bank credit money to fund these delays of 
payment. Bank involvement in short-term circulation credit lays the foundation 
for the analysis of deposits and then of longer-term lending funded by short-term 
deposits, as explained in the next subsection. 
In the analysis so far, a discounter exchanges a private promise to pay for money. 
The analysis now becomes more complex, and the discounted bill is exchanged 
for a second promise to pay issued by the finance specialist, who is now en route 
to becoming a bank proper. This progression can be split into two phases.  
In the first phase, the buying capitalist’s private promise to pay is itself used to 
pay for commodities; i.e. instead of selling the bill of exchange to the discounter, 
the original commodity seller passes it to another producing capitalist as payment 
for bought commodities. This requires a wider social acceptance of the original 
buying capitalist’s creditworthiness than is necessary in simple discounting, 
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however its acceptability is likely to be limited to those in the same business or 
supply chain, or those with knowledge of the original buyer’s business. The 
ability to transfer the credit, or ‘negotiability of the long established foreign bill 
of exchange [is] created with serial endorsements’ (Neal, 1990: 7). These notes 
are signed by a chain of capitalists with ‘long strings of endorsements’ 
(Kindleberger, 1984: 79). Once the debt falls due, the payment of money passes 
back along the chain, with money acting as a means of payment.
75
  
In the second stage, the buying capitalist’s promissory notes are replaced by those 
of a specialist merchant whose notes are more widely and generally accepted, this 
specialist merchant is the emerging bank. One way that this comes about is that 
the specialist (the discounter en route to becoming a bank) buys the original trade 
credit from the seller of commodities, not with money but with its own promise 
to pay (a banknote).
76
 This promise to pay becomes generally accepted and so can 
act as a means of payment in commodity exchange. The note sets off on a random 
path of commodity circulation as a means of payment, but when it falls due, 
payment flows from the bank to the last selling capitalist holding the note (and 
not back down the chain of capitalists, as with the promissory note). In order to 
ease the path of its wider social acceptance as a means of payment, the banknote 
becomes redeemable on demand at the bank.
77
 In this way banknotes as 
‘signifiers of debt became completely depersonalized (that is, payable to ‘X’ or 
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 Ingham splits this into two further stages: first, bills of exchange ‘became detached from the 
existence of any particular commodities in exchange and transit, and were used as pure credit 
between traders. Later, in a crucial further stage of dislocation, bills become detachable from the 
particular individuals named in the creditor-debtor relation.  Signifiers of debt became 
transferable to third parties, and could circulate as private money within commercial networks’ 
(Ingham, 2004: 108). 
76
 The banknote referred to here is a private banknote. Banknotes today are typically taken to 
mean only those issued by central banks. Private banknotes meanwhile have largely become 
replaced by electronic deposits and payments systems. 
77
 Note that this is not fiat money, which is explicitly stamped as a socially accepted symbol of 
money, usually issued by the state as the only institution that can impose such acceptability. 
Banknotes, by contrast, are private credits that become socially acceptable by actions of banks 
and capitalists (through processes outlined in this chapter). The emergence of a central bank with 
a monopoly of note issuance is a often historically key moment in the establishment of bank credit 
money as a means of payment, however this fiat is built on, and extends, existing social practice 
(Kindleberger, 1984). For some post-Keynesians the role of the state in collecting tax in money, 
creating a space for money and creating public banks is more essential as it can fuse private credit 
money and public metal coinage (Ingham, 2004: Ch. 6). 
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‘bearer’) and [are] issued as bank money; … the promises to pay drawn on banks 
became a widely accepted means of payment’ (Ingham, 2004: 108).78 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the transactions. The only initial endowment is to the selling 
capitalist,” and consists of commodities for sale and corresponding equity or net 
worth.
79
 In stage 1, as previously, commodities are sold to the buying capitalist, 
B, in exchange for a private promise to pay later. In stage 2, this private promise 
is sold to the discounter; however, the payment is made from the discounter to the 
seller not in money but in a claim to money: a banknote. After stage 2, balance 
sheets show a completed exchange, with the banknote acting as money and the 
emergence of a recognisable bank balance sheet. 
Figure 3.6: Balance Sheets and Flows of Discounter with Banknotes 
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 Note that in the third section, below, considerably more attention is given to the way in which 
these ‘signifiers of debt’ become ‘bank money’, and, I argue, are connected with and stem from 
the various functions of money, being not only confined to a ‘means of payment’. This view, 
building from commodity money, conflicts with Ingham’s view of money despite accounts 
agreeing on certain aspects of the appearance of bank credit money (Ingham, 2004). 
79
 Note that in Figure 3.3 the discounter also requires an initial endowment of money. In 3.4 this is 
not required. As the analysis will show, the bank lends a promise to pay that  act as money. 
Initial Endowment 
Discounter     B    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
         
         
     S    
     Assets  Liabilities 
     Commodities 10 10 Equity 
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After Stage 1 
 
Bank     B    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
     Commodities 10 10 Private Note
B
t+1 
         
     S    
     Assets  Liabilities 
     Private Note
B
t+1 10 10 Equity 
 
 
Stage 1: S sells to B using trade credit, i.e., exchanges commodities today 
(t) for payment later (t+1). 
 
B S 
Ct 
Private Note
B
t+1 
After Stage 2 
 
Bank     B    
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Note
B
t+1 
10 10 Banknote  Commodities 10 10 Private 
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B
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     S    
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Stage 2: Bank buys from S the private promise to pay of B using its own 
promise to pay, i.e. a banknote. 
 
Bank S 
Private Note
B
t+1 
Banknote 
B 
Ct 
Private Note
B
t+1 
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With the establishment of the generally-accepted private banknote, an alternative 
transaction becomes possible. B, instead of issuing a private promise to pay the 
seller, S, first borrows banknotes directly from the bank and then uses them as 
money to purchase commodities from the selling capitalist with no credit 
relations between buyer and seller. Figure 3.7 illustrates these transactions and 
shows the balance sheets that result from them (note that B and S have switched 
places compared to Figure 3.6). The resulting balance sheets are exactly the same 
as in the case of the purchase of discounted private credit from the seller using 
banknotes, the private note in Figure 3.6 being replaced by a loan from the bank 
in Figure 3.7, a matter of nomenclature, as both are private and particular 
promises to pay on the part of B.  
Figure 3.7: The commodity buyer borrows banknotes 
 
 
 
After Alternate Stage 2 
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Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Loan
B
t+1 10 10 Banknote  Commodities 10 10 Loan
Bank
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Bank B 
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Banknote 
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Alternate Stage 2: Bank lends bank notes to buyer directly. 
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The bank has used its specialist attributes to create a banknote, and in doing so it 
bears the risk of non-payment by the buying capitalist and provides the selling 
capitalist with a means of payment. The banknote solves the same problems as 
those solved earlier in the analysis by the discounter.
 
They achieve this via the 
banknote because as a claim on the bank to money, it acts as money, making 
possible additional circuits of capital: the seller can use it to start a new circuit of 
capital before (delayed) payment arrives for the last, i.e. before the buyer has 
completed hers.
80
 As a result the bank earns part of the additional surplus value 
generated in the form of interest, as discussed later. Through issuing claims to 
money that act as money, banks increase the efficiency of money in the economy. 
To continue the examination of the process of development of commercial banks 
it is necessary to examine bank deposits.
81
   
3.3.2 Deposits and the emergence of investment credit 
The possibility for deposits arises because of the disconnect that money creates 
between purchase and sale (acting in this way as the flipside to credit) and 
because of the leads and lags in production. Money falls idle and the capitalist is 
able to deposit it in an established banking system and earn interest. This idle 
money may be in the form of banknotes, as seen above, or it may be commodity 
money.  
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 It should be noted that selling the debt for money removes all credit risk from the selling 
capitalist’s balance sheet and the bank alone bears the credit risk of the buyer. By issuing 
banknotes the bank still bears the buyer’s credit risk, but has not removed all credit risk from the 
seller’s balance sheet. For the seller, the banknote makes possible a new circuit by acting as 
money, but does not remove all credit risk from the seller’s balance sheet. Instead the risk of non-
payment by the buyer is transformed into risk of non-payment by the bank. As I will show, 
general acceptance as a means of exchange is bound up with general acceptance of banks’ ability 
to repay. 
81
 Historically in England, in the second half of the 19th century merchant banks in London 
advanced money as working capital to capitalists by discounting bills of exchange, the funds for 
which they borrowed on short terms in the money market from commercial banks, who in turn 
collected deposits (Langley, 2002: 56). ‘A manufacturer sells his product for a bill of exchange 
and discounts this bill with a billbroker. But in actual fact the latter only advances his bankers 
credit, and the banker in turn advances the money capital of his depositors, who consist of the 
industrialists and merchants themselves, though also including workers (by means of savings 
banks) as well as landlords and other unproductive classes’ (Marx, 1981: 615). The functions 
have been developed logically separately but it can be seen that historically they coincide. 
Similarly, the analysis moves through banks’ expanding functions in turn as they expand to 
include discounting, commercial banking and investment banking. 
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Deposits are ‘simply a particular name for loans that the public make to the 
bankers’ (Marx, 1981: 603). In return for such a loan the bank issues a promise to 
pay. However, the public may also require access to their money at short notice. 
As with banknotes, deposits must be of short maturity or even available on 
demand.
82
 Partly in this way and partly through banks’ reputation for 
creditworthiness these bank liabilities function as money, a private promise to 
pay that becomes generally acceptable as money. Faith that the claim to money 
will be honoured allows the claim itself to function as money. In fact: ‘Deposit 
credit money is not qualitatively different from private banknotes – merely 
another type of bank liability issued in the normal course of the bank’s business’ 
(Lapavitsas, 2000a: 637). 
In addition to deposits created through the collection of commodity money, the 
lending of banknotes, discussed above, creates deposits of credit money. Issuance 
of a banknote creates a liability on the bank’s balance sheet. If a capitalist does 
not spend all of an advance of bank credit money (banknotes in the illustrations 
above) she effectively makes a deposit at the bank; if she spends it another 
capitalist takes possession of the bank’s liability, thus effectively holding a 
deposit at the bank.
83
 As banknotes become money, lending by issuing banknotes 
results in (credit) money deposits.  
Figure 3.9 below illustrates both sorts of deposit creation. A capitalist, P is 
initially endowed with 10 of idle money and corresponding equity; this is 
deposited at the bank in exchange for a promise to pay on demand (a deposit). 
Separately, the bank lends banknotes to another capitalist, Q. Now both P and Q 
hold redeemable-on-demand bank liabilities which can serve as money in 
commodity exchange. Both the act of receiving money and the act of lending 
have created deposits.  
 
 
                                                 
82
 The leads and lags of production cycles can produce excess cash for deposit at times but at 
others can equally demand cash, potentially at short notice (Lapavitsas, 2000b). 
83
 Electronic deposits of banks in 2013 are nothing more than a promise to pay by the bank. 
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Figure 3.8: Commercial Banking 
 
With the systematic collection of deposits, the banking system becomes fully 
established and takes on the appearance of the commercial bank. The issuance of 
claims to money that act as money makes more efficient use of the money in 
society, which Hilferding calls ‘circulation credit’ (1981: Ch. 5). In addition, 
systematic deposit collection allows the emergence of what he terms ‘investment 
credit’ (1981: Ch. 5). Investment credit is the extension of longer-term loans, e.g. 
for the purchase of fixed capital that will operate over more than one circuit of 
production. The foundations for investment credit are provided by the systematic 
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creation and collection of deposits. This activity grows out of. but is qualitatively 
different from circulation credit.  
The discounter analysed in the previous section lent his own money. The money 
capital lent took the form of IBC. The bank which has emerged from the 
subsequent analysis additionally collects money from around the economy that 
would otherwise be idle and sends it forth on circuits of production. This is a 
more complex role that gives this otherwise idle money a more complex form of 
money capital than IBC: loanable money capital (Marx, 1981: Ch. 30-32).  
3.3.3 A merchants theory of banking capital 
The theory above began with simple categories and the simple circuit of 
production and developed them logically to arrive at an approximation of the 
appearance of commercial banks. Contrasting banking theories that start with the 
appearance of commercial banking but do not investigate the processes by which 
that appearance came about usually fail to capture a full understanding of 
commercial banks (e.g. by concentrating only on particular aspects); allow little 
scope for an evolving understanding of these institutions as they continue to 
change, including to incorporate securities and derivatives dealing; and struggle 
to incorporate both bank borrowing/lending and the formation of bank credit 
money in the same theory, with one assumed in order to explain the other.  
More generally, theory that fails to penetrate the appearance of bank activities 
tends to invert the nature of banking. One critical way in which this occurs is by 
arguing for the creation of lending from deposits and not for the creation of 
deposits from lending.
84
 Such approaches can be characterised as a goldsmith’s 
view of banking in contrast to the specialising merchants’ view presented here. In 
the goldsmith’s view, banks are lenders via a rather passive intermediation, 
aggregating idle money from ‘innumerable small puddles, where it stagnates’ 
(Schumpeter, 1954: 319) and passing it on to those ‘spending units with deficit 
budgets’ (Gurley and Shaw, 1955: 516). A graphic analogy is provided by 
Cannan (1921), who casts the banker as a cloakroom attendant who collects and 
then on-lends cloaks, the presence and workings of the attendant making 
                                                 
84
 Inversion might be thought to be typical of ideology, e.g.  Larrain (1991) and Fine (1980).  
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society’s use of coats more efficient as X is able to make use of a coat while Y 
has no need of it.
85
 
Much of the explanations of banking provided by the neoclassical micro-
foundations literature over the last 30 years or so can be seen as goldsmith or 
cloakroom attendant theories of banking. In these theories banks arise as a result 
of a specified market imperfection that prevents surplus units meeting deficit 
units in the market. Banks (the lending library or cloakroom attendant) emerge as 
a second-best solution. When asking ‘Why do financial intermediaries exist?’, 
Freixas and Rochet (1997) group theories under ‘transaction costs’ (e.g. Benston 
and Smith Jr, 1976), ‘liquidity insurance’ (e.g. Bryant, 1980) ‘information-
sharing coalitions’ (e.g. Leland and Pyle, 1977), and ‘delegated monitoring’ 
(Diamond, 1984). As the grouping implies, these theories tend to take single 
aspects of a bank’s appearance and transform it into the sole reason for the bank’s 
existence.
86
 
One aspect of this approach to banking theory is that the theories do not require 
the creation of bank credit money; in fact, as the analogies suggest, the unit being 
borrowed and lent could be anything from books to coats. Given a stock of 
money, whether bags of gold, fiat money or credit money, simple collection and 
on-lending is indeed what banks appear to do; but can it be that banks simply 
speed up the use of money?
 In that case it is an increase in velocity ‘so great that 
it enables a thing to be in different places at the same time’87 (Schumpeter, 1954: 
320). As I have shown, the bank increases the efficiency of society’s use of 
money by issuing (and sustaining) claims to money, i.e. notes and deposits. The 
fact that it is a claim to money matters: a claim to money is qualitatively different 
from a claim to a commodity (Schumpeter, 1954: 1114). A claim to money can 
act as money; a claim to a coat cannot act as a coat.
88
  
                                                 
85
 The lending library offers another, slightly different, analogy.  
86
 As outlined in the methodology chapter, this thesis argues in favour of a process of 
development with multi-directional, multi-determinant logic rather than the static and mono-
causal logic of these theories. 
87
 ‘The fact that sales take place simultaneously and side by side limits the extent to which the 
rapidity of turnover can make up for the quantity of currency available’ (Marx, 1976: 235). 
88
 Schumpeter (1954: 1114) notes: ‘A claim to sheep does not increase the number of sheep’.  
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It is only by creating and sustaining claims to money which act as money that 
money can be in two places at the same time: only this method is flexible enough 
to coordinate the economy’s variety of rhythms of saving and borrowing; and 
only in this way can the borrower and the lender simultaneously have use of the 
benefits of money. Because the rhythms of production determine when, where 
and for how long money falls idle (as they do for the requirements of borrowers), 
depositors require access to their money at short notice (as do borrowers). Credit 
money is a device, developed from maximising the efficiency of means of 
payment, which gives depositors and borrowers access to a given amount of 
money at the same time. It is this that gives banks the appearance that goldsmith 
theories seek to explain as the collection of idle money, now credit money, for 
lending on elsewhere.
89
 The bank that emerges in the merchant’s view, however, 
lending, creating bank money and collecting otherwise idle money, provides a 
richer theory of banks and one that develops the idea of  bank capital as a 
particular capital which uses its specialisation to take on new activities.   
3.3.4 Constraints  
Although money might be said to be ‘qualitatively … independent of all limits’ 
(Marx, 1976: 230), limits on the size of the banks’ balance sheets arise from their 
activities. Credit money creates deposits from loans, and threats to the ability of 
credit money to act as money arise from both sides of the banks’ balance sheet. 
These threats can be characterised as risks to solvency, generally concerned with 
repayment of loans; and risks to liquidity, generally concerned with the 
withdrawal of deposits. A problem with one will usually lead to a problem with 
the other. For the banker, this threat to his existence places constraints on the type 
and amount of his activity.  
Commercial credit might be thought to be more associated with liquidity risks 
than solvency risks and risks to a bank’s liabilities.90 As it is used to facilitate 
                                                 
89
 In another variant of the goldsmiths view of theories of banking, many theories of the financial 
sector in general can only envisage either money or credit, and not both, as the crucial factor in 
bank activity (e.g. as surveyed by Gertler 1988)  
90
 Lapavitsas highlights traces of Smith and Steuart in Hilferding’s treatment of banks. Banks in 
Hilferding start Smith-like (focussed on providing commercial credit with less maturity mismatch 
to make more efficient use of the money available) and become more Steuart-like (providing 
longer-term credit against secure but illiquid assets to put more money into the economy). 
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exchange, solvency is generally less of a problem than liquidity: further exchange 
of the commodity provides the means for repayment. With commercial credit, 
claims to money support a much greater volume of transactions in a given period 
than would be possible with only (commodity) money. This is at once the aim 
and the weakness of circulation credit. If too many banknote holders try to 
exchange their claim for money at the same time, the bank’s ability to provide a 
means of payment is jeopardised. This potential problem constrains banks’ 
activities: they cannot lend out all the deposits they hold; they must have money 
to hand, reserves that can be paid out on demand (e.g.Harvey, 2006: 279). A lack 
of arrangements such as clearing houses, which support credit money but require 
bank cooperation, can act as a further constraint on banks. 
Liquidity constraints are also observed in micro-foundation theories of banking 
from the 1980s onwards, which use market imperfections to explain observed 
features of banking. Such theories reason that in perfect markets, liquidity would 
not constrain bank activity (Black, 1975). Micro-foundation theories provide 
explanations for anomalies between observed outcomes and those predicted by 
efficient market theory. By assuming imperfect liquidity, it is possible to create 
less liquid instruments through differentiated payoffs (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983). This creates room for banks as second-best solutions compared to perfect 
markets, but the most efficient solution given an assumed imperfection. In this 
case, however, the bank has an unstable equilibrium and, unless confidence is 
maintained, a bank run is possible. This can be resolved by the suspension of 
conversion or deposit insurance – the latter unsurprisingly proving more efficient, 
as it provides a more market-like solution (ibid.).
91
 More recent theories continue 
to create illiquidity with altered pay-offs, e.g. between direct and indirect finance 
and in the absence of credit money (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). 
On the other side of the balance sheet, solvency provides another constraint. As 
banks increase the maturity mismatch in their balance sheets and begin to provide 
investment credit, the emphasis shifts to the intertwined nature of credit money 
                                                                                                                                    
Moreover, for Smith-like banks, liquidity is more of a concern, while for the land- and 
development-banks of Steuart, solvency is more of an issue  (Lapavitsas, 2004). 
91
 Credit money does not form part of the analysis, and little differentiates the bank from the on-
lending cloakroom attendant – the bank merely brings efficiencies to the use of a given supply of 
money. 
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and lending. Long-term lending with credit money is a means of turning assets 
that produce surplus value over time into the form of money today – or vice 
versa, turning money today into assets that produce surplus value over time. 
When lending banknotes against illiquid assets in order to create liquidity, there 
is less reason to worry about people drawing down money against banknotes and 
more reason to worry about assets turning bad. If the bank’s credit analysis skills 
fail, repayment of the loans they have made is threatened. An insolvent bank can 
stay in business longer than an illiquid one, if its liabilities continue to circulate, 
but eventually it will lack the means to honour liabilities as they fall due, creating 
liquidity problems. A second constraint on banks’ activities therefore arises from 
risks to solvency: banks must restrict their credit to projects that appear to offer a 
secure return.  
Once again, such behaviour is observed in banks, and in neoclassical theory it is 
therefore necessary to invent market imperfections to explain it. Efficient markets 
leave no space for credit rationing by unregulated banks (Black, 1975). For 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), information asymmetry is assumed and made into a 
determining factor for the bank’s existence rather than one result of bank 
specialisation. In their model, the price of loanable funds does not necessarily 
produce a market-clearing equilibrium, and a credit-rationing equilibrium can 
occur because price affects loan riskiness.   
3.3.5 Profits  
I have shown above how, notwithstanding the constraints on their activity, 
commercial banks use the device of credit money to increase the amount of 
money acting as capital and generating surplus value. By enabling claims to 
money to act as money, the efficiency of money in exchange is increased, 
enabling additional circuits, and money falling idle in one production process can 
be used in another. Banks profit mainly by claiming a share of this additionally-
generated surplus value. 
Simply put, banks profit from receiving more in return from borrowers than they 
repay to depositors. Figure 3.10 below illustrates how this profit arises. It 
assumes that the total lent and total stock of deposits remains constant over the 
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period. The bank takes in a net total of 10 from borrowers and pays out 6 to 
lenders, retaining 4 for the intermediation or mobilisation of money, or, put 
another way, for facilitating the transformation of money into loanable money 
capital. 
Figure 3.9: Banking Profits 
 
Returns to banking capital stem from banks’ intermediation, which increases the 
amount of money acting as capital and cannot be explained only as simple 
lending; correspondingly the more general concept of loanable money capital and 
its emergence is more useful than IBC for locating banking profits: ‘[T]he money 
capitalist makes the savings of other people into his capital, and the credit that the 
reproductive capitalists give one another, and that the public give them, he makes 
into his own source of enrichment’ (Marx, 1981: 640).  
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Borrowers pay 10% interest on 100 lent. Lenders appear to be paid 5% on 
120 lent. Banks maintain a reserve of 20, supplemented by a profit of 4. 
 
Alternatively configured lenders might be said to be paid 10% on 114.45 
by the bank with a fixed payment deducted from their idle money of 5.54; 
alternatively borrowers might be argued to pay 5% interest and a fixed 
amount of 5 deducted from their surplus value. 
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Money as capital has the additional use value of extracting surplus value, of self-
valorisation; banks enable this additional use value and are paid both by lenders 
and borrowers for doing so. ‘The profit that forms the source of accumulation for 
these money capitalists is simply a deduction from the surplus value that the 
reproductive agents extract (as well as an appropriation of part of the interest on 
the savings of others)’ (Marx, 1981: 634). Banks allow the money of those with 
idle funds to act as capital by enabling those wishing to hoard to simultaneously 
earn a share of surplus income and maintain liquidity. As bank credit money 
becomes the most established form of money, it also becomes the most 
convenient liquid form in which to hold wealth, whether in banknotes issued as a 
loan, as above, or in its modern electronic form as entries in computer systems.
92
 
Banks provide loans to those in need of funds, allowing the creation of surplus 
value. In doing so they permit the production of more surplus value than would 
otherwise be possible in a certain time period, and claim a share of it.  
Bank profit takes the form of interest, reflecting the form of loanable money 
capital, but the similarity of form with discounters’ profits masks a difference in 
content. In fact the form of commercial bank profit is partly a result of habit in 
the way it is expressed. Bank profit is usually configured as the difference 
between the borrowing and the lending rate on the same notional amount. In fact, 
as illustrated in 3.9 above, bank profit might as easily be configured as a 
difference in notional amount, using the same interest rate, where the difference 
in notional amount is paid as a lump sum by either lenders or borrowers. For 
example, the repayment of depositors, instead of being at a lower rate, can be 
expressed as the same rate as the borrower’s but on a lower notional amount, the 
implication being that some of the depositors’ money is paid over as a lump sum; 
conversely, borrowers might pay the same lower rate that lenders receive plus a 
lump sum (recall that banks must keep some cash in hand).
93
 The point is not to 
deny that commercial bank profit takes the form of interest, which it does, and 
                                                 
92 In a world dominated by electronic bank credit money
,
 the alternatives to storing idle money as bank deposits decrease
s,
 and correspondingly
,
 
pressure on banks to pay depositors decreases. 
93 
Illustrations of bank profit throughout this chapter are given as money amounts. It is 
straightforward to reconfigure illustrations as rates, for example using the formula for continuous 
compounding, e-r.t, where r is the rate, t is time and e, the exponential; it is then possible to 
express bank profit as a spread between rloans and rdeposits, the rates on loans and deposits 
respectively. However, to emphasise the ambiguous sources of bank profit and for simplicity of 
presentation, a monetary amount convention is followed. 
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which is important in itself, but that the form of the profit is not enough to reveal 
the content of the activity, namely intermediation and not simple lending.  
A comparison of the form and content of the profits of discounters and 
commercial and investment banks further establishes this point. Discounters, as 
discussed above, earn interest for simple lending from their own funds in the 
form of purchasing discounted bills. Banks, by contrast, do not, in the main, lend 
their own money. They claim a share of surplus value on their own capital 
because their intermediation allows other capitalists to generate additional surplus 
value. Their profit, however, takes the form of interest. In the next chapter I show 
how banks as securities market makers also earn a share of surplus value for bank 
capital by facilitating the collection and on-lending of money, but here the market 
maker’s profit appears to take the form of a fee which is more akin to discount 
than to interest. The differences in form between discounting and commercial and 
investment banking profit somewhat cloak the similarity of content between the 
latter two and their difference from the first. 
Neoclassical approaches to banking might be thought to consider banking as two 
separate but essentially similar lending operations. Analysis starts with an ideal 
market rate at which borrowers meet lenders.
94
 Two loans then occur – typically 
because some market imperfection prevents markets working – one from 
depositors and one from the banks. Relative to the ideal, but non-existent, market 
rate, the bank is able to borrow more cheaply from depositors and lend more 
dearly to borrowers.
95
 The problem with this conception of the world is that the 
starting point for analysis of the bank’s profit is to assume away the bank. It 
considers bank profits in light of a non-existent market for matching borrowers 
and lenders. This is an ideal and illogical approach. I argue here that the lending 
occurs because the bank exists, and that bank capital, as both property and 
process, earns a reward for facilitating this lending. 
                                                 
94
 The UN recommends measuring the difference between lending/borrowing rates and a 
reference (mid-)rate when measuring bank activity for inclusion in national accounts (United 
Nations, 1993). Banks’ ability to price each side away from the reference rate is then taken as 
subject to competition and as fair reward for a service provided, e.g. bearing a risk.  
95
 A parallel is shown to exist when discussing bid-ask price spreads in securities and derivatives 
markets. Reference is often made to a (non-existent) mid rate and dealer profit conceived relative 
to this ideal. Starting from the more realistic proposition that the market does not exist without the 
dealer/bank removes the possibility of theorising bank activity in this way.  
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Banks earn a share of general surplus value as a particular capital (capital as 
property) with its own specialisms (capital as process). They further develop the 
specialist skills of discounters and add a large network of borrowers and lenders: 
specifically they bear risk and provide liquidity, and to do this they must handle 
the technicalities of lending. In practice these activities are intermingled. Nor is 
the process of intermediation passive, but bank capital must be constantly put to 
work to maintain this claim to surplus value, and in particular the role of credit 
money as money must constantly be reproduced, for example by maintaining 
confidence in the bank’s portfolio of assets (see the section on money below).  
As usual, neoclassical theory tends to observe these specialisms but, failing to 
penetrate appearances, makes them the raison d’etre of the bank. So, for 
example, theories recognising the banks’ specialist credit skills attribute their 
existence to information asymmetry (e.g. Diamond, 1984); theories recognising 
the importance of liquidity theorise their existence on this basis (e.g. Diamond 
and Rajan, 2001); and the same goes for theories recognising their money-dealing 
skills (e.g. Benston and Smith Jr, 1976). 
3.3.6 Lending to and borrowing from outside production 
Banks are able to expand their amount of loanable money capital by borrowing 
from and lending to processes other than circuits of production (as described in 
section 3.2). Indeed this ability is in the very nature of loanable money capital 
and therefore of banks as loanable money capital dealers. Banks collect money 
from wherever it is used, both in and out of production, to transform into loanable 
money capital. At the same time they are both connected to and outside the 
circuit of production; their loans facilitate circuits of production but are not of the 
circuit of production. Turning first to the sources of funds, it is principally the 
nature of money that facilitates its collection by banks.  
As the credit or financial system is established, banks collect otherwise idle 
hoards from all over the economy, and not just from production. As the banking 
system becomes established and money comes regularly to serve as capital, it 
becomes capital even before it has been advanced as capital: it is ‘latent, potential 
capital’ (Marx, 1981: 477) in anticipation of being put to use.  Once a banking 
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system is established, and indeed once bank credit money comes to the fore, 
banks naturally collect all money holdings, not just those arising in production, as 
deposits. Hoards naturally seek out self-valorisation by being quite normally 
collected by the banking system. Therefore idle hoards, although initially 
transformed into loanable money capital, become capital automatically via the 
mediation of an established banking system.
96
 
[Revenues that are only] gradually consumed [whether they are that 
part of surplus value that the capitalist accumulates or spends for his 
own consumption, or whether they are] ground rent, the higher forms 
of salary, the incomes of the unproductive classes etc. All of these 
assume for a time the form of money revenue and can hence be 
converted into deposits and thereby into loan capital.’ (Marx, 1981: 
636)  
It can be seen that today this has extended well beyond the ‘higher forms of 
salary’ to encompass all monetary holdings of all classes, and not just money in 
the realm of the capitalist. Thus, for example, savings and wages are mediated by 
the credit system, transforming money into loanable money capital and hence into 
a ‘source of enrichment’ for banks (Marx, 1981: 640). 
Banks not only borrow money from non-productive sources; they lend outside 
production too. Again money facilitates this as the universal equivalent, but here 
it is helped by the form of interest payments and by bank’s particular types of 
credit skills. Money as the universal equivalent has the ability to create a standard 
of prices for imaginary objects even when they have no value (Marx, 1976: 197). 
Similarly the liabilities of banks subsume not only interest from loans to 
productive capitalists but also revenue streams from other activities. As outlined 
above, they mingle returns to money dealing capital and to loanable capital (Itoh 
and Lapavitsas, 1999: 70); moreover the possibility exists of incorporating the 
revenue from any activity, thereby merging ‘the circulation of revenues and the 
circulation of capital indiscriminately’ (Harvey, 2006: 274). 
                                                 
96
 As capitalism develops, the categories established appear at once to be both the preconditions 
and the results of the process of social reproduction (Marx, 1972: 507). 
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This is achieved primarily through the form of interest payments (Marx, 1981: 
595). As an interest rate establishes itself as a norm in society ‘[a]ny regular 
periodic income can be capitalized by reckoning it up, on the basis of the average 
rate of interest, as the sum that capital lent out at this interest rate would yield’ 
(Marx, 1981: 597). The holder of money does not care where the money comes 
from or what its last use was, and the depositor with the bank only cares that 
money, or an equivalent, will be available on demand.
97
 In this way banks can 
profitably lend to all areas of society, whether or not they are productive. As I 
showed above, banks’ particular form of credit analysis concentrates on how they 
will secure the repayment of money, and whether this stems from a production 
process or elsewhere is of little concern to them – clearly these skills are equally 
suited to lending to productive or non-productive ends.  
3.4 Money 
The creation of bank credit money is critical in an explanation of the workings of 
the commercial bank, as I have shown, but a theory of bank credit money must 
also rest on a theory of money. As with the theory of bank credit developed 
above, Marx’s theory of money begins with simple commodities exchange.98 This 
section does not, and indeed cannot in such a small space, attempt a 
comprehensive theory of money. Rather it lays out the aspects of the theory of 
money and bank credit money required for an understanding of the banks of the 
21
st
 century, which engage in a variety of activities from loans and deposits to 
derivatives dealing, all of which have in common the creation and sustenance of 
claims on the bank. 
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 ‘Since money does not reveal what has been transformed into it, everything, commodity or not, 
is convertible into money. Everything becomes saleable or purchasable’ (Marx, 1976: 229). 
98
 In Volume 1, Chapter 1 of Capital, Marx details the emergence of money from a simple to a 
more expanded form of value. The early chapters of Capital form the most abstract part of the 
book, from where ascent to the concrete begins. A analogous exposition of the logic of banking is 
attempted in this thesis from the simple (trade credit) to an expanded form (commercial banking 
and credit money). From here the expansion continues in later chapters to incorporate investment 
banking. The logic of the development of banking, however, is not only developed in an 
analogous manner to but also develops out of the logic of the development of the money form 
(Marx, 1976: Ch. 1). 
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3.4.1 The functions of money 
For Marx, the process of the development of money is endogenous and follows a 
logical order (Lapavitsas, 1991, Brunhoff, 1976). Money emerges as a measure of 
value to form the universal equivalent in exchange (the equal and opposite of 
commodities in the C-M identity); this monetary exchange permits an expansion 
of exchange in general which in turn establishes money as the ‘medium of 
circulation’.99 (Marx, 1976: Ch. 3). The attributes and established presence of 
money in circulation allow a separation between the sale and purchase of 
commodities that gives rise to idle money, or hoards, the first function of ‘money 
as money’; and to their antithesis, the need for credit (ibid.).The separation of sale 
and purchase gives rise to these hoards, but they are given flesh in a developed 
capitalist system by leads and lags inherent in the circuits of production and 
circulation. Finally, the extension of credit gives rise to a new role for money, the 
settlement of debt; and here the bounds of simple circulation over money are 
loosened. Money is sought for itself, first as a means of payment of debts, and in 
so doing emerges ‘as money’, not merely as a means of exchange (ibid).100 These 
stages and their implications are now examined in more detail.  
The logical development of money stems from the exchange of commodities, and 
eventually one commodity, often gold or silver, emerges to face all others as the 
universal equivalent. In truly becoming the universal equivalent, a commodity 
acting as the common currency becomes the numerator rather than the 
denominator when expressing the relation between commodities. For example, 
money is the numerator when there are 14 pounds of silver per shirt, and not a 
certain number of shirts per pound of silver. In becoming the numerator, money 
comes not to have a price. Now other commodities can fluctuate in price, but as 
that price must be expressed in money, e.g. gold, then money itself cannot have a 
price – it is no use to say that one gold bar costs one gold bar. Money is a store of 
value in general and its value can fall (inflation) or rise (deflation) against all 
other commodities in general; in contrast, the prices of all other commodities, 
expressed in money terms, can fluctuate relative to each other. As I show below, 
                                                 
99
 ‘The first function of money is the condition for the second, but the second is the necessary 
complement of the first’ (Brunhoff, 1976: 31). 
100
 Money as ‘world money’ (Marx, 1976) is not considered in this chapter. 
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anything that is given a monetary price is unlikely to be money. Most clearly for 
this thesis, this means derivatives.  
As a measure of value, money helps spread the exchange of commodities for 
money and becomes a medium of circulation. Even chipped and debased coins 
can perform this role; indeed ‘[m]inted into coins and transformed into currency, 
gold can, in circulating, demonetise itself; it loses its weight of metal and 
becomes the shadow of its own metallic substance’ (Brunhoff, 1976: 32). Money 
here is already a fetish, a social construct with its roots in the practices of 
commodity exchange, which, through growing social acceptance, takes on an 
objective role in society. Money stamps commodities with exchange value, and in 
doing so increases their exchangeability. Yet it is critical to specify the conditions 
in which these fetishes arise and the role they play. Legal contracts, weekly 
markets, indeed trade credit are fetishes to increase exchangeability, but they are 
not money; and while derivatives have many fetishist elements and are involved 
in buying and selling, as explored throughout this thesis, they are not money 
either.  
The use of money in the exchange of commodities gives rise to hoards (albeit 
possibly momentarily) by separating sale from subsequent purchase (Marx, 1976: 
Ch. 3). With the introduction of money: 
Circulation bursts through all temporal, spatial and personal barriers 
imposed by the direct exchange of products, and it does this by 
splitting up the direct identity present in this case between the 
exchange of one’s own product [for] someone else’s into the two 
[acts] of sale and purchase. (Marx, 1976: 209)  
For a given capitalist, sale and subsequent purchase do not occur in the same 
moment. The corollary is that ‘as soon as the series of metamorphoses is 
interrupted, money is immobilized’ (Marx, 1976: 227).  
Less abstractly, the differing rhythms found in production and circulation are an 
important reason for these delays between sale and purchase: 
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[W]ith the development of circulation, conditions arise under which 
the alienation of the commodity becomes separated by an interval of 
time from the realisation of its true price. ... One sort of commodity 
production requires a longer, another a shorter time for its production. 
The production of different commodities depends on different 
seasons of the year. One commodity may be born in the market place, 
another must travel to a distant market. One commodity owner may 
therefore step forth as a seller before the other is ready to buy. (Marx, 
1976: 232)  
The natural temporal mismatches in the circuits of production oblige capitalists to 
borrow at some points in time and to hoard at others; moreover, borrowing 
implies a compensating hoard and vice versa. In this way hoards and debts arise 
and fluctuate in the circuit of production. 
Trade credit illustrates how money becomes a means of payment, the next 
function to emerge. In simple circulation, money as a store of value and a means 
of circulation was trapped in the C-M-C relation, merely facilitating an exchange 
of commodity for commodity. With trade credit, the promise of money is enough 
to price and value the commodity and to cause it to change hands. By 
subsequently settling the debt and completing the transaction, money acquires a 
new function by acting as a means of payment.
101
  
Money’s own properties allowed it to split the C-M-C relation asunder, C-M and 
M-C becoming separable. Now money obtains a further degree of independence: 
obtaining money for itself becomes the objective of transactions (e.g. for settling 
debts) rather than simply swapping one commodity for another.
 
Money has 
emerged ‘as money’; it can be found in and out of production and in this way 
comes to be collected by commercial banks across the economy, as discussed 
above (Hilferding, 1981: Ch. 3, Marx, 1976: Ch. 3). 
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 ‘Not until payment falls due does the means of payment actually step into circulation, i.e. leave 
the hand of the buyer for that of the seller. The circulating medium was transformed into a hoard 
because the process stopped short after the first phase, because the converted shape of the 
commodity was withdrawn from circulation’ (Marx, 1976: 234).   
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3.4.2 Making bank credit money 
Although historically observable, the widespread acceptance of bank credit 
money as money has so far been stated more than theorised and it is necessary to 
explore how banks’ actions facilitate this acceptance. Throughout this thesis 
banks are analysed as establishing and sustaining claims, these claims facilitate 
new activities and banks earn a share of the profits of these new activities. To 
understand the development of banking activities it is essential to draw careful 
parallels between the differences and similarities in the different categories of 
claims and how they emerge and are sustained. In analysing bank credit money it 
becomes possible, among other things, to see how and why not all credit is 
money and not all money is credit; that not all fetish devices for increasing 
exchangeability are money; and that not all claims on a bank are money. 
As discussed above, one merchant’s liabilities become more generally acceptable 
than those of others, and this merchant becomes the bank and his liabilities 
become credit money. In order to serve as a means of circulation, these liabilities 
must be established in society’s eyes as a measure of value in general and not one 
whose particular value can fluctuate. For this, the bank must breed confidence 
that the claim to money will always be honoured. The first steps that the bank 
takes is to promise to pay the bearer at short notice, usually on demand, and to 
repay at par. However, in doing so a contradiction arises for the bank: in making 
its liabilities fall due before its assets in order to meet the liquidity requirements 
of liability holders, it actually increases the risks to its business, to liability 
holders and to its own reputation.  
Banks therefore take several steps to increase their creditworthiness in such a way 
that others will have confidence that they will be paid par on demand by banks; in 
other words banks increase their reputation for creditworthiness. This greatly 
increases the number of depositors and borrowers in a many-to-one relation on 
both sides of the balance sheet – a fourth attribute of the banks which reinforces 
the three specialist attributes explored in previous sections, namely credit skills, 
cash to hand and technical money dealing skills.  
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First, banks actively seek a wide range of depositors (Chick et al., 1992) such that 
‘if one person withdraws it, someone else puts it in’ (Marx, 1981: 627). Second, 
they build up a wide range of assets in a diverse portfolio including cash. The 
asymmetry of skills between bankers and other capitalists resulting from the 
specialisation of bankers exacerbates the problem that the banks face. On the 
asset side of their balance sheet, they have become the economy’s specialists in 
assessing creditworthiness and ensuring repayment. Depositors, specifically non-
specialists in this regard, cannot achieve the same level of credit analysis or 
assess the quality of each of the bank’s assets or of its liabilities. Instead, 
depositors rely on the banks’ analysis and must seek other means of reassurance 
regarding their ability to obtain repayment of their funds. Banks provide this by 
building up, and convincing others that they hold, a diverse portfolio of assets 
including reserves of cash.
102
  
The diverse portfolio of an intermediary as a solution to the problem of 
asymmetric information is also analysed by mainstream economists using micro-
foundation theories of banking, most famously by Diamond (1984). Here one 
lender emerges as the delegated monitor of project owners in the face of 
information asymmetry. To solve the problem of monitoring the monitor, the 
delegated monitor develops a diverse portfolio. The theory captures one element 
of the appearance of banks, but to do so it assumes starting conditions without 
exploring those assumptions. In the method adopted in this thesis such conditions 
should be developed from within the theory. As a result, and by focusing only on 
one aspect of banks’ appearance, the theory has limited capacity to explain other 
activities of banks.  
The construction of this diverse portfolio of assets, i.e. loans made to capitalists 
to engage in production, serves to subsume the activities of many production 
cycles under banks’ single liability, making that liability a measure of value in 
general. The regular reflux of bankers’ loans ordinarily ensures repayment of the 
deposit: value flows to the depositor from the production processes to which the 
bank lends, via interest and the repayment of the principal amount. Figure 3.10 
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 Even though this very breadth of holdings further reduces outsiders’ ability to analyse the 
bank’s creditworthiness based on its specific assets. 
3 - Discounters and commercial banks  
Page 111 of 303 
below shows how the loan of banknotes to various production cycles, combined 
with the fungible nature of the banknote – i.e. it can pass from one capitalist to 
another as a means of payment – leads to credit money in general facing a 
portfolio of particular production processes across banks’ balance sheets, as 
commodity money faces other commodities. 
Figure 3.10: Commercial banks build a diverse portfolio 
 
Banks’ activities in the money markets, where they also borrow from and  lend to 
other banks, further increase the diversity of their asset pool (Lapavitsas, 2003: 
83). In Figure 3.11, banks facing different sets of capitalists, e.g. in the town and 
in the country, lend to one another and thereby increase the diversity of their 
portfolios.
103
 This diversity means that depositors are insulated from the success 
or failure of particular production processes, but are exposed to the economy 
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 Marx/Engels quote the Economist of 1847 on the early money market in London. Noting that 
some areas of the country would be in surplus while others were in deficit, they explain how 
billbrokers – in effect bankers – deal with banks in different areas of the country to take in and 
lend out  the surplus; ‘… and in this way Lombard Street has become the great centre in which the 
transfer of spare capital has been made from one part of the country, where it could not be 
profitably employed, to another, where a demand existed for it’ (Marx, 1981). 
 Bank A expands lending across the economy, e.g. to capitalist Q, 
…, U.  
 The bank’s corresponding promises to pay the bearer on demand 
become fungible.  
 A diverse portfolio of loans makes banknotes the ‘general’ facing 
the collection of the ‘particular’ on the asset side of the balance 
sheet – a parallel of the mass of particular commodities which face 
money as the universal equivalent.  
 Bank liabilities come to serve as a store of value and a means of 
exchange. 
 
Bank A     
Assets  Liabilities  
Money 10 10 Equity  
Loan
Q
 10 10 BN
Q
  
Loan
R
 10 10 BN
P
  
Loan
S
 10 10 BN
S
  
Loan
T
 10 10 BN
T
  
Loan
U
 10 10 BN
U
  
…  …   
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more generally through bank lending, particularly as bank lending and bank 
credit money become fully established.
104
 
Figure 3.11: Interbank lending leads to increased portfolio diversity 
 
In light of the above analysis, a parallel can be drawn between the spontaneous 
emergence of commodity money and that of credit money. Value is crystallised 
in commodities through the processes of production and exchange. Commodity 
money then emerges spontaneously as one commodity facing all other 
commodities in general is established as the socially-acceptable universal 
equivalent. As commodity exchange becomes fully established, commodity 
money becomes a measure of value in general; its value is not exposed to the 
price movements of one commodity in particular (Marx, 1976: 193). Similarly, 
value generated in production flows to credit money via the bank through 
repayment and interest payments. Credit money emerges spontaneously, facing 
all other credit in general across banks’ balance sheets, through diverse portfolios 
of bank lending (including interbank lending). As credit becomes established, 
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 Assuming unregulated banks in efficient markets (Black, 1975) and/or a competitive banking 
industry (Fama, 1980) leaves no role for bank portfolio management or credit analysis. Banks are 
obliged to price loans and construct portfolios in accordance with the market, e.g. using option 
prices or option pricing techniques (Black and Scholes, 1973). As with many goldsmiths theories, 
bank credit money does not feature for Black and for Fama, bank liabilities are explicitly 
securities, this is made possible because liquidity is assumed to be limitless.  
Banks lend to each other further diversifying their portfolios 
 
Town Bank     Country Bank    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Money 10 10 Equity  Money 10 10 Equity 
Loan
TownieA
 10 100 BN  Loan
FarmerA
 10 100 BN 
Loan
TownieB
 10    Loan
FarmerB
 10   
Loan
TownieC
 10    Loan
FarmerC
 10   
Loan
TownieD
 10    Loan
FarmerD
 10   
Loan
TownieE
 10    Loan
FarmerE
 10   
Loan
Country 
Bank
 
50    Loan
Town Bank
 50   
 
Banks borrow and lend in the money market and in doing so further 
diversify their balance sheets.  
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bank credit money becomes a measure of value in general; its value is not 
exposed to one production process in particular.  
Credit money becomes money through its social acceptability and the banker’s 
specialism among merchants and the strength and diversity of its lending; 
however, ‘[t]he adequacy of such credit money for the function of “money as 
money” cannot be taken for granted, and has to be established continually and in 
practice’ (Lapavitsas, 2000a: 637). Indeed, ‘… the adequacy with which credit 
money as a whole functions “as money” depends on the institutional structure of 
the credit system, and the policies adopted by monetary authorities’ (ibid: 638).  
A key element of this infrastructure is the clearing arrangements that banks put in 
place, the spread of which allows the gross quantity of credit money to grow in 
relation to the means of payment (Marx, 1976: 235) and generally strengthens 
and broadens the acceptance of credit money. Clearing helps the establishment of 
bank credit money, in part because it allows a private bilateral promise to pay by 
one bank to become a promise to pay that will be redeemed by several banks; in 
doing so, that particular promise becomes more generally acceptable. Clearing 
contributes to the transformation of the particular into the general. Bank A’s 
notes are acceptable by Bank B because they can be submitted to clearing, and 
vice versa. This effectively reduces competition between Banks A and B and, 
importantly, sets their notes apart from the notes of banks not accepted in 
clearing. Banks must invest in building and maintaining payment systems and 
clearing houses, and must cooperate in order to do so. As I show in later chapters, 
a strong parallel exists with derivatives, where derivatives claims on various 
banks are given an increased appearance of exchangeability by being submitted 
to a central clearing house.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed a theoretical understanding of banks that stems from 
exchange in a capitalist society and allows for a continued and consistent 
expansion of the theory of banks to include their early 21
st
-century activities, 
most notably derivatives dealing. Banks emerge from discounters, which are 
specialist merchants that take on certain skills which they continue to adapt as 
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bankers, the possession of which separates them from other capitalists. Banks 
become established as a separate capital to which the creation and sustenance of 
claims to monetary value is essential. Claims to money act as money, allowing 
commercial banks not only to economise on the use of money in exchange but 
also to collect idle monies that would not otherwise be used and channel them to 
profitable uses. To understand this fully it is necessary to move beyond the 
concept of IBC, which I have analysed as providing a return to property only. 
Analysis must move on from IBC to introduce the more concrete and complex 
category of loanable money capital, involving a return to bank capital as both 
property and process. 
The distinction between capital as property earning interest and capital as 
property and process earning a share of surplus value in general becomes even 
more central to an understanding of banks with the advent of joint stock 
companies and markets for debt and equity securities. Banks expand their 
activities using and developing their specialist attributes, and through the 
issuance and sustenance of claims they profit from making securities markets. 
Yet in these markets the nature of the claims that they establish is different from 
those that become credit money; indeed in securities markets the claim is not a 
claim to money that comes to act as money, but a claim to a particular stream of 
income that is exchangeable for money. It is once again important to specify the 
ways in which the claims arise and function, and their impact on the economy; 
the next chapter addresses this. 
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4 Securities dealing as a banking activity 
4.1 Introduction 
Securities’ dealing is undertaken overwhelmingly by investment banks and is a 
banking activity (Duffie, 2010). A single theory of banks should be capable of 
explaining how banks have become both commercial banks and securities dealers 
(and, for that matter, derivatives dealers). This chapter and the next develop a 
theory of investment banks that presents investment banks as securities and 
derivatives market makers. It views investment banking as an integral banking 
activity and as an expansion of the specialisation developed by discounters and 
commercial bankers discussed in Chapter 3. It presents a view of financial 
markets which is quite different from that often found in financial theory: it views 
financial markets not as emerging on their own or in opposition to banks, but 
rather as a result of bank activity. In fact I argue that banks literally make 
financial markets for themselves and for money capitalists: not only do they 
‘stand ready to buy and sell’ (Levi, 2005: 563), they also they provide the market 
infrastructure for this.  
More than in the previous chapter, the foundation for the analysis of securities 
markets laid by Marx and Hilferding must be approached with care. The method 
outlined in Chapter 2 must be applied to ensure that their work is updated and 
refined to reflect the reality of international banking in the early 21
st
 century, and 
in particular with the aim of understanding banks’ role in derivative markets. 
With this aim in mind, this chapter expands the analysis of commercial banking 
set out in the previous chapter such that securities’ dealing is incorporated into a 
theory of bank capital. It is argued that bank capital proceeds by creating and 
sustaining claims to monetary value, on itself and others, which facilitate 
activities otherwise not possible, and that bank capital earns a share of the profits 
from such activities. Securities, as one form or manifestation of this essence are 
shown to be claims on the income of a production process that are sustained by 
banks undertaking to make a market in them. This market enables lenders to 
return to the benefits of money when required. In this way, banks as securities 
market makers use the creation and sustenance of claims in the form of securities 
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to facilitate the collection and lending of monies that would otherwise remain 
idle.  
The analysis draws a parallel with commercial banking, showing first the 
essential similarity as creators of claims but also the key differences in form; and 
second how this change in form has implications, particularly for dealing 
activities, which it encourages, and for the sorts of idle money that come to be 
collected. Crucially, liquidity in securities markets comes not from claims acting 
as money (as bank credit money was shown to do in Chapter 3) but by making 
claims exchangeable for money, or tradable. The trading behaviour that this 
begets influences the character of securities markets and opens the way for 
derivatives dealing.  
Contrary to neoclassical theory, and as stressed throughout this thesis, markets 
cannot simply be assumed to spring from nowhere; they must be given material 
roots (Lapavitsas, 2003: 9). In this analysis the opportunity for banks to profit 
from the creation and sustenance of claims provides these roots. Banks, the 
keystone of securities markets, really are ‘market makers’: ‘intermediar[ies] who 
creates  a market for a financial obligation’ (Law, 2008: 278). In this thesis this 
making of markets has two elements: the first and usual sense is that they publish 
prices at which they ‘stand ready to buy and sell assets’ (Levi, 2005: 563), 
providing liquidity to the markets.
105
 Second, they are market makers when they 
provide the market infrastructure – a role interlinked with the first. For example, 
they are central to the standardisation of legal terms;
106
 they organise and run 
clearing houses;
107
 and they provide technology and research to market 
participants.
108
 By making markets in this way, banks sustain the joint stock 
organisation of capitalism, where the analysis begins. Throughout this thesis 
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 Although not a critical assumption the main market structure assumed throughout this chapter 
is what market microstructure theory refers to as a ‘competitive multiple dealer market’, this is the 
dominant market form not only in most debt security and FX markets but more importantly for 
this dissertation in OTC derivative markets. (Gravelle, 2002: 1)  
106
 E.g. the European Financial Markets Lawyers Group, (European Financial Markets Lawyers 
Group) 
107
 E.g. of 20 members of the board of the London Clearing House (LCH), 2 full-time members 
are previously long term employees of JPMorgan and the Bank of England, 15 are employed by 
international Banks, 2 are from other exchanges and only 1 is not a banker.  
108
 E.g. see UBS Investment Bank’s website outlining services provided to hedge funds. (UBS 
Investment Bank, 2012) 
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banks making markets in this dual role are referred to as market makers or, more 
often, dealers.
109
  
Section 4.2 analyses joint stock capitalism; section 4.3 draws a parallel between 
commercial banking and securities dealing; section 4.4 looks at the specialisms 
and profits of banks as securities dealers, again in comparison with commercial 
banks. Finally section 4.5 examines lending and borrowing from outside 
production in securities markets, before 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Joint Stock 
4.2.1 Joint stock capitalism 
Joint-stock financing represents a qualitative change from the pooling of 
individual capitalists, and the emergence of general incorporation marks a 
distinctive change in capitalism. National institutions have been important in 
shaping the specific forms and timing of the emergence of joint-stock capitalism 
and related banking practice at different times and in different places. 
Nevertheless, important commonalities can be extracted for the general theory of 
banks being constructed here.  
Before the full establishment of industrial capitalism, securities issuance was 
dominated by states, especially for purposes of war, with lenders advancing 
money in return for a share of the spoils. Corporations also pre-date industrial 
capitalism, perhaps most famously in the UK with the East India and South Sea 
Companies, and securities were already a rich environment for bubbles, 
speculation, swindles and crashes.
110
 As industrial capitalism became established, 
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 Benston and Smith (1976) state: ‘The most basic form of financial intermediary is the market 
maker. He simply provides a market-place where potential buyers and sellers come together ….  
An example of this form of intermediary is the New York Stock Exchange. It does not create 
assets, it only furnishes a physical location for buyers and sellers to transact. … A somewhat more 
sophisticated form of financial intermediation is provided by a dealer who also takes a position at 
his own risk in the asset transacted.’ By this definition banks act as dealers in securities and 
derivatives markets. ‘Market maker’ however captures more of the sense of banks as instrumental 
to the existence of the market. 
110
 Chancellor (1999: 48) notes that ‘In the stock market of the 1690s, the line between 
commendable self-interest and arrant fraud was frequently crossed’; indeed he notes that ‘at this 
date, ‘to bubble’ meant to perpetrate a fraud’. Crashes were also spectacular: ‘of 140 English and 
Scottish companies operating in 1693, only 40 survived the crisis of 1697 – a failure rate of 70%’ 
(ibid: 52).  A generation later the South Sea Company was at the centre of another bubble 
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first canals and then railways became favourites for incorporation. In 1824 the 
Bubble Act was repealed and generalized incorporation was largely ushered in 
with the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (Kindleberger, 1984, Hobsbawm, 
1975: 252). In the meantime the Country Bankers Act of 1826 allowed joint stock 
banks outside the City of London, resulting in their spread in the 1830s 
(Kindleberger 1984).  
Outside Britain, the detailed story of incorporation and related bank practices has 
its own specificities. As Gerschenkron (1962: 7) notes, although other European 
nations, such as Germany broadly followed England’s path to industrialisation 
there were also ‘considerable differences’ and ‘to a considerable extent’ these 
stemmed from specific national institutional arrangements.  Early institutional 
economists, such as Veblen, ‘stressed the cumulative and path dependent nature 
of institutional change’, where institutions can be broadly defined, including for 
instance the law and ‘generally accepted ways of thinking and behaving’ 
(Rutherford, 2001). This idea of path dependency is consistent with a Marxist 
approach which stresses agency within an inherited structure which re-shapes the 
future structure; and which investigates the interaction of economic forces, law, 
politics and ideology. The specificity of developments in different places at 
different times is reflected in the debate over the benefits of bank-based vs. 
market-based financial systems (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). While the 
UK might be thought to be more market-based, Germany is typically seen as 
more bank-based. These differences were influenced by different national 
institutional arrangements and national banking structures. For example, larger 
German banks would have had a greater capacity to hold larger-scale loans while 
retaining depositors’ trust in the diversity of their portfolio (see Chapter 3), while 
in comparison the relatively fragmented UK banks would have had less capacity 
to hold large-scale loans and were therefore more likely to turn to securities 
markets.  
Despite these differences as industrial capitalism established itself in different 
places and at different times, financial systems became a mixture of bank lending 
                                                                                                                                    
resulting in the Bubble Act of 1720, ‘which made illegal the establishment of companies without 
parliamentary permission and prevented existing companies from carrying on activities not 
specified by their charters’ (ibid, 1999: 82). 
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and securities markets. The empirical difficulties in distinguishing between bank-
based and market-based systems underline this: empirical studies invariably 
display a complex mix of the two and have difficulty constructing a single 
measure of financial structure for use in regressions
 
(Levine, 2002).  
For the purpose of developing the theory of banking practice, the similarities are 
more important than national differences: securities issuance and joint stock 
capitalism emerged in all advanced capitalist economies. The securities markets 
of today are the most developed form available for study, and both the issuance 
and the market making for securities are dominated by investment banks (Duffie, 
2010).
111
 The very large banks that dominate these markets appear to have more 
in common as global banks, particularly in financial markets, than they do as 
nationally-specific banks.  
As an additional point, the theory developed here suggests that the labels ‘bank-
based’ and ‘market-based’ financial systems would be more appropriately called 
‘commercial bank-based’ and ‘investment bank-based’ financial systems: 
companies must visit their commercial bank for loans and their investment bank 
to issue securities. Such an approach also argues against an outright process of 
bank disintermediation as a result of more financial markets (as expounded by 
mainstream accounts of banking (Campbell et al., 1988: 201, Edwards, 1996)) 
but rather argues for a shift in the form of banking. As discussed in Chapter 2, a 
market is an abstract category that means little without further elaboration of how 
it is ‘made’, therefore to discuss market-based systems without analysing their 
roots and mechanisms is to risk misunderstanding them.
112
 
The general emergence of securities represents a change in the form of property: 
they give the wealthy a means of transforming the form of their property away 
from land or a particular business such as the family firm (Kindleberger, 1984: 
Ch. 10).
113
 In prior forms of capitalism, wealth ownership and control of 
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 Chapter 1 highlighted how derivatives markets are dominated by the 15-20 largest banks 
acting as dealers. 
112
 Methodologically it might be thought that the bank vs. market view also has a tendency to 
begin analysis with earlier forms of securities market, rather than with the latest form of highly 
tradable capital markets dominated by dealers and other non-dealer financial investors.  
113
 Government bonds played a crucial role in this process of change of form of property by 
offering a risk-free benchmark, the least risky route for alternative investments (Kindleberger, 
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productive resources were fused together, such as the owner/manager of a factory 
or the lord of the manor under feudalism. The general emergence of joint stock 
capitalism means, to put it simply, that ‘many … corporations are not run by the 
people that own them’ (Morck et al., 1986: 1). In other words there is a 
‘separation of ownership and control’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
Joint stock companies are not the same as the pooling of owner/manager 
capitalists in a partnership; they represent a qualitative shift of form in both the 
scale and the flexibility of ownership.
114
 The separation of control and ownership 
allows owners the flexibility to exchange ownership and to change the form of 
wealth without affecting or being tied to underlying processes (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2006: Ch.  4). Above all, the ability to change the form of wealth from 
securities to money allows banks to collect additional funds through securities 
markets, as explored in the rest of this chapter. In this way joint stock permits a 
‘tremendous expansion in the scale of production’ (Marx, 1981: 567).115  
4.2.2 Capital as property and process 
The establishment of the credit system, and in particular the coming of joint stock 
companies, exposes a dual aspect of capital – the qualitative division between 
property and process. In this thesis, joint stock companies represent a moment 
when the ‘quantitative division of profit into net profit and interest turn[s] into a 
qualitative division’ (Marx, 1981: 495), where ‘interest is the fruit of capital in 
itself, of property in capital, without reference to the production process, while 
profit of enterprise is the fruit of capital actually in process, operating in the 
production process’ (ibid: 497). Importantly, this division is one of capital and 
does not involve the relationship with labour.  
                                                                                                                                    
1984: Ch. 10). The railway and canal companies can be seen as an intermediate stage before the 
fuller establishment of general incorporation.  
114
 Even using the term owner/manager anticipates the split in roles, of course, and can only be 
used in light of the changes that subsequently occurred 
115
 Kindleberger (1984: 202) notes the historical significance of the emergence of joint stock 
capitalism when he says: ‘Whatever the proximate cause … the basic reason was surely that the 
amounts of capital required by railroads, mines, shipping companies, banks and an increasing 
number of industrial enterprises were increasing beyond the capacity of informal markets to 
provide them’. Stock markets here might be usefully seen as both a precondition and a result of 
the expansion of production.   
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One way to analyse this split is via the relations of production. Capital both 
benefits economically from the production process and has possession of the 
means and objects of production (Poulantzas and Camiller, 1978, Poulantzas and 
Fernbach, 1975). The split between capital as property and capital as process 
might be thought to separate these two aspects of the relations of production. 
Capital as property owns the economic benefits, while capital as process has 
possession of the means and objects of production.
116
  
The distinction between capital as property and capital as process can be used in 
analysing securities markets. In this analysis, securities, including both debt and 
equity, are taken to be capital as property. To see how this abstraction comes 
about it is possible to trace several steps from an owner-manager issuing debt to a 
company issuing highly-traded debt and equity.  
In an owner-managed capitalist enterprise that issues debt, debt certificates can be 
thought to earn interest as capital as property. The equity held by the owner-
manager, however, is not distinctly split between capital as process and capital as 
property. With knowledge of the more developed form, i.e. joint stock capitalism 
and increasingly actively-traded equity security markets, it is possible to see that 
analytically the owner-manager’s capital can be split abstractly between property 
and process, even though, concretely, it is jointly embodied in the owner-
manager. 
In the next logical step, the roles of owner and manager are split as equity 
securities are issued. There might appear to be some ambiguity about the place of 
issued equity when considering control of the production process. Equity holders 
are largely removed from the production process; they advance money and expect 
a return, and in this respect equity securities look like capital as property. At the 
same time equity holders theoretically retain some aspects of control, perhaps 
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 ‘In capitalism, the direct producers are entirely dispossessed of the object and means of their 
labour: they are separated from them not only in the economic property relation but also in the 
relationship of possession.’ By way of contrast ‘… in the pre-feudal modes of production, the 
direct producers were separated from the labour-object and the means of production through the 
economic property relation, they were not separated from them in the second constituent of the 
relations of production, namely, the relationship of possession’ (Poulantzas and Camiller, 1978: 
18). In this framing it can be seen that the split between property and process could not have 
occurred in the same manner in another mode of production, e.g. where direct producers owned 
the means of production. At the same time securities are merely a form of ownership of the 
economic benefit of production, and as such, securities can and do exist outside capitalism.  
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diminished compared to an owner-manager but in theory distinguishing them 
from debt-holders. 
Neoclassical economics has developed a large body of theoretical literature 
investigating this separation of management and control and the problems it can 
bring as managers pursue their own interests and not those of owners (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In theory their interests are aligned because, for example, 
owners can usually vote at annual general meetings and approve board 
membership and remuneration; it is also argued that the threat of takeover and the 
sacking of managers allows equity holders to influence control of management 
(Stiglitz, 1985). Yet this does not appear to be the case in practice, and micro-
foundation theorists seek to explain this through market failure, most often based 
on information symmetries (Stiglitz, 1985). As usual this micro-foundation 
approach seeks to explain discrepancies between observation and perfect market 
theory with instances of market failure and advocates action in this light, e.g. 
paying management with equity (Morck et al., 1986). 
The exchangeability of securities distinguishes them from partnerships, and 
observations of the latest trading practices in securities markets allows equities to 
be categorised in this analysis as capital as property on a similar footing as debt 
securities.
117
 Equity holders in the latest period, e.g. in 2013, especially with the 
rise of institutional investors analysed in the next chapter, can be characterised as 
trading more and as having ever-shorter holding periods. This reduces both the 
motivation and the scope for intervention in the processes of production 
(Edwards, 1996: 54-59). Computerised high-frequency trading (HFT), in which 
dealers potentially undertake thousands of trades per second and holding periods 
are measured in fractions of seconds, shows how little possibility there is for 
equity to act as capital as process.
118
 Furthermore, to banks as securities market 
makers there is no qualitative difference between debt and equity securities as 
objects of their securities-dealing business, as becomes clear in the next section’s 
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 It might be noted here that capital as property and process have both shared and divergent 
interests: they fight for a relative share of surplus value but have a common interest in increasing 
the absolute amount of it. 
118
 Control of the early charter and joint stock companies rested more in the hands of politicians 
and management, e.g. in determining the scope of the charter, than in the hands of equity holders 
(Neal, 1990). 
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analysis of the role of banks as securities dealers and makers of the securities 
markets.
119
  
For this analysis, therefore, debt and equity are treated as having more in 
common than differences as claims on the income of the corporation
120
 As Marx 
states:  
The ownership titles to join-stock companies … are genuinely titles 
to real capital. Yet they offer no control over this capital. The 
capital cannot be withdrawn. They give only a legal claim to a 
share of the surplus value that this capital is to produce. (Marx, 
1981: 608)  
The income generated by industrial capital, which is taken to be capital in 
process, is paid over to securities as interest on capital as property.  
Accepting their essential similarity for the purposes of this analysis shows that 
this payout to capital as property has a structure. In different circumstances 
different types of claims are likely to take precedence: in times of high profit the 
claim of a bond holder might earn less than that of an equity holder; in less 
profitable times the reverse may be true, particularly in default. This simply 
means that the claims are structured or contingent, and indeed there are hybrids of 
debt and equity such as convertible bonds, and amongst the classes of debt and 
equity there are often further distinctions, e.g. senior and subordinated debt. 
121
  
Finally, the distinction between property and process helps the analysis of 
banking capital (containing both property and process) and of the form of capital 
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 The definition of securities debated here cannot be formed independently of the broader 
analysis of the making of securities markets.  
120
 Much of economics views the split between debt and equity as critical. Much neoclassical 
scholarship emphasises the importance of the difference between two for calculating the value of 
the firm, from Modigliani and Miller (1958) to agency theory discussed above, e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Meanwhile, Black and Scholes’s (1973) theory, used by money capitalists to 
profit from trading financial claims ,views securities as differently-structured claims on the assets 
of the firm while equity as the residual claim retains a qualitative difference to debt. Amongst 
post-Keynsians, opinion might be said to be split: while Toporowski (2000: Ch. 1) sees little 
difference for the purposes of explaining financial inflation, he points out that the difference is 
important to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1975: Ch. 5). 
121 
Hilferding points out that corporates can obtain bank loans more easily than partnerships, as 
they have the option of issuing equity to raise money to pay back loans (Hilferding, 1981: 120). 
Equally firms can raise debt to increase leverage, effectively benefiting shareholders. 
4 - Securities dealing as a banking activity  
Page 124 of 303 
in which it deals (claims to interest – capital as property).122 As a particular 
capital, banks must offer a specialised process to capital in general in order to 
allow returns to bank capital as property. Bank capital does not simply lend 
money and earn interest as a share of surplus value, i.e. IBC (Marx, 1981); it is a 
capital that contains elements of both property and process, and this process 
involves dealing in capital as property. The complexity is increased as banks 
generally deal in other people’s and their own capital as property – put simply, 
banks lend their own and other people’s money. Banks as dealers in capital as 
property take various forms, but categories of commercial and investment bank 
prove useful for analysis as they reveal both similarities and critical differences, 
which the next section takes up as it explores how investment banks come to 
facilitate and profit from the collection and lending of (other people’s) otherwise 
idle money via securities markets.
123
 
4.3 Securities dealing as a banking activity 
Securities markets might appear to be a disintermediation of bank activity; (IMF, 
1998), but banks are at the heart of these markets and understanding securities 
markets is inseparable from understanding banks’ role as securities dealers 
(Duffie, 2010). This section therefore analyses the emergence of securities 
market-making activities by drawing parallels between commercial and 
investment banking. The essential similarities between the two banking activities  
in creating and sustaining claims to allow the collection and on-lending of 
otherwise idle money are drawn, before examining the differences in the forms of 
the liquidity provided. A theory of banks must be capable of incorporating 
securities dealing and the trading behaviours inherent in securities dealing, 
identified only abstractly in this chapter, which are critical to the emergence of 
derivative markets discussed in the next chapter.  
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 As noted above, joint stock banking in the UK dates to the 1830s (Kindleberger, 1984). 
123
 Banks are also generally joint stock companies and thus subject to their own concrete division 
of property and process. Amongst other things this, allows them to lend to other banks via 
securities markets and the money market.. The joint stock nature of banks allows them, as other 
capitals, a scale that would otherwise not be possible. This aside, however, incorporating the joint 
stock nature of banking into this analysis brings added complexity without much further insight 
into the nature of banks’ securities and derivatives activities.  
4 - Securities dealing as a banking activity  
Page 125 of 303 
4.3.1 The similarities between securities dealing and commercial banking 
Investment banks typically provide capital to corporations by managing the 
issuance of securities on its behalf: 
To provide the capital [to the corporation], the bank need only 
advance it, divide the sum into parts, and then sell these parts in 
order to recover its capital. Thus performing a purely monetary 
transaction (M-M1). (Hilferding, 1981: 120) 
 
Buyers of securities, who are lenders, hold assets which are a claim directly on 
the income of the borrowing firm.
124
 
However, simply selling debt to long-term holders of loans is qualitatively 
different from banking: banks do more than this, as they allow money capitalists 
(lenders) to retain access to money. Commercial banks achieve this by issuing 
claims to money which, through banks’ actions, come to act as money (see 
Chapter 3). First, this allows them to minimise the relative amount of money used 
in exchange, and second, it allows them to collect idle money from ‘innumerable 
small puddles’ (Schumpeter, 1954: 319) and, concentrating it, to lend it and earn 
a share of the additional surplus value or revenues thus generated by the 
borrower. This doubling achieved by credit money allows access to the benefits 
of money for both borrowers and lenders. 
Investment banks achieve a parallel doubling via securities markets: 
[Banks] also perform a third function in supplying productive capital, 
not by lending it, but by converting money capital into industrial 
capital and fictitious capital and taking charge of this process 
themselves. (Hilferding, 1981: 127)  
‘Fictitious capital’ is a claim to income from industrial capital which, thanks to 
the marvels of discounting, can be expressed as a lump sum of money today.  
This doubling of money capital into industrial capital, and claims to income from 
it, allows the money lent to be used by the borrower (as capital in process), while 
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 This is in contrast to a commercial bank ,which subsumes the advance of capital under its own 
liabilities. Depositors could be said to own the assets indirectly via the banks liability. 
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at the same time lenders (money capitalists or owners of capital as property) 
retain access to money via securities markets. Banks facilitate this access to 
money by making markets in securities: the investment bank undertakes to buy 
back the security on demand, thus re-transferring it into cash for the lender. 
An example helps to illustrate how dealing in securities works. Company A 
wishes to borrow money to buy machinery, which will repay the cost of 
borrowing over a number of years. Companies B, C, and D produce Christmas 
cards, Easter eggs and deckchairs, receiving cash at Christmas, Easter and in 
August respectively and not spending it until later in the year. The demands of 
the production process mean that companies B, C and D have idle money at 
certain times of the year, but cannot lend in the long term if they are to restart 
their production processes in time for the next year’s sales. On the other hand, 
they cannot leave their annual proceeds sitting idle. The bank, as security dealer, 
organises the issue of a security, a claim to the income of company A (as 
generated by the new machine). Company B buys the security on January 1
st
 with 
its annual revenue, but after some months requires money to buy card and ink. 
The bank makes a market in the security of Company A, quoting both a buy and a 
sell price with the intention of profiting from the difference. Thanks to the bank 
making a market Company B sells the security back to the bank in exchange for 
money. Meanwhile, with the proceeds of its Easter bonanza, company C is 
similarly looking to temporarily invest its capital; it advances money to the bank, 
holds the security and receives an interest payment from the security before C 
sells the security back to the bank when the time comes to pay for its annual 
shipment of cocoa.
125
 Finally, company D temporarily exchanges money with the 
bank in return for a claim to the income of company A and, thanks to the bank 
acting as market-maker, is able to return to money long before Company A has 
the money to repay the loan.  
This ability to return to money is much more than a convenience: ‘For the 
shareholder to become a money capitalist … he must be able to regain possession 
of his money capital at all times’ (Hilferding, 1981: 109), and ‘[i]t is the 
                                                 
125 Note that the interest payment from the security may take the form of a dividend for equity 
secutities. 
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transferability and negotiability of these certificates, constituting the very essence 
of the joint stock company, which makes it possible for the bank to ‘promote’ … 
the corporation’ (ibid: 120).  
So that the bank does not find itself holding the entire loan, which might pose 
several problems for the bank, for example making it undiversified (see Chapter 
3), it must cultivate many possible buyers (and sellers) of securities, i.e. a 
secondary market. While this market may appear to take on a life of its own, the 
bank must stand behind it: it must ‘make’ the market if it is to ensure that the 
lenders have the ability to exchange their securities holdings for money. Banks 
also build market infrastructure such as legal norms, payment and clearing 
systems.
126
 There are clear similarities here with commercial banks’ activities 
seeking  to cultivate a wide range of depositors and to build payment and clearing 
systems.  
This view of securities markets is in direct opposition to most other economics 
theories of securities markets. In neoclassical theory, securities (and derivatives, 
less costly than ‘primitive securities’) help to achieve efficiency through market 
completion (Ross, 1976). Markets appear to emerge inevitably in the light of 
these efficiency gains. The closest many textbooks get to explaining their 
presence, or the process of their emergence, is to state the theoretical gains.
127
 
Market infrastructure is then captured as a second-order effect by adding 
assumptions about transaction costs and market imperfections. 
4.3.2 The differences between securities dealing and commercial banking  
As well as fundamental, even essential, similarities between securities dealers and 
commercial banking there are also important differences. Liquidity provision in 
securities issuance and dealing contains crucial differences to liquidity provision 
through commercial bank deposits and lending. This difference stems from the 
nature of the doubling that the bank uses to facilitate the lending of money that 
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 Sociologists examining financial markets often pick up on the ways in which dealers construct 
markets. E.g. Knorr-Cetina and Preda  (2005) and MacKenzie (2007) 
127
 E.g. ‘[t]he importance of capital markets cannot be overstated … funds can be efficiently 
allocated from individuals with few productive opportunities and great wealth to individuals with 
many opportunities and insufficient wealth. As a result, all (borrowers and lenders) are better off 
than they would be without capital markets’ (Copeland and Weston, 1988: 13). 
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would not otherwise be lent. In commercial banking, liquidity is achieved by a 
doubling of money: bank credit money faces production processes in general 
through the diversity of the bank’s balance sheet, repays at par and is made up of 
claims to money that come to act as money (Ch. 3). In securities markets the 
lender’s claim is on a particular production process. As a result, securities cannot 
act as the universal equivalent – money – as they are not equivalent to the 
universe of commodities or production processes as money was shown to be in 
Chapter 3. Instead of acting as money securities are made exchangeable for 
money. Not being money and being exchangeable for money, securities have a 
money price that moves relative to the prices of other assets and commodities. 
Bank credit money, representing production in general and serving as the 
universal equivalent, does not.  
Again, an example helps to emphasise the point. Company A holds a liability of 
bank Z. If bank Z has lent to every production process in the economy, either 
directly or via lending to other banks in the money market, and has cash to hand, 
then the creditworthiness of the liability that A holds is not exposed to the ability 
of any one producer to sell commodities but to the economy as a whole. This 
diversity increases the chances that the bank’s liability repays at par and 
establishes a stable and reliable 1-1 ratio between the claim on the bank to money 
and money itself. In terms of the functions of money, the bank’s liability can 
become a measure of value and therefore a means of circulation. This, together 
with the fact that the whole economy borrows and holds bank liabilities, 
contributes to making them generally acceptable as money.
128
 The bank liability, 
a claim to money, comes to act as money.  
If on the other hand Company A buys a security of Company B, A can still return 
to money by selling the security back to the market maker, but the claim on 
company A is exposed to the effects of competition on company B: if B prospers, 
the price of the security is likely to rise; if it falters, the price is likely to fall. 
Facing one production process it is not universally equivalent (to all other 
commodities / production processes) but rather equivalent to one particular 
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 Central banks, fiat money and the state play a critical role in making bank credit money 
generally acceptable, but this can be left aside in the comparison of commercial and investment 
bank activities.  
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capital. The security cannot then be used as money, i.e. to buy commodities, as 
there is no reason for it to hold a stable 1-1 relationship with money – it is not a 
reliable measure of value (in general) and therefore fails as a (general) medium of 
circulation.  
Further clarity can be seen in comparison to the approach of Kregel, a leading 
Post-Keynsian economist, who argues: ‘Both [commercial and investment banks] 
provide liquidity; they just do it in different ways: the former by creating 
deposits, the latter by structuring the liabilities issued by borrowers’ (Kregel, 
2010a: 8). Furthermore: 
Investment banks … provide liquidity by ensuring that the liabilities 
they underwrite [i.e. securities] have a higher liquidity premium than 
the capital assets they finance and thus can be bought or sold in 
organised markets … They do this by ensuring an active and liquid 
secondary market for securities through their … activities as market 
makers. (Kregel, 2010b: 3)  
Howeverr, Kregel appears to downplay the difference between commercial and 
investment banking when he claims that ‘a commercial bank creates liquidity by 
ensuring that its liabilities have a higher liquidity premium than its assets and 
thus can always be exchanged for currency’.129 I have shown how bank credit 
money goes beyond being simply exchangeable for money and how its liquidity 
comes from the way in which it comes to act as money.  
4.3.3 Trading 
Financial market trading is defined in this thesis as buying and selling with the 
aim of profiting from price moves. This is different from simple buying or selling 
which is motivated by a desire to hold the asset (e.g. to earn interest) or to 
liquidate it in order to return to money. The trading element which is inherent in 
securities markets stems from the nature of the liquidity that the bank provides, 
and is critical in explaining the role of bank as dealer and later the emergence of 
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 In his arguments about financial regulation in the articles cited, Kregel appears to regard the 
liquidity produced as interchangeable, perhaps because he downplays the differences of form, 
whereas the very difference in the form of liquidity analysed above would prevent such 
interchangeability. 
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derivatives. The term ‘dealer’ here is synonymous with ‘market maker’. The 
dealer is engaged in trading, i.e. buying and selling at different prices to make a 
profit, but differentiates itself from other traders by making the market, providing 
both liquidity and infrastructure. Dealers/market-makers are paid primarily by 
charging a higher price for selling than for buying; the difference in price 
between the highest price that a buyer is willing to pay for an asset and the lowest 
price for which a seller is willing to sell it is known as the ‘bid-ask spread’.  
At this point in the analysis, securities markets contain two inherent and 
combined elements: they provide firms with finance and they trade. By providing 
a way for capitalists to return to money they allow the collection and 
concentration of idle monies and their conversion into money capital through 
lending it to industrial capital. At the aggregate level, for a given amount of 
borrowing, lenders come and go as depositors did: while some lenders exit the 
relation by selling their securities, the lending relation is replenished as, on the 
other side, new lenders enter by buying securities.  
Because they are claims on a particular process, and because they are exchanged, 
securities have a price, and a price that moves. This in turn means that lending in 
these markets is bound up with trading and with the constant readjustment of the 
investor’s portfolio which stems both from ‘the stick of financial risk’ and the 
‘carrot of speculative profit’ and, as I will show, with derivatives, is ‘laced with 
the proceeds of extensive arbitrage’ (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: 3).130  
The palpable but ever-changing price is central to these markets and merits 
further investigation.
 
This price is nothing more than an expression of the interest 
earned by capital as property. Interest (and hence the price of the security) has an 
appearance of solidity: it is continuously quoted and seems to be fixed for all, 
even if it changes in the next moment to a new fixing (Marx, 1981: Ch. 22-3). 
This is true for both untraded bank loans and traded securities, but the nature of 
interest nevertheless helps to establish trading in the latter. If interest is paid on 
deposits it might be quoted each day but makes little difference to the activity of 
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 ‘The fact that speculation is unproductive, that it is a form of gambling and betting … does not 
run counter to its necessity in a capitalist society … but simply testifies against the way in which 
this society is organised’  (Hilferding, 1981: 138-9). 
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liability holders, except that they may switch deposits from one bank to another; 
they will nevertheless (ordinarily) be repaid at par on demand by the borrower 
(i.e. the bank). Where the advance is to be traded, however, the continuously 
updated nature of the interest is relevant to the security holder. The interest rate is 
expressed as a price for the security, and by having a price the security can adopt 
the form of a commodity without being a commodity (Marx, 1976) .
131
 Securities 
prices must be known to market participants, who must be able to trade at any 
time to return to cash, and the palpable nature of interest helps in this regard.
132
  
As well as being palpable and quoted, however, interest is simply the result of a 
division of surplus value between capitalists and is not determined by anything 
more fundamental than the forces of supply and demand.
133
 The setting of interest 
involves no confrontation with labour
134
 and therefore lacks a fundamental 
tendency around which the price can fluctuate.
135
 The price varies with the 
interest rate in general (the forces of supply and demand between property and 
process); among particular capitals (the perceptions of the varying prospects of 
particular production processes); and among the various claims to the funds 
flowing from those processes (affecting the relative prices of a given 
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 Interest moves inversely to price through the simple mechanics of discounting. The price of a 
single future cash flow, P, of size X, can be expressed as P=X e
-rt
 using continuous compounding 
or P=X / (1+r)
t
 using simple compounding, where e is the exponential, r is the interest rate and t 
the time until the cash flow (Copeland and Weston, 1988: Appendix A). 
132
 Indeed the more frequently the prices are displayed, the more frequently participants are 
encouraged to trade as they attempts to profit from price changes, and vice versa: the more they 
trade, the more the price appears palpable, if forever changing. Banks are aware of this and 
encourage more transactions per time period by proving real-time trading tools to clients – for 
banks, ‘moments are the elements of profit’ (Marx, 1976: 352), and the more transactions per time 
period the more profit they can accumulate. This, however, is not to speed up the circuit of capital 
and hence increase the flow of surplus value but their attempt to capture a share of that surplus 
value from other capitalists. High-frequency trading provides further evidence of the continued 
increase in the speed of securities trading with trades occurring in milliseconds and firms locating 
next to exchanges to reduce the length of carbon fibre cable and hence reaction time of their 
computers to published prices (Grant, 2010). 
133
 The separation of ownership and control, the payouts to each face of capital (property and 
process) and the resulting incentives for factions of capital has led to a wide literature both 
classical (e.g. Smith, 1937: 700, quoted in Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 305) and neo-classical 
(e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). These works essentially attempt to 
rationalise this straightforward conflict within an efficiency- and market-based theoretical 
framework. 
134
 Notwithstanding matters of financial expropriation where labour faces the financial system as 
lender and borrower. For more on financial expropriation see Lapavitsas, 2009b.  
135
 Unlike the rate of profit, which does have a central tendency thanks to its determination at the 
point of conflict between labour and capital, but which is not palpable and observable, as interest 
is.  
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corporation’s different types of securities).136 As the price varies with all these 
factors, holders of securities have the opportunity to profit from the changing 
price and the necessity that securities be transferable for money.  
With securities prices palpable and constantly moving (but without a fundamental 
tendency around which to move), banks construct securities market for trading, 
for money capitalists and for themselves as dealers. Banks provide liquidity and 
also make markets in the sense of constructing the market, providing the 
necessary infrastructure such as the legal framework and payment, settlement and 
clearing systems, to facilitate trading. Banks construct infrastructure such as 
payment and settlement systems to facilitate large and frequent transfers of 
securities. Clearing houses, which require cooperation among banks, play an 
important role, negating offsetting deals and reducing the actual transfer of 
securities. In order to process transactions they also agree and publish reference 
prices which further establishes the palpability of securities prices and helps 
securities financing (Hilferding, 1981: 144). The need for the security to be 
transferable determines the legal form of securities as negotiable and therefore 
transferable between parties, in contrast to the less transferable legal form of the 
bank loan. Banks design securities with a high degree of standardisation, 
increasing their tradability, for example, in the widespread use of English law. It 
also manifests in standard maturities, coupons and the currency of securities. 
There is however a limit to standardisation; securities remain claims on particular 
production processes and not on production in general, and are exchangeable for 
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 For the purpose of analysing banks here it can be assumed that the distribution of surplus value 
to capital as process is profit of enterprise and is retained by the corporation, e.g. as retained 
earnings, and its management, and that the distribution to property is interest paid to all types of 
securities. While Marx argues that wages of supervision – both for coordination and exploitation 
– will be competed away until they become pure wages (Marx, 1981: Ch. 23), here use is made of 
the more abstract division. Perhaps more importantly, the distribution between firm and securities 
argued for here disagrees with Hilferding’s (1981) notion that profit of enterprise is capitalised 
and paid to founders, namely banks and entrepreneurs. It is not clear why the risk premium would 
not rise to eliminate such a windfall, and Hilferding does not provide a source for the continuing 
bid-ask or market-making profits that banks make in securities markets after the initial public 
offering (IPO). In any case the location of profit of enterprise does not materially affect the 
treatment here of debt, equity and hybrid securities as structured claims on that part of surplus 
value which is paid to security holders. Banks’ capital attracts profit as property and as process 
where it acts as a specialist in dealings in loanable money capital. Its profits are paid from the 
money capital of those with which it deals and from the additional surplus value generated by the 
borrowing it facilitates, as I show in the rest of this chapter. 
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money; thus their price moves in money terms  and they are not generally 
redeemable at par as credit money is.  
4.4 Banks as dealers: specialist attributes and profits  
4.4.1 Banks as specialists 
Banks are specialists as makers of these markets; they offer a particular process 
to capital in general which allows them to claim a share of surplus value. As the 
analysis has expanded to incorporate investment banking, the key attributes of 
this specialisation have remained very similar to those required by commercial 
banking. These attributes interact with and are enhanced by the wide network of 
clients that banks develop, forming a many-to-one relation with the bank, as with 
commercial banks. In short, and as explored below, banks still i) are experts in 
credit analysis, ii) have cash to hand and iii) can provide and adapt the 
infrastructure or institutions of markets – specialist attributes initially identified in 
the analysis of discounters.  
First, banks are experts in credit analysis. Lenders of idle funds, i.e. the buyers of 
securities, are not likely to be experts in analysing the credit the credit analysis of 
the borrowing firms; they rely a great deal on the bank’s analysis. Although they 
are likely to replace the bank’s portfolio diversity with their own portfolio 
diversity, they nevertheless trust the bank’s reputation for analysing and pricing 
the security correctly (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007). Additionally, avoiding the 
risks of default on loans now involves analysis of the ability to sell the loan 
(before it defaults) as much as to secure repayment from the borrower. This 
means that investors replace their confidence in the commercial bank’s ability to 
judge and enforce repayment of loans with confidence in the security dealer’s 
willingness and ability to buy their security from them, and the investment bank’s 
judgement of credit involves an understanding of who is buying and who is 
selling and their motivations – market makers are uniquely placed to access this 
information.
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 The capitalist looking to (occasionally) invest temporarily idle 
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 Known as ‘colour’ or ‘flow’ (dealers stress the importance of being ‘in the flow’) in the 
markets and as ‘payoff irrelevant private information’ (Gravelle, 2002: 6), or later ‘private non-
fundamental information’ (Cao et al., 2006: 333) in market microstructure theory, this 
information is also offered to clients when suggesting trades and/or to provide narratives to price 
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funds is clearly disadvantaged. Note that the banks’ credit skills are not greatly 
altered from the commercial banking attribute of securing repayment by whatever 
means available, not simply by assessing the technical merits of a production 
process.  
Second, banks have access to cash so they can exchange the security for cash on 
demand, and investors must be confident that the banks hold cash to buy their 
securities with. Again, a wide network of buyers and sellers greatly enhances the 
possibilities of access to cash by finding buyers of banks’ securities inventories. 
In this aspect there is a clear asymmetry with the lone capitalist: the bank, 
particularly a universal bank, has multiple and continuous sources of cash while 
the capitalist must rely on the rhythms of the circuit of production and the holding 
of costly reserves. 
Third, the investment bank also brings its money-dealing skills to bear, keeping 
track of customers, processing payments and often acting as a custodian for 
securities and so on. Construction of this costly infrastructure requires that the 
flow of securities through it is large enough to warrant the initial outlay, requiring 
a large network of buyers and sellers and a large volume of transactions. In fact 
banks explicitly sell the benefits of this infrastructure to market participants.
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This last category is somewhat akin to a narrow definition of money-dealing 
profits (Marx, 1976), although here it is more accurately capital as property 
dealing, or perhaps loanable money capital dealing.
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 It has both a visible side, 
such as its custody services, but also a softer, less visible side in the hiring and 
retention of staff who can perform these operations. Once more, the lone 
capitalist is at a disadvantage here to the extent that he or she is obliged to use the 
infrastructure provided by the bank. 
                                                                                                                                    
movements.  Inasmuch as market microstructure research is slowly starting to acknowledge the 
importance of such information, it is acknowledging the importance of alternative means of 
completing the mediation of the M-M’ relation. 
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 This selling of services produces fee income and might be thought separate from income from 
lending or market making; however it remains dependent on a specialist attribute that the bank 
requires for its core activities.  
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 The analysis so far in this chapter has constrained itself to the mobilisation of otherwise idle 
monies between production processes. As I discuss in the next section, and as similarly shown for 
commercial banks in the last chapter, various characteristics of money, credit and banks make 
them as just able to lend and borrow from outside production. Once this analysis is in place, banks 
can be analysed as dealers in loanable money capital. 
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4.4.2 Banks’ profit 
The form of profit of securities market-makers differs from that of commercial 
bankers, the difference being dictated by the differences between the form of 
money capital in each. Securities are streams of interest income capitalised to a 
lump sum to the present moment; payment to the bank also takes the form of 
capitalised income, i.e. a lump sum today. In contrast, commercial banks receive 
a stream of interest over time and aim to pay out lower interest over time; 
payment to the bank takes the form of periodic interest payments. Capitalised 
profit to the securities dealer comes from their ability to charge a higher price 
when selling than when buying, called a bid-ask spread; indeed one definition of 
market makers might be that they are able to charge such a spread, and the rest of 
the market participants are obliged to pay it. 
Despite these differences in the form of commercial and investment banks’ profit, 
the content remains largely the same. The bank facilitates lending that would not 
otherwise occur by creating a doubling, which for investment banks involves a 
doubling of money capital into money lent to industry as industrial capital and the 
claim to income from that capital in the form of a security (sometimes called 
fictitious capital (Marx, 1981, Hilferding, 1981)). They sustain this doubling by 
allowing the conversion of securities (fictitious capital) to money – in other 
words they provide liquidity. They profit from this, first by claiming a part of the 
additional surplus value generated, paid both by borrowers from the surplus value 
generated and from the money capital of lenders, as in the case of commercial 
banks (see Chapter 3). Second, in the course of providing liquidity, banks also 
hold a portfolio of securities of their own and so additionally profit from holding 
their own capital in securities, just as commercial banks lend their own money. 
This section explores these categories of profit in more detail. 
Analysis must differentiate between the two sources of profit, and isolate market-
making profit from gains from holding securities (either as a market maker or an 
investor, from interest payment and from speculative gains), even though in 
practice the two are comingled. Figure 4.1, below, demonstrates the mechanism 
by which pure market-making profits arise, in particular isolating the bid-ask 
spread earned by providing both lenders with access to money (the parallel of 
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depositors) and borrowers with money to invest for longer periods than lenders 
would otherwise permit. It does so by making the dealer bank’s buy and sell 
transactions instantaneous.  
Figure 4.1 shows three periods, with balance sheets for the actors providing a 
snapshot of the position before and after each stage, as shown in Chapter 3 for 
commercial banks. Two investors start with an initial endowment of 10, held in 
money. In the first period the bank organises the issue of the security and 
instantly sells it to Investor 1, who receives a coupon during the period. At the 
end of period 1 the bank has gained some profit from market making and Investor 
1 has lent money to the borrower, who has paid over some interest to Investor 1. 
During period 2, investor 1 sells the security to the market-making bank, which 
instantly re-sells to Investor 2. The borrower continues to have access to the 
borrowed funds, while Investor 1 also has access to liquidity. Investor 2 receives 
a coupon for lending money for a period. In period 3 the banks buys back the 
security and the borrower repays at par. The borrower has paid 4 in coupons, 
which have been paid to investors as interest and to the bank as market maker.  
 
Figure 4.1: Market-making profits 
 
Initial Endowments 
 
Bank     Borrower    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
         
         
Investor 1    Investor 2    
Assets Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Cash 10 10 Equity  Cash 10 10 Equity 
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Stage 1 
1. Bank issues a security (paying interest of 2 per period) on behalf of 
borrower. Borrower receives 10 in cash. Bank announces it is ready to 
buy at 9.5 and sell at 10.5 
  
2. Bank sells instantly to Investor 1 for 10.5 
  
3. Borrower pays interest of 2 to investor 1. 
 
Security 1 
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After Stage 1 
 
Bank     Borrower    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Cash 0.5 0.5 Equity  Cash 8 10 Security 
       -2 Equity 
         
Investor 1    Investor 2    
Assets Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Cash 1.5 11.5 Equity  Cash 10 10 Equity 
Security 10        
 
Investor 1 Bank 
Security 
 
Cash (9.5) 
Investor 2 
Security 
Cash (10.5) 
Stage 2 
1. Investor 1 sells to Bank for 9.5.  
2. Investor 2 buys for 10.5 
3. Borrower pays coupon of 2 
 Borrower 
Cash (2) 
After Stage 2 
 
Bank     Borrower    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Cash 1.5 1.5 Equity  Cash 6 10 Security 
       -4 Equity 
         
Investor 1    Investor 2    
Assets Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Cash 1 1 Equity  Cash 1,5 11.5 Equity 
     Security 10   
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The illustration shows that the profit earned by the investors and by the market 
maker is not of the same nature. The investors hold the security for one period 
each. They suffer a loss if the borrower defaults, or otherwise earn interest. The 
lenders have their parallel in commercial bank depositors who deposit idle money 
for a short period, the bank’s actions allowing idle money to act as loanable 
money capital.  
The market maker buys and sells instantaneously, thus earning 2 in total by 
market making and not by owning securities. The bank’s market-making profit 
arises because it allows lenders access to money before payments from the 
borrower are complete; in other words the bank completes the mediation of the 
lenders M-M’ circuit before the borrower does by buying the security (Lapavitsas 
and Levina, 2010).  
Investor 2 Bank 
Security 
 
Cash (9.5) 
Borrower 
Security 
Cash (10) 
Stage 3 
1. Investor 2 sells to Bank for 9.5.  
2. Borrower redeems the security for 10. 
 
After Stage 3 
Bank     Borrower    
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Cash 2 2 Equity  Cash -4 -4 Equity 
         
Investor 1    Investor 2    
Assets Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Cash 1 1 Equity  Cash 1 1 Equity 
 
Note that the borrower has paid 4, investors have earned interest of 2 for 
holding the bond, the bank has earned 2 for making the market. 
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The borrower pays out 4 in total interest over 2 periods, thus the market maker 
ends up with a portion of the interest paid, not for holding the security for a given 
time but for its ability to charge different prices for buying and selling both upon 
issue of the security and upon providing liquidity to the secondary market. Note 
that it is assumed, but not shown here, that the borrower puts the money to some 
profitable use, out of which it pays the coupon.
140
  
Although the payment is from the additional surplus value generated, in the first 
instance it may be from the money capital of lenders. In Figure 4.2, below, the 
bank completes the M-M’ relation for money capitalists by buying the bond, in 
this case without reference to the borrower (this has been removed from the 
diagram to isolate the payment from the lender/investor money capital). Figure 
4.2 shows the cash flows from buying and selling securities. It shows a zero-sum-
game between A, B and the market maker in which price moves represent not 
interest payments, as above, but price moves due to changes in demand and 
supply. Clearly the M-M’ relation is completed and the bank is paid from the 
security holders’ money capital. More generally, if the borrower pays into the 
security as envisaged, the security buyer’s capital is recompensed by the 
borrower. If there is a default, this second stage does not occur and the profit of 
the seller of the security is paid only from the money capital of the holder of the 
security at default (Lapavitsas and Levina, 2010). 
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 The profit could be configured as a - b where a is the sale proceeds and b is the cost of 
purchases. In turn this can be reconfigured as pa.qa over na transactions less pb.qb over nb 
transactions where p is price, q is quantity and n is the number of buys or sells. Unfortunately this 
would beg the question of the joint distribution of a-b, or, more likely, the distributions and 
correlations of pa, qa, na, pa, qa and na, which are, again unfortunately, unknowable. As above, 
partly for these reasons the examples in this chapter continue in the simple form of monetary 
amounts. Such an approach might be typical of a neoclassical exploration of the mechanics of 
security dealing profits, but, not straying from immediate appearances, it adds little to a deeper 
understanding of the essence of these markets. 
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Figure 4.2: Market making profits – no borrower 
 
 
Taking this further, although the bank is paid out of the additional surplus value 
generated by mobilising otherwise idle funds, it is not possible to say whether it 
is paid by the lender or the borrower. It is paid by both, and there is no objective 
basis for the split between the two. As discussed above, the forces at work in the 
markets for interest are purely ones of supply and demand among different 
aspects of capital: the borrowing firm’s payments reduce its profit of enterprise 
while the lender’s payments reduce its interest earned. There is no objective or 
qualitative basis to the split.  
The bid-ask spread is paid to the bank as a return to specialist bank capital for 
facilitating the creation of additional surplus value – similar to the return to 
commercial banks. It is only the banks’ mediation that makes the transaction 
possible, therefore the bid-ask spread is the starting point and not the end of the 
analysis; e.g. the analysis cannot proceed on the basis of a (purely theoretical) 
reference rate such as the mid-price and add the bid-ask as a result of market 
Investor 1 
+99-96=3 
Investor 2 
+95-100=-
5 
99 t1 
96 t2 95 t2 
100 t1 
Bank 
- 99 + 100 
-95 +96 
= 2 
Investor 1 receives 99 from the bank at time=t1 for selling a security 
(security not shown). The bank instantaneously sells to B for 100 (charging 
a bid-ask spread of 1). The market price goes against B and falls to 95. At 
time=t2 B cuts his losses at 5 and sells back to the bank for 95. A is happy 
to buy back the security for 96, closing her short position for a profit of 3. 
The bank makes 2 (twice 1) for crossing bid-ask twice. This is paid from 
the money capital of the investors. 
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imperfections because this implies that a market could exist without the 
intervention of a market maker.
141
  
Mainstream economics in the form of market microstructure theory captures 
some elements of the bid-ask spread but is limited because it makes the purely 
hypothetical mid-price its starting point. For example, Demsetz (1968: 35-36) 
argues that ‘[t]he ask-bid spread is the mark-up that is paid for immediacy of 
exchange in organised markets’. The idea of ‘immediacy’ certainly captures some 
of the nature of the market maker’s closing of the lender’s M-M’ relation by 
buying the security before repayment by the borrower falls due. Nevertheless, 
Demsetz’ explanation lies clearly in the micro-foundations tradition of explaining 
observed phenomena as arising from a deviation from perfect markets, and posits 
the bid-ask spread as a fair price for a service rendered around a purely 
theoretical mid-price. Market microstructure theory has built upon the work of 
Demsetz with a variety of explanations of the bid-ask spread that share these 
traits. As O’Hara notes: 
[The] idea … of immediacy captured an aspect of the price process 
not envisioned in the Walarasian framework. … If the actual 
mechanism used to set prices is not merely a channel to an inevitable 
outcome, but rather is an input into the equilibrium price itself, then 
how such mechanisms work cannot be ignored? (O'Hara, 1995: 5-6)  
This opens up a whole field of research. As is typical of neoclassical economics, 
while some elements of the appearance of markets are captured, this approach 
cannot explain the presence of the markets in the first place without reference to 
purely theoretical perfect markets. 
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 The same is true for the spread in interest rates charged by commercial banks; e.g. the UN 
recommends measuring the difference between lending/deposit rates and a reference rate in the 
measurement of the activity of banks to be included in National Accounts (United Nations, 1993). 
The banks’ ability it price away from the mid- or reference rate in this approach must then be 
explained as a ‘fair price’ for a service provided, e.g. bearing risk. The bank’s return in the theory 
put forward here, in contrast, stems from its being a capitalist, which allows it to accumulate 
others’ surplus labour as surplus value because it has property and because it undertakes a 
specialist process which permits capital as a whole to extract more surplus value from labour, and 
which gives individual capitalists a chance to gain from speculation. Banks sometimes 
accumulate via the accumulated money capital of others. 
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As well as profiting from pure market making however, dealer banks also profit 
from their own capital (as property) by earning interest and benefitting from price 
moves. What Figure 4.1 does not show, because it assumes instantaneous resale, 
is that in making markets a dealer ordinarily carries a portfolio of securities of its 
own while in the process of buying and selling. Therefore the market maker also 
earns interest on its own capital. Again, there is a parallel with commercial banks: 
on the one hand there is the provision of a specialised capitalist process – at its 
core the doubling of money and credit money by commercial banks and the 
doubling of industrial and fictitious capital by investment banks, sustained by the 
specialist attributes of the bank – which facilitates the lending of other people’s 
money. In addition to and as part of this, both commercial and investment banks 
earn interest by lending their own capital.  
The attributes that banks possess as market makers give them an advantage over 
investors when lending their own capital, either holding securities to earn interest 
or trading to profit from price moves. As usual, these follow from the asymmetry 
the develops between bankers, as specialists, and other capitalists. For example 
their greater access to cash might allow them to sustain mark-to-market losses for 
longer to allow a position to return to profitability; their greater trading volume 
might reveal more opportunities than appear to occasional traders, not least 
because dealers, by being ‘in the flow’, have access to information that less 
frequent market participants do not; third, their extensive dealing infrastructure 
might enable them to move faster than other market participants.   
4.5 Lending to and borrowing from outside production 
The analysis so far has concentrated on lending to and borrowing from 
production; however, as with commercial banks, the nature of money and interest 
generally means that securities markets are as able to collect and lend money 
outside production as in it. However, the difference in form, and in particular the 
tradable nature that securities require, mean that there are differences in the 
sources of money that is collected, as this subsection explores. 
Analysis of banks and the relations with and between lenders and is as applicable 
outside production as within it because of the nature of money and interest, as 
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exemplified in the M-M’ relation or the advance of money now in return for 
repayment plus and an increment as explained in Chapter 3. Turning first to 
lending, the lender requires repayment, not in a specific use-value but in money, 
and will lend to anyone that promises to return money with interest. The 
separation of the M-M’ relation from the mediating process means that from the 
lender’s perspective any process can form the mediating circuit as long as it 
promises to return M + M, where M = M’ – M. Banks, as lenders and as 
securities traders, are crucial to the production circuit as providers of finance, but 
they are also separate from it and are able to apply their specialism outside 
production, including to other financial institutions as well as other banks and 
others trading securities. As noted previously, the skill of the bank in credit 
analysis rests in securing repayment and not the technicalities of a production 
process. 
In fact the seeds of this separation are implicit in the joint stock form, even when 
lending to production: the actual money lent is not repaid but used by industrial 
capital (the coin lent sets off on its own journey of commodity exchange), and 
repayment comes from the ongoing results of the production process
142
 
(Hilferding, 1981). As discussed at the start of this chapter, interest is the return 
to capital purely as property and in production this means appropriating the 
product of other people’s labour, but the fact that it earns its money while 
separated from production means that interest is not completely capitalist in 
character. As a result, interest both pre-dates, as discussed above, and occurs 
outside production. Analysis must expand from production in industrial 
capitalism to capture this.  
The fact that interest can be earned from outside production makes it, if anything, 
clearer that funds can be lent from outside production. Whilst the analysis begins 
with monies falling idle in production, money as the universal equivalent is 
accumulated in many places in society. Like commercial banks, any revenues that 
are only ‘gradually consumed’ can be ‘converted into deposits and thereby into 
loan capital’ (Marx, 1981: 636). The establishment of the credit system and 
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 The same is true of longer-term commercial banking investment credit and can be contrasted 
with trade credit and circulation credit, in which, for example, the onward sale of commodities 
provides the coin that repays the lender.  
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widespread banking means that money becomes capital even before it has been 
advanced; in anticipation of being put to use it is ‘latent, potential capital’ ibid: 
477). Interest on money generally is anticipated before it is lent, so money is also 
lent from outside production. This is true for both the workings of commercial 
banks and the purchasing of securities with otherwise idle money.  
 However, there are differences between commercial and investment banks when 
it comes to collecting money from outside production, and in the financialised 
capitalisms of the early 21
st
 century these differences are important to 
understanding securities markets. Commercial banks remain a pre-eminent site 
for the collection and concentration of temporary idle monies (Hilferding, 1981). 
Credit money can be used immediately in a large range of transactions from the 
smallest to the largest; it becomes money, and is therefore more suited to those 
who want quick and easy access to money, as discussed above. As money, its 
value moves against all other commodities in general, or, put another way, credit 
money (ordinarily) repays at par.  
In contrast, securities must be traded each time money is required, incurring 
transaction costs (hence a certain scale is required) and delay. This tends to lead 
to larger investments and less frequent exchange for money. Furthermore the 
price of a security, as income from a particular capital, can move in relation to 
other assets; i.e. losses might be incurred relative to other assets. One result is 
that commercial banks are natural buyers of securities (which they incorporate 
with loans in their diverse portfolio of assets). More importantly, institutional 
investors emerge holding portfolios of securities, often collecting and investing 
the idle money of individuals. Analysis of institutional investors and their trading 
behaviour is critical to understanding derivatives markets and is taken up in the 
next chapter.  
4.6 Conclusion 
To recap, the growth of joint stock companies crystallises a division between 
capital as property and capital as process. With this split, the analysis of banks 
can expand to incorporate a third function; that of securities dealing. Banks 
facilitate the conversion of idle money into money capital by effecting and 
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sustaining a doubling between industrial capital and claims to income from that 
capital. Money is lent to and used by industry, the lender being entitled to part of 
the borrower’s income which, thanks to discounting, can be expressed as an 
amount of money today. Banks sustain the doubling by maintaining a market in 
these claims to income, the securities markets.  
The use of exchangeability to return the lender to money changes the character of 
securities markets from that of commercial banking. As in commercial banking, a 
variety of processes can mediate the lender’s M-M’ relation as long as it offers a 
return of money lent with an increment, and therefore securities enable borrowing 
from inside and outside production (as with commercial banks). The difference 
now is that in addition, the sale of the security can complete the relationship. 
When the latter occurs, a security holder’s M-M’ circuit is completed, not with a 
stream of income from the borrower but from the money capital of another 
security buyer (Lapavitsas and Levina, 2010). In completing the M-M’ circuit in 
this way, however, security buyers and sellers are exposed to movements in the 
price of the security and thus may complete the M-M’ circuit through sale with a 
profit or a loss. Price moves provide the ‘carrot of speculative profit’ and ‘the 
stick of financial risk’ (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: 3), which helps to give rise to 
securities trading which is more concerned with price moves than with 
temporarily investing money that falls momentarily idle in the production 
process. This trading behaviour is bound up with the emergence of institutional 
investors, and above all with the emergence of derivatives. The next chapter 
investigates this.  
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5 Derivatives: institutional investors and derivatives 
dealers 
5.1 Introduction 
Derivatives markets are dominated by banks dealing in financial derivatives 
amongst themselves and with non-dealer financial firms (see Chapter 1). The 
world’s biggest banks are derivative dealers, and the world’s biggest derivative 
dealers are banks. The theory of bank capital developed in the last two chapters 
must now be expanded to incorporate banks as derivatives dealers, and in doing 
so, to explain what is it about banks that has led them to the very heart of these 
markets and what is it about the derivatives that they trade in that has led to them 
becoming overwhelmingly used as instruments for financial trading. 
Banks have been shown to make activities possible that would otherwise not be 
possible, specifically by generating efficiencies in the use of money and 
collecting idle money, concentrating it and lending it. They have been shown to 
do so above all by issuing claims invested with properties by the actions of banks 
to make new activities possible. Both commercial banks and securities dealers 
have done this by turning idle money into money capital for borrowers while 
lenders are issued with a claim to their lent money. In the case of commercial 
banks, this claim to money comes to act as money, while in the case of securities 
it is exchangeable for money. In both cases the issuance and sustenance of the 
claim is organised by the bank and creates a ‘doubling’ that gives both lender and 
borrower access to the benefits of money when they need them,  and creates 
additional lending and additional economic activity out of which the bank itself is 
paid. 
In this chapter I show that derivatives are also a claim issued and sustained by 
banks’ market-making activities, from which they profit, but now the activity that 
this claim makes possible (and which otherwise would not occur) is not an 
extension of credit but trading activities – repeated buying and selling with the 
aim of profiting from price moves. A derivative makes these trading activities 
possible by being a claim to the monetary proceeds as if the exchange had taken 
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place, without it actually having to take place. Thus derivative counterparties 
come to act as if they are trading things on a scale and scope far beyond what 
would be possible if exchange actually had to occur. This is made possible 
because derivatives are claims and through the properties invested in them by 
banks’ actions, as explored throughout this chapter. 
In the last chapter I showed how the exchangeability of securities is inherent in 
the way in which buyers can return to the benefits of money. This chapter starts  
in section 5.2 by analysing how institutional investors emerge, providing a 
separation between securities exchange to manage liquidity and trading to capture 
price change. Section 5.3 investigates derivatives as a new category, comparing 
them to securities trading as a way to adjust a portfolio of claims and showing 
them to be concerned with trading to benefit from price changes and not with the 
provision of credit. Section 5.4 further examines banks’ role in these markets 
before section 5.5 concludes and briefly compares derivatives trading and 
gambling.  
5.2 The emergence of institutional investors and trading portfolios 
In the analysis so far, balances of money falling temporarily idle, whether in 
production or elsewhere, are exchanged for either bank credit money or 
securities. While bank credit money acts as money and can itself be used in a 
large range of transactions, securities must be exchanged for money with a dealer 
bank. Two key features stem from security exchange, the starting point of 
analysis in this chapter. First, there is an asymmetry between dealers as 
specialists and individual lenders which is exacerbated by scale. Institutional 
investors emerge to aggregate the idle money of individual lenders, and with the 
resulting increase in scale reduce the asymmetry between lenders – now 
represented in securities markets by institutional investors – and dealers. Second, 
and partly as a result of this, the securities exchange analysed in the last chapter is 
split into two. Additional trading behaviours emerge which stem not from the 
demands of liquidity, but from the aim of profiting from moves in the price of 
securities. These two developments are examined further in this section and set 
the scene for the emergence of derivatives as claims that enable trading 
behaviours. 
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5.2.1 Institutional investors emerge 
Individuals attempting to invest in securities markets face a large asymmetry of 
specialism and scale with banks in securities markets. As shown in the previous 
chapter, banks are specialists and have an advantage over non-specialists in 
operating in securities markets; furthermore the attributes of banks are enhanced 
by the scale of their networks. Specifically, small lenders, e.g. individuals, face 
large asymmetries with banks in credit analysis skills, access to cash and loanable 
money capital dealing skills.  
However, to a large degree these asymmetries can be reduced with scale: many of 
the problems can be mitigated by building a large and diverse portfolio and 
borrowing against it, trading more often and building hard and soft infrastructure 
and technical abilities, e.g. by employing specialist individuals. Institutional 
investors that concentrate the holdings of many small lenders can therefore 
mitigate some of the disadvantages that individuals face in trading securities with 
banks, and can charge for doing so.
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Institutional investors emerge from this asymmetry to face dealer banks in 
securities markets, concentrating idle money from across the economy and 
building a portfolio of securities.
144
 But they are not banks, and in many ways are 
analytically the opposite of banks. This opposition, and the nature of institutional 
investors, can be further explored through comparison first to commercial banks 
and then to securities dealers. 
Chapter 3 discussed how commercial banks advance their own liabilities. In order 
to convince borrowers to hold these liabilities, banks make them of short maturity 
or even repayable on demand. Thus commercial banks first lend and then borrow. 
Institutional investors, on the other hand, borrow first. Having persuaded 
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 Theoretically the effect of the emergence of institutional investors on dealer profits might be 
thought to be ambiguous; on the one hand the reduced asymmetry between dealer and client can 
reduce margins, while on the other it can attract greater volumes to securities markets. This seems 
to accord with historical experience of growing securities-markets trading accompanied by a 
shrinking bid-ask spread. Financial profits have risen, which suggests that the increased volumes 
more than compensate for falling margins.  
144
 Minsky (1996: 358) identifies ‘money market capitalism’ as a new stage of capitalism in 
America. Edwards (1996: 53) details the empirical changes, showing how ‘households have 
increasingly placed their money with institutional fund managers’. 
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investors to hand over their money first, they are under little compulsion to make 
their liabilities repayable on demand.  
Indeed, once institutional investors emerge they act further on the differences (as 
explained in the last chapter) for individuals with idle funds between on-demand 
bank deposits and securities investments, which are subject to delay and dealing 
costs. The liabilities of institutional investors are usually subject to a specific lack 
of liquidity, e.g. lock-up periods in hedge funds, payout only at retirement in the 
case of pension funds, payout on only demonstrable insured loss by insurance 
firms and so on.  
Partly for this reason, the liabilities of institutional investors do not come to act as 
money. This is true even when they seem to have other key attributes of bank 
credit money; above all they face a wide and diverse portfolio of assets (e.g. 
production processes) across the balance sheet and may even offer to repay at par 
as, for example, money market funds tend to do. Although this may render the 
liabilities of some institutional investors into ‘near money’, e.g. money market 
fund liabilities, these do not fully act as money, unlike bank liabilities.
145
 
Institutional investor liabilities remain exchangeable for money, mirroring the 
portfolio of assets that they buy with their collected idle money.  
On the asset side of the balance sheet, there are also differences between 
institutional investors and commercial banks: despite the apparent similarity of 
holding a diverse portfolio of assets, there is a difference in the liquidity of these 
assets. Ordinarily commercial banks do not sell their loans, and develop a close 
relationship with borrowers, partly in order to assess their ability to repay and the 
best way to ensure repayment. Institutional investors, on the other hand, rely less 
on repayment and much more on completing the M-M’ relation by selling the 
security. Therefore the most important relation they develop is with banks as 
securities dealers. As a result, the relation with borrowers takes on an arm’s-
length nature not found between commercial banks and borrowers.
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 E.g. money market fund liabilities cannot be used in a range of transactions, from buying a loaf 
of bread to buying securities, as money can. 
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 This difference in the number of close relations carries over into derivatives markets. 
Institutional investors typically rely on a handful of dealers to make markets and provide the 
market infrastructure while banks as derivatives dealers typically develop thousands of 
5 - Derivatives: institutional investors and derivatives dealers  
Page 151 of 303 
Moving on to the comparison with securities dealers, there are also important 
differences here. First, the last chapter showed that securities dealers in the first 
instance aim to buy and sell securities instantaneously, thereby capturing the bid-
ask spread, the form of their profit (the bid-ask spread is paid by institutional 
investors). Second, any holdings of securities are a secondary consequence of this 
activity, either because securities dealers come to hold an inventory in the course 
of making markets or because they feel that their specialist skills give them an 
advantage in holding securities to benefit from price moves. Institutional 
investors are again the theoretical reverse of banks here: they first hold securities 
on behalf of many smaller lenders and savers and then develop trading activities 
and attributes as a consequence of holding a portfolio of securities. Finally, banks 
retain a specialist role as dealers in loanable money capital; specifically, 
securities dealers (market makers) provide market infrastructure. While 
institutional investors make use of this infrastructure, indeed investment banks 
sell securities finance, custody and other brokerage services to money managers 
for a fee; e.g. hedge fund prime brokerage. 
In short, banks as securities dealers and institutional investors come to face each 
other across securities markets, constituting the two main categories of market 
participants (also the case in derivatives markes as will be seen). Comparing the 
two reveals that in many ways they are opposites. Institutional investors seek 
liquidity on the asset side so that they can exchange securities for money, and in 
many ways aim to reduce liquidity on the liability side. Commercial banks 
undertake the opposite, illiquid assets being made possible by supplying liquidity 
to liabilities, while in securities markets investment banks provide the liquidity 
that institutional investors require.  
5.2.2 Trading behaviour 
The emergence of institutional investors in this way allows the analysis to divide 
the exchangeability of securities for money into two new categories: exchange for 
money driven by liquidity needs and exchange driven by a desire to capture 
                                                                                                                                    
counterparty relations, e.g.: ‘According to its administrators, the London arm of Lehman Brothers 
alone had roughly 8,000 ISDA Master Agreements’ (Parker and McGarry, 2009: 16). However, 
as also noted in Chapter 7, some financial firms sign more than one ISDA Master Agreement, so 
the number of counterparts is likely to have been less than 8000. 
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moves in the price of the security. Institutional investors pool investors’ idle 
money to be invested and by doing so can greatly reduce the need to buy and sell 
securities for liquidity reasons.  
As ever, the analysis starts with exchange. As money moves around the economy, 
some production processes have idle money while others have a shortfall. Put 
most simply, if A buys commodities from B, A has no money (having given it to 
B) and must borrow if their commodity is not resold immediately; conversely, B 
now has money which they invest if they do not buy a commodity immediately. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the money above allows a pause in exchange, giving rise 
to credit (Marx, 1976).  
In securities markets without institutional investors this would lead to one party 
buying a security from a dealer and another selling to a dealer as individuals 
deposit their money into and withdraw their money from securities markets. By 
pooling these liquidity flows, institutional investors are able to match the 
withdrawal with the deposit and offset these flows of money without having to 
buy and sell securities. In this way institutional investors can, to a large degree, 
insulate their asset side from liquidity demands.  
This pooling of liquidity flows covers not only monies used in production 
processes but also those used across the economy, and can be seen in the typical 
forms of institutional investor in the early 21
st
 century. For example, as some 
people retire and draw pensions, new workers enter the market and contribute to 
pensions; as some pay in insurance premiums, others claim for losses. 
Furthermore institutional investors, as mentioned, attempt to restrict withdrawals 
so that they are not forced to sell their assets. 
The asset side of the institutional investor balance sheet, then, is to a degree 
separated from the liquidity demands of depositors. Insulated from liquidity 
constraints, the asset managers of institutional investors are required to manage a 
portfolio of securities in the face of constantly-quoted and constantly-moving 
prices. In the last chapter I explained how constantly-moving and -quoted prices 
are respectively a feature of interest – a division of a surplus value among 
capitalists with no centre of gravity around which to tend – and necessary to 
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securities markets so that investors can exchange securities for money. Banks 
profit from the exchange of securities for money and so have an incentive to 
advertise buying and selling prices and to tempt market participants to trade more 
often and in larger quantities. Institutional investors holding a portfolio of 
securities are faced with Eatwell and Taylor’s (2000: 3) ‘stick of financial risk’ 
and ‘carrot of speculative profit’. The result is that institutional investors trade to 
capture price moves by avoiding losses from price falls and capturing gains, and 
this has come to typify the behaviour of market participants in securities markets.  
This behaviour tends to inflate the amount of trading in a given period. First, to 
profit from relatively small price moves requires trading large amounts in order to 
capture a sizeable absolute amount of profit. Second, the more trades that are 
recorded, the more frequently completed prices of exchange can be published; the 
market price then appears to be moving quickly and so trading becomes more 
frequent and holding periods shorter. Computerised high frequency trading has 
become the latest incarnation of this process, with holding periods of fractions of 
a second and vast numbers of trades completed in a trading day (MacKenzie et 
al., 2012, Makan, 2011, Grant, 2010).
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Finally, briefly and before the analysis moves to derivatives, the trading activities 
of nonfinancial firms on the financial market can be accommodated within the 
category of institutional investors. As nonfinancial firms, many of them 
multinational, increase in size they develop the need for a central treasury 
department to manage their liquidity needs. In doing so they can also offset 
liquidity deficits and surpluses within the firm to some extent. Thus any cash 
surpluses can also become insulated from the daily ebbs and flows of cash within 
the firm. Nonfinancial firms investing these cash piles in securities face the same 
situation as the institutional investors analysed in this section and can be treated 
as such.
148
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 The large share of trading taken by HFT and its propensity for errors has led one commentator 
to remark: ‘When events like this happen they just reaffirm that these aren’t investors, these are 
traders’ (Popper, 2012). 
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 Nonfinancial firms have become more financialised in a number of ways that can run 
alongside this treatment as institutional investors and traders in securities markets. As Lapavitsas 
notes: ‘The modern MNC is ‘financialised’ in the sense that financial transactions are a 
substantial part of its activities and profit making’ (Lapavitsas, 2009a: 15). 
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5.3 Adjusting portfolios – derivatives as an instrument for trading 
At this point, that is with dealer banks facing institutional investors actively 
trading portfolios of financial claims to capture price changes, the analysis can 
introduce derivatives. As mainstream economists note, ‘institutional ownership of 
securities has fuelled the growth of derivatives markets’ (Edwards, 1996: 54).  In 
Chapter 1 the analysis began with the agricultural, physically-settled derivatives 
that were the dominant form before the rapid expansion of cash-settled, bank-
centred financial derivatives over the last 30-40 years. Derivatives were posited 
as a way for the producer to adjust his inventory through active trading, and are at 
once both similar and different to selling the actual produce. Similarly the 
analysis here approaches derivatives as a way to adjust, through active trading, 
the composition of a portfolio of financial claims in the form of securities, and 
now of derivative claims too.  
Dealer banks make derivatives markets in the double sense used above: by 
standing ready to buy and sell and capturing bid ask spread by doing so, and by 
providing market infrastructure. Derivatives are analysed as claims, issued by 
dealer banks and sustained by banks’ market making, from which banks profit. 
Securities, also analysed as claims, allowed the doubling of industrial and 
fictitious capital and thus the production of surplus value that would not 
otherwise have occurred. Derivatives as claims allow trading behaviour that 
would not otherwise be possible. This section explores how this is achieved by 
contrasting the trading of securities with trading via derivatives.  
The analysis of derivatives presented here contrasts sharply with the neoclassical 
tradition, for which the usual theoretical starting point is the increase in efficiency 
gained by moving towards complete markets (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). 
Derivatives are seen in this analysis as a cheaper way of completing markets than 
securities (Ross, 1976). Following Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961), this 
activity should be carried out by the owners of a firm and not by the firm itself. 
Indeed holders of securities (institutional investors) are, as I have shown, the 
largest traders of derivatives, however they do not generally use derivatives to 
trade the inputs and outputs of production but use them to trade financial 
derivatives. 
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This has not stopped a sizeable section of the microfoundations literature asking 
why firms hedge (Judge, 2006). Assuming that (nonfinancial) enterprises use 
derivatives to hedge, the literature attempts to establish why (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). It constructs microfoundations using familiar market imperfections such as 
information asymmetries and taxes; Tufano’s (1996) survey groups them 
primarily under shareholder maximisation and managerial utility maximisation. 
However Bartram et al’s (2009) survey of the empirical testing of these theories 
finds the results inconclusive and sample-specific, although it can be argued that 
Covitz and Sharpe (2005) finally seem to obtain more meaningful results by 
asking if firms hedge.  
Empirically, however, it has been shown that the major protagonists in 
derivatives markets are dealers and institutional investors (see Chapter 1); 
theoretically these opposites have been developed above as traders in securities 
markets concerned with capturing price moves. Institutional investors hold 
portfolios of financial claims, securities, and now derivatives as well; adjusting 
the composition of that portfolio can occur through trading securities themselves 
or through trading derivatives. The neoclassical argument that these are 
essentially interchangeable ways of completing markets fails to explain what 
derivatives are: what is distinctive about them, why they emerge, and why two 
ways of trading are required. On the other hand, analysis of the differences 
between trading securities themselves and trading via derivatives demonstrates 
the role that derivatives play and how they are distinct from securities. This 
section examines these differences.  
5.3.1 Trading without extending credit: a qualitative shift 
The first difference between selling and buying securities and using derivatives is 
that derivatives make concrete a division inherent in securities markets between 
trading and extending credit to enterprises. In other words, derivatives are 
leveraged. As shown in the last chapter, trading is an inherent part of extending 
credit via securities markets; it enables lending by allowing lenders to return to 
money as and when required. At this point in the analysis any split between the 
provision of credit and trading for price moves is highly abstract and can only be 
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made with knowledge of the forms that emerge later, e.g. institutional investors 
and securities finance such as repurchase agreements.  
Introducing securities finance to the analysis creates a crack in the basic 
analytical category of securities exchange. In securities financing such as 
repurchase agreements (repos and reverse repos) and stock-borrow-lend, lenders 
of money hold securities from the borrower as collateral. This lessens the cost of 
financing securities purchases (collateralised lending being generally cheaper 
than uncollateralised) and enables short selling (the seller borrows the security 
and delivers it into the sale, when closing the transaction the short seller buys 
back the security repays the borrow of the security). More importantly here, it 
enables the lender of money to lend via securities markets without trading in 
securities themselves and, critically for an analysis of derivatives, it allows the 
traders in securities to operate without providing the idle money themselves.  
Similarly institutional investors also allow a form of separation between the 
provision of credit and trading in order to benefit from price moves. Institutional 
investors take idle money and extend credit by buying securities, but they then 
separate trading behaviour by pooling and restricting liquidity on their liability 
side. Both securities finance and institutional investors make possible a 
separation of roles, with one party providing the credit, the other trading 
securities. Nevertheless both elements are present in both cases: one is not 
possible without the other, and the net effect is to provide credit to securities 
issuers. 
Derivatives’ trading, however, marks a qualitative shift. It isolates the trading 
element with no corresponding provision of credit: because there is no underlying 
exchange there cannot be an exchange of a promise to pay for money. If the 
emergence of institutional investors cuts financial markets off from lenders, cash-
settled derivatives cut them off from borrowers too. The derivative claims issued 
by the bank do not permit the collection, concentration and on-lending of 
otherwise idle money as commercial banking and securities dealing do but they 
do permit trading that would otherwise not be possible. How they manage this is 
explored below by continuing the logical sequence of the separation of 
derivatives from securities trading. 
5 - Derivatives: institutional investors and derivatives dealers  
Page 157 of 303 
Trading without the provision of idle funds is linked with the leverage for which 
derivatives have become infamous (e.g. IMF, 2002: 54, Dodd, 2005: 155, Gowan, 
2009: 14).
149
 In valuation theory, a derivative can be replicated with a trade in the 
underlying security together with securities finance – in other words a leveraged 
securities trade (e.g. Hull, 2003). Among other things, this leverage allows for a 
greater volume of derivatives trading for a given amount of money, used to settle 
the claim, than would be possible in simple securities trading. While the leverage 
in derivatives is important, making concrete the separation between trading for 
price moves and extending credit, inherently combined in securities markets, is 
critical in the theory.  
5.3.2 Physical settlement and capital trading costs 
The second way in which derivatives differ from securities trading, which reflects 
their status as trading instruments above all, is the savings in trading costs that 
arise by not exchanging a commodity or security but by settling the trading profit  
or loss with a monetary payment between claimants as if exchanges have 
occurred. This can be illustrated by examining the possibilities created by 
offsetting buys and sells in a physically-settled derivative – analytically a prior 
form to the cash-settled derivative.  
Buying and selling securities incurs various dealing costs for banks: securities 
and cash must be transferred through payment systems, usually supported by 
clearing mechanisms; money balances are kept in bank accounts while conversely 
securities custody is arranged with differences in bearer and registered bonds; 
coupons must be claimed; and securities finance is often also arranged. Critically 
when the time comes to sell or buy back the bond the whole process must be 
reversed. Internal control practices at the bank and at institutional investors 
require a segregation of duties such that different individuals undertake the 
different roles of trading, confirming, and settling; furthermore these must be 
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 Leverage is often seen as the source of the danger that derivatives pose to the financial system: 
‘Financial derivatives allow investors to unbundle and redistribute various risks … [h]owever the 
same instruments allow market participants to avoid prudential safeguards, manipulate accounting 
rules, and take on excessive leverage’ (IMF, 2002: 54). 
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controlled and audited both internally and externally. With securities turnover in 
the trillions of US dollars per day, the costs are significant.
150
 
Contrast this with a physically-settled forward derivative on the same single 
security. On the day of the transaction the buyer agrees to buy a specified asset 
(the underlying) for a specified price on a specified date – the expiry date – in the 
future. For the period of the derivative (until expiry) no money or security flows 
are required and therefore no securities financing is required. Yet on the 
derivative’s expiry date the money and securities must be settled. The only 
difference so far has been to delay the costs.  
Now consider if the derivative to buy the security is followed before expiry of the 
first derivative by a derivative to sell the same underlying security, or indeed 
many derivatives to buy and sell. In a securities transaction the whole process is 
repeated with more or less the same costs each time. Because settlement is 
pushed out in time, and because the underlying asset is standardised, the form of 
the derivative provides time for offsetting trades to be matched and netted out. At 
expiry a net position of potentially many transactions can be calculated, and 
settlement need only occur for a minimum amount. The extension of maturity 
that the derivative claim entails is suited to repeated buying and selling with no 
need to repeatedly exchange the asset underlying the derivative. Derivatives 
might be thought to bring economies of scale for increased numbers of 
transactions.  
In addition the final settlement, even of physically-settled derivatives, may be in 
cash only. As Cronon (1991: 125) notes of the Chicago exchanges: 
Moreover, the seller of such a contract did not necessarily even have 
to deliver grain on the day it fell due. As long as the buyer was 
willing, the two could settle their transaction by simply exchanging 
the difference between the grain’s contracted price and its market 
price when the contract expired. 
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 The DTCC alone settled US$1.48 quadrillion of  securities transactions in 2009 (Deposit Trust 
and Clearing Corporation, 2009). Bliss and Steigerwald note: ‘securities depositories … track 
beneficial ownership of securities, record changes in ownership, provide mailing lists for proxies 
and dividend payments, and so forth. These mundane functions occur on such an enormous scale 
that centralization provides overwhelming economies’ (2006: 27). 
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 With cash settlement, as I discuss below, the derivative’s suitability for trading 
(meaning buying and selling repeatedly to capture price moves) over and above 
its suitability for exchange of an asset underlying a derivative is made clear. 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the nature of the derivative as a claim and the way in 
which the cancellation of offsetting trades can occur before the expiry of the 
derivative with the effect discussed; it does so by comparing securities exchanges 
with the corresponding derivatives. The securities transaction shows the exchange 
of money for securities at time t2 and the reverse at time t3. The derivatives 
transaction (shown in the second part of the diagram) is in two stages. In stage 1 
Investor A enters a derivative at t2 to buy the security for 95, to be settled at t5. 
At t3 she enters a derivative to sell for 96, also to be settled at t5. In stage 2 the 
bank matches the offsetting trades, terminates them and pays over the profit of 1 
in money form at t3. As noted above, no security exchange occurs, no credit is 
extended to the borrower and there is only a single cash payment between the 
bank and its counterpart. 
The ways in which offsetting trades can be made to net and pay out are manifold. 
As I explore briefly below and at more length in the following chapters, much of 
the infrastructure of derivatives markets is constructed to allow equal and 
opposite claims to net off and result only in a single payment. It can occur by 
bilateral agreement or multilaterally, e.g. when derivatives are cleared centrally, 
as usually happens at exchanges. In the case of exchange-traded derivatives the 
exchange provides the infrastructure to novate all trades to face the exchange and 
it then terminates offsetting trades, thus helping to minimise the amount of 
physical delivery that is required. In this case there is no requirement to transfer 
ownership of the security and the money to be processed in the payments, and 
clearing systems can be reduced simply to the payment of profit and loss on the 
trade. Compared to securities trading, therefore, even physically-settled 
derivatives offer the opportunity to drastically reduce transaction costs where 
there is substantial trading, i.e. multiple derivatives trades to buy and sell the 
underlying. These advantages are made clearer with the advent of cash-settled 
derivatives.  
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Figure 5.1: Netting and terminating offsetting derivatives 
 
 
 Here an investor buys at time t2 and sells one period later. Comparison is made 
between doing so with securities (with same-period settlement) and with a 
derivative (where settlement is pushed forward to time to t5). This illustrates the 
money-capital dealing costs savings that are possible even with physically-
settled derivatives 
 White arrows symbolise flows of money, with the amount of money shown. The 
subscript now shows the time at which the trade is agreed while the superscript 
shows the time at which settlement will occur. Also shown here are the security 
flows in the same direction with the same sub/superscript notation.  
 The securities transaction shows the exchange of money for securities at time t2 
and the reverse at time t3.  
 In the derivatives transaction, grey, solid outline arrows represent the derivatives 
and white arrows represent money flows, with the same sub/superscript notation. 
 In stage 1 Investor A enters a derivative at time t2 to buy the security for 95 at 
time t5. At time t3 she enters a derivative to sell for 96 at t5.  
 In stage 2 the bank matches the trades, terminates them and pays over the profit 
of 1 in money form at time t4. 
 In the derivatives transaction no security exchange need occur, only a single cash 
payment.  
 The derivative transaction extends no credit to the borrower, is highly leveraged 
and results in considerable dealing cost savings compared to the securities 
transaction   
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5.3.3 Cash settlement: the separation of credit and trading 
Cash-settled derivatives are the fully-developed form of derivatives, released 
from the constraints of possible physical delivery. The removal of physical 
delivery cements the separation of trading from the provision of credit as well as 
saving dealing costs. Clearing or the termination of physically-settled derivatives 
before expiry might greatly reduce the incidence of their physical settlement; 
however, the possibility of delivery remains.
151
 Delivery means the exchange of 
money for an asset, with the dealing costs that this entails, and in some cases the 
exchange of money for a promise to pay and thereby the extension of credit. The 
move to cash settlement removes this possibility and marks a qualitative shift in 
form, opening up a scale and scope of derivative trading that would be 
impractical or impossible in securities trading. For counterparts to cash-settled 
derivatives it is as if they can trade on anything that can be measured to their 
mutual satisfaction. Finally, it also further distances financial markets from the 
broader economy; if institutional investors shut lenders out of the market itself, 
cash settlement shuts the borrowers out.  
With cash-settled derivatives the level of the underlying price index agreed in the 
contract is compared to the level on the expiry date and the profit or loss settled 
as a monetary amount. For example if, using a physically-settled derivative, John 
agrees on Monday to buy at a price of 4 on Friday and on Friday the market price 
is 10, he has the opportunity to buy for 4 using his derivative and sell for 10 in 
the market, thereby realising a profit of 6. A cash-settled derivative would simply 
pay over 6 of money between the counterparts to the derivative on Friday with no 
exchanges of asset for money. As noted in the introduction, perhaps the clearest 
example of a cash-settled derivative is a contract for differences: 
An agreement between two parties … to pay each other the change in 
the price of an underlying asset. Depending on which way the price 
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 As Cronon (1991: 126) says of Chicago’s agricultural and exchange traded derivatives: ‘... 
however tenuous [the relationship between actual wheat or corn and the derivative underlying] 
might have become, it could never finally disappear, for one simple reason. No future contract 
ever overtly stated that it could be cancelled by settling the difference between its price and the 
market price for grain on a given day’.   
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moves, one party pays the other the difference from the time the 
contract was agreed to the point where it ends. (lexicon.ft.com) 
The movement from physical to cash-settled derivatives presented here is 
analytical, but it also corresponds to historical experience. Credit default swaps 
provide an example; as their volume grew it became clear that in the event of a 
default of a large underlying reference credit, the logistics of gross and physical 
delivery would result in a disorderly or chaotic situation (Helwege et al., 2009). 
The result was that the dealers, via the International Swaps and Derivative 
Association (ISDA), changed the standard documentation to allow not only net 
settlement but also cash settlement based on the price at an auction of bonds 
subject to default (ISDA, 2009a, 2009b).  
Figure 5.2, below, illustrates how cash settlement separates derivatives 
transactions from the underlying processes it references, marking a qualitative 
shift from lending and securities trading. Securities trading, shown across the 
middle of the diagram, is based on a process that borrows money at the beginning 
(bottom left of the diagram) and repays at the end (bottom right). As previously, 
the arrows signify money flows, with the security flowing in the opposite 
direction and not shown. This may or may not be a production process. Note that 
while the bank as dealer/market maker has been removed from this diagram for 
presentational simplicity, it remains as the intermediary between trades. Investors 
that buy and sell temporarily hold a claim to the income of the underlying process 
but their circuit is completed by the next buyer (in anticipation of eventual 
repayment by the borrower), so they can be said to have the typical M-M’ circuit 
of a lender. The repayment differs from the initial outlay as M’ = M+M, where 
M can be positive or negative and is determined by the price movement 
between buy and sell.
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 Broadly investor’s trading profits along the way are paid out of ‘value to be created’ as long as 
there is no default, and from the money capital of the holder of the bond at default is there is. This 
is explored further below. 
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Figure 5.2: Cash-settled derivatives are separated from the underlying 
processes 
 
 
Derivatives sever the link with the underlying process, removing the need to 
advance and repay money and reducing the relation simply to the M of price 
moves, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. The first implication, as touched upon 
previously, is that with no advance of money no credit can be extended. This is 
bound up with the impossibility of exchange of the underlying asset. Credit is an 
exchange of money for a promise to pay. As discussed in Chapter 3, banking 
consists of the exchange of promises to pay, one more generally acceptable than 
the other, e.g. a banknote for a private promise to pay.  
A second implication of the severance of derivatives from any underlying 
borrowing is that, in a narrow sense at least, they become a zero-sum-game: what 
one counterpart wins, the other loses (Pickens, 2006: 231-2). Once again this 
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stems from the fact that credit is not advanced.  When trading securities, traders 
are paid out of the borrower’s yet-to-be-created value, while a trader that buys 
and sells a security initially has their M-M’ circuit completed with the money 
capital of the buyer, this is eventually validated with the repayment of the 
security by the borrower (as long as there is no default). If, as in derivatives, there 
is no advance to and repayment from the borrower, all that remains is payment 
from the money capital of one or other of the counterparts.  
As a result, while derivatives do not allow for the provision of credit, as bank 
lending and securities do, the necessity that payment is from a counterpart’s 
money means that they nevertheless involve counterparty credit risk (Duffie and 
Canabarro, 2003, Zhu and Pykhtin, 2007). In Chapter 3 I noted that the advancer 
of trade credit, the most basic form of credit examined here, incurs two 
disadvantages: no money to hand to restart the production circuit and the risk of 
non-payment.
153
 With derivatives, as no money is advanced it might be said that 
there is no problem of having no money to hand, e.g. to start a circuit of 
production; however, as a claim on the other party for a monetary payment in the 
future there is a risk of non-payment. As I show later, the banks’ specialism in 
assessing and enforcing the repayment of credit are put to use in assessing this 
counterparty credit risk.  
5.3.4 Cash settlement: increasing scale and scope of derivatives trading  
Cash settlement, the separation of the derivative transaction from exchange of the 
underlying asset permits a great increase in the scale and scope of trading 
possibilities. Starting with the scale of trading, first, derivatives trading is not 
limited by the amount of deliverable asset in existence. For example it is not 
limited by the amount of security issued by a borrower because by referencing 
only the price of the security, cash-settled derivatives can be struck in quantities 
many times greater than the amount of securities issued. Among other things, this 
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 Recall that selling the debt for money to the discounter solved both problems. Selling it to the 
bank in exchange for a banknote appears to leave the seller of commodities with the risk of non-
payment by the bank; however both problems are solved at once when the bank note is exchanged 
for commodities (illustrating how ‘measure of values’ and ‘means of circulation’ are bound up 
(Brunhoff, 1976: 31)). However, if the seller of commodities on trade credit takes an overdraft 
from the bank against the trade credit they are able to fund a new circuit of production but are left 
with the risk of non-payment by the buyer of commodities. 
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loosens the bonds between the size of production and the size of the derivatives 
markets. Second, velocity of exchange can become seemingly limitless as 
simultaneous transactions can occur on the same underlying asset, the sellers safe 
in the knowledge that they will not have to source and deliver the underlying 
asset.
154
 Third, options are a type of derivative that, amongst other things, allows 
actors to buy and sell at the same time. The result is that the amount of 
derivatives traded can become many times greater than the amount of securities 
outstanding; in this way the scale of production and circulation become even 
smaller relative to the possible notional scale of derivatives trading. 
A second way in which the scale of possible derivatives trading is boosted 
relative to simple securities trading is through additional trading opportunities 
from arbitrage activities that derivatives present. Arbitrage is profit from 
inconsistent prices, and the nature of derivatives affords many more opportunities 
for such profits than simple securities. Securities arbitrage would typically 
involve buying in one market and selling in another, e.g. where information flows 
or trading between the two are somehow restricted. The flexibility of derivatives 
without the lack of necessity for delivery means that there are more opportunities 
to find and exploit price inconsistencies. 
In many ways the increase in scale is linked to the increase in scope that 
derivatives make possible. Even without cash settlement, derivatives present the 
possibility for a large array of instruments on the same underlying price index. 
Not only are a vast number of maturities possible for the simplest forward 
buy/sell contracts but additional features, most obviously optionally, can be 
introduced. This further increases the possibility for price inconsistency and 
therefore for arbitrage. Most famously, it is possible to replicate an option pay-off 
with trades in the underlying security to exploit price differences (Black and 
Scholes, 1973). Similarly, derivatives allow the pooling of many assets into one 
instrument against which the underlying securities may be traded (e.g. a stock 
index (Fremault, 1991)) and conversely, the division of one asset into many 
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 As Schumpeter (1954: 320) remarks of the doubling involved in credit money, this is more 
than an increase in velocity unless it is ‘a velocity so great that it enables a thing to be in different 
places at the same time’.’ The parallel to credit money can be seen, the claim to the thing coming, 
in some respects, to act as the thing itself, releasing some constraints and imposing others. 
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instruments (e.g. dividing a bond into LIBOR interest rate risk and credit spread 
risk (Bomfim, 2001)). This multiplication of instruments provides more 
opportunities for inconsistent prices than exist in securities markets alone. Banks 
as market makers stand to profit from this additional activity and, as with 
speculation in securities, are also best placed to spot and profit from such 
opportunities themselves. 
Perhaps the most crucial way in which cash-settled derivatives expand the scale 
of trading activities is by massively increasing the scope of possible things to 
trade, well beyond that of securities markets, most simply by making it possible 
to trade the price of things that it is impractical or even impossible to actually 
exchange. As I explore in greater detail in Chapter 7, derivatives involve the 
(social) construction of the underlying reference price index. This is most evident 
for derivatives with undeliverable underlying assets such as those which 
reference sports results (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: 101),  weather events 
(Campbell and Diebol, 2003), economic aggregates (Costa et al., 2008) and so 
on. But, especially knowing these derivatives, it is clear that even in physically-
settled derivatives, the underlying of the derivative is not the same as the 
commodity it purports to reference: e.g. agricultural futures are on a notional, 
standard quantity of a standard quality and not on the actual wheat of a particular 
producer.
155
 The derivative underlying is in fact a social construction which has 
increases in tradability as its material roots, and cash settlement greatly increases 
the scope of underlying price indices which can be constructed.  
One important way in which this can happen is through pooling assets and 
therefore abstracting from the particular to the more general.
156
 This abstraction 
appears almost universally in derivatives – e.g. from agricultural commodities to 
government bond futures to credit default swaps.
157
 Pooling is a form of 
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 In Cronon’s (1991: 126) terms: ‘Grain elevators and grading systems had helped transmute 
wheat and corn into monetary abstractions, but the futures contract extended the abstraction by 
liberating grain trade itself from the very process which had once defined it: the exchange of 
physical grain’.  
156
 Cronon (1991: 132 cited in MacKenzie, 2006: 14) labels the abstraction that derivatives 
perform in Chicago’s agricultural futures markets ‘homogonous abstraction’.  
157 
One example is the wheat future, an early agricultural derivative traded in Chicago. While it 
would be almost impossible to trade particular farmers’ future production of wheat on a large 
scale once wheat came to be collected in large grain elevators rather than  individual sacks, 
futures markets emerged. Now grain of a particular quality was gathered together and buyers and 
5 - Derivatives: institutional investors and derivatives dealers  
Page 167 of 303 
standardisation that can increase liquidity, and one way it does this is by 
increasing common knowledge between participants. This knowledge does not 
have to be objective; it is enough that each believes what the others believe, and 
therefore a belief in diversity from pooling leads to increased common 
knowledge and increased tradability.
158
 Derivatives can increase tradability by 
abstracting from referencing the price of particular securities to the price of pools 
of securities. (Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999). It is only cash settlement that 
makes the trading of pools of securities practical; the delivery of multiple 
securities into a derivative contract would quickly become too unwieldy to be 
practicable.
159
 
While ‘homogenous abstraction’ (Cronon, 1991: 132 cited in MacKenzie, 2006: 
14) increases tradability, there is a limit: derivatives cannot be completely 
abstracted from the particular to the general and become money, i.e. the universal 
equivalent. Money, the universal equivalent, does not have a price but forms the 
price of everything else, while on the other hand derivatives payoffs are 
determined by moves in the underlying reference index and subsequently in 
changes in the derivatives price itself. Derivatives must exhibit price moves 
because their very purpose is to trade to capture price moves.  
Finally, cash settlement expands the scale and scope of derivative trading by 
changing who can trade, because the scope of market participants is not limited to 
those than can deliver (Das, 2010: 27-9). Thus as long as buyers and sellers can 
agree on a metric, anything that can be measured can serve as the underlying 
reference price index for the derivative. By being traded (or perhaps even by 
simply being proposed for trading) this measurement becomes a price, the critical 
input of the underlying into the derivative instrument. The cash-settled derivative 
                                                                                                                                    
sellers of future production could agree on the underlying product that they were trading. 
Contracts were traded on a standardised quantity (e.g. 5000 bushels) of a standardised quality 
(e.g. No. 1 white wheat), greatly increasing the tradability of the instrument (MacKenzie, 2006: 
13-14).   
158
 The role of financial economics in forming these common beliefs is crucial and is explored in a 
later chapter. Financial economics rests squarely on the ideas of variance and covariance, and in 
particular on the ideas of risk and return famously outlined by Harry Markowitz (1952). 
159
 Indeed the example of stock index derivatives features in the lore of early derivatives markets. 
The Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Product Exchange wanted to trade index 
derivatives but were forbidden to do so where no physical delivery was contemplated, as this 
would have constituted gambling. This in effect prohibited stock index derivatives, as the delivery 
would be too cumbersome (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003, MacKenzie, 2006).  
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is a claim for the change in the index, and this gives banks, the economy’s 
specialists in creating and sustaining claims, the ability to invent new derivatives 
for which they can make markets. At the same time, however, cash settlement 
imposes limits on who can trade: because there is no exchange, payment comes 
from the counterpart’s money capital and therefore counterparts must be 
creditworthy.  
The underlying to the derivative is a social construct with its material roots in 
potential market making profits for banks which makes tradable things that 
previously were not. In this way, for the last forty years derivatives have been the 
carrier for the spread of ‘speculative capital’ (LiPuma and Lee, 2005) and the 
market into ever more areas of social reproduction, but it has been the dealer 
banks and institutional investors that have carried it there.  
5.3.5 Trading claims 
Derivatives contain a contradiction: they are an untraded claim that exists to 
facilitate trading behaviour. A derivative takes the form of a claim against a 
counterpart, one of which is almost invariably a bank acting as derivative market 
maker, and as a claim it allows trading that would not otherwise be possible. It 
allows market participants to act as if they are trading the asset underlying the 
derivative because they can profit from price changes, resulting in the net cash 
payment from the winner to the loser without having to actually exchange the 
underlying asset.   
At the same time, however the form of a bilateral claim contains restrictions; in 
short, it is not itself traded. A single derivative is in a sense the equivalent of a 
buy-and-hold investment in a security, although the purpose of derivatives is not 
to take buy-and-hold positions but to facilitate increased buying and selling. Both 
dealers and institutional investors seek trading opportunities; in other words, after 
trading a derivative they look to lock in profits which manifest themselves in 
changes in the price of the derivatives they have already transacted. The problem 
is that the derivative claim itself is not traded; its very usefulness arises from the 
fact that it is a bilateral claim between dealer and counterpart. Therefore to 
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capture any price changes in the derivative itself, the trader must trade another, 
reverse, derivative transaction, another claim against a market maker.  
The bilateral nature of the derivative as claim leaves the trader with a problem, 
because offsetting claims are not automatically fungible. Buying and selling a 
security results in a monetary gain or loss. Buying and selling a derivative, 
however, results in a claim and a counterclaim against a derivative dealer. In 
seeking increased tradability, the derivatives market accumulates a huge pile of 
claims on dealers which market participants hope they will be able to offset 
against each other. The very trading behaviour they are designed for leads to a 
piling up of claims and counterclaims. 
Banks, having created derivatives as claims to increase the scale and scope of 
trading, run up against a constraint or limit that stems from the form of the 
derivative itself. Banks sustain the market by making a market, standing ready to 
buy and sell and offering counterparts the chance to trade out of positions they 
have previously taken by trading a new derivative. But they must also make the 
market in the sense of developing its infrastructure to cope with the problems of 
the ever-increasing pile of claims and counterclaims that results.  
Much of the content of the chapters that follow is at base concerned with bank 
practice aimed at overcoming this contradiction and the constraints on the growth 
of the market that it imposes. They show that much of the organisation of the 
derivatives markets is about transforming these bilateral claims into fungible, 
tradable financial instruments. Moreover this infrastructure, from risk and 
valuation models to accounting standards and the legal and regulatory 
framework, is much more than an administrative afterthought; it constitutes 
derivatives markets and, as it struggles to overcome the limits to trading inherent 
in the form, once again reveals derivatives as trading instruments par excellence. 
Derivatives’ material roots lie in the possibilities for trading profits, above all to 
derivatives market makers as market making profits, and this is reflected in the 
form they take and the development of this form.  
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5.4 Banks and derivatives 
In the cash-settled derivative, banks as dealers have created a claim which 
permits trading that otherwise would not be possible. The cash-settled form is the 
fully-developed form, whose potential can be seen in earlier forms. Dealers 
sustain such claims by making markets; they stand ready to trade further, 
potentially offsetting claims, and they provide the infrastructure of the market. 
The basic ways in which banks profit from the creation and sustenance of these 
claims and the specialist attributes used in the process are little different from 
those used in securities market-making and in fact in banking generally.  
The content of the profit is, first, a payment to a specialist capital process out of 
the profits of an activity which it has made possible – here, trading. As with 
commercial banking and securities dealing, the form of profit follows the form of 
the instrument in question. In commercial banking, the form of profit is a stream 
of income over time, the difference between the rates at which the bank lent and 
borrowed. For securities dealers, the form of profit follows that of the security as 
a capitalised stream of payments, it is captured by the bank in the bid-ask spread. 
For derivatives, the form of the profit is also a bid-ask spread captured for 
standing ready to buy and sell, but following the form of derivatives, this is 
realised in the future (as in commercial banking) and not on execution of the 
exchange (as in securities market making). Furthermore, as with the derivative 
form itself, banks attempt to treat this bid-ask spread as if it has already been 
paid, and they set up the market infrastructure to allow them to do e.g. cash 
collateral. 
The same essential skills that allow them to do this also allow them to profit from 
securities trading and commercial banking. First, banks are experts at judging 
credit risk, and here the ability in securities markets to complete the M-M’ 
relation by selling the security is transformed into trading offsetting derivative 
claims. In addition, because the claim is between the dealer and the counterpart 
and not on the borrower, as in securities, derivatives incur counterparty risk 
(Duffie and Canabarro, 2003). With its established specialisation in assessing 
credit risk and enforcing repayment, this provides the bank with further 
advantages which other would-be derivatives dealers do not possess. Moreover, 
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as in commercial banking, banks must establish a reputation for creditworthiness 
to persuade counterparts to trade with them. Second, banks as dealers have access 
to cash to make payouts. Third, they invest in a large payment and valuation 
system infrastructure with specialist staff in order to be able to handle the huge 
volumes of derivatives transactions that being a market maker involves. As with 
securities trading, these three attributes are enhanced by a large network of 
counterparts. In addition to the return for this specialist role – the return to capital 
as process – there is a return to capital as property as banks invest their own 
capital in derivatives, aided by their knowledge of the market and the increased 
opportunities that this brings for market making profits, e.g. through arbitrage 
opportunities.  
Yet the divorce of trading from credit provision, made concrete in derivatives 
trading, makes locating the source of derivative profits considerably more 
complicated than locating other banking profits e.g. from lending. As touched on 
above, securities are a claim to the income of a particular process, the claim 
holder’s liquidity arising from exchange for money. The security holders M-M’ 
relation is completed initially by the buyer of the security and later supplanted (or 
not) by the arrival of income from the underlying process (Lapavitsas and Levina, 
2010). If repayment from the underlying process does not arrive, the last seller of 
the security has been paid from the money capital of the last buyer.  
In cash-settled derivatives the transaction is completed only between the buyer 
and seller and is detached from any underlying circuit or process. No credit is 
extended, the advance, M, is no longer exchanged (e.g. for a promise to pay), and 
the M-M’ relation is further reduced to M. The primary claim is now a claim 
against not the underlying process but the market maker (as counterpart to every 
trade) on the change in price of the underlying reference price index. The circuit 
of the derivative counterpart is completed only from the money capital of the 
other counterpart; unlike securities, where there is a clear link to the yet-to-be-
created value of the security in question, there is no clear analytical line either to 
the source of the money capital or to value creation.  
The payment from money capital means that only creditworthy counterparts can 
engage in derivatives markets. This is both analytically and empirically true: the 
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counterparts to a large majority of OTC derivatives are the institutional investors 
discussed above, e.g. pension funds and hedge funds. The need for derivatives 
counterparts to have access to money capital in order to be deemed creditworthy 
is consistent with the analytical starting position: that financial derivatives 
emerge as a way for portfolio holders, e.g. institutional investors, to adjust their 
portfolios.  
While there is no clear analytical line between the creation of surplus value and 
derivatives profits, some possibilities for linking them arise from the source of 
the counterparts’ money capital. Institutional investors manage the idle money of 
workers and capitalists, private pension funds typifying the former and hedge 
funds the latter. In the case of market-makers’ profits coming from the money 
capital of workers, this would suggest either a form of financial expropriation 
(Lapavitsas, 2009b) or that interest bearing capital has infiltrated and subjugated 
other areas of economic activity (Fine, 2010). In the case of market-making 
profits coming from the money capital of capitalists, e.g. from hedge funds, this 
suggests a lack of alternative profitable opportunities in production or a form of 
over-accumulation (LiPuma and Lee, 2005). Inasmuch as institutional investors 
are generally holders of wealth in a financial form, they also earn interest on 
loans and securities in the usual way, and hence when we talk of the money 
capital of institutional investors this includes interest and hence surplus value, 
some part which is paid from production, as well as revenue in the form of 
interest from outside production. Regardless of its composition, in the first 
instance the derivative claim is paid from the institutional investor’s money 
capital.
160
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the political economy theory of banks based on the work of Marx 
(1976, 1981) and Hilferding (1910) as outlined and developed in the last two 
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 At a more abstract level, for the institutional investor money capital and interest earned must 
become inseparable. ‘There is not one single atom of [the money capital’s] value that does not 
owe its existence to unpaid labour’ (Marx, 1976: 728). This is clear for  the interest and dividends 
it earns and for the savings of capitalists, which are most clearly distributions of surplus value. 
Matters are more complicated for the savings of workers; one might, for example, ask if interest 
paid to a worker’s pension constitutes a return to capital or the reproduction of labour power. 
Unfortunately there is not the space to explore this further here.  
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chapters, is extended to incorporate institutional investors and derivatives 
dealing. Derivatives dealing is shown to be an extension of the activities of 
banks, their essence being to issue, sustain and profit from claims to monetary 
value that allow activities that would not be possible otherwise. For commercial 
banking and securities market making these activities were made possible by the 
collection, concentration and lending of otherwise idle money; with derivatives it 
the trading of underlying price indices is made possible.  
Developing from the theory of securities dealers in the last chapter, the scene is 
set for derivatives markets as institutional investors emerge to reduce the 
asymmetry between dealers and individual buyers of securities in securities 
markets. Their ability to pool liquidity and their use of securities finance both 
highlight a division in the category of securities exchange developed in the last 
chapter; now the provision of credit via securities markets can be separated from 
the trading of securities to profit from price changes. Derivatives make this split 
concrete, and it is only with their introduction into the analysis that trading for 
price changes emerges without any accompanying credit provision.  
The bank as derivative dealer makes this market, issuing, sustaining and profiting 
from the issuance of derivative claims, using the specialist skill which first 
separated banks from other merchants (Chapter 3) and allowed them to sit at the 
centre of securities markets (Chapter 4). Derivatives work as a claim to a 
payment of money from a counterpart, their value determined by an underlying 
price index, allowing the counterparts to act as if they have traded – bought and 
sold – the underlying index without any exchange actually taking place. Among 
other things, the form allows an enormous increase in the scale and scope of 
trading activity, as market participants can act as if they can trade things and/or 
amounts that could not otherwise be exchanged. 
This lack of exchange is also central to the lack of credit provision: without the 
exchange of money for a promise to pay (and the reverse when the debt is settled) 
there is none of the advance or repayment with interest that forms the typical M-
M’ circuit of a lender. The sale of a security can close the M-M’ relation by 
reimbursing the security holder, initially out of the money capital of the security 
buyer, and this is eventually validated from the repayment of the borrower (as 
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long as they do repay), the difference between M and M’ being determined by the 
change in security price.  
With derivatives the only payment is for the difference between M and M’, and 
reimbursement comes only from the money capital of the counterpart. There is no 
eventual validation from the borrower, e.g. from some additional surplus value 
that they have generated with the borrowed funds. It is this that gives derivatives 
the character of a zero-sum game. Not only is a single derivative a zero-sum 
game in which a winner on one side must reimburse a loser on the other from 
their money capital, but a string of buying and selling simply extends this. With 
no extension of credit there is no link back to a borrower who creates additional 
surplus value.  
An argument for derivatives as a positive sum game because they allow for the 
hedging of risks ignores the reality that derivatives have developed not as 
insurance, where a specific loss must be demonstrated and/or delivered, but as 
trading instruments.
161
 Derivatives’ separation from transactions in the 
underlying asset itself is based on the advantages this gives for repeated buying 
and selling to capture price changes (i.e. trading), and precisely for not delivering 
a loss. An argument for derivatives as a negative sum game stems from the 
profits of dealers and institutional investors. Their profits from derivatives 
dealing can only be from the money capital of those who deposit money with 
institutional investors. Like a roulette wheel, derivatives might be thought of as a 
zero sum game where the house always takes a cut.   
This begs the question: are derivatives gambling? Clearly there are very close 
similarities between the forms of the contract, any subsequent difference between 
their labelling being socially determined and subject to change. The best evidence 
for this is perhaps the 1970s legalisation on cash settlement in the US and UK, 
which transformed it from illegal or unenforceable gambling to legitimate 
investment practice at the stroke of the legislator’s pen.162 As legal scholars point 
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 Lynch (2011a) frames the debate about derivatives by contrasting arguments for positive and 
negative sum outcomes.  
162
 Financial activities have long walked a fine line in social status between immoral gambling 
and moral investment practices: ‘For much of the 19th century the stock jobber’s trade, for 
example, occupied the same twilight moral world as the bookie; by the end, stock jobbing become 
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out, there remains little logic to the division based on the characteristics of the 
transaction (Lynch, 2011a, 2011b, Stout, 1999, 1995). There are also strong 
similarities between the dealer and the bookmaker, with the dealer’s bid ask (and 
to a lesser extent the institutional investor’s fees) comparable to the over-round 
margin of a bookmaker (Cain et al., 2000) or the house’s cut in a casino.  
There are, however, differences that legal scholars might miss by focusing too 
hard on the form and not the use of the contract. Derivatives develop in the 
context of an owner of an inventory, above all of securities, finding ways to 
adjust the characteristic of that inventory by buying and selling, and it is in this 
buying and selling that the transactions differ. While a bet is typically placed with 
the intention of holding it until maturity (except where, as with spread betting, 
activities officially classified as betting have become more akin to derivatives 
trading
163
), derivatives have explicitly been developed as a way of buying and 
selling repeatedly, specifically separate from fixing the price of a particular 
commodity or purchasing insurance – or betting on a particular outcome. 
Derivatives are trading instruments.  
In short, whether gambling or not, cash-settled derivatives are a way for market 
participants to capture profits from the money capital of others by repeatedly 
buying and selling and trying to capture price moves. With no extension of credit, 
the profits of dealers and institutional investors can only be paid by those whose 
money capital they trade with. It seems doubtful that this is an activity that even a 
capitalist society should desire for those whose previous role was the provision of 
credit to borrowers from the otherwise idle money of lenders, to create additional 
surplus value. To see how international bank regulators have shaped the change 
in bank activities and the expansion of derivatives activity over the last 30 years, 
the next chapter turns to international bank regulation and the rise of the Basel 
Accords.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
a respectable occupation for public schoolboys – the first old Etonian jobber dates from 1891’ 
(Froud et al., 2011: 104). 
163
 Sports betting is becoming a hedge fund activity, helped by the ability to cut losses and lock in 
gains as odds/prices move and second trades/bets can be made (Wachter, 2010). 
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6 Banking regulation and the rise of Basel 
6.1 Introduction 
The evolution of the role of banks and their emergence as makers of derivatives 
markets has been accompanied by changing banking regulation. Integrating these 
changes in banking regulation into the theory of banks developed here enriches 
and improves the understanding it provides of derivatives dealers and at the same 
time moves the analysis to a slightly more concrete level, inevitably introducing 
an element of historical contingency. This chapter first weaves an analysis of how 
changes in the economy, bank activity and financial regulation develop and affect 
each other into the theoretical expansion of banking activities outlined in the 
preceding chapters. This is not the same as building a comprehensive theory of 
regulation from the simplest categories; after all, banks as derivatives dealers, and 
not regulation, are the primary object of this analysis. The chapter goes on to 
show how the new activities and institutional forms require new regulatory forms 
and the ways in which regulation, in particular the rise of the Basel Accords, 
facilitates these new activities. This perspective differs from much discussion of 
the Basel Accords which views them as dealing with the consequences of the 
growth of new markets (e.g. Underhill, 1991). In this thesis regulation is seen as 
mediating the relation between banks as specialists and the wider economy in 
various ways. 
As shown in Chapter 1, the explosion in derivatives growth that led to their 
current size and character began in the late 1980s. However, the expansion of 
banking activities and the regulatory changes that accompany it must be traced 
further back than this. In the aftermath of the crash of 1929 and the resulting 
depression, a regime of financial regulation was put in place that, broadly 
speaking, suppressed finance. It is best exemplified by the politics of the New 
Deal in the United States. The New Deal regime began to slowly unravel, 
especially from the 1950s, and by the time of the eruption of the financial crisis 
which began in 2007/8 it was almost extinct. In its place, a new regime centred 
on international financial markets, and the very large international financial 
conglomerates that make up the core of the derivatives market had arisen. With 
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regard to the regulation of derivatives, the New Deal regime was typified in the 
US by the Commodities Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA). From the late 1980s 
onwards the New Deal regime was gradually replaced in international banking 
regulation with a regime centred on the BIS and its Basel Accords. 
The shift in regulatory regime during the period of derivatives growth under 
consideration has many facets, and can be and is characterised in several different 
ways: International Political Economy (IPE ) scholars sometimes characterise it 
as a shift from an American to an international financial order (Langley, 2002, 
Strange, 1990); it is also a shift from systemic to institutional financial regulation 
(Lapavitsas, 2011).
164
 Thirdly, it is a shift to ‘state-authorized self-regulation’ 
(Picciotto and Haines, 1999: 360): ‘[R]egulatory functions have increasingly been 
delegated to public bodies or agencies with a status semiautonomous from central 
government’ (Picciotto, 2011: 89). These bodies tend to be specialist, less 
democratic arms of the state or hybrid private/public regulators.
165
 With regard to 
derivatives markets important examples of such include central banks and 
banking regulators, and organisations of derivatives users themselves e.g. ISDA.  
While incorporating elements of these shifts, this chapter is grounded in the 
theoretical understanding of banks developed in the preceding three chapters. 
First, banks, and accumulation more generally, are intimately connected: banks 
emerge from merchants as specialists and as a result they and the wider economy 
remain mutually reliant. Regulation plays a role in mediating this relationship and 
therefore, second, it is possible to see how existing regulation influences the form 
of new banking activities, either by permitting them or, more often here, as banks 
seek to escape their regulation. This makes it possible in turn to see how bank 
activities influence the form of new regulation, as regulation sometimes adapts to 
permit new activties and sometimes more proactively facilitates them.  
The shift in one form of regulatory environment to the other, especially between 
the 1950s and the start of the financial crisis of 2007/8, is analysed in two parts. 
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 Freixas and Rochet (1997: 259) , describe Glass-Steagall from a neoclassical perspective as 
typical of ‘structure regulation’ and ‘capital or reserve requirements ... a typical conduct 
regulation.’ 
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 ‘… the doctrine of the “arm’s-length” relationship has been a central figure of constitutional 
rhetoric in Britain and a key device to insulate the workings of agencies with delegated functions 
from the accountability pressures of the democratic state.’ (Froud et al., 2011: 108) 
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The first half of the chapter addresses the expansion of banking activities. 
Regulation can be seen mainly to shape the form of bank activity as banks seek to 
take on new activities outside the framework of its constraints: commercial banks 
take on increased securities dealing and institutional forms change, with the 
emergence of institutional investors and banks as derivatives dealers. Regulation 
is adapted, mainly through liberalisation, to both encompass and permit these 
new activities. This process might be termed deregulation (Cerny, 1991). 
The changes in bank activities and consequent changes in institutional form alter 
the relation between banks and the wider economy, requiring new regulation to 
mediate this. In particular this need arises because of one of the contradictions of 
banking. Banks are the economy’s specialists in assessing credit, but in order to 
operate they themselves must convince the rest of the economy, i.e. non-credit 
specialists, of their creditworthiness so that non-banks can be persuaded to hold 
bank liabilities (credit money and others). Banks must both manage their assets 
(broadly, they must remain solvent) and convince others that they are doing so 
and that therefore bank liabilities are a safe bet (broadly, banks must remain 
liquid).  
The Basel Accords that arise to regulate the new bank activities in a process of 
re-regulation that accompanies deregulation are analysed in light of how banks 
(and the rest of society) manage this contradiction (Cerny, 1991). The second half 
of the chapter addresses the ways in which re-regulation arises not just to 
encompass and permit new activities but also to facilitate them.
166
 Presenting 
these processes of de- and re-regulation separately helps to highlight the 
differences between the old and new regimes and moreover emphasises that, 
contrary to neoclassical theory, financial markets are not something that spring up 
when all rules are taken away but rather are governed and defined by tacit 
agreement between banks and the wider economy, some of which is set down as 
banking regulation.  
This chapter both forms a pivot in and replicates the broader structure of this 
thesis. It marks a move from more abstract, theoretical analysis of banks’ 
evolution and their role as derivatives dealers to a slightly more concrete analysis 
                                                 
166
 In this facilitation re-regulation might be seen as a shift in favour of finance. 
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of the practices they have undertaken to develop the infrastructure derivatives 
markets since the 1980s. The preceding chapters deal with the theoretical 
expansion from discounters to commercial banks to securities, and then to 
derivatives dealers, the first half of this chapter re-examines this expansion of 
activities through the lens of the processes of deregulation.  
This and the remaining chapters analyse the practices that have gone into making 
these markets, and especially how they are made by and for banks as dealers (and 
for institutional investors as the counterpart to dealers). This chapter generally 
addresses international bank regulation; the next explores the contractual form 
and its role in the growth and change of character of derivatives, and the final 
chapter addresses the ways in which the new system is regulated by risk 
management practices. These three areas of practice become essential to the 
running of large-scale derivatives markets and as such become entrenched, taking 
on an objectivity which affects the growth and in particular changes the character 
of these markets.  
Section 6.2 discusses banks’ expanding activities in light of the existing 
regulation and the way the regulation changes to encompass and permit these new 
activities. It builds from commercial banks and New Deal regulation to increases 
in banks’ activities as securities dealers and the changing institutional forms that 
have resulted, including the rise of institutional investors, before discussing the 
emergence of the OTC derivatives markets. Section 6.3 discusses how these 
changes are reflected in new regulation. It analyses the rise of the Basel Accord, 
starting with the theoretical relation between banks and the wider economy and 
discussing the form that re-regulation takes in light of banks’ moves offshore, and 
then turns to market-based activities before discussing the treatment of 
derivatives in more detail.  
6.2 Expanding bank activities 
6.2.1 Changing forms of regulation of the relation between accumulation and 
banks 
The expansion of bank activities, explored theoretically in the previous chapters, 
has been accompanied by shifting forms of regulation. This section analyses the 
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changes in regulation that have accompanied the expansion of bank activities in 
advanced capitalism – namely the expansion from commercial banks to securities 
dealers, the rise of institutional investors and the emergence of banks as 
derivatives dealers.  
Bank regulation is analysed as one manifestation of the relation between banks 
and the economy more generally and is one way in which this relation is 
mediated and regulated. The analysis is approached by examining first the mutual 
reliance of banks and the rest of the economy, and within this, banks’ search for 
greater profit (and conversely the rest of the economy’s ability to restrict this); 
and second, how this is mediated by the existing regulatory structures. The forms 
that regulation and banking take can only be understood by including this 
mediation.  
As Picciotto and Haines (1999: 368) put it:  
The underlying dynamic of changes in the social structure of finance 
(the social patterns of saving and investment), has generated new 
competitive pressures mediated through institutional and regulatory 
forms, which have played a major part in shaping the new financial 
system. Far from being a lawless new frontier, financial markets are 
riddled with regulation at every level… Markets do not and cannot 
exist independently of rules – they are created and shaped by rules.  
Markets here can be seen as including those for commercial banking and 
investment banking activities.  
The mediation or regulation of the relation between the economy generally and 
banking and finance will at any time mix elements stemming from the reliance of 
the economy on banking with elements stemming from the reliance of finance on 
the rest of the economy. Opportunities for banks to profit are closely bound up in 
this. Although New Deal regulation appears to repress finance and the Basel 
regime appears to give it a freer hand by facilitating new activities, nevertheless 
opportunities for banks to profit appear under both regimes, supported by some 
measures and restricted by others, as I show throughout this chapter. 
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The rest of this section shows how bank activity can react to existing regulation 
in various ways, focusing mainly on how banking attempts to evade regulatory 
constraints, and on how regulation sometimes accommodate these changes.  
6.2.2 Commercial banks  
The regulatory structures in place might be thought to influence bank behaviour 
by encouraging the behaviours that they permit. The events of the 1920s and ’30s 
can be framed in this way. The regulatory structure of banks in the 1920s might 
be said to have allowed banks to extend increasing amounts of leverage, 
including to institutional investors who used it to buy shares and financial assets. 
This build-up of leverage in financial markets and the economy more generally 
burst in 1929 and the early 1930s with successive stock market crashes at the 
centre of events (Galbraith, 1992). 
The crash of 1929 and the depression that followed prompted a clampdown on 
the speculative behaviour, and particularly financial speculation, that was seen as 
responsible for the crash. As Tinker (1997: 34) notes: ‘The New Deal era saved 
the heaviest guns for regulating finance’. The 1933 Banking Act (the famous 
Glass-Steagall Act) was followed by the completion of the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency (the Pecora Committee) investigation before derivatives 
were addressed in the Commodity Exchange Act, 1936 CEA). The CEA put into 
place a regulatory form and regime that restricted banks’ activities, and in 
particular might be thought to have restricted them to commercial banking 
activities.  
6.2.3 Securities markets 
However, regulation can also influence bank behaviour as banks attempt to take 
on profitable activities outside its framework. Sometimes, ‘grouped under the 
euphemistic heading of “financial innovation”, [new activities enabled] Wall 
Street Banks to escape regulatory restrictions and expand their activities and 
profits’ (Gowan, 2009: 15). When analysing these new activities and the 
emergence of banks as securities dealers, changes in the economy generally and 
in its relation with finance can be linked with a change in the scale of finance, 
e.g. as changes in the economy call for increased financing. To understand how 
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this growth manifests it is necessary to analyse how regulation mediates the 
relation between banks and the economy more generally. Finding their profits and 
activities constrained by the New Deal regulation, banks sought profits and 
activities outside the regulatory framework e.g. in securities markets.  
The dynamics between the economy, banks and regulation are well illustrated in 
the opening up of the Eurodollar markets. First, in the wider economy there was 
an increase in international trade following a relaxation of current account 
controls in the 1950s; second, these changes in the economy were associated with 
changes in banks’ activities; and third, the form of these changes was mediated 
by the existing regulatory structure as banks sought to evade controls and operate 
outside its framework.  
Increasing international trade in the late 1950s and early 1960s led producers and 
merchants to require a corresponding increase in access to trade finance, but they 
still faced strict capital controls. At the same time, British banks were searching 
for ways to expand their international business: 
During the 1957 sterling crisis they stumbled upon the Eurodollar 
market as a solution to their problems. The catalyst for the market’s 
development were the restrictions on British banks’ use of sterling to 
finance trade between countries outside the sterling area. … The 
London bankers found they could satisfy this demand [for trade 
finance] by offering dollar loans against their dollar deposits of 
overseas residents. This business proved so attractive that when the 
restrictions were removed in early 1959, bankers continued their new 
Eurodollar activity. (Helleiner, 1994: 84) 
The emergence of the Euromarkets revealed in international banking the first 
cracks in the New Deal’s restrictions on competition.167 
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 Parts of the UK state were not averse to this development, seeing it as a way to ‘reconcile the 
goal of restoring London’s international position with the Keynsian welfare state and Britain’s 
deteriorating economic position. The Bank of England was the most active proponent of the 
Eurodollar market. It not only refrained from imposing regulation on market activity, but took 
several important measures … permitting the growth of a Eurobond market’ (Helleiner, 1994: 
84). 
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Turning first to changes in the real economy and the growth in finance, and 
leaving aside changes in form, it can be seen that only a partial explanation 
emerges for the changes in banks’ activities. The growth in Eurodollar markets 
was associated with a growth in trade, as seen above, and, bound up with this, the 
situation of the United States, the leading global economy at the time (Barkin, 
2003). The growth of the Euromarkets, which had the support of parts of the US 
state (Helleiner, 1994), was associated with an emerging ‘dollar overhang’ 
(Underhill, 1991: 201) whereby the US found that it was able to support a current 
account deficit with international borrowing due to the willingness of exporters to 
the US (and others) to hold dollar-denominated financial assets. The recycling of 
petro-dollars through the Euro markets
168
 and deposits of dollars in these markets 
by the Soviet Union are important examples of the increase in 
offshore/international financial activity as a result of trade and the emergence of 
the US dollar as a world money.
169
 Changes in the domestic US economy, not 
least a demographic boost to savings as baby boomers reached working age, also 
influenced the growing scale of finance (Edwards, 1996: Ch. 3).
170
  
While a change in the scale of finance can be associated with changes in the 
broader economy, in addition, credit creation begets further credit expansion. 
Bank lending creates both financial assets and liabilities and fuels an expansion 
of finance relative to the rest of the economy. The accumulation of claims and 
counterclaims creates a quantitative growth in these markets that marks a 
qualitative shift to an era of finalisation which is distinct from times when credit 
grows in tandem with the rest of the economy.
171
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 The USA vetoed IMF recycling of petro dollars through the IMF in 1970 (Helleiner, 1994: 
101-114). ‘It was left to the market institutions of the London-centred Euromarkets to undertake 
so-called petro-dollar recycling’ (Langley, 2002: 86). Many of these ‘market institutions’ were, of 
course, American banks. 
169
 The Soviet Union used the Eurodollar markets to house dollars to avoid interference from US 
authorities (McCauley, 2005: 60). 
170
 The choices of these savers, as I will show, depended on regulatory structure, but they also on 
faced an inflationary environment from the late 1960s which affected their choice of financial 
instruments (Edwards, 1996: 13). 
171
 Langley (2002: 90) notes: ‘While partly resulting from contemporary state and corporate 
financing requirements, the increased volume of credit created through world credit practices and 
associated capital movements also arises from financialisation. As with the periods from the 
1740s to the 1790s and the 1870s to 1914, a structural feature of contemporary world finance is 
the expansion in the value of credit created due to the speculative accumulation of capitalist 
world credit practices themselves’ [emphasis added]. 
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However, looking solely at changes in the scale of finance only takes the analysis 
so far. It is not possible to understand changes in banking without analysing how 
existing regulation mediates the changes and in so doing affects the form of 
finance that results. The conjunction of the growth described above with the 
existing regulatory structure, i.e. the New Deal regime, led to a period of 
financialisation that is different from previous instances; in particular, ‘current 
financialisation is evidenced by the sheer extent of secondary trading practices’ 
(Langley, 2002: 91).  
The regulatory structure, however, shaped this expansion in bank activity not so 
much by what it permitted as by banks’ actions outside its framework in light of 
changes in the wider economy. New Deal regulation stifled bank activity, 
constraining profitability. Banking developed new activities that escaped its 
control in two interrelated ways: they developed both more offshore international 
activity and more investment banking or market-based activity. 
First, banking became more international, with increased offshore activity, 
especially in the Eurodollar markets. On the one hand changes in international 
financial regulation increased the demand for international finance: currency 
controls put into place in the 1930s had both prevented and reduced the need for 
international banking and its regulation, and allowing increased international 
trade led to greater demand for international finance. On the other hand, the 
continued constraints to onshore banking activity pushed banks to expand their 
activities offshore, where they were able to evade onshore controls. British banks 
trading in the Euromarkets, i.e. outside the control of sterling, were soon joined 
by American banks operating on British soil.  
The move offshore was more than simply a move to a space where new activities 
could occur because the British authorities looked the other way. Euro-market 
activities fell between the authority that the Bank of England felt it had over 
British banks and that of the New York Federal Reserve over activities in 
London. The authority to impose regulation requires that the regulator has 
autonomy from those being regulated (Poulantzas and Camiller, 1978). Banking 
activity under the New Deal regime was constrained within national borders by 
currency controls; as a result the state, as regulator, had a large degree of 
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autonomy and therefore the authority to maintain strict control of banks’ 
activities. In the international setting there is no autonomous body with such 
authority.  
Regulation, as the mediator between banking and the wider economy, adapts to 
new activities, attempting in various ways to re-encompass them even if only by 
permitting them. A new form of regulation was required for these new banking 
activities, and their international offshore aspect was important to the form of the 
new regulatory regime that emerged, as I discuss in the second half of this 
chapter. Without an autonomous international body that can exert authority in the 
way that nation states can, international banking regulation takes a different form: 
it requires cooperation among states, from which consensus and agreement must 
be sought.
172
 In the new form of regulation that arose, the Basel Accords, this 
literally took the form of regulation by committee, and agreement often proved 
difficult to achieve (Schenk, 2010).
 173
 
As well as the move offshore, the tight control of commercial banking prompted 
banks to turn to market-based activities. Its control of prices and quantities of 
credit was a ‘market-negating’ element of the New Deal regime (Lapavitsas, 
2011). For example, Regulation Q of the 1933 US Banking Act set limits on 
various interest rates and the quantity of loans for lending against securities 
(Edwards, 1996). Coupled with inflation, these constraints on commercial 
banking activity prompted market-based activity as banks sought to compete 
outside the framework of the existing regulation. For example, as a reaction to the 
constraints of Regulation Q, commercial banks in the US invented the certificate 
of deposit as a way of paying interest (Bannock et al., 1998). As Edwards (1996: 
13) notes:  
The rise in inflation beginning in the late 1960s led to higher interest 
rates and made investors more sensitive to yield differentials on 
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 Keynes and White at Bretton Woods highlight how cooperative action on an international scale 
was required to control capital flows. As discussed, in the absence of an international body 
capable of enforcing such an agreement it was easy for the UK and US to ‘cheat’ on the 
agreement, or at least to look the other way, and for the Eurodollar markets to become established 
(Helleiner, 1994). 
173
 Even when cooperation is in the interests of all, the difficulties of regulation by committee 
remain, not least because of variations of free rider and collective action problems (Stigler, 1974). 
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different assets. The result was the so-called dis-intermediation 
process, in which depositors took their money out of banks paying 
low interest rates (on both checkable and time deposits) and 
purchased assets with higher yields. 
As above, regulation is the mediator of the relation between banks and the rest of 
economy and therefore adjusts to changes in banking activities, if only to permit 
them: ‘The growing disadvantage of banks in raising funds led to their supporting 
legislation in the 1980s to eliminate Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits and 
allow checkable deposits that paid interest’ (Edwards, 1996: 16). The 
deregulation that followed also saw the end of the era of informal supervision and 
moral suasion (Schenk, 2010), and its replacement with a raft of new rules and 
formal regulation and supervision (Picciotto and Haines, 1999). 
Banks’ turning to securities markets was also important offshore. Chapters 3 and 
4 have shown the theoretical importance of money markets to the functioning of 
commercial banks and the related emergence of securities markets as an 
investment banking activity. This was played out in the Eurodollar markets as the 
‘influx of U.S. banks and multinational corporations transformed the Eurodollar 
market from a short-term money market into a fully-fledged international capital 
market serving needs that had previously been met by the New York market’ 
(Helleiner, 1994: 89). 
6.2.4 Changes in institutional form: banks as dealers and institutional investors 
These changes in banks’ activities as they turned offshore and to financial 
markets in order to operate outside the established regulatory framework, can be 
seen as contributing to changes in the institutional form of banks and other 
financial institutions. The changes have been categorised as i) a trend towards 
universal banks mixing commercial and investment banking; ii) the emergence of 
massive financial conglomerates; and iii) the emergence of institutional investors 
(Langley, 2002). 
First, new activities led to growth in the number of banks combining commercial 
banking and financial market activities. The New Deal regime constrained the 
functional form of domestic banks (Lapavitsas, 2011). Only banks were permitted 
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to offer demand deposits; geographical restrictions kept banks small; and, most 
famously, investment and commercial banks were separated by the law (Edwards, 
1996). But this formal separation of onshore commercial and investment banks 
mattered little in the offshore Eurodollar markets, where both types of banks were 
active in market and investment banking activities. Once again, these 
developments came to be reflected in regulation as they adapted to the reality of 
new bank activities. For example, new onshore and offshore activities began the 
erosion of Glass-Steagall’s separation of commercial and investment banks which 
was completed in the early years of the 21
st
 century (Kregel, 2010a). 
Second, only larger institutions were capable of opening overseas branches, a 
move which allowed them to extend their activities considerably; at the same 
time the smaller domestic commercial banks that could not or did not venture 
offshore remained constrained by domestic regulation, contributing to the 
emergence of two tiers of banks. As domestic liberalisation continued, however, 
removing the barriers to interstate banking, smaller local banks became prey to 
larger ones (Mishkin, 1996). Bank consolidation in the US saw the larger 
international banks swallowing up many smaller domestic banks to leave the 
banking sector even more dominated by the largest ‘mega’ banks, the same 
institutions that dominate derivatives markets (see Chapter 1).  
Third, the rise of institutional investors, so large a part of derivatives markets and 
examined theoretically in Chapter 5, can be seen in the twin turn offshore and to 
the market. The same pressures to evade price and quantity controls that led to 
the invention of, for example, certificates of deposit also led to the rise of 
institutional investors such as money market funds. It was possible to structure 
such funds to replicate, outside the framework of regulation, some of the deposit 
functions constrained by New Deal bank regulation (Campbell et al., 1988). 
Similarly, institutional investors emerged to allow savers access to the growing 
securities markets. As mentioned above, additional savings were looking for a 
home during the period, e.g. the saving of baby boomers. The domestic financial 
systems that individuals could access most easily were still restricted by New 
Deal regulation. As discussed in Chapter 5, individuals face disadvantages, 
mainly of scale, in operating in the financial markets where the most attractive 
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solutions to their needs were to be found and where institutional investors 
emerged to fill the space created by the asymmetry between dealers and 
individuals. In this way institutional investors both emerge from and contribute to 
the growing volumes and changing character of finance manifesting in growing 
financial markets.  
Banks acting as both commercial banks and securities dealers, together with 
emerging institutional investors, set the scene for the emergence of banks as 
derivatives dealers. Indeed, ‘[t]he spectacular growth in the use of derivatives 
instruments has … been closely bound up with the disintermediated and 
financialised form of contemporary world credit practices’ (Langley, 2002: 91). 
6.2.5 Derivatives and escape from the CEA regime in the US 
The emergence of banks as derivatives dealers and in particular of over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives markets can also be analysed, like the securities 
market above, as an instance of banks seeking new activities and sources of profit 
outside the constraints of the existing regulatory framework which limits 
activities and profitability. Regulation, however, continues to mediate the relation 
between the wider economy and banking, and as a result adapts to changes in the 
relation. This subsection shows first how new derivative activity is permitted by 
deregulation. The next section shows how the very constraints shown in this 
section to be evaded by banks’ actions and removed by deregulation are re-
regulated under the Basel Accords.  
While exchange-traded derivatives remain important, the key to understanding 
the evolution of banks and their role as derivatives dealers lies in studying the 
rapid expansion of OTC markets from the 1980s onwards. Two key moments can 
be used to mark the beginning of this change: first, the legalisation of cash 
settlement in both the UK and the US, discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, which 
heralds the birth of a qualitatively different instrument; a change which might be 
considered necessary but not sufficient to subsequent developments; and second, 
discussed here, the exemption of OTC derivatives from the Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA) of 1936.  
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As Chapter 5 discussed, derivatives are firstly an agreement between two parties, 
or, put another way, a claim on a dealer. A derivative, as a negotiated, private and 
non-transferable agreement, distinguishes derivatives from the publicly-known, 
standardised terms of the transferable security. This distinction is also the basis 
on which their exemption from the regime of the CEA was built. 
In the mid-1980s the most important derivatives markets were in the US, dealt in 
agricultural produce and were exchange-traded. Derivatives were to a large 
degree regulated as they had been since the 1930s. In the midst of the Great 
Depression, the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) was passed as part of a 
clampdown on the speculation that was blamed for the crash and was seen to 
continue to disrupt agricultural production in the depression years.
174
 The CEA 
required that all futures were traded on exchanges, making those not on 
exchanges illegal. This corralling ensured that the regulator, the CFTC, was able 
to exert control over derivatives practices.
175
 In short, the derivatives industry 
was confined to exchanges, regulated by law and supervised by a single federal 
regulator, the CFTC. 
Dealer activity in exchange-traded derivatives markets is constrained in a variety 
of ways. First, competition among dealers in the design of contracts is 
constrained, as it is the exchange which designs the contract. Second, banks 
cannot compete by offering better credit terms, as at the end of every trading day 
each trade is novated such that every participant faces the exchange as a central 
counterparty. To protect the creditworthiness of the exchange standard, 
margining and other credit enhancement processes are put in place. This has the 
effect, third, of suppressing competition among dealers with respect to the 
amount of market risk they can take relative to their capacity to absorb losses 
(more market risk requires a bigger cash margin). Fourth, again given the 
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 There are slight differences between securities and derivatives in this regard. Attempts to limit 
speculation in derivatives markets can be seen before 1936; the fact that the asset underlying 
derivatives was overwhelmingly agricultural and not financial was important. For example, the 
1921 Futures Trading Act tried to tax speculators but was short-lived, overturned by a decision in 
the Supreme Court. The Grain Futures Act of 1922 had more success but did not go as far as the 
1921 Act (Swan, 2000: 249-253). 
175
 The Act and CFTC enforcement provided public and transparent pricing; disclosure of the real 
counterparts to the federal government; regulation of intermediaries i.e. brokers and employees; 
stringent rules for customer protection; processes to detect unlawful trading; prohibitions against 
fraud etc and; enforcement of all of this by the federal regulator (Greenberger, 2010). 
6 - Banking regulation and the rise of Basel  
Page 190 of 303 
centralised nature of the exchange, dealers are restricted in the amount of 
operational risk they can take as the mechanics of settlement, accounting, 
payments and so on are centralised and hence standardised for all parties.  
The late 1980s however saw the growth of OTC contracts which were, as the 
name suggests, different from the standardised instruments trading on established 
exchanges. OTC contracts, typified by swaps, are privately negotiated between 
parties and require specific tailoring and were undertaken outside the framework 
of the CEA. One of the earliest transactions of this kind was between the World 
Bank and IBM in the early 1980s, and involved the swapping of coupons of 
offshore bond issuance.
176
  
The World Bank swap can be seen in the light of the offshore borrowing made 
possible by the Euromarkets, but, perhaps more importantly, OTC derivatives can 
be seen as banks’ derivative activity escaping from the constraints of the CEA. 
Moreover the derivative escapes in its basic, or perhaps naked, form, shorn of the 
clothing of institutional support provided on exchanges (e.g. clearing, cash 
margining and so on); it is a private claim between two parties that is intended to 
remain in place until a series of cash payments referencing an underlying index 
have been completed.  
Starting with a CFTC Policy Statement in 1989, OTC derivatives became steadily 
more exempt from the provisions of the CEA on the basis that they are private, 
tailored claims between two parties (and not standardised and public as futures 
were). A pattern established itself between 1989 and the Commodity Futures 
Modernisation Act (CFMA) of 2000 that ‘declared financial derivatives exempt 
from CFTC or SEC oversight’ (Stout, 2009: 7).177 
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 The bank had reached its limits on Swiss Franc and Deutsche mark borrowing but preferred to 
pay the lower rates in these currencies than the 17% it would pay on US dollar borrowings. At the 
same time IBM had borrowed in the European currencies and had made large unrealised gains on 
their depreciation. It wanted to secure these gains by switching to US$ denomination. The bank 
therefore borrowed in US dollars and IBM, in Swiss Francs and Deutsche Marks, and the two 
institutions entered into a currency swap. IBM effectively paid the USD coupon and principal of 
the World Bank debt and the World Bank paid the principal and lower coupon of the European 
currencies (Kapur et al., 1997). 
177
 Even the long-term capital management crisis, in which OTC derivatives were heavily 
implicated, failed to stop the process: a CFTC concept note attempting to roll back the clock on 
OTC deregulation was suppressed in no uncertain terms. On the very same day of the CFTC 
concept note, ‘Robert Rubin, then U.S. Treasury Secretary, joined with Alan Greenspan, then 
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OTC derivatives activity grew steadily, dominated, as seen in Chapter 1, by the 
largest banks acting as derivatives dealers. Dealers were then able to point to the 
resulting and ever-larger pile of OTC notional outstanding and argue for stronger 
legal status for existing trades, as it was felt that the 1989 exemption, for 
instance, did not provide enough legal certainty. By the late 1990s there was 
more than USD50 tn of OTC derivative notional outstanding (BIS, 2011). The 
threat of this all being deemed legally invalid put the market firmly into the ‘too-
big-to-fail’ category (Greenberger, 2010). Regulation was progressively loosened 
and the exemption progressively strengthened to validate existing trades.
178
 In 
theory this made the financial system safer by lessening the threat of trillions of 
dollars-worth of invalid contracts, but in doing so conditions were only improved 
for ever more derivatives trading.  
In short, OTC derivatives escape New Deal regulation on the basis of being 
bespoke, private claims between two parties. Banks as dealers seek a space in 
which to operate outside the existing framework of constraints in their quest for 
increased profits, each bank being incentivised to trade as much as possible to 
increase profits. As volumes grow, market participants must put measures to 
support them into place . International banking regulation adapts to and has a role 
to play in supporting these ever-increasing derivatives volumes, with the result 
that these markets simultaneously de- and re-regulate (as especially noted by 
international political economists). Piccotto (2011) notes how markets cannot 
exist on this scale without organisation, rules and regulations; and Vogel (1996: 
3) states: ‘We have wound up with freer markets and more rules. In fact, there is 
often a logical link: liberalization requires reregulation’. Accordingly, areas 
previously constrained under the CEA, seemingly de-regulated with the move off 
                                                                                                                                    
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and Arthur Levitt, then Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Chairman, to caution against [the] proposed Concept Release’ (Baker, 2010).  
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 In a 1989 policy statement, the CFTC set forth the criteria for trades that they would exempt 
from the requirement to trade on an exchange and be subject to CEA provisions. The 1992 
Futures Trading Practices Act clarified on what grounds the CFTC could exempt transactions 
from the CEA, stressing again the tailored, nonstandardised nature of OTC. The CFTC followed 
this with a 1993 rule on exemptions, putting the 1992 Act into practice. In 1999 the Presidents 
Working Group on Financial Markets recommended removing ‘legal uncertainty’ (Presidents 
Working Group on Financial Markets, 1999). Finally, in 2000 the Commodity Futures 
Modernisation Act (CFMA) ‘removed OTC derivatives transactions … from all requirements of 
exchange trading and clearing under the CEA so long as the counterparties to the swap were 
‘eligible contract participants’ (Greenberger, 2010: 9.) 
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exchanges – credit, market and operations risk-taking - become progressively re-
regulated under the Basel regime. Driven by the incentives and practices of banks 
seeking to expand their OTC dealing, derivatives markets are re-regulated, and 
during the process the character of derivatives is transformed, as the rest of this 
chapter now explores.  
6.3 Regulating banks’ new activities: the rise of the Basel Accords 
The expansion of banking activities associated with the deregulation of the New 
Deal regulation of the 1930s, explored in the last section, required re-regulation. 
The most prominent regulations to emerge as a result were the Basel Accords, 
which were agreed among advanced capitalist nations in the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
These are analysed in this section to show how the developments outlined above 
influence the form of the new regime. The analysis shows how the turn offshore 
is associated with the form of the regulation by international committee, and how 
the turn to the market requires price risk to somehow be brought ‘on-balance 
sheet’ so that liability holders can have some information about it. This is 
achieved with a capital adequacy requirement. It goes on to show how –
particularly for derivatives – credit, market, and operational risk are steadily 
incorporated into the Basel regulations. To achieve this, the analysis starts with 
the theoretical nature of banks developed in the preceding chapters, but especially 
in Chapter 3.  
6.3.1 Banking theory, systemic risk and too big to fail 
Very briefly put, banks emerge from other merchants as specialists. They come to 
increase the efficiency of the use of money in the economy and mobilise idle 
money, transforming it into loanable money capital in the process. In doing so, 
they come to lend their own liabilities, to support which as money they must 
make them of shorter maturity than the loans they have extended. Banks are 
already the economy’s specialists in assessing and ensuring repayment of credit, 
and this transformation puts non-banks at an even bigger disadvantage. As a 
result, banks must always find ways to reassure liability holders. Typically this 
involves diversification of their portfolio, including having cash to hand and 
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lending and borrowing in the interbank market. It also involves finding ways to 
manage the temptation to over-leverage, or, put another way, to hold insufficient 
capital to sustain losses and remain solvent. Finally, they must boost their 
reputation, not only by actively managing their assets but also by convincing 
others that they are doing so.  
Banks’ emergence as specialists gives rise to a mutual reliance between them and 
the rest of the economy (see Chapter 3). This can be explored by looking at first 
the asset and then the liability side of banks’ balance sheet. Bank assets are 
fundamentally made up of loans to the rest of the economy. The banks reliance 
on rest of the economy as a result of this is clear; not only do profits flow from 
the broader economy but also the failure of the rest of the economy to pay will 
make them insolvent. The mirror to this is that the rest of the economy has come 
to rely on bank credit in order to operate.  
The reliance of the rest of the economy on bank lending in combination with the 
expansion of finance has led to an increased perception of systemic risk. 
Especially since the onset of the latest financial crisis in autumn 2008, systemic 
risk has once again come to the attention of global financial regulators. A report 
for G20 finance ministers and central bank governors recently defined systemic 
risk as: 
… a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an 
impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the 
potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy. 
Fundamental to the definition is the notion of negative externalities 
from a disruption or failure in a financial institution, market or 
instrument. (Staff of the IMF BIS and the Secretariat of the FSB, 
2009: 2).
179
  
Specifically, the rise of very large financial institutions during the period of 
deregulation has led lender of last resort (LOLR) functions of central banks, 
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 The threat to the economy from finance is thought to come from two channels. First, through a 
chain of contagion: most obviously from one bank to the rest of the financial system, and from 
there to the rest of the economy. Or second, simultaneously: from one bank sufficiently large and 
connected that the shock hits finance and the broader economy at the same time (George, 1998). 
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regulators and/or governments to include ‘too big to fail’ – a term that can be 
dated to the mid-1980s.
180
 As finance continued to grow, so too did the 
perception that the default of some institutions posed too big a threat to the 
system – when they found themselves in trouble it was simply imperative for the 
economy in general that these institutions were not allowed to fail. The financial 
crisis that began in 2007/8 has provided ample examples of this, including the 
American International Group in the US and the Royal Bank of Scotland in the 
UK.  
The growth of finance and the form it has taken, with very large banks and other 
institutions giving rise to systemic risk and too-big-to-fail, appears to have 
provided banks and finance generally with a certain amount of structural power 
(Strange, 1990). Nor is this constrained to the rescue of individual organisations; 
the escape of OTC derivatives from CEA regulation can be seen in the same 
light, as regulators and lawmakers apparently felt that they had little choice but to 
continuously remove legal uncertainty in the face of trillions of dollars of OTC 
notional amounts outstanding.
181
 
The rest of the economy’s reliance on banks continues to be made clear when 
analysis turns to banks’ liabilities, particularly because a large portion of the 
liabilities of commercial banks serves as money, but also because banks’ debt 
more generally is held by the rest of the economy, default on which would cause 
disruptions to capitalist accumulation. The flip side of this, however, is that banks 
are reliant on the rest of the economy to hold their liabilities; as Chapter 3 has 
shown, it is only by doing so that banks can come to lend and to operate more 
generally. The rest of this chapter analyses the Basel Accords in light of banks’ 
reliance on the rest of the economy to continue holding bank liabilities 
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 ‘[I]n September 1984 the Comptroller of the Currency testified before Congress that some 
banks were simply ‘too big to fail’ and that for those banks total deposit insurance would be 
provided (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990: 1587). 
181
 In the aftermath of the bailout of the financial system of 2008/9 the problem of systemic risk is 
being addressed in part not by reducing the size of or reliance on finance but by providing a ‘legal 
framework for winding down such firms in an orderly way in the midst of a crisis’ i.e. preventing 
contamination of the rest of the system, hence the rise of measures such as ‘living wills’ and 
‘administrative liquidation’ (Bernanke, 2012, Fitzpatrick IV et al., 2011). 
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6.3.2 Maintaining confidence in bank liabilities in the light of deregulation 
The changes that occurred during the deregulation process impacted negatively 
on banks’ ability to present themselves to liability holders as a safe bet in a 
number of ways. First, constraints on bank behaviour also came with a degree of 
protection from the authorities. Banks subject to laws such as the 1933 Banking 
Act were very low credit risks: between 1934 and 1980 an ‘unusual calm’ 
descended and ‘systemic banking panics or waves of bank failures became a 
distant memory’ (Calomiris, 2000: 1). Both activities outside this framework of 
constraints / protection and the gradual rescinding of that framework increased 
uncertainty about banks’ ability to meet their liabilities.  
Second, and in combination with the first point, the scale and nature of banks and 
borrowing firms grew. The bank manager who relied on her knowledge of the 
local economy to assess and enforce repayment was redundant in an era of large, 
international credits given to big, complex institutions, both banks and non-
banks, on an ever-increasing scale. Banks themselves were larger and more 
complex, with accompanying division of duties and formalisation of processes 
and, as part of this, the use of statistical techniques to manage the scale of their 
commercial banking and financial market activities. On the other side of the 
relationship, borrowers were now also larger more complex organisations.  
Third, in addition to scale, the nature of the business changed from take-and-hold 
positions in commercial banking credit to buy-and-sell positions in securities and 
derivatives. For outsiders, this made judging the banks’ portfolios harder as their 
composition could change much more quickly than previously; for example 
banks could become rapidly undiversified. In addition, the rise of buy-and-sell 
positions greatly increased their exposure to price changes in comparison with 
commercial banking activities under the New Deal regime. Once again, these 
changes made judging banks’ creditworthiness considerably harder for outsiders. 
The processes of ensuring the solvency and liquidity of the banks’ assets had to 
adapt to the new activities, and banks had to find new ways to persuade outsiders 
that they were managing these new risks.  
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6.3.3 Regulation by committee 
Markets do not simply spring up, or emerge when rules are removed: they are 
made.
182
 From the 1980s onwards banks were making derivatives markets for 
themselves, and one of the most important tasks in this was addressing 
perceptions of their creditworthiness in the new environment. Above all, the new 
environment was represented by the growing, ever-more integrated and 
international, financial markets. With no single international body able to impose 
regulation, international cooperative agreements among bankers were at the basis 
of the new regime (Underhill, 1991: 215). The eventual form of these agreements 
was the Basel Accords on Capital Adequacy, as Underhill (1991: 216) reports: 
‘The political demands for convergence on the question of capital standards came 
as much from international banks and other financial institutions as from 
governments and central bankers themselves’.. 
As discussed above, while currency controls kept banking and finance corralled 
within national borders, governments were autonomous enough to exert authority 
over them. By contrast, international regulation had no such autonomous body, 
and agreement came via a committee of central bankers at the BIS.
183
 Within the 
BIS, the BCBS was to be the location for the new international bank regulation. 
Formed in 1974, the Committee issued its first Capital Accord (Basel 1) in 1988, 
(BIS, 1988). The members of the committee are nation states, ‘represented by 
their central bank
184
 … The Committee does not possess any formal 
supranational supervisory authority, and its conclusions do not, and were never 
intended to, have legal force’ (BIS, 2009). Committee members must come to an 
agreement among themselves as representatives not of the BIS but of their nation 
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 Fine and Lapavitsas note that markets comprise and are sustained by complex social relations 
and can rarely serve as a starting point for analysis (Fine and Lapavitsas, 2000). 
183
 The BIS statutes state that the ‘first object’ is ‘to promote the cooperation of central banks’, 
cooperation that ‘should be evident in continuous and daily practice rather than as an emergency 
manifestation’ (BIS, 1935: 41, Toniolo, 2005). This took the form of monthly meetings for the 
world’s leading central bankers (Helleiner, 1994: 17). It is a more private international financial 
institution than the International Monetary Fund and was in contrast to the general spirit of the 
Bretton Woods agreement, which called for its closure. (Helleiner, 1994) However, it escaped 
closure, and as the Bretton Woods agreement became less important throughout the 1960s and 
1970s the BIS correspondingly increased in influence as a place where central bankers met both 
regularly and in the cases of financial crises. 
184
 … ‘and also by the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of 
banking business where this is not the central bank’. (BIS, 2009). 
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states. They express this agreement in ‘broad supervisory standards and 
guidelines’ (ibid.), and individual nations then take the necessary steps to 
implement the standards in their respective countries.  
Regulation by committee of national representatives lacks autonomy from those it 
is trying to regulate compared to national governments and their own banking 
systems, and because of this constraints on bank action in the Basel Accords have 
operated in the context of the ever-increasing derivative volumes. Representatives 
are likely to vote in their own interests or those of their constituents, limiting the 
ability of the committee to impose solutions against those interests. The actions 
of the BCBS appear to have achieved some degree of autonomy, given the strong 
status of the Basel Accord, and the Accords might be argued to have provided a 
level playing field, potentially against the interests of some representatives. 
Nevertheless, the committee cannot seem to override the incentives of all dealers 
to increase the amount of derivatives traded and it can be argued that the Accords 
focus on improving the feasibility and safety of these growing volumes. Above 
all, national banking regulator representations to the committee are likely to be 
shaped by existing bank practices to manage these risks, and thus regulators have 
little option but to represent the interests of banks at the BCBS. As a result it is 
unsurprising if regulation is focused on facilitating and improving the safety of 
ever-more, ever-faster derivative trading.  
Finally, regulating the market via the capital requirement of the market makers 
creates an ‘Other’, i.e. those that engage in derivatives but are not directly 
regulated under Basel. This ‘Other’, comprising principally institutional investors 
(including, for example, the now notorious shadow banking system (Pozsar et al., 
2012)), could not exist under the CEA regime when all trading institutions were 
obliged to trade on the principal focus of regulation, i.e. the exchange, and were 
themselves regulated. The preceding chapters have made clear, however, that this 
division between market makers and the rest is first and foremost built upon the 
specialist attributes of banks as dealers and market makers and the asymmetry 
that this creates with other uses of derivatives. Re-regulation has taken up this 
division and acted upon it, because it is the market makers that are most 
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represented at the heart of the regulatory regime, i.e. by bank regulators on the 
Basel Committee.
185
  
While the international element of expanding bank activities is strongly 
associated with the form of the regulatory body, i.e. an international committee, 
the expansion of bank activities to include financial market dealing is associated 
with the specific form of the regulation and its focus on capital adequacy, as the 
next section explores.  
6.3.4 Putting risk on the balance sheet. 
If the move offshore is associated with form of the regulator, namely the 
international committee, the turn to markets may be more closely associated with 
the form of regulation itself, namely the bringing of risk onto bank balance sheets 
through capital adequacy requirements. The use of new risk-management 
techniques based on mathematical valuation models (discussed further in Chapter 
8) was at the centre of banks’ management of their new activities. These practices 
were standardised and formalised in the Basel Accords and, by setting a risk-
based capital adequacy requirement, risk was brought onto the balance sheet. To 
some extent the capital adequacy requirement constrained bank activity, but, at 
least as importantly, it signalled to liability holders that risk management was 
practiced, capital was set aside and banks’ activity was constrained. 
The quantity of bank lending and capital held is published for outsiders in 
financial accounts via the balance sheet; under the Basel Accords the banks 
attempted to include incorporate the quality, specifically the risk of loss, of this 
lending in the balance sheet as well. The Accords set a minimum capital 
adequacy ratio (in the initial Accord a minimum ratio of 8% was agreed). The 
ratio is calculated between a capital requirement and the amount of capital held. 
Turning first to the amount of capital held, capital was already shown on the 
balance sheet, but a way of standardising its measurement across the various 
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 Gowan posits the shadow banking sector an outgrowth of the banking system rather than as a 
competitor. In many ways this fits the view presented in Chapter 5, of institutional investors and 
banks facing each other in financial markets and relying on each other to generate profits. Gowan 
goes on to argue that the while banks have been re-regulated under the Basel Accords, to a large 
extent the shadow banking system represents the growth of a deregulated sector alongside it 
(Gowan, 2009: 13-14). 
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capital instruments that banks all over the world were issuing was required. 
Agreement was relatively straightforward. These liabilities were classified into a 
relatively small number of categories (instrument types); furthermore, for the 
issuers of these liabilities there is no need to consider their own creditworthiness.  
When it came to measuring the capital requirement to be incorporated in the 
capital adequacy ratio to capture the riskiness of bank assets in the bank balance 
sheet things were more complicated. Measurement needed to be standard across 
banks, and to be capable of convincing outsiders that the risk of non-payment of 
bank liabilities was captured, managed and to some degree mitigated by capital. 
Those agreeing the standards published in 1988 in Basel 1 were only able to 
agree on a relatively limited and simple incorporation of risk into the balance 
sheet via the capital requirement.  
First, there are many sources of potential loss. Basel I covered only credit risk 
and country transfer risk, perhaps the clearest risks that a commercial bank faces, 
and, like capital, the quantity if not quality of which was already measured on the 
balance sheet. However, Basel I also acknowledged that ‘there are many other 
kinds of risk – for example, investment risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, 
concentration risk’ (BIS, 1988: 8). Discussion evidently covered these other 
areas, but agreement on them was postponed. 
Second, the main challenge was how to include the riskiness of the banks’ assets 
in the capital requirement and thus on the balance sheet. In order to standardise 
the measurement of different assets, Basel I categorised borrowers into different 
types and proposed standardised risk weights for each category. The Accord itself 
acknowledged that this was unsophisticated,
186
 and presumably this simplicity 
represents, to some extent, the limited ability of the BCBS to agree more complex 
common standards.
187
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 ‘The framework of weights [was] kept as simple as possible and only five weights [were] used 
- 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%’ (BIS, 1988: 8). 
187
 In another example, the decision to offer zero weights to Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries was chosen among several options mentioned in 
the Accord – the OECD grouping included South Korea and Turkey, which were both to 
experience financial crises before the introduction of Basel II. 
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As well as reflecting the slow process of agreeing standards by committee, 
however, the limited scope of the Basel I Accord also reflects banking practices 
at the time. In the mid-1980s, when agreement was being thrashed out, the huge 
trading portfolios, and in particular the massive derivatives markets of today, 
were not yet in evidence. The Accord that emerged reflected bank practice at the 
time, and as I show below, as the financial markets and particularly derivatives 
markets grew, new Accords came out which to reflected evolving practices a 
large degree. 
6.3.5 The treatment of derivative under the Basel Accords 
As derivatives dealers, banks sought to increase the volume of their derivatives 
trading and in so doing developed a series of practices that came to be 
incorporated into the Accords. The central contradiction of derivatives in this 
regard is that they are untraded claims which arise to facilitate trading. One result 
is that existing trades are not sold to capture profits from price moves; instead, 
new, offsetting trades are undertaken. Managing the implications of this piling of 
claims and counterclaims is central to all the more detailed practices explored in 
the second half of this thesis. I show here that even though OTC derivatives 
escape the New Deal regulatory constraints on credit, market and operational 
risk-taking, the Basel Accords re-regulated these, albeit differently, and that 
managing the contradiction of trading with untradeable claims is at the heart of 
this re-regulation.  
The treatment of derivatives under Basel evolves over time, reflecting changing 
bank practices and the growth of the market. In Basel I, derivatives are treated 
primarily as credit exposures to a counterpart (BIS, 1988). Market or price risk is 
subsequently included with the amendment of 1996 (BIS, 1996). Basel II 
includes a capital adequacy requirement for operational risk and updated 
treatment of counterparty credit risk (BIS, 2006). Finally the market risk inherent 
in derivative counterparty credit risk, known as the credit valuation adjustment 
(CVA) is also included in the capital adequacy calculation in Basel III (BIS, 
2010, revised June 2011). 
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This subsection traces the above developments and shows how they develop as 
banks’ practices aiming to regulate their relation with the wide economy. Risk 
management practices develop, bringing risk onto the balance sheet and so 
communicating with liability holders. These different categories of risk also build 
on each other to cumulatively address the contradiction of derivatives as untraded 
claims for trading, and in doing so transform the character of derivatives into 
something closely resembling the standardised, apparently tradable claim of 
exchange-traded derivatives. 
Under Basel I, derivatives were treated as a claim in much the same way as loans. 
A capital requirement for counterparty credit risk was calculated: the exposure 
calculation method was the current replacement value of the contract (RV) plus a 
percentage add-on that reflected that variable nature of the exposure. Offsetting 
exposures to a single counterparty were measured with a net replacement value, 
but add-ons were calculated gross per counterparty and were determined by basic 
categories that were similar in nature to the credit risk weights and which 
attempted to capture the different volatilities of different underlying index prices 
or risk factors. As the name suggests, the use of net replacement value assumes 
that exposures are replaceable in the market. However, the assumption behind 
gross add-ons limits this to replacing net exposure to each risk factor one at a 
time. Derivatives in this regulation look principally like loans whose repayment 
amount  can vary (BIS, 1988: 12-13). 
This treatment reflects the practices of OTC derivatives as they emerged in the 
late 1980s as one-off bespoke claims on other counterparts, not overwhelmingly 
aimed at trading in and out of the underlying index to profit from price changes. 
Yet even as Basel I came into force, banks’ activities were moving on, in part 
reflecting the delays inevitable in agreeing and publishing international regulation 
by committee. They were also facing new dangers stemming largely from the 
growth of bank activity in financial markets. In particular, they faced losses from 
price moves, and the speed at which portfolio composition could change 
increased; new measures were required to convince liability holders that banks 
were sufficiently diversified. The dangers posed by this activity to individual 
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banks and to the system more generally were brought home by the crash of 
1987.
188
  
In 1996 the BCBS formalised the new market risk management practices in an 
Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, thus bringing 
into the capital requirement, and thereby onto the balance sheet, a new source of 
loss for liability holders (BIS, 1996). Basic methods for measuring the price risk 
– the so-called standard approach – were available, but for the largest dealers the 
new accord meant the introduction of the advanced-models approach and the 
calculation of capital requirement based upon a value-at-risk (VaR) model. VaR 
simulates changes in the market value of a bank’s portfolio and calculates a 
capital requirement based upon a mark-to-market loss in the tail of the 
distribution of portfolio values.  
Market risk management and calculation of a market risk capital requirement 
proceeds on the assumption that there is no counterparty credit risk, and as such 
assumes that losses (and gains) from derivatives stem solely from buying and 
selling the claim in the market – i.e. from price moves. This assumption rests 
upon and contributes to the increasing appearance of derivatives as tradable, an 
appearance which not only reflects market participants’ increased trading but is 
also built upon a number of concrete back-office practices to support this 
appearance.  
First, it is made possible by the accounting treatment of derivatives. On the one 
hand, the value of the claims included in the VaR calculation was marked-to-
market, so the balance sheet already reflected losses (and gains) from falls (and 
rises) in the replacement value of a book of derivative claims. Both this marking 
to market and the VaR calculation were in turn made possible by financial 
accounting treatment of counterparty credit risk: first, reserving for expected loss, 
and second, because counterparty credit risk had already been brought onto the 
balance sheet via the capital requirement of Basel I for derivative counterparty 
risk.  
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 In addition, in 1995 the failure of Baring Brothers (Leeson and Whitley, 1996) brought 
attention to banks’ risk control processes and departments.  
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Second, and as I explore in the next chapter, changes in legal documentation also 
support the appearance and treatment of derivatives as tradable claims. At the 
level of individual contracts, these changes have tended to standardise derivative 
instruments. As a result, a derivative claim on a counterparty that buys the 
underlying index becomes a closer match to one that sells the underlying index. 
This makes it easier for market-risk practices to treat them as the buying and 
selling of the claim. At the level of portfolios of claims between two counterparts, 
portfolios are legally valued at their replacement value, thus assuming that the 
claims can be bought and sold. Finally, the new documentation allowed for 
collateralisation which, like counterparty risk reserving and capital treatment, 
reduces the risk of loss from counterparty default and therefore further allows 
market-risk calculations as if claims were themselves tradable and not dependent 
on payment by the counterpart.  
As shown, the measures required to make derivatives appear tradable require 
considerable institutional support; this support however mainly grows out of 
banks’ requirements to support ever-larger volumes of derivatives trading, e.g. 
through the division of labour within the dealer firm, the automation of certain 
tasks, collateralisation and so on. With this increase in the back office functions 
of dealers there is an increased chance of mistakes being made and banks making 
losses as a result. In this light, the capital requirement for operational risk 
introduced with Basel II can be seen as a part of the same process of transforming 
derivatives from claims to tradable instruments (BIS, 2006). 
As derivative trading volumes continued to grow, banks raced to bring out new 
instruments and to increase volumes in existing instruments, often without the 
necessary controls in place. Operational risk covers a wide variety of areas from 
delays in finalising legal documentation to not sending cash payments in time and 
fraud. The risk to banks from operational lapses was most famously demonstrated 
by the collapse of Baring Brothers in 1995 attributed to the actions of Nick 
Leeson, a ‘rogue trader’ (Leeson and Whitley, 1996).189 These incidents continue 
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 Leeson appeared to be a successful trader, but he was accumulating losses in a ‘hidden “error” 
account that he managed.’ The losses were eventually large enough to bring down Barings. The 
control problem was that ‘Leeson was responsible both for trading and for … the back office … 
He was able to disguise transactions and report them to the head office’ (Smith and Walter, 1997). 
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with predicable regularity; the ‘fat fingers trades’ that regularly sent markets into 
a temporary spin a few years ago (Barker et al., 2005) have been upgraded to 
their modern counterpart the ‘flash crash’ caused by rogue algorithms in 
computer-based high frequency trading (Easley et al., 2010). An operational risk 
capital requirement brings these risks onto the balance sheet, constraining bank 
behaviour through the capital requirement, and advertising to potential liability 
holders that banks are managing this risk of loss and mitigating it with additional 
capital.
190
  
The other change to derivatives in Basel II was a change in the calculation of the 
capital requirement for counterparty credit risk. For the largest dealers, Basel II 
replaced the replacement value plus add-on methodology to allow a more 
sophisticated modelling of credit exposure. The new methodology simulates 
moves in the value of the entire portfolio of trades facing each counterpart for the 
first year of the trade (Zhu and Pykhtin, 2007). In comparison to Basel I, the 
assumption of tradability is expanded by modelling each counterparty portfolio as 
a whole, including correlations between risk factors. Basel II assumes that in the 
event of counterparty default the entire portfolio facing each defaulted 
counterpart will simply be replaced in the market.
191
 Derivatives here are buyable 
and sellable claims. Those derivatives facing a defaulted counterpart can simply 
be replaced by buying some more.  
I have shown above how the various Accords have built up to the idea of a 
derivative as a tradable claim. For the credit risk capital requirement, the claim is 
valued at its market replacement value; meanwhile the market risk requirement 
proceeds as if there is no counterparty at all, and operational risk management 
bolsters the infrastructure that makes the appearance of the tradable claim 
possible. The inclusion of the CVA in Basel 3 marks a qualitative step on from 
here (BIS, 2010, revised June 2011). CVA incorporates counterparty credit risk in 
the valuation of the instrument (i.e. the derivative claim). While a derivative 
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 Regulators have been involved in the past in attempting to fix and forestall problems from such 
issues, notably the Federal Reserve of New York coordinated banks in 2005 to fix a potentially 
dangerous backlog of unconfirmed CDS novations (Mengle, 2007: 28-31). 
191
 In practice, portfolios are calculated at the level of a ‘netting set’. When, for example, trades 
between counterparts are documented under more than one ISDA Master Agreement this means 
that there would be more than one portfolio per counterpart. In the majority of cases, however, all 
or most exposure is contained under a single netting agreement. 
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claim is valued at its market replacement value, a reserve is taken in the accounts 
for expected losses from counterparty credit risk. CVA increasingly moves that 
reserve to a mark-to-market basis. The result of including the risk of mark-to-
market losses in the reserve (as well as previously on the claim itself) is that the 
derivative claim as a whole is treated as a (counterparty) credit-contingent claim 
which can be bought and sold to a monetary payment determined by the moves in 
the underlying price index. In some respects it combines the earlier categories of 
counterparty credit and market risk.  
The practice of marking CVA to market led to and stemmed from more active 
hedging of mark-to-market counterparty credit risk as firms first tried to reflect 
the cost of bespoke hedges in their accounts and secondly, tried to hedge the 
resulting mark-to-market volatility. Inclusion in the Accord further formalises 
and spreads the adoption of mark-to-market CVA practices, and with it the 
market for instruments to hedge CVA. This process has moved rapidly; in 2000 
CVA desks were almost non-existent, but now they are an integral part of the 
trading operations of major banks and have turned from a defensive or hedging 
activity to activity that is expected to earn a trading profit – a powerful example 
of the way in which new trading businesses develop for dealer banks in 
derivatives markets. 
Finally, more recently and, as discussed more extensively in the next chapter, the 
central clearing of derivatives insisted upon by regulators and lawmakers in the 
wake of the crisis that began in 2007/8 has further, and dramatically, increased 
the appearance and ability of market participants to treat derivatives not as claims 
on a counterpart but as a universally acceptable and exchangeable claim.  
The economic incentives and practices of dealers lie at the heart of this treatment 
of derivatives as tradable. Derivatives dealers profit from issuing derivative 
claims to buy and sell at a bid-ask spread (see Chapter 5), to capture more profit 
in this way each dealer is continuously incentivised to increase the quantity of 
derivatives they trade.  As a result they put into place procedures and practices to 
manage the resulting portfolios and trading operations. Although national central 
banks and bank regulators sitting on the BCBS might not claim or aim to 
represent banks’ interests directly, they cannot help but be influenced by banks’ 
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existing practices. As a result, practices for managing these ever-increasing 
quantities find their way into banking regulation.  
This serves dealers as a group in two ways. First, it constrains the amount of 
leverage that they can take with respect to these risks, and in doing so provides a 
solution to the ongoing bank problem of competing themselves into over-leverage 
and default. Second, and related to the first, it provides a means of signalling to 
the holders of bank liabilities that those liabilities are safe. The Basel Accords are 
understood here as a mechanism that helps banks to extend derivatives markets; 
this is quite different from their usual portrayal, which argues that they merely 
‘deal with the … consequences of this extension’ (Underhill, 1991: 215).  
Banks as derivatives market makers profit by collecting bid-ask spread. This 
creates the incentive for them to trade more and to increase the tradability of 
derivatives to achieve this. They develop practices that make derivatives more 
tradable, including those embodied in the Basel Accords and, as later chapters 
explore, in risk management and contractual practices. As these practices become 
established they become indispensable to the continued operation of derivatives 
markets, especially in their support of the ever-larger volumes being traded. In 
doing so they take on a certain objectivity and in turn affect the development of 
new practices. In this way the process of growth and development continues.
192
 
Since the escape of OTC derivatives from the constraints of the CEA as bespoke 
private agreements, market participants have increasingly been able to act as if 
derivatives are themselves tradable rather than an untradable claim against a 
market-making bank. 
In this way the banks’ incentives to treat derivatives as tradable claims, incentives 
that stem from profit motvies, are realised through their practice; the appearance 
of derivatives is transformed and market participants can increasingly act as if 
derivatives are, after all, tradable claims.  
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 As Chapter 8 explores in more detail by looking at the use of valuation models and risk 
management, the approach outlined here differs from Mackenzie’s (2003, 2006) use of 
performativity. Performativity (and counter-performativity) might be thought to arrange analysis 
in a different way, concentrating on the last of these stages and asking (only) how ideas such as 
valuation theory come to affect the development of new practices. 
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Crisis, however, has a way of disabusing the assumptions that have led to this 
construction of derivatives as tradable instruments. In particular, the crisis that 
began in 2007/8 illustrates how the various dimensions of risk in derivatives, to a 
large degree assumed separable in the Basel modelling, are very definitely 
interconnected. In 2008/9 large mark-to-market losses on portfolios price 
disruptions were associated with counterparty credit events, further price 
disruptions and dramatic falls in liquidity which further undermined the 
assumptions of both counterparty and market risk modelling. Furthermore, 
operational risk is intertwined with these other risks; e.g. dealers’ failure to 
collect sufficient collateral from AIG, Lehmans and other defaulting counterparts 
led to larger losses than risk management systems were predicting and to 
systemic risk. The total collapse of the residential mortgage market illustrates 
how, without ongoing trading, derivatives become claims on counterparties, and 
the risk management that sustains their appearance as tradable claims becomes 
useless to banks and therefore meaningless.  
The financial crisis that began in 2007/8 also revealed how bank practices 
continue to develop, often in ways that seek to operate outside the constraining 
framework of existing regulation. As discussed, the Basel Accords attempted to 
reflect bank activity on the balance sheet. The crisis revealed the many ways in 
which, in reaction to those regulations, banks had been attempting to seek 
activities and profit outside their framework by undertaking off-balance-sheet 
activities, e.g. collateralised debt obligations and structured investment vehicles 
(Duffie, 2010). Banks moved assets into seemingly separate entities, thus those 
assets did not incur a capital requirement on their own balance sheets under 
banking laws. However, the crisis revealed that the majority of these activities 
were not capable of standing alone, and many came rapidly back onto bank 
balance sheets as a result. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted how the evolving role of banks and their emergence 
as derivatives dealers are bound up with changing banking regulations. It has 
shown how derivatives markets, dominated by banks’ trading financial 
derivatives emerged from the changing economic, financial and regulatory 
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landscape of the mid-20
th
 century: first, as banks sought new profit opportunities 
outside existing regulatory structures with liberalisation often following as 
regulation sought to re-encompass these activities and; second, how re-regulation 
facilitated these new activities by mediating the relation between banks and the 
holders of their liabilities in the wider economy. 
In some ways, however, the changes, particularly those that have occurred since 
the crisis, are bringing OTC derivatives full circle to the form of exchange-traded 
derivatives from which they escaped in the 1980s. First, credit risk, market risk 
and operational risk are now included once again in the regulatory environment; 
and second, while capital requirements are being boosted by the regulatory 
response to the crisis, perhaps the biggest operational issue will be a move to 
central clearing for a large volume of OTC derivatives (Duffie et al., 2010, Duffie 
and Zhu, 2011). The OTC markets that emerge will resemble ETD derivatives in 
many ways, but with vital differences to the ETD derivatives of the New Deal 
regime.  
The regulatory logic throughout the OTC era has led to increases in the volume of 
derivatives and to a change in the character of derivatives from bespoke, bilateral 
claims to standardised and tradable claims. In many ways the return to exchanges 
can complete this transition: thanks to centralised credit enhancement 
mechanisms such as daily cash margining, derivatives on exchanges become 
devoid of counterparty risk and simply become ‘things’ to buy and sell; moreover 
other restrictions on the growth of the market such as operational risk are also 
largely dispensed with.
193
  
Whether the changes in OTC derivatives markets, such as the move to central 
clearing, will be advantageous to banks or represent a return to the suppression of 
their activities remains to be seen. New Deal regulation was able to suppress 
derivative activity to a large degree because it had derivatives corralled on 
exchanges. However, that regime was national and legislative, and was aimed at 
suppressing the speculative elements of finance. Partly as a result of the reaction 
to this regime, the Basel regime whcih replaced it is quite different. It is 
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 In a direct parallel clearing houses play a critical role in the transition of bank credit money 
from claims on individual banks to fungible, commodified, claims acceptable by all as money. 
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international, run by specialist agencies focusing on banks, and appears to have 
no problem with the continued growth and trading character of derivatives 
markets. Insistence on corralling derivatives activity through central clearing 
offers an opportunity to alter derivatives markets for those who feel that 
derivatives markets are not serving broader society, a group which has grown 
since the financial crisis that began in 2007/8 (Turner et al., 2009). Whether this 
opportunity will be taken up remains to be seen, for central clearing also offers 
the opportunity to trade yet more derivatives. 
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7 Contracts and clearing: managing volume and the 
derivative contradiction  
7.1 Introduction 
The central contradiction of derivatives markets for this chapter and the next is 
that the derivative form is a bilateral untraded agreement between two parties 
that exists to allow market participants to trade in an underlying which itself 
cannot be bought or sold, as it is merely an index, a measurement which 
determines the payments into the derivative. A cash-settled derivative is 
therefore an untraded claim to allow trading (see Chapter 5). The analysis 
arrives at this contradiction through examining the evolution of banking, the 
emergence of institutional investors and the shift in the character of financial 
markets from a means of providing credit to a site for trading. This contradiction 
provides, from within the analysis of the development of the derivative form 
itself, constraints to the growth of derivatives markets. The analysis continues in 
light of this contradiction by examining the evolving practices of banks as 
derivatives dealers, led by their profit motives, and in particular the ways in 
which they strive to increase derivative trading volumes and how derivative 
claims themselves come to appear tradable to market participants as a result.  
Contemporary derivatives markets are dominated by high-speed incessant 
trading by dealers and other, non-dealer financial institutions. Understanding 
how this situation came about is impossible without understanding how 
derivatives claims come to appear tradable. One of the critical elements of the 
practices that have made this possible has been the form of the legal contracts 
that constitute derivatives and, on a multilateral basis, clearing practices that are 
closely related to bilateral contractual practices. As a result, analysis of the 
nature and development of the legal contracts governing derivatives since the 
late 1980s is an important part of understanding the growth and changing 
character of derivatives.  
The contract governing OTC derivatives was central to them escaping the 
regulation put in place in the 1930s, which effectively suppressed derivative 
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activity and limited it to derivative exchanges (see Chapter 6). OTC derivatives 
escaped these constraints as tailored, bespoke contracts between eligible parties 
and not the standardised contracts found on exchanges. Fears for the validity of 
derivatives contracts in the face of a rising amount of OTC derivatives 
outstanding prompted the gradual strengthening of their exemption of OTC 
derivatives from the constraints of the Commodities Exchange Act (1936). They 
also motivated the actions of the International Swaps & Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), which has long been at the centre of shaping the OTC derivatives 
markets from the perspective of the legal contract.  
However, changes in the form of OTC contracts since the late 1980s represent a 
return to the form of exchange-traded derivatives in two ways: first, there has 
been a tendency to standardise derivatives contracts, and second, there has been 
a growth of netting, collateralisation and more recently, central clearing for 
OTC derivatives. The motivation for these developments can be found in the 
profit motives of dealers – the market makers in several senses – for whom 
profit is gained from a bid-ask spread on derivative prices, and for whom 
increased trading activity (other things being equal) means increased profits. 
The formalisation of agreements both within the dealer firm and between all 
firms in the market is both shaped by and encourages further growth in 
derivatives markets and in turn comes to affect the character of derivatives 
markets. 
194
 
Section 7.2 places contracts in the context of the extraordinary growth of 
derivatives markets which provides dealers with growing market-making profits 
and requires more coordination than small markets would. Section 7.3 analyses 
the confirmation, which is the contract governing a single trade.
 195
 As 
derivatives are instruments that are traded by pilling up claims and 
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 Making derivatives markets requires the coordination of those who participate in it, both 
within and between firms. The practices involved in coordinating participants become 
entrenched and give rise to arrangements such as contracts, which take on an objectivity and in 
turn impose themselves on future developments (Ilyenkov, 1977, 2013, Pilling, 1980). This 
approach can be contrasted with the approaches to the analysis of regulation and risk 
management/valuation models, such as performativity, which arrange the analysis to examine 
the effect of arrangements such as contracts or valuation models on practices.  
195
 The confirmation, so called because the back office uses them to confirm the trader’s 
agreement, is the basic legal document governing single derivative contracts and specify the 
terms of the trade such as the reference index, the expiry date and so on. 
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counterclaims, section 7.4 examines the role of the agreements between parties 
covering portfolios of claims first bilaterally and then multilaterally. Section 7.5 
concludes. 
7.2 Contracts and the growing business of derivatives market makers 
Legal contracts in derivatives markets are one of the most direct and observable 
manifestations of the forces that shape these markets. Their form emerges from 
the practices of market participants, but above all from banks as derivatives 
market makers. Of all the participants in the market, market makers are most 
interested in increasing the total volume of derivative contracts that are traded. 
Practices to support increasing volumes find their way into formal expression in 
derivative contracts, which become central to the continued working of the 
markets and affect its future development.  
This section begins to trace the ways in which these processes occur.  Broadly, 
the analysis moves from informal agreements that might allow very small 
derivatives market to function to the ways in which new devices – here, 
contracts – emerge in response to and at the same time facilitate the growth of 
the market. This paves the way for the later analysis of how these formal 
agreements further increase the scale and scope of the markets.  
7.2.1 Contracts: central to performing derivatives  
Informal agreements regarding derivatives transactions could only support a 
very small derivatives market. To a large extent it is formal, written legal 
contracts that allow derivatives markets to grow. Put another way, contracts 
provide the framework within which trading occurs on the scale that it does, and 
such a framework could not be provided by ‘gentleman’s agreements’ between 
traders.  
The conduct of relatively small groups of derivatives traders, e.g. in a single 
trading pit or market, or even on a given exchange, functions by codes of 
behaviour that are more complex than those strictly prescribed by the rules and 
certainly more than those posed by the hypothetical homo economicus of 
mainstream economics (MacKenzie, 2006).  This social code can, to a limited 
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extent, resolve disputes about the details of completed trades and to an even 
more limited degree could support the settlement of such trades. However, as 
derivatives trading expands in scale from a few thousand up to millions of trades 
a day, more formality is required.
196
  
Processing even a moderate quantity of trades requires specialisation such that 
once the trader has struck the deal a large middle and back-office staff are 
required to ensure that the payments agreed upon in the deal are processed.
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The contract helps with this in two ways. First, the system can only function by 
formalising the terms of the trades. Second, such a large group cannot support 
the diffusion of trust and reciprocity on which the smaller group relies for 
informal dispute resolution. I now explore these two elements in more detail.  
First, formal contracts help to organise activity on a large scale. It might seem 
that the two traders striking a deal over the telephone or in an exchange pit are 
‘performative’ in the sense that ‘the issuance of the utterance is the performing 
of the action’ (Austin, 1962: 6), or that the utterance ‘brings into being that of 
which it speaks’ (MacKenzie, 2004: 305); i.e. when traders announce the deal 
‘done!’. However it can equally be argued that the derivative is not performed 
until all the payments are made and any other terms fulfilled – in short, without 
the back office nothing would actually happen when two traders agree that the 
derivative transaction is ‘done’. Even a moderate scale of derivatives activity 
demands several specialist groups to complete the performance.  
While ‘derivatives trades are initiated in the front office trading function, [they 
are] then cleared, managed and settled in the middle and back office functions.’ 
(Schinasi et al., 2000: 20):  
The back office provides five critical functions: issuing and 
monitoring confirmations; recording transactions; settling 
transactions; ensuring that legal documentation is completed; and 
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 It might be even argued that the informal behaviour observed occurs within the framework of 
a large-scale trading environment made possible by the formal economic structure, not least 
property rights. In this case the informal codes that appear to be at work in small groups of 
traders cannot be analysed separately from the more formalised aspects of a trading floor.  
197
 Even on the trading floor itself, there is a division of duties and a definite hierarchy, with 
heads of desks and dealing rooms at the top earning huge salaries and relying on many more 
junior employees to undertake the individual tasks of derivatives trading (Godechot, 2008). 
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producing information for management and control purposes, 
including reports on positions that are subject to trading and 
counterparty limits, reports on profitability, and reports on positions 
that require action…’ (Schinasi et al., 2000: 21)  
Typically there are many more employees supporting traders, than there are 
traders. Analysis of the whole of this arrangement for performing derivatives 
gives a broader insight into the rise of derivatives in the last 30 years than would 
be possible if concentrating only on trading floors.
198
  
Given the enormous resources required to make the market operate on the scale 
that it does, translating the deal into ‘legalese’ is critical to the performance of 
the derivative; 
[Legal contracts render] the innovations of the market, expressed in 
the Esperanto of the trading floor, into legal documentation that both 
ensures the correct application of the appropriate legal concepts and 
that the contractual intentions of the parties reproduces in written 
form. (Hudson, 2002)  
The legal contract, embodied at the lowest level in the confirmation, provides 
the definition of the trade that enables the machinery of middle and back office 
to operate, both coordinating specialists within firms and coordinating across 
firms. 
In addition, once the derivatives market is operating on a lage scale in terms of 
both the number of trades and the number of employees the law is required to 
mediate in disputes between firms, replacing more informal mechanisms that 
might work in smaller situations. Traders might agree the terms of the trade 
between themselves but scale requires formality, not least when elements of the 
performance of the derivative, such as ensuring that payments are made, involve 
many other people besides the traders; and this formality, in turn, requires 
written specification of much more detail than traders would ordinarily specify 
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 Methodologically, focusing only on trading floors, important as they are, risks becoming 
ideal as the analysis focuses not on the whole phenomena under investigation but a preselected 
part using unspecified theory (see Chapter 2). 
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between themselves. There are two aspects to this: first, the terms require 
detailed specification to ensure that all payments are correctly processed, e.g. 
payment dates, payment currency and which publication provides the reference 
price, and moreover for some instruments, specifying the conditions in writing 
involves considerable complexity. Second, the parties’ behaviour in the event of 
unforeseen circumstances (not least the default of one of the parties) must be 
addressed in the contract. 
In short, the legal confirmation can be thought of as a manifestation of practices 
that to a large extent grow from the need to support derivatives trading on a 
large scale. Large-scale trading mainly stems from the profit motives of the 
dealers, who are also the group with the most say in the development of legal 
documentation of OTC derivatives. For further detail of how these practices 
impact on the development of derivatives markets, the next section explores 
how the confirmation has developed since the explosion of OTC derivatives that 
began in the late 1980s. 
7.3 The production of a virtual underlying asset and the standardisation of 
the derivative contract 
A derivative contract must establish two major elements: the  price index that 
the derivative references and the terms of the derivative itself. Because cash-
settled  derivatives do not involve any exchange of an underlying asset or 
commodity, the first task facing a derivative dealer striking a new derivative is 
to define which reference index will be used. This index needs to appear 
objective to both parties, e.g. it cannot be one over which one party can exert 
control. Legal academics might describe this as an aleatory contract.
199
 This 
section first examines the ‘production of virtuality’ (MacKenzie, 2007) that 
dealers must undertake to establish an underlying price index. 
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 Lynch (2011a: 10) describes derivatives as aleatory. An aleatory contract  is a ‘contract in 
which one party’s duty of performance depends on some uncertain event, e.g. a wagering 
contract, a contract of insurance’ (Richards and Curzon, 2011) or more simply as ‘a wagering  
contract.’ (Osborn and Woodley, 2005) Lynch stresses that in derivatives and in aleatory 
contracts duty of performance depends on an uncertain event external to the counterparts and not 
on their performance.  
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This need to separate the making of the index from both parties, or to establish 
its ‘facticity’ (MacKenzie, 2006) contains the seed of the standardisation of the 
index and of the derivatives contract. The second part of this section turns to the 
standardisation of derivative contracts which has typified OTC derivatives ever 
since the market escaped New Deal era regulation in the late 1980s, an escape 
made on the basis of being non-standardised. (Greenberger, 2010) Once again 
standardisation is associated with growth in derivatives markets and with a 
change in their character.  
7.3.1 The reference price index underlying the derivative and the production of 
virtuality 
Cash-settled derivatives proceed as if an underlying commodity-like exchange 
occurs: they appear to represent the net cash payment that would occur if an 
underlying purchase and sale have been completed. As happens so often, 
though, appearance is the inverse of reality, for cash settlement actually ensures 
that no underlying exchange occurs – only cash is delivered and no commodity, 
security or any other asset is involved. A cash-settled derivative simulates an M-
C-M’ exchange; i.e. the participants act as if, starting with money, a purchase 
and a sale will result in a return to money with a loss or a gain. In fact cash 
settlement ensures no exchange of money for commodity (M-C), or commodity 
for money (C-M) takes place and instead there is on a single money payment 
between derivative counterparts equal to M, the difference between M and M’.  
‘When something comes to exist “in practice”, but not in reality in the strict 
sense, it can be said to be virtual’ (Arnoldi, 2004: 24). In this sense derivatives 
dealers must invest in the ‘the material production of virtuality’ (MacKenzie, 
2007); they must bring into being something to trade in practice but not in 
reality. Economic sociologists have explored the material ways in which the 
virtual nature of financial markets comes into being in general and how the 
virtual asset underlying the derivative is ‘made’ in particular. Banknotes, 
debased coins and even entries in electronic databases are material, but their 
materiality is indirectly linked to their ability to serve as money.  
7 - Contracts and clearing: managing volume and the derivative contradiction 
Page 217 of 303 
Similarly, although not money, the material production of virtuality in 
derivatives markets has numerous physical manifestations. Examples include, 
but are not limited to, the banks of computer screens and the software they 
display (Knorr-Cetina, 2005, Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger, 2002, Pryke, 2007), 
the organisation of trading floors (Beunza and Stark, 2004) and the processes of 
risk management and credit assessment, e.g. visiting other financial institutions 
with which derivatives might be traded (Kalthoff, 2005). 
With exchange of an underlying asset entirely missing, cash-settled derivatives 
counterparts require simply a change in the price at which the virtual exchanges 
occur. This is provided by a measurement or index, and it is this price index that 
is the underlying to the derivative. Herein lies the fundamental separation 
between trading the real underlying asset and trading with a derivative: in the 
former an asset or commodity is exchanged for money, in the second the 
underlying a measurement and it is impossible to actually exchange a 
measurement, it is only possible to trade derivatives on it.   
This is most evident in the most developed forms of derivatives, such as weather 
derivatives for which delivery of an underlying asset is simply impossible (there 
is no asset in this case), but armed with knowledge of these forms it is possible 
to go back and see that the same is true in earlier forms. The analysis below 
moves from physically-settled derivatives to financial derivatives on an existing 
single security, to derivatives on a pool of securities and finally to derivatives 
referencing an index where no underlying asset even exists and certainly cannot 
be traded e.g. LIBOR-based or weather derivatives. 
Starting once again with the physically-settled derivatives that pre-date the 
explosion of financial and OTC derivatives in the 1980s and returning to the 
wheat contract on the Chicago exchanges, it can be argued that social and 
technical processes are under way that create conditions for the emergence of 
the derivative (MacKenzie, 2007: 14). To a certain extent, technological 
advances (themselves a social process and a part of the more general 
development of capitalist relations) created conditions for the contract. In 
particular, the use of the railways and grain elevators pooled the grain of several 
farmers while transporting it to market, making it impossible for a buyer to say 
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exactly where or from which farmer the purchased grain originated. In some 
part, more obviously social processes created conditions for the contract: 
inspectors from the Chicago Board of Trade assessed the quality and the 
fairness of the weights and measures used, and in time the State of Illinois took 
up the role of independent assessor of the grain (MacKenzie, 2007). 
Buyers no longer bought and inspected the specific grain of a certain farmer for 
themselves – now they bought an amount of a standardised produce to be 
delivered from the pooled grain stores. Based on pooling and inspecting 
practices, confidence in the quality and quantity of the grain to be eventually 
delivered into the derivative contract allowed derivatives trading on produce 
that not only could not be physically inspected by the buyer at the time of the 
transaction but might not have even been planted at the time of trading 
(MacKenzie, 2006). The underlying asset can be characterised not as actual 
grain but as an ‘homogenous abstraction’ (Cronon, 1991: 132,  quoted in 
MacKenzie, 2006: 14) to a standardised quantity of a standardised quality of 
grain that can be traded in practice but not in reality, i.e. it is only traded 
virtually.  
Traders must come together in financial and OTC markets, too, to define a 
common underlying reference price index to trade. As with commodity 
derivatives, the creation of the underlying reference price index requires 
‘facticity’ (MacKenzie, 2006), i.e. to be accepted as fact. To do so the 
underlying reference price index must be measureable and representative of the 
thing it purports to trade virtually, i.e. ‘in practice’, and both counterparts must 
believe that it is free of manipulation. This facticity can be achieved by invoking 
groups in society beyond the dealers themselves, as seen above with the 
introduction of the State of Illinois.
200
 Market makers in derivatives markets 
have often found ways to create the underlying reference price index 
themselves, e.g. in LIBOR-based derivatives.  
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 The state can play various roles in helping to establish facticity. Occasionally it has instigated 
markets such as carbon and sulphur markets. More often it has ratified existing markets to boost 
acceptability, investigations into the probity of LIBOR might be seen as one such example. 
(Murphy et al., 2012 )   
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Even financial derivatives on a single underlying asset, such as a derivative 
referencing a common equity, involve referencing a price, not the price of an 
underlying exchange. The process of compiling a reference market price from 
the variety of trades that might or indeed might not have occurred in a day 
requires rules, i.e. modelling (MacKenzie, 2006: 21-22). A variety of techniques 
exist for compiling a reference price, e.g. published closing prices are often not 
the last trade of the day and involve calculation using the prices of a variety of 
trades.
201
 A reference price calculated from numerous transactions underlines 
that even when the derivative appears to be on a single asset there is a separation 
between the asset and the price index underlying the derivative.
202
  
Consider now derivatives on pools of securities rather than on single securities, 
for example government bond futures and equity index derivatives. Here the 
reference price forming the underlying price index for the derivative is even 
more clearly separated from any actual exchange. For example, a critical 
component in pricing government bond futures is the calculation of the so-called 
‘cheapest to deliver security’, which may not even have been issued at the time 
the derivative is traded (Livingston, 1987). Similarly, it is often difficult to the 
point of impossibility in equity index futures to simultaneously trade the 
underlying pool of assets. Derivatives on the S&P500 equity index are among 
the oldest financial derivatives of the modern derivative era and remain some of 
the most popular. Trading five hundred stocks in the same moment is 
considerably more difficult than trading in one derivative contract.  
Finally, most derivatives trading is in instruments where the link to an 
underlying asset exchange does not exist at all. Examples include such things as 
weather derivatives; the most voluminous example, however, comes from 
derivatives on the LIBOR (Campbell and Diebol, 2003, British Bankers' 
Association). Now compiled by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), it 
serves as a reference for more OTC derivatives (measured by notional amount 
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 Indeed it can become complex, for example as a result of attempts to manipulate closing 
prices (Comerton-Forde and Putnins, 2011). 
202
 Moreover, and as I discuss further in Chapter 8, as the construct of the reference price 
becomes more established an inversion occurs such that actual prices of exchange come to be 
seen as diversions from the modelled price. This parallels the way that the price of commodified 
labour comes to be measured as diversions, ‘mere sources of error’, from the price of abstract 
labour. (Lukács, 1971: 89) 
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outstanding) than any other set of underlying price indices (BIS, 2011). LIBOR 
represents the banks’ estimates of where they might borrow from each other in 
various currencies for various maturities and need not represent actual 
transactions. To avoid perceptions of possible manipulation, outliers are 
removed and the remainder of the estimates averaged. Thus the banks 
collectively create the measure that they then use to trade and profit from.  
CDS offer a further example: as discussed in Chapter 1 and elsewhere in this 
thesis, the underlying reference price for a CDS is effectively an index that 
equals 1 until a committee made up of dealers and other large market 
participants declares a default event, at which point all trading ceases and an 
auction among market participants sets the final index level between 0 and 1. In 
other words, trading only occurs when the index = 1. Derivatives on this index 
are the only way in which this underlying reference price can be traded, the 
reference price being the committee’s decision and the result of the auction.203 
Again, market participants construct the index that they use to trade. Contra 
Fehle (2006: 534) it is not only in exchange–traded markets that derivatives 
dealers ‘collude’ to design the instruments.  
Even when the derivative is highly complex and / or bespoke and is not intended 
for further trading, it must be built upon commonly-accepted facts, e.g. 
published interest rates or exchange rates. Indeed, once the underlying asset is 
not socially constructed then a specific and private loss must be proved to the 
other counterpart, in which case the instrument in question ceases to be a 
derivative and becomes insurance. Once a specific loss must be proved or 
delivered, the contract in question becomes unsuited to repeated trading. By 
being a claim referencing movements in an index, the derivative eases the 
counterparts’ ability to act as if they are trading precisely because they do not 
have to actually exchange anything. 
To recap, the underlying to a derivative is an index, a measurement constructed 
by the market participants. Successful derivatives markets rely on participants 
                                                 
203
 Trades in the bonds which make up the pool can be modelled to produce a yield curve for 
that class of bonds, and this can be used as a guide to CDS pricing. Usually CDS trade at a 
‘basis’ to bonds, meaning that there is a difference between the yield curve of the bond and the 
CDS.  
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establishing the facticity of this index between them. The index cannot itself be 
traded; only via derivatives can participants trade as if they are trading the 
index. 
7.3.2 Standardisation and tradability 
The benefits to the bank of increased tradability of derivatives and the need to 
establish the facticity of the reference price  underlying the derivative exert 
pressure to standardise it. As discussed, the creation of facticity involves 
references that are external to the two counterparts. Moreover if the counterparts 
wish to trade the derivative again, which after all is the purpose of trading in 
derivative form in the first place (see Chapter 5), then the more widely the 
underlying price is accepted as fact, the easier it will be to engage large numbers 
of counterparts in trading.
204
 The nature and purpose of the derivative and the 
benefits to dealers of increasing trading volumes lead to a standardisation of the 
underlying reference price index. This standardisation affects derivatives in a 
number of ways that are explored below. 
Standardisation affects the underlying price index and the derivatives contract 
itself (i.e. the contract that references the underlying price index). It manifests in 
the confirmation, the basic legal document governing single derivative 
contracts. Increasingly, standard confirmations are published by ISDA, the 
organization charged with coordinating legal matters in the OTC derivatives 
markets and dominated by the largest derivatives dealers.
205
  
The most basic way in which standardisation increases tradability is almost 
arithmetical; it reduces the possible contracts available, and by reducing choice, 
creates more potential matches. If there are, say, 100 market participants and 50 
                                                 
204
 It should be noted that the underlying price may only have become a ‘price’ by being invoked 
in the derivative, and may have already been an socially established fact e.g. official 
measurements of inches of rainfall in a weather derivative.  
205
 Originally called the International Swap Dealers Association. Although ISDA boasts 803 
members, 209 of these are ‘primary members’ and in fact a smaller group appear to hold more 
power than others: apart from the executive vice chairman and CEO the officers and directors 
are overwhelmingly employed by major derivative dealers. Officers and directors are drawn 
from Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Morgan Stanley, BNP Paribas, UniCredit, Citi, 
Société Générale, Goldman, Sachs & Co, The DE Shaw Group, PIMCO, Nomura Securities, 
HSBC Bank plc, Standard Chartered Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays Capital, 
Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities, BP, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, UBS AG, 
BlackRock, RBC Capital Markets, and ICBC. (ISDA, 2009a) 
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contracts, the chances of finding offsetting trades are small; if there are only 5 
possible contracts then the chances of matching trades is greatly increased. At 
the level of the derivative contract, if terms are limited more participants will 
find offsetting trades; e.g. if counterparty A wants to buy an option with a strike 
price 49.5 and counterparty B wants to sell an option with a strike 50.5 they 
more likely to trade if only one strike of 50 is offered than if three, of 49.5, 50 & 
50.5, are offered. The same is true for the choice of underlying reference price 
index (just another contractual term in this respect): for a given number of 
participants, a restricted number of possible underlying reference indices will 
tend to increase participants per contract specification, concentrating activity.  
Neoclassical economics might portray this restriction of choice as a trade-off for 
market participants in which they choose a suboptimal contract in order to 
increase tradability (Fehle, 2006, Koch and Lazarov, 2007). This assumes, 
however, that the market participant has a use for the contract other than trading 
which determines their optimal contract, the most likely of these uses being 
hedging. As Chapters 1 and 5 in particular have argued, however, derivatives 
are trading instruments designed to facilitate repeated buying and selling. In this 
light standardisation is not a trade-off but a sensible collusion on the part of 
market participants to concentrate and therefore increase the number of potential 
buyers and sellers in a given contract. 
The second way in which standardising the underlying reference price index can 
increase tradability is by making it easier to generate the level of shared 
knowledge required to allow two parties to transact. Carruthers and Stinchombe 
(1999: 354) ask how ‘heterogeneous claims on income streams associated with 
different sorts of assets get turned into homogeneous commodities that buyers 
and sellers can understand’. They find that in order to transact, buyers and 
sellers require some level of common understanding; knowledge has to be 
created socially in order for buyers and sellers to be able to reach consensus on 
price and for reasonably stable prices to emerge. Furthermore, this knowledge is 
socially created and does not need to be objective. In the case of financial 
instruments, the widespread belief in the benefits of diversity argued for in 
academic work (e.g. Markowitz, 1952), leads people to believe they have 
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increased shared knowledge when assets are pooled, compared to when they are 
not – put another way generating sufficiently common beliefs to trade a pool of 
mortgages is easier than generating sufficiently common beliefs to trade each 
mortgage individually thanks to a belief in diversification. As noted in Chapter 
5, trading in pools of assets is only possible and practicable with cash-settled 
derivatives. 
Credit markets provide an example of the process of contractual standardisation 
that has occurred in OTC derivatives markets (see section 1.4.2). Credit markets 
began as bespoke agreements for banks to hedge specific exposures that were on 
their balance sheets without sacrificing their client relations. After a while banks 
expanded their activities from using credit derivatives to making markets in 
them. This was accompanied by and contributed to increasing quantities of 
derivative trading. In time a standard instrument emerged: the CDS (Mengle, 
2007). Then, via ISDA, documentation for the CDS was standardised, 
culminating in the big and small bang protocols introducing net cash settlement 
(ISDA, 2009a, 2009b) By standardizing and adapting the pool of deliverable 
bonds over time and then defining the auction process for cash settlement, 
dealers have brought into being and steadily increased the tradability of a 
commonly-accepted reference asset. Practices which led to increased 
standardisation have resulted in greater tradability.  
These processes of standardisation accompany a change in the character of 
credit derivatives from an instrument used by banks to adjust their credit 
portfolio without selling loans (where the primary concern was the payoff in the 
event of a credit event) to an instrument for making trading profits (where the 
primary concern is the payoff from buying and selling a tradable instrument in 
the market).  In light of this analysis it is worth repeating the quote from the 
head of ISDA regarding sovereign CDS: 
Most importantly, the critics of the product have misunderstood the 
fundamental difference between CDS and insurance. While CDS is 
often referred to as insurance it is not. It is a traded financial product 
and thus participants can buy it and sell it any day regardless of 
whether a credit event is declared or not. Currently, even without a 
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credit event in effect, an owner of protection can sell it and get paid 
… thereby monetising his gains and exiting his position …  Quite 
unlike insurance, CDS can pay on any given day by unwinding the 
position. A credit event simply forces payouts on the same day. 
(Voldstad, 2011) 
In most circumstances, however, Voldstad is wrong: it is not enough to sell 
protection to monetise gains. Profiting from a favourable price change involves 
trading an additional offsetting derivative; the profit is only monetised when 
both trades have run their course and the streams of coupons in the derivatives 
have been paid. Furthermore, if there is subsequently a default event in the 
reference credit the apparently successful trader is denied his profit: equal 
amounts of bought and sold protection are netted and terminated and the 
(differing) streams of coupons cease to be paid.
206
 The next section investigates 
the legal documentation covering portfolios of derivatives, documentation 
which is very important in making it appear as if derivatives are themselves 
tradable claims, even to the head of ISDA. 
7.4 Making portfolios of claims and counterclaims tradable 
The analysis in this section starts once again with the contradiction of 
derivatives as bilateral and untraded claims that exist to facilitate trading. Buy 
and sell a security, and you are left simply with a monetary gain or loss; to buy 
and sell with a derivative, however, requires two offsetting claims, each a 
bilateral claim to future monetary flows from a counterpart. Repeated buying 
and selling operations result in growing pile of claims and counterclaims. The 
realisation of any trading profits in money does not happen immediately: by 
definition the derivative is finished when the last payment has been made, and 
conversely it is only live if future payments are remain to be paid. It is, as a 
result, subject to counterparty credit risks. The analysis starts by investigating 
the steps taken to mitigate this counterparty credit risk and reveals once again 
                                                 
206
 This can contribute to an inversion in the CDS price curve, as a reference credit is perceived 
to be nearing default because traders rush to buy additional, short-term protection. Traders aim 
to become over-hedged in case of default in order to compensate them for the loss of mark-to-
market profits that have been recognised in the accounts before the stream of coupons is 
realised.   
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how they result in increased volumes and changes in the character of derivatives 
markets.  
Legal documentation in derivatives markets allows participants to net, cancel 
and then accelerate the cash settlement of offsetting claims to various degrees, 
increasing market participants’ ability to treat derivatives as tradable.207 I begin 
by looking at arrangements developed on a bilateral basis – first close-out 
netting under the ISDA Master Agreement and secondly collateralisation – and 
then examine multilateral arrangements such as trade compression and central 
clearing. I end with the exchange-traded derivative which, by combining these 
elements, appears as and in effect is a tradable claim.  
7.4.1 Bilateral agreements: netting, close-out and collateral under ISDA master 
agreements 
By their own account, ISDA’s crowning achievement was the creation of the 
Master Agreement in 1992 (ISDA, 2010a). ISDA master agreements are signed 
between the vast majority of OTC derivative market participants, in other words 
between dealers and other dealers and between dealers and almost all end-
users.
208
 The master agreement is designed to be the dominant agreement 
between two derivative counterparts; confirmations, the document governing 
individual transaction, are subsumed by its terms. In fact: 
The philosophy behind the International Swaps Dealers Association 
(‘ISDA’) documentation is that all of the confirmations entered into 
between the two parties together with their master agreement, 
schedule, and credit support documentation are construed as 
constituting one single contract.
209
 (Hudson, 2002: 96-7).
210
  
                                                 
207
 It is possible both to novate and to terminate OTC derivative contracts. However, this is only 
carried out in a small minority of cases.  
208
 While alternatives to ISDA documentation are used they do not vary greatly and are not very 
common. For the purposes of this analysis it is safe to analyse only ISDA agreements and 
assume no differences in the other cases.  
209
 ‘There are three tiers of derivatives documentation: the confirmation which documents each 
individual transaction; the Master Agreement which sets out the more general terms on which 
the parties agree to conduct all of their derivatives business; and the credit support document 
which provides for the collateralisation of the guarantee of payments to be made under specified 
transactions.’ (Hudson, 2002: 92)  
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Default by a derivative counterparty that fails to honour the claim to money 
could result in losses to the non-defaulting counterparty – particularly if a profit 
on its trades has been recognised in the latter’s accounts. The Master Agreement 
sets out to reduce the impact of counterparty default and is largely concerned 
with how the parties should behave in such a case. The two principle elements 
of the agreement are netting and close-out (explained below); these can be 
augmented by the posting of collateral under a Credit Support Annex (CSA) to 
the master agreement. 
First, the core aim of the master agreement is to achieve netting. In the event of 
a default by one party, the agreement ‘seek[s] to achieve netting across all 
payments made by all transactions between the parties’ (Hudson, 2002: 96). 
Indeed this is the prime motivation, that ‘the master agreement, together with all 
of the other documents entered into between the parties across all transactions, 
is to be read as constituting a single agreement’ (ibid).211 This prevents cherry-
picking, a situation where the non-defaulting counterparty must pay in full on 
trades where it owes money but can only stake a claim to those where it is owed 
through bankruptcy proceedings. The Master Agreement ensures that an 
apparently offsetting pair of trades will be treated equally in the event of a 
counterparty default. Moreover, as I show below, it facilitates the 
collateralisation of the net present value (NPV) of outstanding trades.  
Second, the master agreement allows the closing out of outstanding claims. 
Netting alone would require that payments from the solvent counterpart are on-
going even in the event of failure to pay by the other counterpart. Close-out 
netting allows the acceleration of future payments to a single claim, calculated 
at the time of default as the cost of replacing the outstanding trades in the 
market. For example, the replacement value can be established by asking other 
market participants for quotes on trades equivalent to all or part of the defaulted 
                                                                                                                                  
210
 Master agreements are another element of the relation between dealers and their counterparts 
that has become standardised thus easing trading and lowering dealing costs. The Master 
agreement comprises ‘the master agreement (usually in a standard form); [and] the schedule to 
the master agreement which amends or particularises provisions’. (Hudson, 2002: 95) 
211
 Placing the transactions under a single master agreement between companies avoids the 
dangers that an agreement netting freestanding trades might experience in different legal 
jurisdictions, e.g. if netting is contrary to the usual bankruptcy practices in one or more of these 
jurisdictions (Bliss and Kaufman, 2005: 5). 
7 - Contracts and clearing: managing volume and the derivative contradiction 
Page 227 of 303 
portfolio. This process allows the non-defaulting party to enter new derivatives 
trades to replicate those terminated by the default of the original counterparty. 
The non-defaulting party can then submit a claim for bankruptcy proceedings 
for the cost of those trades, upon which they would hope to recover some of 
their losses.
212
  
The third element of the ISDA documentation is the use of collateral to further 
reduce the risk of loss from a counterparty default. As shown in the case of 
counterparty default, close-out netting results in a net claim on the defaulted 
counterpart by the non-defaulting counterpart (if the non-defaulting counterpart 
is overall owed money, known as ‘in the money’). However the non-defaulting 
counterpart will only expect to recover a portion of the cost of replacing the 
defaulted portfolio. Collateralisation is used to reduce that credit exposure.  
Collateralisation under the Credit Support Annex (CSA of an ISDA Master 
Agreement is unlike more traditional forms of securing credit against the assets 
of another firm, where typically the claimant might have a senior claim to a 
specific piece of machinery, a building or an inventory, for example.
213
 Like the 
other documents, the CSA is subsumed by the Master Agreement and as a 
result, payments of collateral effectively represent a separate trade to be netted 
under the ISDA Master Agreement. On regular dates, usually daily, collateral 
must be delivered to the in-the-money counterpart by the out-of-the-money 
counterpart such that the total collateral amount is equal and opposite to the 
replacement or market value of the outstanding derivatives trades.
214
 In the 
event of default, the receiver of collateral, typically cash or near-cash financial 
instruments, can use it to replace the outstanding and now defaulted-on trades in 
the market. The net claim on the defaulted party now amounts only to any 
                                                 
212
 Close-out also gives a precedent to derivatives counterparts over other claimants as the 
ability to accelerate and fix a claim is not usually extended to other, ‘normal’ creditors, for 
example to employees or trade creditors (Bliss and Kaufman, 2005). 
213
 ‘In insolvency, most collateral remains under the control of the bankruptcy trustee, at least 
initially. While secured creditors may have a claim on particular assets, their ability to 
immediately realize the value of the assets is subject to the procedural delays inherent in the 
bankruptcy process’ (Bliss and Kaufman, 2005: 7). 
214
 In practice, CSAs have ‘minimum transfer amounts’, ‘thresholds’ and rules on rounding such 
that the amount of collateral required rarely actually equals the agreed replacement value of the 
derivatives trades (ISDA, 2010c). 
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shortfall in collateral posted against the replacement value of the outstanding 
derivatives trades, and is likely to be relatively small.
215
 
The fact that the majority of OTC derivative notional outstanding is 
collateralised in this way is not often remarked upon (ISDA, 2010c). Intra-
dealer trades, which account for approximately a third of notional outstanding, 
are invariably collateralised, as are the majority of transactions between dealers 
and non-dealer financial firms, which account for approximately 50% of 
notional outstanding) (BIS, 2011). In particular, trades with hedge funds, 
generally high-volume traders, are collateralised, usually with an additional 
initial margin posted by the hedge funds to the dealer (ISDA, 2010c: 43). 
Close-out netting and collateralisation under the ISDA Master Agreement are 
put in place with the aim of reducing the counterparty credit risk in derivatives – 
a risk which stems from the nature of the derivative as a claim on the other party 
for future money payments. In doing so it allows greater volume than would 
otherwise be possible for a given amount of credit risk (Bliss and Kaufman, 
2005). Alternatively put, dealer banks’ ability to make markets would be 
severely constrained if they needed to reserve and set aside capital on each trade 
individually and not on a portfolio basis.  
Reliance on close-out netting and collateralisation, however, also affects the 
nature of the resulting derivatives. The very need for close-out netting gives lie 
to derivatives as tradable claims and highlights their nature as ongoing claims – 
even as they allow participants to act as if derivatives are themselves tradable. 
As long as the counterparts continue to pay into the derivatives and the two 
parties assume that they will receive the rest of the payments due, they can make 
calculations about the derivative as if the payment has already been received. 
Discounting the streams of payments, they can calculate as if the derivative 
claim itself has been bought or sold and therefore value it at a replacement or 
market value. In particular, two offsetting trades, i.e. a purchase and a sale on 
the same underlying reference price index, can be calculated as if a set stream of 
                                                 
215
 In the case of over-collateralisation the collateral would be returned in the usual collateral 
management process once the close-out replacement value of the derivatives trades had been 
agreed.  
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income will be paid and as a result a trading profit (or loss) is recognised as if 
the money has already been received.  
Default by a derivatives counterpart is likely to leave the non-defaulting 
unhedged, because market participants buy and sell from a variety of 
counterparts. What appear to be matched purchases and sales become 
unmatched at the point of a single counterpart’s default. The illusion of having 
bought and sold the claim, sustained by calculating on a net basis, is shattered.  
Close-out netting aims to allow the non-defaulting counterparty to quickly 
replace the lost trades of a defaulted counterpart and rebalance their portfolio, 
thus allowing the market to continue functioning smoothly. Collateralisation in 
effect brings forward (accelerates) future cash settlement to today by paying 
OTC counterparts today for derivative flows due in the future. Collateralisation 
builds on netting and close-out but takes a very big step further to allow market 
participants to act as if outstanding derivative claims are themselves tradable: 
putting money into the account of the derivative holder at the end of each 
trading day as if they have sold the claim, only for them to buy it back the next 
morning for the same price.  
Netted collateralised derivative exposures are not the same as buying and selling 
a security; they are closer to buying and selling a derivative claim. In a security 
transaction the full replacement value of the security is paid over on the first day 
and gains and losses are not realised in money until the offsetting transaction is 
made. In a cash-collateralised derivative the notional value is not paid over, and 
indeed it may be that no initial payment is made. Cash payments are made each 
day to reflect movements in the price of the underlying reference price index.
216
 
Collateralisation provides the cash today to replace derivative contracts in the 
event of default.
217
 
Bilateral agreements, most notably the ISDA Master Agreement and the CSA, 
go some way towards giving derivative claims the appearance of 
                                                 
216
 Daily margin calls are by far the most usual margin frequency found in CSAs, although 
longer frequencies are possible. 
217
 Alternatively it might be thought of as buying the portfolio of derivative claims at the 
opening bell and selling it again at the close of business every day, thus realising the 
replacement value of the derivative portfolio in money each day. 
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exchangeability, but multilateral agreements are required to achieve more 
general exchangeability. Derivative end-users (non-dealers) face a choice of 
fifteen to twenty very large international derivatives dealers plus several 
hundred smaller dealers (see Chapter 1), and will typically maintain open trades 
with more than one. The dealers themselves are likely to have dealing relations 
with the majority of other dealers. The overwhelming majority sign ISDA or 
equivalent confirmations, but this leaves the problem that buying from one party 
does not net with a sale to another (ISDA Master Agreements are bilateral). 
Indeed, it has been shown that part of the motivation for bilateral agreements is 
the ability to rebalance a portfolio made up of purchases from one party with 
sales to another in the case of a counterparty default. To achieve more general 
exchangeability of derivative claims, banks must coordinate netting, close-out, 
termination and cash settlement on a multilateral basis.
218
 
7.4.2 Multilateral agreements: trade compression and derivative clearing 
The clearest example of multilateral post-trade processing of derivative claims 
occurs on derivatives exchanges, where derivatives almost fully take on the 
appearance of being exchangeable for money. However, increasingly there are 
initiatives in OTC markets to achieve the same ends, and I begin here with these 
efforts.  
Although derivative counterparts can and occasionally do terminate trades on a 
bilateral basis, this does not occur on a meaningful or systematic scale. 
Recently, however, dealers have been coordinated into systematically 
terminating offsetting trades on a multilateral basis, principally via a private 
company called TriOptima, whose ‘triReduce’ service works in cycles, typically 
covering different instrument types/currency combinations: 
Each participant submits a portfolio of trades versus the other 
participants in the cycle, and those trades are matched to determine 
                                                 
218
 There is a clear parallel between derivatives as claims on a bank and private bank credit 
money as claims on banks. On the one hand bank credit money does not become generally 
exchangeable until multilateral arrangements are put in place, above all clearing. The similarity 
with derivatives is strong, however derivatives are not money, most fundamentally because their 
very raison d’etre is to have a moving  money price, while money cannot have a price as the 
numerator in the price relation.  
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the [offsetting] trades eligible for compression … Once all 
participants have accepted the Unwind Proposal, the transactions are 
legally terminated. (TriOptima, 2012a)  
In this way a purchase and a sale via a derivative on an underlying price index, 
even with different counterparts, can be terminated and settled with cash. In 
other words, for an offsetting purchase and sale, even with different 
counterparts, the derivative claim has in effect become a tradable one and not a 
bilateral claim against a counterparty. Trade compression as this process is 
known, is only open to the largest players in the market, however. 
In 2009 the amounts of transactions undergoing trade compression fell (see 
figure 7.1 below), since then an increasing number of OTC derivative 
transactions are being cleared centrally. In this process OTC derivatives in 
standardised instruments between a majority of OTC counterparts,  dealers and 
non-dealers (not just major dealers as with trade compression), are regularly 
submitted to a central clearer. The clearing house steps between the two original 
counterparts and splits the trade into two, novating each of the new trades such 
that each original counterpart now faces the central clearer. Each counterparties’ 
relationship with the clearer is collateralised, and furthermore, as with 
exchange-traded derivatives, this greatly facilitates the termination of offsetting 
trades. As shown above, both measures increase the appearance of the claim as 
tradable or, more importantly, the ability of market participants to treat the 
claim as tradable. Central clearing extends this benefit not just to bilateral 
relations with ISDA documentation and dealers with trade compression but also 
to the market generally.  
The quantity of OTC derivatives affected by these measures has increased 
significantly in recent years. Figure 7.1, below, shows how the total notional 
outstanding either compressed or cleared for interest rate swaps has grown since 
2003 and the shift from compression to central clearing since the regulatory 
changes following the financial crisis. What is, of course, impossible to 
determine is the effect on gross volumes of the ability to compress and clear, the 
most likely presumption being that it has increased the volume of OTC 
derivatives trading by reducing the relative amount of counterparty credit risk 
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per transaction. What is more certain is that it has increased the appearance of 
derivatives as tradable claims.  
 
Figure 7.1 Coordinated terminations of Interest Rate Swaps by 
TriOptima’s TriReduce service 
 
 
Source: TriOptima, 2012b 
 
The culmination of the logic of this analysis is exchange-traded derivatives 
(ETD). Although each trade is initially between any two counterparts, it is 
executed in the knowledge that it will be cleared. As described above, trades are 
novated to face the exchange, which is acting as clearer; they are subject to 
close-out and netting provisions, offsetting trades are terminated and the whole 
relation is cash-collateralised. As a result, not only is credit risk reduced but the 
offsetting of purchases and sales results in a change in the money balance 
comparable to the change in money balances that result from buying and selling 
an asset in the typical M-C-M’ relation. In short, derivatives on an exchange 
come very close to allowing market participants to act as if the derivative itself 
were an exchangeable, tradable claim – only the lingering, if usually remote, 
risk of the default of the exchange itself casts a shadow over this transformation, 
and thus this legal framework allows those trading derivatives to act as if they 
have traded the derivative claim.  
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A theoretical difference that appears to remain between ETD and centrally-
cleared OTC derivatives is that ETD contracts are designed by the exchange, 
while OTC contracts are designed by the market participants themselves. 
However, competitive pressure to standardise OTC contracts to both increase 
volumes and facilitate compression and clearing substantially reduces this 
difference. Standardisation makes compression and clearing easier and cheaper. 
For example, ‘standardisation is a low-cost way to increase the number of 
offsetting … [derivatives contracts] … by equalising more of the cash flows that 
they generate’ (BIS, 2010a: 62). Accordingly most progress has been made in 
terminating offsetting OTC derivatives in the most standardised contracts such 
as Index-CDS (BIS, 2010a: 63).
219
 This is apparent in the setup of derivatives 
exchanges that maximise the central clearing of highly standard contracts, and is 
becoming more apparent in the OTC markets, which are increasingly coming to 
resemble them.  
7.5  Conclusion 
The theoretical discussion of derivatives moves to a less abstract, and more 
concrete level when discussing derivative contracts. It does so in several ways. 
First, it develops an understanding of the essence of the derivative as a cash-
settled untraded claim between two parties which emerges so that they can 
virtually trade an underlying reference price index that cannot otherwise be 
traded. Second, and under the pressure of the contradictions of this essence, it 
shows how these markets have grown and how the appearance of derivatives 
has changed. Banks as derivatives dealers develop practices by which to 
increase derivative trading volumes in search of increased market-making 
profits, and these practices have shaped the legal documentation and the growth 
of clearing in these markets. In addition to the growth in volume, such practices 
have changed the character of derivatives from an untraded and bespoke claim 
                                                 
219
 Index CDS have highly standardised terms. For example, in contrast to interest rate swaps, 
Index CDS have standard coupon amounts and dates (interest rate swaps set specific coupon 
amounts and dates with every new trade). In contrast to single-name credit instruments, Index 
CDS not only have standard dates and coupons but also a more standardised underlying 
reference price. There is considerably more scope for matching a limited number of indices than 
there is for matching the much more numerous single names underlying the index. 
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into a standardised claim which appears to be traded and indeed allows market 
participants to act as if the derivative claim itself is being traded.  
The theoretical nature of banks as derivatives dealers, developed in earlier 
chapters, formed the  basis for this more detailed examination of practices in 
derivatives markets in the last thirty years and the ways in which these practices 
have shaped the market’s development. Having examined regulation in the last 
chapter and the derivative contract in this, the next chapter finishes the analysis 
of derivatives by discussing the role of valuation models and risk management. 
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8 Risk management and valuation theory: calculating 
for growth 
8.1 Introduction 
Derivative valuation models are theoretically and empirically ill-equipped to 
predict derivative prices and derivative risk management has repeatedly failed to 
prevent losses, not least in the financial crisis that started in 2007/8. Yet these 
practices remain critical and central to derivatives markets. In the face of this 
apparent paradox one might well query the usefulness of such inaccurate models 
(Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). This chapter poses Millo and MacKenzie’s 
question in detail and argues that the apparently problematic features of the 
models are in fact useful and even essential to banks as dealers in derivatives 
markets, in particular by allowing them to increase derivative trading volumes.   
This analysis builds on the theoretical development of banks as derivatives 
dealers developed in earlier chapters and the nature of derivatives as cash-settled 
claims that have increased the scope of possible instruments and the scale of 
trading; elaborates on the resulting nature of derivative prices and the motivations 
of market participants; and enriches this analysis with an investigation of the 
properties of valuation models and the important insights of economic 
sociologists, particularly Millo and MacKenzie (2003, 2009), into the ways in 
which these models are used by traders.   
Trading rules of thumb and trading practices pre-date the emergence of formal 
statistical models (Mixon, 2009). Indeed it can be argued that today’s valuation 
models are a sanitised version of trading rules handed down in the long trading of 
derivatives (Haug and Taleb, 2011). Yet pointing this out only serves to show 
that something changed that required the formalisation of these practices,  above 
all drawing on older statistical techniques to handle larger amounts of data 
(Bernstein, 1996). The growth in the scale and scope of derivatives trading, 
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fuelled by cash settlement and the deregulation of OTC derivatives, provides the 
catalyst for this change.
 220
   
The historical emergence of risk management coincides with the growth of 
derivative markets from the late 1980s onwards. A crude measure of this recent 
rise can be gained by counting instances of the word ‘risk’ in the titles of finance 
books in the British Library and Library of Congress. Figure 8.1, below suggests 
a dramatic rise in the idea of risk management in the late 1980s/early 1990s. This 
timing broadly coincides with the first exemption of OTC derivatives from the 
CEA (Greenberger, 2010), the first publication of OTC statistics by ISDA (ISDA, 
2010d), reaction to the stock market crash of 1987 and the first regulatory use of 
the word ‘derivative’ (Swan, 2000: 9-10). 
Figure 8.1: Instances of the word ‘risk’ in the British Library and Library of 
Congress catalogues of finance books 
 
Source: Data accessed at British Library, Library of Congress 
Valuation models and risk management practices have become increasingly 
important in making derivatives markets function, and in this way have 
                                                 
220 A parallel can be drawn with finance theory more generally: portfolios of financial assets were 
traded long before Markowitz (1952) set in train modern finance theory, which today is presented 
as the only way to approach finance and which might be thought to principally allow the 
systematic trading of larger portfolios. 
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influenced the world that they purport to report.
221
 To understand how they 
influence derivatives markets it is first necessary to clearly understand that they 
emerge because they prove useful to dealers managing large-scale derivative 
dealing. Put most simply, it is not possible to manage such large volumes of 
outstanding derivatives dealing without mathematical and statistical techniques.  
Starting with an analysis of valuation models, this chapter traces a line from the 
features of the models that appear problematic, which are primarily their reliance 
on arbitrage-free pricing and simple probability distributions. Drawing on the 
analysis of earlier chapters, and in particular the nature of market participants 
trading repeatedly to capture price changes and the scope of derivative 
instruments made possible by cash settlement, it can be seen that the apparently 
problematic features of the models are in fact those that make them useful and 
suited to dealers’ management of large trading volumes.  
Moving on from valuation models, derivatives are often portrayed as allowing 
risk management (e.g. Froot et al., 1994), but to understand how this came about 
it is first necessary to understand how risk management allows derivatives. The 
contradiction of derivatives as untraded claims that enable trading helps to 
explain how valuation models and risk management help dealers to manage the 
pile of derivative claims and counterclaims that arise from the repeated trading of 
derivatives. Valuation models and risk management apply a market price to an 
untraded and un-tradable claim and define the terms of a new derivative to offset 
the risk of the existing portfolio. Doing so allows market makers to manage ever-
growing portfolios of derivative claims and counterclaims as they strive to 
capture bid-ask spread. In this way risk management enables derivatives trading 
                                                 
221 As noted above, the authors of the models seem to think that they are for pricing derivatives – 
in effect that they objectively report a world that they do not influence (e.g.Hull, 2009). 
Conversely MacKenzie makes a (qualified) case that derivative valuation models are 
performative, and derivatives markets come to perform derivative valuation models (MacKenzie 
and Millo, 2003, MacKenzie, 2006). Meanwhile Kaltoff (2005: 90) argues that ‘the case of risk 
management shows a possible link or code switch between both perspectives: the manufacture of 
economic representation through practices and tools of representation shapes economic practices’. 
As outlined in Chapter 2 when discussing the incorporation of theory into theory, the approach 
here is to develop a theory of banks and derivatives that explains market makers’ incentives and 
therefore practices that in turn illuminates both how derivatives valuation theories and models 
come about and how they shape future practices.  
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and dealing, but because it defines the next offsetting trade it appears that 
derivatives enable risk management.  
This detailed understanding of how the models are useful explains how they 
become established. As volumes grow, pricing practices using models and risk 
management become indispensable and their use becomes entrenched. The 
resulting reliance on models shapes the further development of these markets, 
affecting both their growth and their character, and in particular derivatives, 
although untraded claims, come to appear tradable.
222
 The result, however, is a 
fragile house of cards. The completed derivative remains an untraded claim, and 
in the event that no new derivatives are transacted, as in a crisis, it is no longer 
possible to assign it a price and therefore the commodity form. Valuation models 
and risk management become useless as derivatives revert to their basic state as 
untraded claims. 
Section 8.2 outlines the structures of two models: that of Black and Scholes 
(1973) and the one-factor Gaussian copula CDO model. I point out some 
theoretical and empirical problems of the models and ask how these inaccurate 
models are useful (Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). In answer, Section 8.3 examines 
the nature of the prices and the motivation of participants in these markets, and 
the particular nature of derivatives. Section 8.4 then builds from a single trade to 
a portfolio, showing how the models and risk management allow dealers to build 
up and manage large portfolios of derivative claims and counterclaims. In doing 
so, derivative claims come to appear tradable, largely by taking on a price, and 
with it, the form of a commodity. Concluding, section 8.5 notes the fragility of 
this structure: large-scale trading relies on risk management, which in turn relies 
on large-scale trading.   
                                                 
222 Ilyenkov (1977: 90) notes that ‘…ideal forms … have always arisen, taken shape and 
developed, turned into something objective, completely independent of anyone’s consciousness, 
in the course of processes that occur not at all in the ‘head’, but most definitely outside it…’. 
Similarly Pilling (1980: 69) notes that ‘the form taken by human thought … reflects man’s 
practice’ (Pilling, 1980: 69) Valuation models and risk management are the ideal form that 
through incorporation into practice become something objective. 
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8.2 Valuation models 
Formalised derivative valuation models can be analysed as descendents of Black 
and Scholes’ and Merton’s pioneering papers of the early 1970s (Black and 
Scholes, 1973, Merton, 1973, Merton, 1974).
223
 The basic structure of valuation 
models has not changed dramatically since, and to some extent I show this here 
by using both the Black-Scholes-Merton model and the standard CDO pricing 
model, the One-factor Gaussian copula model, to illustrate the features of the 
models. These two models can be seen as bracketing the modern derivative 
period, which broadly stretches from the introduction of cash settlement on the 
Chicago derivatives exchanges to the 2007/8 financial crisis.  
The basic approach starts by defining the financial instrument being priced, it 
does so by specifying the different payments that are to be made between 
counterparts in different states of the world, or more precisely in different states 
of the underlying asset price index. These payments must then be discounted and 
probability-weighted. It is the choices made regarding discounting and 
probability distributions when using the standard models that raise questions and 
become the primary focus of analysis in the rest of the chapter. 
In short, as I show below, the models that emerge as the standard models 
combine discounting and probability weighting to allow a single organisational 
component to emerge – volatility in the case of options and correlation in the case 
of CDOs – and to emphasise arbitrage-free pricing. Analysis shows that there 
appear to be numerous problems with the models, and yet models based on the 
same approach as Black & Scholes continue to be used and have grown in 
number and application. This suggests that there is something else useful about 
these models besides that which most analysis assumes for them, raising the 
question: What is the use of these inaccurate models? (Millo and MacKenzie, 
2009). 
                                                 
223 Hereafter Black-Scholes-Merton or Black & Scholes. 
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8.2.1 Risk-neutral pricing 
Perhaps the biggest breakthrough in derivative pricing that Black & Scholes 
achieved was the introduction of risk-neutral pricing. Prior to Black & Scholes 
deciding on the discount rate for future cash flows was the largest obstacle to 
option pricing. Finance theory tells us that risk-averse investors require a risk 
premium, i.e. the discount rate should be higher than for less risk-averse or risk-
neutral investors to compensate for the stochastic nature of the option value 
before expiry (or the risky payoff) (Pratt, 1964): ‘[T]he problem which had been 
an obstacle in the pricing of all kinds of options [was]: what risk premium should 
be used in the evaluation. The answer given by the Prize-Winners was: no risk 
premium at all!’ (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1997) 
Risk-neutral pricing, Black & Scholes’ breakthrough, remains the standard 
approach for valuation: ‘at its core, the process for valuing tranches of synthetic 
CDOs is the same as for any other asset: calculate risk-neutral expected cash 
flows and discount the cash flows using the risk-free rate…’ (Smithson and 
Pearson, 2007: 92 citing John Hull). 
Black & Scholes can calculate the option value with no risk premium in the 
option discount rate by showing first that it is possible to replicate the option 
payoff by trading only the underlying asset, and therefore second, that by trading 
the latter against the former it is possible to create a risk-free portfolio.  
Black & Scholes (1973) denote the value of an option, w,  as a function of the 
underlying asset price, x, and time, t: 
w(x,t)    
and the sensitivity of the option value to changes in underlying asset price (the 
first partial derivative with respect to x) as: 
w1(x,t)  
They construct a portfolio of one unit of underlying asset and a number of sold 
options; the hedge ratio between the two being equal to: 
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 1/w1(x,t) 
Thus the total sensitivity of the option positions to moves in the price of the 
underlying asset equals: 
w1(x,t).-[1/w1(x,t)]=-1 
In the combined portfolio, therefore, changes in the value of the underlying asset  
are offset by changes in the value of the options. For a given asset price at a given 
time, therefore, the portfolio is risk-free and so risk preferences are irrelevant: ‘If 
risk preferences do not enter the equation, they cannot affect its solution … 
[allowing] … the very simple assumption that all investors are risk-neutral’ (Hull, 
2003: 245).  
Critically, the portfolio that is constructed is only risk-free instantaneously and 
requires continuous rehedging. The second partial derivative of an option value 
with respect to asset price (sometimes called gamma), w11(x,t), and the first 
derivative with respect to time, w1(t,x), are typically non-zero. Therefore changes 
in the price of the underlying asset, x, and in time, t, require the rebalancing of 
the portfolio. In other words, as the price of the underlying asset moves so does 
the hedge ratio, 1/w1, and the hedge amount must be adjusted.  
If the option is correctly priced according to the formula then the proceeds from 
(or costs of) of this hedging strategy are equal and opposite to the cost of (or 
revenue from) the option. For example, in the case of one call option versus a 
short position in the underlying asset, as the underlying asset price rises fresh 
sales are required from the short position in the underlying asset, and as it falls 
purchases must be made. The hedge requirements of the option therefore dictate a 
buy-low-sell-high policy in the underlying asset, the profits of which equate to 
the cost of the option, which is therefore valued with reference to the underlying 
asset.  
The replicating portfolio or risk-neutral approach to financial valuation is now 
very widely, if not universally, applied in academic valuation models and is 
generally thought of as descending from Black & Scholes; it marks a key moment 
in academic discourse on financial instrument valuation: ‘most everything that 
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has been developed in modern finance since 1973 is but a footnote on the BSM’ 
(N. Taleb, quoted in MacKenzie and Millo, 2003: 109).  
Risk-neutrality introduces a neat technical solution to the problem of providing a 
single valuation, but immediately gives rise to a number of problems concerning 
the nature of derivatives and the ability to rehedge. The first is that the replicating 
portfolio approach throws up the question: if the option, or more generally the 
derivative payoff, can be replicated with the underlying asset, what is the purpose 
or point of the derivative? Mainstream economics argues that the derivative helps 
to complete markets by allowing individuals with different risk preferences to 
share risk (Ross, 1976). This clearly contradicts the assumptions required to make 
the Black & Scholes model work. Derivatives must be different from trading the 
underlying asset in this argument: if markets in the underlying asset are as perfect 
as Black & Scholes require them to be then there is no need for derivatives e.g. as 
cheaper than trading primitive securities (Ross, 1976). Put another way, if 
everyone is or can act as if they are risk-neutral, why would they need to share 
risk? On the one hand, then, assuming that the underlying asset is perfectly 
tradable leaves no room for the justification of derivatives.  
On the other hand, as shown elsewhere in this thesis it is impossible to trade the 
underlying price index to a cash-settled derivative; this provides theoretical space 
for derivatives but poses significant problems for risk-neutral pricing. The pay-
out and therefore the price of a derivative is derived from a standardised 
measurement created by market participants – the underlying reference price 
index (see Chapters 5 and 7). The measurement itself cannot be bought and sold; 
only the derivatives that reference it can. This line of reasoning provides a 
justification for the derivative: in extremis the derivative exists in order to trade 
something that cannot otherwise be traded. At the same time this also provides 
problems for Black & Scholes’ critical assumptions, as the replicating portfolio 
cannot be constructed.
224
 
                                                 
224 This approach does leave room for Black-Scholes providing an arbitrage relation between 
futures or forwards and options on the same price index 
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Even skipping these theoretical problems, the assumption that the option can be 
continuously hedged is both critical to the valuation produced and unlikely to be 
met. As shown earlier, the portfolio requires continuous re-hedging as the profits 
(or losses) from re-hedging offset the cost (or revenue) of the option. If re-
hedging is not possible, there is no reason the option value should calculable from 
the underlying assets. Assuming for the moment that instruments can be found to 
trade the underlying, the liquidity requirement for this instrument is still likely to 
be too high. Even if liquidity is available for most of the life of the option, if 
hedging fails for one moment there is a possibility of large losses on the 
supposedly risk-free portfolio (Haug and Taleb, 2011). Infinite liquidity and zero 
transaction costs are assumed, and these are not weak assumptions in the search 
for parsimony but are critical to the validity of the formula.  
In short, risk-neutral pricing is both critical to the model’s outcome and 
theoretically incoherent, and its critical assumption is extremely unlikely to be 
met in practice. Risk-neutral pricing has nevertheless become the central plank of 
the vast academic literature on derivative valuation and the centrepiece of 
practitioners’ risk management practices. Before exploring this conundrum 
further it is necessary to turn to the second element of pricing models: the choice 
of probability distribution. 
8.2.2 Probability distributions 
When Black & Scholes turn to the probability distribution describing the process 
of the reference price, the first step is a move from discrete to continuous 
distribution. This has the effect of moving the rehedging requirement described 
above from periodic to instantaneous rehedging, rendering the assumption still 
more onerous. On the other hand, the choice of a continuous distribution opens 
the way for the elegance of stochastic calculus.  
The model assumes a lognormal distribution for the underlying asset, and this 
choice is critical in rendering the equation as tractable and elegant as it is. 
Because the normal and lognormal distributions can be described with just the 
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first two moments of the distribution, the famous Black and Scholes (1973: 643) 
differential equation, 
w2 = rw – rxw1 – ½ v
2
x
2
w11 
need go no further than the second derivative. If a different distribution were 
used, the formula would need to continue with extra terms, e.g. 1/3 v
3
x
3
w111 and 
so on (where v
2
 is the variance on the underlying asset). This would quickly 
complicate both the calculation of the formula and the understanding to be 
gleaned from the outputs. As it is, the variance, or volatility, is isolated as a key 
unknown. 
If the Black & Scholes option model opened the modern derivatives era, the 
standard CDO pricing model is the latest big contribution. Over thirty years since 
Black & Scholes was published, the two models share the same basic structure. 
The standard one-factor or Gaussian copula model, developed mainly from a 
paper by Li (2000), is the market’s standard model for pricing and 
communication. More complex models exist and are used (see below for some 
examples), but the family of models is best understood by reference to the 
standard Gaussian copula model in the same way that more sophisticated option 
pricing models are discussed in relation to Black & Scholes. As with the Black & 
Scholes approach, the model defines payoffs given different states of the world, 
assigns probabilities to those states and discounts appropriately. The model aims 
to give the equilibrium valuation for a CDO tranche, and the key challenge is to 
define the joint distribution of losses; in the end, as in Black & Scholes’ model 
before, the model chooses elegance and simplicity over complexity.  
The model starts with individual default distributions. A key step for Li (2000) 
was the move from a discrete default probability at time t to a distribution of 
default, which he captures with the idea of a survival time. In the first major 
simplifying assumption, the default or survival time distributions are then 
mapped to a normal distribution using a percentile-to-percentile transformation.  
The next step combines the individual default distributions, ‘copula function is a 
simple and convenient approach’ to doing so when taken together with a 
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dependency structure (Li, 2000: 12). Having previously mapped individual 
distributions to standard normal distributions it is possible to define a copula that 
combines all of the individual assets using a copula correlation matrix of pairwise 
correlations (Li, 2000: 16). The theory now faces the problem that as the number 
of assets (n) rises this matrix quickly becomes large. Each new asset requires (n-
1) correlations. This becomes onerous from both an input and a calculation 
perspective.  
The model makes its next simplifying assumption by moving from an nxn 
correlation matrix to a factor model.
225
 Default times are made dependent on 
some latent variable, the underlying factor taken to be the ‘state of the economy’ 
(Vasicek, 1987: 2), the ‘default environment’ (Hull et al., 2009) or similar 
factors. As with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), this provides a neat 
solution to the compilation of huge correlation matrices; each asset now only 
requires one correlation input rather than (n-1), greatly simplifying the definition 
of inputs and calculation.  
The final step is to turn the cumulative default distribution into a loss distribution 
from which tranches can be priced. This makes use of the second great benefit of 
the factor model: any given draw from the default distribution is conditionally 
independent. This allows aggregation using the binomial, which is of great 
practical benefit thanks to its relative simplicity (Hull and White, 2004, Wang et 
al., 2008). Using simulation it is possible to associate each draw with a number of 
defaults and therefore with repeated draws to construct a distribution of defaults. 
In running this final simulation, three further simplifications are made. Recovery 
on defaulted assets is assumed to be fixed at 40%. The individual asset default 
distributions, often gleaned from the market spread curves, are put aside and a 
single price for the basket of assets is used to determine the spread for all. Finally 
– and critically, as explored later – individual correlations are also put aside and a 
                                                 
225 Financial economists encountered a similar problem when first looking at efficient portfolios 
following Markowitz’s (1952) breakthrough paper, and dealt with it using the approach taken by 
the CAPM model, i.e. with a factor model (e.g. Sharpe, 1964). The same route is taken in the 
standard CDO model and indeed in most of its extensions. 
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single average correlation is used across all assets (Hull and White, 2004, Wang 
et al., 2008). 
To summarise the approach to defining the distribution of payoffs, then, the 
distribution of the pool of assets in the CDO is theoretically modelled by 
combining the individual loss distributions of each asset, expressed as time to 
default. To make this problem tractable, numerous simplifying assumptions are 
made. The most important are: first, individual times to default are transformed to 
be normally distributed, giving easily definable and mathematically malleable 
distributions. Second, a factor model is used, much as in CAPM, which both 
reduces the number of correlations (from a correlation matrix of n
2
 inter-asset 
correlations to n asset-factor correlations) and, perhaps more importantly, allows 
assets to become conditionally independent, making both theory and practical 
computation simpler. Third, the input requirements are further simplified by 
inputting the same average default and recovery probabilities for all assets. 
Both risk-neutral pricing and the choice of simple distributions make for ease of 
calculation; furthermore, the distributions in particular allow the models to 
revolve around one key organising factor: the volatility applied to the second 
partial derivative with respect to the underlying price (known as gamma) in 
options and the single correlation that describes the relation of the assets in the 
CDO to the latent factor. The volatility and correlation terms that ‘fall out’ of the 
models are termed the implied volatility and implied correlation. As I explore 
below, this reduction to a single element is critical to the usefulness of the 
models.  
8.2.3 Skew and smiles  
As elegant and tractable as the models are, they are not particularly successful at 
predicting derivative prices; in particular, the family of normal distributions does 
not seem to empirically match the distribution of financial prices. This is seen 
most importantly in the presence of ‘skew’ and ‘smiles’.  
 Skew and/or smiles are observed in both the implied volatilities of options and 
implied correlations of CDOs. Option skew describes how implied volatilities for 
0 -  
Risk management and valuation theory: calculating for growth  
Page 247 of 303 
different options on the same underlying price index are not equal, such that low 
strike options have a higher implied volatility than those at the money or with 
high strikes.
226
 Black & Scholes assumes one lognormal distribution of forward 
prices with a mean of the current forward price and a volatility as defined by the 
market’s best guess of future realised volatility (kept in line with this best guess 
by arbitrage, as outlined above). All the various derivatives possible on this single 
underlying should theoretically be priced with the same volatility input. But 
observed prices imply different volatilities for different derivatives on the same 
underlying. This can only mean that the model is wrong; after all the reference 
price will only exhibit one realised volatility in the end.  
In CDO tranche markets, implied correlation also displays skew/smiles 
(Burtschell et al., 2009). For a given CDO at a given time, only one portfolio 
default distribution, made up from individual default distributions combined 
using correlation as described, exists in the theory. However, market prices can 
be observed to produce a ‘smile’ structure to implied correlation across tranches, 
such that correlations for mezzanine tranches are lower than for those for equity 
and senior tranches. Base correlations – correlations for equity tranches of 
different widths – can be seen to have a skewed structure such that equity 
tranches with higher detachment points have higher base correlations than those 
with lower detachment points. These effects are illustrated in Figure 8.2 below.  
Figure 8.2: Implied Correlation Skew and Smiles 
                                                 
226 For some markets such as Foreign Exchange this can be observed as a smile whereby strikes 
far away from the forward price both high and low have higher implied volatilities than at-the-
money options. 
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Source: Burtschell et al., 2009 
 
What is most important with regard to skew, however, is that the model itself is 
still used to communicate the relative price levels. Skew is part of the standard 
language of CDO and option markets, despite the model apparently implicating 
itself in the process. Skew is an understood and continuing feature of these 
markets only because the standard models are used to express it and only exists 
and persists because the standard models continued to be used.  
Numerous alternatives to the standard models have been proposed, typically 
elaborating on them with more sophisticated mathematics – e.g. using more 
complex distributions or additional factors – but they have not managed to 
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dislodge the simpler models as the standard approach. For example, changing 
probability distributions can sometimes appear to reduce skew, so in CDO 
models the standard normal might be replaced with, for instance, students-T (e.g. 
Andersen et al., 2003), double-T (e.g. Hull and White, 2004), Marshal-Olkin (e.g. 
Giesecke, 2003) and so on.
227
 Secondly, additional factors have been added to the 
usual one-factor model (e.g. Gregory and Laurent, 2004), or indeed the factor 
model can be replaced with other devices (Duffie and Gârleanu, 2001, Hull et al., 
2009). Regardless of their success or otherwise in consistently predicting future 
prices, none of these models has replaced the standard model.  
Bound up with the phenomena of skew and smiles, the models have proved 
resistant to crashes that appear to disprove their worth. During the crash of 1987 
the possibility of re-hedging option positions dried up and therefore the option 
valuation models ceased to be either used or useful (Yamada and Primbs, 2002, 
MacKenzie, 2004). Black-Scholes-Merton option valuation models reacted by 
incorporating skew (MacKenzie, 2004, 2006). This part of the riddle extends to 
risk management more generally, which somewhat paradoxically appears to grow 
more entrenched each time it is found wanting, for instance in 1988 after the 
LTCM/Asian/Russian crisis, after the dotcom losses and the most dramatic of all, 
after the 2007/8 crisis.  
In short, the models purport to provide valuations for derivatives (Hull, 2009), yet 
despite appearing not to be very good at this either theoretically or empirically, 
they continue to be used. Indeed the phenomenon of skew shows that the models 
are not accurate for predicting prices, and simultaneously that they remain 
centrally important to these markets; moreover they are resistant to crashes, 
which again appears to disprove their worth. In both the use of risk-neutral 
pricing and the choice of distribution they appear to value elegance, tractability 
and simplicity over accuracy, and this presents a riddle.
228
 One answer to the 
riddle is that models are in fact doing something other than they advertise. In 
                                                 
227  For a comparative analysis see Burtshell, Gregory & Laurent (2005). 
228 As Gregory & Laurent (2004) note: ‘The Gaussian copula model seems to have become an 
industry standard for pricing.’ They remark that its appeal is ‘partly due to its ease of 
implementation via Monte Carlo simulation’ and its tractability. They then explore drawbacks to 
the applicability of the one-factor Gaussian model. 
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particular, they may be useful in ways other than those they profess, and may be 
more constitutive of markets than they appear. So what is the usefulness of these 
inaccurate models? (Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). 
8.3 Prices in derivatives markets and the role of models 
In searching for an answer to this riddle it is worth asking why derivatives 
markets need models, when other established markets do not. This section shows 
that the features of the model identified above as problematic are actually useful 
for the management of growing volumes of derivatives trading; in particular, they 
allow traders to translate between the recorded money prices of completed 
transactions and the potential prices of new transactions. In this translation, 
arbitrage-free pricing and the relatively simple nature of the probability 
distributions are a great help.  
That they should need mathematical models to make this translation stems from 
the particular nature of derivatives markets and derivatives themselves. This is 
shown by drawing on the theory of derivatives developed in earlier chapters, 
further elaborating on the nature of price and the motivations of participants in 
these particular markets, and enriching the analysis with economic sociologists’ 
observations on the use of these models. Prices in derivatives markets are found 
in the following analysis to be disconnected from production and value, to exhibit 
great volatility and arbitrariness and to be greatly affected by the ebb and flow of 
demand and supply from market participants aiming to capture short-term price 
moves by buying and selling. Combined with the particular nature of derivatives, 
this reveals the central use of valuation models to connect the prices of completed 
transactions with the prices of potential new transactions, and in doing so, to 
allow dealers to operate on a large scale. 
8.3.1 The role and nature of prices in securities and derivatives markets 
Chapter 4 introduced banks, as securities dealers, as makers of securities markets 
who, mobilising otherwise idle money from around the economy, direct it to 
profitable ends thus generating additional surplus value out of which they are 
paid. They do this by issuing and sustaining claims to monetary value (in this 
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case, securities). Securities claims do not involve an engagement with labour but 
are rather a division of surplus value among capitalists. The establishment of 
joint-stock capitalism makes it increasingly possible to make an analytical 
distinction between capital as property and capital as process. In this split, surplus 
value is divided: securities, representing capital as property, are paid interest 
while capital as process is paid profit of enterprise (Chapter 4). This split, and 
therefore the price of securities, is purely one of demand and supply between 
capitalists and as such lacks a centre of gravity such as the one that as the struggle 
between capital and labour provides to the rate of profit (Chapter 4). 
Marx points out that not only can things such as a promise to pay have a price 
without value but also that price plays a critical role in their form. In his 
discussion of value and price in the opening chapters of Capital, Marx notes that 
commodities have both a value and a price and that there can be a ‘quantitative 
incongruity’ between them (Marx, 1976: 193). Critically for derivatives, the 
possibility of a quantitative incongruity opens up the possibility of: 
[a] qualitative contradiction, with the result that price ceases 
altogether to express value, despite the fact that money is nothing but 
the value form of commodities. Things which in and for themselves 
are not commodities, things such as conscience, honour, etc., can be 
offered for sale by their holders, and thus acquire the form of 
commodities through their price. Hence a thing can, formally 
speaking, have a price without having a value (Marx, 1976: 193).  
Promises to pay such as securities and derivatives can therefore have price 
without having value, again emphasising the distance of this price from central 
tendencies such as the rate of profit; importantly, through price they can assume a 
commodity form without being commodities. 
The next analytical stage, discussed in Chapter 5, has shown how institutional 
investors emerge, and in doing so how the category of securities trading 
developed in Chapter 4 can be split into trading to profit from price changes and 
trading to invest or recover otherwise idle funds. The growing importance of 
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institutional investors means that trading concerned with capturing price 
movements becomes increasingly important in securities markets. The nature of 
securities markets gives rise to institutional investors that emerge to reduce the 
asymmetry between investors and banks as dealers. Institutional investors are 
able to pool liquidity and restrict liquidity demands on their liabilities, which 
isolates their actions in securities markets from liquidity concerns. As a result 
their actions in securities markets become concerned more with capturing price 
movements by buying and selling than with depositing and withdrawing liquidity. 
Banks as dealers are equally concerned with capturing price movements as their 
primary form of profit takes the form of a bid-ask spread.  
In this way the nature of securities markets’ prices, dictated overwhelmingly by 
the actions of market participants buying and selling to profit from price changes, 
is taken a stage further. In the first stage, simple securities exchange, the 
securities was already distanced from outside pressures and especially from 
production, being purely the result of a division between capitalists. In the second 
stage, with the emergence of Institutional Investors aggregating individual 
investors and pooling liquidity, the liquidity management aspects of simple 
securities exchange are greatly reduced. Individual lenders are essentially shut 
out of acting in the markets themselves, and as a result the price is now 
overwhelmingly determined by market participants concerned solely with 
capturing price moves by buying and selling (Chapter 5).  
In derivatives markets, which develop out of securities markets focused on 
trading for price change, the isolation of price from effects other than the ebb and 
flow of demand is even more starkly presented. The cash-settled derivative 
excludes the possibility of an exchange of an underlying asset for money; most 
importantly, this includes the exchange of promises to pay. As a result cash 
settled derivatives cannot extend credit, and the needs of borrowers and the ebb 
and flow of their hoards and borrowing requirements are also largely excluded 
from the activities of the market itself. Market participants are explicitly trading 
only to capture price moves in the underlying price index. In short, the cash-
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settled derivative makes the division inherent in securities markets discussed in 
the previous stage concrete (see Chapter 5). 
The three stages outlined above theorise the successive distancing of the price 
and actions in financial markets from production and a corresponding increase in 
arbitrariness and unpredictability. The appearance of these markets is captured by 
Keynes.
229
 Even in the 1930s he was able to  write that ‘the energies and skill of 
the professional investor and speculator are mainly occupied … not with making 
superior long-term forecasts of probable yield of an investment over its whole 
life, but with foreseeing change in the conventional basis of valuation a short time 
ahead of the general public’ (Keynes, 1997: 154-5). 
Keynes famously compares: 
professional investment … to those newspaper competitions in which 
the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred 
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice 
most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors 
as a whole. [To succeed in such a market] it is not a case of choosing 
those which, to the best of one’s judgement, are really the prettiest, 
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. 
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to 
anticipating what the average opinion expects the average opinion to 
be. (Keynes, 1997: 156) 
Keynes argues that this behaviour drives out longer-term investing: ‘He who 
attempts it must surely lead much more laborious days and run greater risks than 
he who tries to guess better than the crowd how the crowd will behave; and given 
equal intelligence, he may make more disastrous mistakes.’ In an age of 
institutional investors and extensive benchmarking of fund managers’ 
performance, Keynes’ last point in the section I am quoting has perhaps even 
more pertinence now than it did then:  
                                                 
229 The volatile and arbitrary nature of price and the actions of market participants trying to 
capture movements in that price, of course, also prompt the use of the casino as metaphor, most 
famously in Strange’s (1986) Casino Capitalism. 
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Finally it is the long-term investor … who will in practice come in for 
the most criticism, wherever investment funds are managed by 
committees or board or banks. For it is in the essence of his behaviour 
that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of 
average opinion.  If he is successful, that will only confirm the general 
belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which 
is very likely, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom 
teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to 
succeed unconventionally. (Keynes, 1997: 156-8)
230
 
Neoclassical financial economics also concurs with this basic appearance of 
financial price, i.e. as unpredictable, albeit with different theoretical 
underpinnings. Prices appear to follow a ‘random walk’, where the price today is 
the best guess of the price tomorrow; in essence, price moves in financial markets 
cannot be predicted (Rutterford, 1993, Fama, 1965). This appearance is consistent 
with the theory of financial prices developed above and the theory developed by 
neoclassical economics to explain it, namely the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) (Fama, 1970). The theoretical thrust of the EMH, however, namely that 
‘information [about the underlying processes paying into them] is immediately 
reflected in stock prices’ (Malkiel, 2003), is almost the opposite of that proposed 
above, where arbitrariness reflects a disconnection from the economic rather than 
an accurate reflection of it.  
This subsection has stressed the volatility of financial prices because, as I will 
show, this aspect of them is critical for uncovering the uses of financial models. 
However, it must also be noted that they also contain tendencies to regularity, not 
least links to the underlying economy. While securities’ prices are removed from 
value they nevertheless remain a claim on an underlying process, including those 
                                                 
230
 Keynes’s disapproval of the resulting state of financial markets: ‘There is not clear evidence 
from experience that the investment policy which is socially advantageous coincides with that 
which is most profitable’, strongly echoes Hilferding on the same subject: ‘The fact that 
speculation is unproductive, that it is a form of gambling and betting … does not run counter to its 
necessity in a capitalist society … but simply testifies against the way in which this society is 
organised’  (Hilferding, 1981: 138-9). 
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processes producing surplus value. At the macro level they ‘cannot move for long 
in a direction contrary to the rate of profit’ (Lapavitsas, 2003: 27). Similarly, for 
derivatives the construction of an underlying price index ensures a separation 
from actual trading in the underlying; nevertheless there remains a connection if 
the measurement is to appear valid and to attract trading. So, for example, despite 
recent wrongdoing LIBOR is related to the rates at which banks lend,  and the 
price of an abstract ton of standard quality grain is related to the price that a 
farmer will obtain when selling his particular grain.
231
 Moreover, high trading 
volumes and arbitrage-free valuation models themselves bring a degree of 
regularity and transitivity to financial prices.   
The point is, however, that the nature of prices in these markets, in particular 
their distance from production, admits increased possibility for ‘volatility and 
arbitrariness’ (Lapavitsas, 2003: 27). In a market where participants are 
concerned with capturing price moves and recall derivatives markets are 
constructed explicitly to allow participants to do so, it is this volatility and 
arbitrariness that is most important, for it is in volatility that trading profits are 
made.
232
 It is also critical to explaining the role of valuation models and risk 
management.  
8.3.2 Completed vs. potential exchanges 
In markets where the price has a large element of volatility and arbitrariness and 
in which the principal aim of participants is to gain from capturing price moves 
by buying and selling, the ability to know the price at which the latest 
transactions have occurred is vital. Especially as a market of this sort becomes 
                                                 
231 As noted in Chapter 5, the quantities of different derivatives traded is also related to activities 
in the rest of the economy. Derivatives reflecting sports outcomes, for example, are less 
widespread than those connected to interest rates. Institutional investors (and dealers, inasmuch as 
they hold portfolios of claims) trade derivatives as part of the business of holding an inventory of 
assets, which to a large degree reflect the funding requirements and therefore the activity in the 
rest of the economy.  
232 Holzer and Millo (2005: 240) argue that financial markets’ ‘instabilities are increasingly 
related to processes internal to the markets and to the organisations operating within them – rather 
than to external events’ (emphasis in original). This change is prompted by changes in the 
practices of market participants, e.g  in Holzer and Millo’s study a reduction in the use of 
‘fundamental analysis’ is brought about by a rise in program trading (2005: 233-4). This argument 
runs against the standard neo-classical argument that ‘arbitrage generally serves the useful 
function of bringing asset prices closer to fundamental values’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990: 153). 
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more established, buying at a price higher than others are selling (or selling lower 
than others are buying) gives others the opportunity to profit and, assuming that 
the trade is reversed at the market price, sustains a loss. As Keynes (1997: 155) 
notes: ‘the actual, private object of the most skilled investment today is “to beat 
the gun”, … to outwit the crowd and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown 
to the other fellow’. CDS, where the underlying asset index remains at 1 
(representing no default and 100% recovery) while trading is ongoing, again 
provide an excellent example; to buy and sell CDS for a profit it is critical to 
know where the market is trading.
233
   
Although the category of arbitrage owes more to neoclassical notions of complete 
markets than to the analysis developed here, the notion of arbitrage can help to  
identify the importance of  market participants trading in line with others.
234
 
Prices must be arbitrage-free, or market participants face paying over money 
capital to those who can take advantage of price differentials. To avoid losses, the 
price of potential new trades must be consistent with the prices of the most 
recently-completed transactions.  
Marx highlights this dual role of price in completed and potential transactions. 
First, price can describe exchanges that have actually been made, namely the 
price that provided the seller with money: ‘to enable it to render its owner the 
service of a universal equivalent, [the commodity] must be actually replaced by 
gold’ (Marx, 1976: 197). Second, price can describe potential future prices: ‘to 
establish its price it is sufficient for it to be equated with gold in the imagination’ 
(ibid). This establishment of the price ‘in the imagination’ is important. The seller 
of derivatives must ‘lend them his tongue, or hang a ticket on them, in order to 
communicate their prices to the outside world’ (Marx, 1976: 189). The distinction 
is critical to understanding the role of derivative valuation models which, as I 
                                                 
233 See Chapters 1, 5 and 7 for more details. Trading ceases in CDS once a default event has been 
declared.  
234 As Working (1953) shows the categories of hedger, speculator and arbitrageur are rarely 
observed separately. A farmer who uses derivatives to hedge price moves in a type of produce has 
chosen not to sell when the produce is ready to come to market or to find a buyer for her specific 
inventory and fix the price in advance. In this way she is at once hedging, speculating and 
arbitraging. Analytical space for such categories seems only possible in a theory centred around 
complete markets, where a hedge (with derivatives) is synonymous with selling forwards.    
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show below, mediate back and forth between the two types of prices. However, to 
understand why derivatives require a mathematical model to do this it is 
necessary to contemplate the complexity that derivatives bring to the task and in 
particular the variety of instruments on the same underlying price index that they 
make possible.  
8.3.3 Increased scope of derivatives brings added complexity 
The task of ensuring that the price of potential new trades is in line with latest 
completed trades is both critical for derivatives, as discussed above, and at the 
same time made more complex by derivatives’ very nature. Derivatives exist to 
allow market participants to act as if they are buying and selling an underlying 
asset, the price of which (the only element that matters for the derivative) is 
represented by the underlying reference price index. To achieve this the 
derivative has the form of a claim, yet the properties of the claim make knowing 
the market price more complex. This happens in two ways.  
First, because the claim is a bilateral relation between parties, it has specific 
characteristics which may cause its price to diverge from an identical instrument 
or trade with a different counterpart; e.g. counterparts present different 
counterparty credit risks, have different power relations and so on. For now, 
however, the analysis sets this problem – as indeed the models themselves do, 
although I return to it later – and concentrates on the difficulties introduced by the 
second effect of derivatives being a claim.  
Second, claims massively increase the array of possible instruments on a given 
underlying asset. The biggest effect of the introduction of cash-settled derivative 
claims was the vast increase in the scale and scope of trading (Chapter  5). This is 
true of the possible instruments even on the same underlying reference price 
index. First, derivatives extend trading out into the future, theoretically making 
possible a infinite number of maturities. Even in practice there are a vast number 
of possible maturities for the simplest of transactions, e.g. a forward 
purchase/sale. Secondly, more complex claims are possible, most obviously 
perhaps by introducing optionality. This again massively increases the number of 
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instruments available to trade in the same underlying asset: even among simple 
options on the same underlying reference price index with the same expiry, a vast 
number of strike prices can be used in both put and call options. In both OTC and 
ETD markets the number of possible derivatives is very large, and in any given 
time period – a minute, a day, a week, or even a year – there is no practical 
possibility that a completed price can be observed for all of them.
235
  
What makes this vast array of instruments troublesome is that they have a vast 
array of possible money prices, making life complicated for market participants 
attempting to propose new prices consistent with those just traded. The prices of 
this array of instruments must be related, as they are all different ways of acting 
as if participants are buying and selling the same underlying; but even very 
closely-related instruments can have very different money prices, e.g. even with 
the same expiry and the same strike, a put and a call will have completely 
different money prices. If a trader is to avoid being passed the ‘bad, or 
depreciating, half-crown’ (Keynes, 1997: 155) he must be able to price them 
consistently. 
In earlier times this problem was circumvented because the range of instruments 
being traded was constrained, allowing a reverse of the pricing convention; 
On modern option exchanges, an option contract is specified with a 
given strike price and the price of the option (the premium) is 
negotiated between buyer and seller. In nineteenth century option 
markets, the convention was reversed. Option contracts were sold for 
a fixed price, but the strike price was negotiated between buyer and 
seller. … The fact that the strike price was the one free variable in the 
contract may have simplified any rules of thumb used by option 
sellers. (Mixon, 2009: 176) 
                                                 
235 On a derivatives exchange this range is finite, as the exchange effectively constrains 
competition in the creation of new contracts (Fehle, 2006). In OTC markets, while the number of 
possible transactions is theoretically infinite, standardisation has effectively served to greatly 
reduce the number of plausible transactions (see Chapter 7). 
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The most important implication of this historical convention, however, is that a 
fixed money price dramatically reduces the number of instruments being traded 
to two: the put and call costing the fixed premium.   
In modern markets, market operators need to find a way to ensure that potential 
new prices are consistent with recently-completed prices; prices must be 
compared, but may have very different money amounts. This is where the two 
main attributes of the models comes to the fore: they are arbitrage-free, and they 
make commensurate an array of money prices by using a common pricing factor, 
e.g. implied volatility or implied correlation, as the next section explores.  
8.3.4 Running valuation models backwards and forwards 
Valuation models purport to produce derivative prices as an output, but in the 
first instance, prices observed in the market must serve as an input. The observed 
price is translated into an implied volatility or implied correlation by the model. 
This is then input to the model, which is run in the opposite direction to deliver 
prices for possible trades that have not yet taken place. In this way the model acts 
as a pivot or means of translating between the observed prices of completed 
trades and the prices of different instruments on the same underlying that arise in 
the imagination of the trader for future possible transactions, as I now discuss.  
The parameters of the various valuation models are often divided into those that 
stem from the definition of the instrument,
236
 those that are taken to be 
observable, and those that are taken to be unobservable. Observable parameters 
generally include the risk-free interest rate and, given the requirement for 
facticity (MacKenzie, 2007) explored in the last chapter, the price of the 
underlying. Those that are generally thought to be unobservable come down to 
two key figures: the money price of the instrument and a factor that falls out of 
the specification of the model, e.g. volatility for Black-Scholes and correlation for 
CDOs (Mayhew, 1995). Yet the model cannot produce a solution with two 
unobservable parameters. While future prices are unobservable, the money prices 
of completed transactions are observable. Conversely, the implied volatility or 
                                                 
236 Which, for example are input as boundary conditions into the Black-Scholes formula and as 
parameters into the simulation for the Gaussian copula model. 
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implied correlation, even of completed transactions, is not capable of being 
observed; the model can only calculate it from completed transactions.  
As a result there are two logical phases with respect to the model and prices: in 
one the model is run backwards, and in the second, forwards (or perhaps vice 
versa). While this back and forth action continuously compares old and 
prospective new prices, analytically the starting point is with the money prices of 
completed exchanges. In the first phase, observed prices of actual transactions are 
an input and model works to reduce the vast array of possible instruments (e.g. 
different put-call, expiry, strike combinations) to a single organising factor (e.g. 
implied volatility). The potentially very different and incomparable money prices 
of different instruments on the same underlying are translated into common 
currency, e.g. implied volatility or correlation. In the second phase, the organising 
parameter, e.g. implied volatility or correlation, is input and prices are produced 
for potential future trades. Once the money prices of existing trades in a variety 
of instruments have been translated into a comparable metric in the first phase, a 
trader can run the model in the other direction to produce new prices for new 
trades (e.g. any put-call/strike/expiry combinations) to revalue existing trades or 
to propose new ones.  
The riddle posed by the success of inaccurate models begins to be answered. 
Dealers do not face the market as price-takers in perfect markets; instead they 
must make the markets themselves. The array of possible derivatives that can be 
struck, even on a single underlying reference price index, means that dealers must 
propose consistent prices on related instruments even though the quantitative 
money prices (of consistently-priced instruments) may be completely different. 
To do this requires, first, an arbitrage-free model, which is provided by risk-
neutral pricing. Second, the array of potential prices should be reduced to a single 
factor, addressed primarily through the choice of distribution. The choice of 
lognormal distribution in the Black-Scholes ensures that only one term is left as 
organising principle: implied volatility. Similarly, the Gaussian copula reduces 
the complexities of varying tranches to a single parameter: implied correlation. 
After the sophisticated modelling of the Gaussian copula and more complex 
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models, the crude approach of a single average correlation for each asset in place 
of a specific correlation figure for each can now be seen as central to making the 
model useful.  
8.4 Using ‘these inaccurate models’: from single trade to portfolio 
management 
The preceding sections have analysed how the form of valuation models makes 
them useful to market makers, drawing on the particular nature of derivatives 
markets established in earlier chapters. The section above focused on a market 
maker calculating prices at which new purchase and sales transactions might 
occur. This section starts first with the pricing of a single trade; however, the 
business of both dealers and institutional investors is buying and selling to profit 
from price moves. Once again, the contradictory nature of derivatives as untraded 
claims to facilitate trading is critical here. The first trade is not sold, rather a 
second trade is undertaken which, it is hoped, will offset the first. Next, therefore, 
the analysis must look at how the model can produce a potential price for this 
second, offsetting trade. Critically, this operation not only prices the offsetting 
trade but revalues the first, allowing an untraded claim to acquire a price and the 
commodity form. Third, the analysis shows how valuation models also produce 
risk measures, and in doing so define and price offsetting trades, not on a trade-
by-trade basis but for entre portfolios. Fourth, I highlight some more practical 
ways in which models have aided the growth of derivative portfolios and 
markets. Once again, derivatives risk management practices are seen to arise 
from the particular nature of derivatives markets and not from the general nature 
of trading things per se. 
8.4.1 The first trade: hanging a ticket on new trades 
The analysis begins with a market maker coming to market to sell derivatives. To 
do this he must ‘lend them his tongue, or hang a ticket on them, in order to 
communicate their prices to the outside world’ (Marx, 1976: 189). As I have 
shown, valuation models allow translation, without providing an opportunity for 
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arbitrage, between the prices of completed trades and prices of trades being 
proposed.  
Mackenzie (2006) shows how growing derivatives volumes led to Black & 
Scholes becoming used in this way in option markets. Individual dealers practised 
in the art of derivative pricing can make prices on a small number of derivatives 
positions. However, as derivative volumes and the number of instruments being 
traded grow, traders are unable to keep track of the multitude of money prices 
available for different instrument types (e.g. put-call, expiry, strike) on the same 
underlying reference price index, and require more formalised methods to allow 
them to quote consistent prices for different instruments.  
As a result, Black & Scholes comes to be used to promote consistency between 
traded and prospective prices by reducing the number of parameters required for 
comparison. At first this is carried out using paper sheets printed each morning 
(MacKenzie, 2006: 156-162). The sheets show the money prices for different 
implied volatilities and strikes (measured as distance in and out of the money) for 
different expiries.
237
 Traders are able to use the sheets to translate back and forth 
between prices expressed in terms of money and of implied volatility. By 
observing trades, the trader can find out the volatility at which the market is 
trading and, knowing current prices in implied volatility terms, can provide a 
money price for different strike/expiry combinations on the same underlying from 
the sheet. In time, paper is replaced with calculators and pocket computers.  
Similarly, in the trading rooms of dealer banks where OTC trades are priced the 
first stage is to enter market prices into the model. The model, housed on 
computers, is then able to produce possible prices for new and different trades 
consistent with the last observed prices enabling traders to update the prices of 
observed trades in order to update (and advertise) possible future prices.  
To make things easier, traders sometimes trade and communicate solely in terms 
of the model; for instance, options traders might communicate in terms of implied 
volatilities. First, this saves time in translation and is based on a standard model 
                                                 
237 At the O’Conner trading firm the sheets were known as ‘pilgrims’ or ‘’grims’, so reliant on 
them were the traders for direction. 
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so that all traders understand that certain Black-Scholes volatility (or correlation 
or other factor) equates to a certain amount of money. Second, the price in 
implied model terms is not as volatile as the money price. Here, the issue is less 
the array of possible instruments but the volatility of other inputs – thus if interest 
rates move or times passes  the money price of the instrument moves ,even when 
the implied volatility or correlation remains stable. For instance, in the nascent 
CDS swaption markets of the mid-2000s transactions were much fewer and 
generally took longer to execute than the volatile and frequently-traded CDS that 
they reference; partly for this reason, CDS swaption prices were often quoted by 
market makers in terms of volatility and not money prices.
238
  
8.4.2 The second trade: revaluation  
Participants in derivatives markets aim to capture price changes. In such a market 
a purchase (or a sale) must often be followed by a sale (or a purchase). In 
derivatives markets, ‘selling’ an existing position means entering into a new trade 
that is equal and opposite to the first. The use of the models in doing so is not so 
different from the procedure above. The model is used to ‘hang a ticket’ on a 
potential new trade; the difference is that the terms of the new trade are dictated 
not by a client’s request (or a new perceived opportunity in the market) but by the 
trade that the party pricing the trade has already completed – the first trade 
described in section 8.4.1 above.  
Critically, although existing derivative transactions are rarely sold, valuing a new 
and offsetting trade appears to be a revaluation of the existing trade at market 
prices as if it could actually be sold. Partly because of the infrastructure of the 
market (including regulation, contracts and clearing – see Chapters 6 and 7), two 
trades to buy and sell the underlying asset index can be treated as if they exactly 
offset each other; as if the second is a sale of the first. This ability to offset allows 
the existing derivative, which is not a traded thing, to be assigned a current 
                                                 
238 ‘The market standard for pricing [CDS Swaptions] is an adaptation of the option pricing model 
developed by Black and Scholes in the 1970s’ (Curien, 2006). In theory this means that the 
underlying is assumed to have a lognormal distribution, which is unlikely to be true of credit 
spreads. In practice it facilitates communication, e.g. between market participants, and risk 
management as it allows CDS Swaption traders to make use of existing option pricing software 
and conventions (Spinner, 2004). 
0 -  
Risk management and valuation theory: calculating for growth  
Page 264 of 303 
market price that is equal to the potential new (equal and opposite) trade. Partly 
by being assigned a current market price, the untraded claim takes the commodity 
form (without being one (Marx, 1976: 193).  
This assignation of a price to an untraded object and the resulting adoption of the 
commodity form is a pivotal point in this analysis, not least because it allows risk 
management of the completed transactions. The material roots of the models and 
risk management can be seen in dealers’ adaptation to the growing scale of 
derivatives markets. The models not only become indispensible, but also further 
facilitate the growth of the market and help derivatives to appear as tradable 
claims themselves.  
Before moving on, it is worth noting the way in which the models move to centre 
stage. At first, the model price is seen as a deviation from real, i.e. completed, 
prices of derivatives transactions. As the pricing of new trades becomes 
increasingly reliant on the use of valuation models, the model price moves to 
centre stage and model-generated prices appear to be the market price. The prices 
of completed transactions, i.e. those that actually render the seller money and 
constitute the liquidity that makes it possible for the model to function now come 
to be seen as diverting from the ‘true’ or model price.239 
Closely related to this, the last section noted that the derivative claim makes 
pricing more complex, first because of the scope of possible instruments 
(analysed above) and second because the form is a bilateral claim between parties 
with different credit perspectives, different powers and so on. The analysis so far, 
and indeed the workings of the model, leave aside this second point and disregard 
differences in the prices of completed transactions due to counterparty-specific 
elements.  
In fact counterparty-specific deviations from the model price occur to both the 
model’s inputs and its outputs. Traders collecting observed market prices must 
undertake modelling to estimate the mid-price from observed prices which, 
                                                 
239 Lukács notes how a similar phenomenon occurs with the widespread emergence of wage 
labour, where prices become more regular and as a result come to be seen as a dispersion around 
an ideal and not the opposite (Lukács, 1971: 89). 
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particularly in OTC markets, differ for reasons specific to the relation between 
counterparts, e.g. their creditworthiness or market power.
240
 Similarly, as traders 
come to market (e.g. as they take to the exchange pit with their pricing sheets, or 
the electronic equivalent) they are armed with the model’s mid-price However, 
trades rarely occur at mid-price – the dealer after all makes money from charging 
the bid-ask spread. The trader therefore starts calculating the actual price to be 
quoted for a new trade by adding to or subtracting from the model mid-price in 
order to incorporate a bid-ask spread. In OTC markets, dealers then further add to 
the mid-bid or mid-ask spread by adding a premium for counterparty credit risk 
(known as the credit charge), their margin and so on.  
8.4.3 A portfolio of trades: risk management 
I have shown above how valuation models can find the current market price of a 
trade to offset a completed transaction. But if market participants, especially 
dealers, had to match completed trades one-for-one with new trades, the volumes 
transacted would be constrained as they sought to find perfect matches. Risk-
management techniques grow out of valuation models by calculating the new and 
offsetting trade, not on a trade-by-trade basis but for a portfolio of trades.  
The problem of defining and pricing offsetting trades for an entire portfolio is 
similar in nature to that of pricing a single trade; the difference now is that the 
quantity of each completed transaction is added to the problem of price outlined 
above. As noted above, traders could keep track of the market price if a single 
instrument were being traded, as the conversion from completed to potential new 
prices would be trivial and there would be no need for mathematical models. 
Once the increased scope and complexity of instruments made possible by 
derivatives is admitted, however more formal models are required. Similarly, 
when considering a single instrument it is possible for a trader to keep track of 
the net position because the quantity of contracts traded is additive. Once the 
scope and complexity of derivatives is admitted, however, a model is again 
                                                 
240 Calibration of the model parameters, e.g. volatility surfaces, to completed market prices is an 
important task for trading desks, particularly with regard to complex instruments (Benhamou, 
2007). 
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required to make the positions additive.
 
As above, this can be analysed first by 
varying maturity only and second by adding complexity such as optionality. 
Take, for example, a portfolio of securities: a purchase of 200 million and a 
separate purchase of 300 million of a given security requires an offsetting sale of 
500 million. The same is true of a CDS on the same underlying with the same 
expiry. As soon as the possible scope of derivative instruments, even on the same 
underlying, is brought to bear, however, things become more complex. 
Derivatives can have different maturities, so, for example, a purchase of 200 
million of a 5-year CDS and a purchase of 300 million of 2-year CDS does not 
result in an unambiguous single sale of 500 million in either instrument in order 
to offset the first two trades. The range of maturities in less standardised products 
is even more bewildering, for example in interest rate swaps. Now add optionality 
– e.g. a put and a call with different strikes; it is clear that without a model the 
trader cannot offset these positions unless on a trade-by-trade basis.
 
 
Valuation models solve this problem because they provide the sensitivity to 
moves in the underlying reference price index, or in other words the hedge ratio 
required by risk-neutral pricing, in order that the derivative position can be 
replicated with trades in the underlying.
241
 Critically, these hedge ratios are 
additive. To continue with options as an illustration, the hedge ratios produced by 
Black & Scholes are additive, and therefore the aggregate hedge ratio of various 
purchases and sales of puts and calls on different strikes and expiries can be 
calculated. Similarly, the hedge ratio of potential new trades can be calculated. In 
this way the trader can select an appropriate quantity of an instrument in order to 
adjust the aggregate sensitivity of his portfolio to moves in the underlying 
reference price index. The valuation produced by the derivatives models have 
sensitivities to other factors beside the underlying reference price index, and 
valuation models produce sensitivities to a variety of input parameters – known 
as ‘Greeks’ for the use of Greek letters in their naming conventions  (Hull, 2009). 
                                                 
241  
Millo and MacKenzie highlight how the dual output of the models, both in prices (as seen 
above) and in sensitivity to moves in the underlying reference price index, makes them so useful 
(Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). 
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Given the nature of derivatives as future cash flows, sensitivity to interest rates 
and time are important examples.  
Greeks also include sensitivity to the single organising parameter in the model, 
e.g. implied correlation or implied volatility. What started the analysis as a device 
to translate between the money prices of completed and potential prices has 
become in turn an index to be bought and sold. As with derivatives’ underlying 
reference price indices, it is impossible to buy implied parameters themselves; it 
is only possible to trade more derivatives. Initially this is via derivatives that 
reference the same underlying reference price index, e.g. a portfolio of bought 
options on the S&P 500 will be long implied volatility – selling options on the 
S&P 500 will offset this sensitivity to implied volatility. In a second stage, 
however the implied volatility itself can be measured, standardised, formalised 
and published as an underlying price index upon which derivatives can be struck; 
in the case of the S&P 500 this is the Vix volatility index (Zhang et al., 2010). 
By summarising the portfolio in this way the model provides the specification on 
a portfolio basis (and not on a trade-by-trade basis) of new trade or trades that 
offset those that have gone before, or in other words that constitute the sale to the 
original purchase (or the purchase to the original sale) on a portfolio basis. The 
model allows risk management of the portfolio. Now it is possible to see the 
inversion that occurs with the widespread establishment of derivatives trading 
and risk management. In the first instance it is risk management that allows the 
growth of derivatives trading by allowing the management of large-scale trading 
and portfolios. With the widespread establishment of model-based derivatives 
trading, however, it is derivatives trading that allows risk management. The 
practice of trading a large portfolio using the valuation models has bought about 
the objectification of risk management, and with it an inversion.  
8.4.4 Portfolios in large organisations: division of duties and communication 
More concretely formalised valuation and risk management has played a vital 
role in the growth of these markets in the context of the very large dealers and 
institutional investor firms that constitute the derivatives market, allowing a 
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division of duties within individual banks through communication and 
coordination (see Chapter 7 for a similar role played by contracts) and 
communication outside the firm, above all to liability holders (see Chapter 6 for a 
discussion of risk-based regulation as a means of communicating with liability 
holders).  
Turning first to the models’ usefulness internally, there is an additional advantage 
to their use when it comes to growing derivatives business in the context of a 
large organisation: in order to trade derivatives on a large scale it is necessary to 
divide up the work (see Chapter 7). Valuation models and risk management are 
among the practices that emerge to manage this division of labour. For example, 
valuation models allow traders to report their overnight positions to management, 
and one of their early roles was to allow management to aggregate trading 
positions across several traders, and indeed across exchanges (MacKenzie, 2006).
 
242
  
The new banking activities of securities and derivatives dealing, and the 
possibility of catastrophic losses from them as highlighted by the stock market 
crash of 1988, also created the need for increased external reporting by dealer 
banks. Banks took steps to mitigate the risks of new activities and, as importantly, 
needed to be seen to do this by liability holders (see Chapter 6). Risk 
management is used to communicate with and maintain the confidence of liability 
holders in a number of ways. For example, valuation at market value is the 
backbone of fair value accounting for financial reporting (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 2007), and modelling forms a critical component of the 
regulatory capital requirement, e.g. VaR and exposure at default (EAD) 
calculations (BIS, 1996, 2006). 
8.5 Conclusion: price, the commodity form and liquidity 
Valuation models and risk management are bound up with the increase in 
derivatives trading witnessed over the last 30 or so years, but they are also 
                                                 
242 The division of labour necessary for operating derivatives dealers on a large scale and the 
devices that emerge to manage this coordination illustrate the more abstract idea that man acting 
socially creates ideals that take on an objective force (Ilyenkov, 1977, 2012, Pilling, 1980,).  
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entirely reliant on continued trading. This reliance results in an inherent fragility 
in derivatives markets which are built on valuation models and risk management.  
This chapter has shown how the expansion of banking activities to include first 
securities and then derivatives dealing, the rise of institutional investors to face 
them in financial markets and the resulting character of derivatives markets gives 
rise to a need for valuation modelling and risk management practices. These 
practices emerge in the face of, and to facilitate a growth in, derivative trading 
volumes, motivated by banks’ dealing profits.  
First, derivatives markets require a device by which to translate the money prices 
of an array of possible trades into a common currency. This need stems from a 
combination of two elements. First, markets in which participants aim to capture 
gains from price moves by trading with one another, and where prices display 
high degrees of arbitrariness and volatility. Combined with, second, the enormous 
range of possible instruments, even on the same underlying reference price index 
that cash-settled derivatives make possible.  
As noted throughout this thesis, the central contradiction of derivatives is that 
they are untraded claims to facilitate trading. In these markets, where trading 
occurs to capture price changes, a purchase is usually accompanied by a sale, but 
because derivatives are untradeable this must occur via a new offsetting 
derivative claim. Valuation models allow the calculation of a price for the 
offsetting trade, whether completed or only calculated in the imagination of the 
trader, that can be applied to the existing untraded claim. On acquiring a price, 
the untraded derivative takes on the commodity form, further enhancing its 
tradability, not least because now the trader can use valuation models to risk-
manage her existing trades on a portfolio rather than a trade-by-trade basis. By 
using the formal mathematical properties of the valuation models, traders have 
become able to manage large portfolios of derivatives and greater trading 
volumes. Derivative valuation models, and by extension risk management, are 
bound up with the growth and changing character of derivatives from untraded 
claims to claims, which themselves appear to be tradable.  
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This is a fragile construction because it is circular: large trading volumes in 
derivatives markets are both a precondition and a result of valuation models and 
risk management. Derivatives markets rely on valuation models and risk 
management, and valuation models and risk management rely on active trading. 
If trading is interrupted, for example by a crisis, the models’ calculations become 
meaningless and, as derivatives revert to their basic state as untradeable claims, 
useless.  
If there is no trading, there is obviously no need to produce prices for potential 
new trades. It becomes impossible to apply the price of an equal and opposite 
potential new trade to existing transactions: mark-to-market valuation of existing 
trades is not possible if there is no market. Hedge ratios, or Greeks, become 
impossible to calculate if it is not possible to calculate a valuation – indeed there 
is no sense in calculating the sensitivity to market price moves if there are no 
markets. In short, the calculations of valuation models and risk management 
models, which make derivatives trading possible on a large scale, become 
meaningless if there is no ongoing trading. In fact this was clear from the first 
exploration of risk-neutral pricing above – Black-Scholes must be acted out to 
make it true, and inability to trade the replicating portfolio invalidates the 
calculation. A cessation of trading such as might happen in a crisis, and as indeed 
did occur in many parts of the US residential mortgage markets in 2008, renders 
the calculations of valuation models meaningless and risk management practices 
impossible, as offsetting trades cannot be completed. 
Valuation models and risk management enable the derivative to transcend its 
basic nature as a claim and allow market participants to treat it as a ‘thing’; taking 
on the form of a commodity that appears to be bought and sold in the market. But 
without ongoing trading the derivative reverts to a claim on another party settled 
by the underlying reference price index, and valuation must begin on another 
basis entirely such as historical cost or the current level of the underlying 
reference price index.
243
 The problem with such an approach to managing 
                                                 
243 Of course in many instances the underlying reference price index is itself calculated or 
modelled from market prices. In this case even this calculation may become impossible or 
difficult. 
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derivatives is that it is antithetical to the nature of derivatives, which are 
instruments that emerge to facilitate trading and can only be differentiated from 
other financial instruments on this basis.  
Finally, then, there is something paradoxical about risk management when 
viewed from the perspective of international bank regulators and bank liability-
holders: to calculate potential losses in times of market disruption it assumes the 
continued presence of working markets, and as a result is likely to be found 
wanting exactly when it is most needed by bank liability holders or regulators. 
The answer to this apparent riddle is that the models perform a very useful role 
for those who practice risk management: they increase the latters’ ability to 
manage large portfolios and high trading volumes and thereby their profits. Those 
practicing derivatives trading and risk management need something that is useful 
to them most of the time rather than something to protect them against occasional 
crashes (Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). 
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9 Conclusion: making markets for themselves 
9.1 Introduction 
When seeking to understand what derivatives are and how the markets for them 
came to be so large compared to the broader economy, two related approaches are 
most commonly heard.  First, the more theoretically and firmly neoclassical 
argument is that derivatives complete markets (Ross, 1976). There are several 
problems with this approach, among which three merit mention here. First, it 
does little to help understanding of the financial crisis that began in 2007/8. The 
complete markets argument suggests that approximately US$600 trillion of 
notional outstanding in OTC alone was not enough derivatives, that the markets 
were not complete enough.; a more common understanding of the crisis argues 
that these markets and their size were very much part of the problem. Secondly, 
and typically for neoclassical theory, it is a static explanation that does not 
explain how or why derivatives markets changed when they did. Third, it offers 
no insight into why these particular markets need banks at their centre. Even Alan 
Greenspan (former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 1987-2006) admits this 
might not be the best theory of financial markets (Andrews, 2008).  
The second common and related approach, invoked on occasion by both 
heterodox and orthodox economists, argues that the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods agreement led firms to hedge, and derivatives emerged to help with risk 
management, leading to today’s derivatives markets. While at least historical and 
describing a process of development, this approach also struggles to get to the 
heart of derivatives markets. One complaint against it is that it cannot explain the 
size of these markets, the turnover of which is several times that of world GDP 
and world trade; another is that almost none of the phenomena to be explained 
involve firms hedging.  
Beyond from these two problematic explanations, Marxist and heterodox writers, 
unsurprisingly, offer richer accounts of derivatives but tend to focus on the ways 
in which derivatives and capitalism are changing one another, looking outwards 
from derivatives markets to their relation with accumulation more generally. How 
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derivatives and broader society are affecting each other (especially how 
derivatives are changing society) is a, if not the, critical question and this chapter 
finishes with some of the ways in which further research could address this area.  
To analyse the ways in which derivatives affect society and accumulation more 
generally, a thorough understanding of derivatives themselves and their process 
of development, in particular in the last 30-40 years is necessary. There does not 
appear to be an approach that provides a logical and detailed construction in 
theory that corresponds to actual observations of derivatives markets; there is no 
theory that is more inward than outward-looking and focuses more on what 
derivatives are than on how they have changed the world, although the former 
will help explain the latter. This is the task that this thesis set itself: to clear a path 
through existing theories to arrive at an understanding of derivatives markets that 
accords with reality. Only with such an understanding does it becomes possible to 
understand detailed practices in derivatives markets and then to explore their 
relation with accumulation more generally, and indeed to form policies that 
confront it.  
Approaching the construction of such a theory, it soon becomes clear that a 
theory of derivatives also needs to be a theory of banks. This finding further 
confirms the lack of theories that can explain derivatives today: the existing 
theories of banks tend not to treat banks as derivatives dealers, and existing 
theories of derivatives tend not to treat them as a banking activity. New theory 
has to cut a new path, and in doing so, fill in a gap in existing theory. The first 
thing that this thesis has shown is that whatever they were before, and whatever 
they become in the future, in the last 30 to 40 years derivatives have become a 
banking activity. That derivatives are a banking activity should not be surprising. 
The general and financial press confirm it daily, whether reporting the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs’ deals with the Greek government, (Robinson, 
2010) or Deutsche Bank’s dealing in CDS (Alloway, 2010). Researchers know it 
too: in the quote that opens this thesis, the authors visited banks’ trading floors 
(Knorr-Cetina and Preda, 2005: 43-4). With this thesis we can begin to know 
theoretically as well that derivatives are a banking activity .  
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The second thing that this thesis has shown is that derivatives are for trading. The 
behaviour we observe in derivative markets is trading; repeated buying and 
selling to capture and profit from changes in price. Theoretical analysis shows 
that the derivative form that has developed was developed by banks, and is suited 
to trading. The trading behaviour that can be observed is not accidental. Not only 
is buying and selling for a profit the basis of dealer bank’s bid-ask profit, it is also 
the source of dealer and institutional investor profit as a result of taking positions 
in derivatives. In contrast to the notion of trading, hedging, arbitrage and 
speculation are only of secondary use in understanding derivatives markets and 
do not offer any analytical purchase on what these markets are really about. 
Almost all derivative activity involves aspects of all three and as a result they are 
useful mainly descriptively as commonly-understood words.
244
 Like much of 
neoclassical economics, from which they derive, these terms do not probe 
beneath appearances.  
Again, the fact that derivatives are a trading activity involving repeated and often 
frenzied buying and selling should not be surprising. The press and financial 
press confirm this regularly with reports covering the wide spectrum from the 
enormous official statistics to the images of trading floors that provide the daily 
backdrop to market reports. Economic sociologists know it too: Knorr-Cetina and 
Preda’s (2005: 43-4) traders ‘strap themselves to their seats … their eyes will be 
glued to [their] screens,… in what appears to be total immersion in the action in 
which they are taking part’. Again, with this thesis it can also come to be known 
theoretically that derivatives are for trading, showing moreover that this facility 
for trading arises from the nature of derivatives as claims which are the domain of 
banks.  
Thirdly, the present theory of derivatives and banks as dealers provides a base for 
the exploration of more detailed aspects of derivatives markets behaviour and for 
further exploration of the relationship with accumulation more generally. Much 
of the academic theory about derivatives focuses on price. Prices in derivatives 
markets are not the focus of this thesis, but having built a theoretical framework 
                                                 
244 For example Gowan uses the term ‘speculative arbitrage’ to describe Wall Street bank activity. In many 
ways it is a useful way to describe their activities, but as these activities also include an element of hedging it 
is also possible to describe them as ‘speculative arbitrage hedging’, which brings us back to where we 
started.  
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for understanding derivatives in general it is possible to provide insights into 
derivatives prices and the theories that surround them and their uses. The 
framework can also build a theory that leads to understanding other, more 
concrete aspects of derivatives markets such the legal documentation used and 
the evolution of bank regulation.  
In short, this thesis observing that banks are at the centre of derivatives markets 
has developed a theory of banks as derivatives dealers, using a political economy 
approach that draws most heavily on Marx and Marxist political economists. 
Original in itself, more importantly this approach provides original insights into 
derivatives markets and the evolution of banks and their role as derivatives 
dealers. The analysis begins with the basic categories of Marxist analysis and sets 
out how Marx and others theorise the emergence of banks and the financial 
system. It does this, however, with a critical eye, aware, as earlier writers could 
not be, of the development of banks into, among other things, derivatives dealers. 
Having reviewed the existing theory of banks emerging from capitalist dealings 
in this way, it then extends that theory to incorporate new kinds of securities 
dealing and, most importantly, derivatives dealing. The theoretical picture of 
derivatives markets that results is a recognisable reflection of their observable 
reality as presented in the introduction. This theoretical development of the 
evolution of banks to encompass derivatives-dealing activities is the core of the 
thesis and not only extends existing theory but also provides a theoretical 
framework for further analysis. The analysis then both builds on and enriches this 
theoretical framework by incorporating more concrete manifestations of banks’ 
activity in the construction of derivatives markets. Banks’ practices in derivatives 
markets are analysed in light of the central contradiction inherent in derivatives; 
they are an untraded claim that emerges to facilitate trading, a contradiction that 
can only come to light through the theoretical framework built in previous 
chapters. 
Throughout this thesis I have stressed that markets do not make themselves. 
Analysis must ask how they are made. Banks, observed initially as central to 
derivatives markets, have been shown to draw on the nature of their specialisation 
in capitalist economies to make derivatives markets, both by standing ready to 
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buy and sell and by providing the necessary infrastructure. A gap in existing 
theory is identified in the opening chapter; no theory so far has explained the 
centrality of banks to derivative markets. This thesis fills this gap.  
9.2 Banks making markets for themselves 
Banks have not only made financial markets; they have made those markets for 
themselves. They have made them for institutional investors too, but inasmuch as 
banks profit from institutional investors, the markets that banks make are above 
all for themselves. The material presented throughout this thesis shows how 
banks have done this in four ways, Future research can build on the theoretical 
analysis presented here to  look outwards at derivatives’ relation with the rest of 
society instead of focusing inwards on derivatives markets,  
First, a market is an abstract construction. As stressed in Chapter 2, to understand 
how things have developed as they have, it is necessary to ask how they were 
made. This means, first, that the analysis should ask how things observed in 
reality have come about. Second, it must ask how the abstract construction of the 
market came to be made and attempt to understand how markets were made in 
reality by building their abstract construction.  
Neoclassical theories of financial markets, and indeed some market participants 
treat the market as a pre-made, transhistorical construction divorced from social 
context; in this view the market (presumably) emerges spontaneously when 
restrictions on it are removed, as the most efficient way to organise society. In 
securities and derivatives markets this view manifests above all with the idea that 
the market will buy when an individual wants to sell, and sell when an individual 
wants to buy. Thus it is the market that completes the M-M’ relation when 
securities are sold or offsetting derivatives positions are taken.  
Interestingly, while this view might be shared by neoclassical economists and 
parts of the back and middle offices of dealer banks, the front office, sales and 
trading staff instinctively know better (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003, MacKenzie, 
2006). Those involved in trading see it as a much more personal affair: a 
derivative trade is not executed by Goldman Sachs but by Sarah at Goldmans or 
Tommasso at Deutsche. Institutional investors know which dealers are strongest 
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in which instruments. Corporate entertainment, extortionate bills in French 
restaurants and above all the importance of ‘colour’ (see footnote 137) all attest 
to the fact that it is not the market but another trader, usually at a dealer bank, that 
buys when a trader wants to sell and sells when a trader wants to buy.  
Second, banks make these markets, and moreover they them make them for 
themselves. First, they make markets. Analysis of the expansion of commercial 
banking activity begins in Chapter 4, which shows how buyers of securities are 
the equivalent of depositors in a commercial bank. The bank’s promise to redeem 
the deposit on demand is a parallel its offer to return the security holder to money 
through exchange. It is the ability to exchange the security holding for money – 
to transform a particular promise to pay for a generally acceptable form of value 
– that marks joint-stock capitalism as qualitatively different from owning capital 
in partnership. Banks as market makers standing ready to buy and sell, and not 
the market, backstop this ability to exchange claim for money. This role of banks 
as market makers is even clearer in OTC derivative markets, where they stand as 
one counterpart to every outstanding trade (see Chapter1).  
Second, they make the markets for themselves. Chapter 4 analyses banks making 
securities markets for borrowers and lenders; Chapter 5 shows how they 
increasingly make markets for themselves and for institutional investors. The rise 
of institutional investors insulated market participants from the ebbs and flows of 
depositors’ liquidity and marked a point at which market participants turned in 
upon themselves in many ways. Trading became increasingly bound up with 
capturing price moves on the market, which consisted of other dealers and 
institutional investors intent on the same purpose.  
Derivatives markets took this making of a market for themselves one step further. 
Where the emergence of institutional investors took lenders out of the picture, 
now cash settlement takes borrowers out too. Cash settlement ensures that there is 
no underlying exchange of money for asset; even the exchange of the borrowers’ 
promise to pay for money is removed from derivatives markets, and with it the 
connection to borrowers and production. In making derivatives markets, dealers 
make markets that are increasingly cut off from external influences, on which 
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they and institutional investors can trade with each other as each attempts to 
capture price changes.  
Third, banks make the very objects to be traded (MacKenzie, 2007). They issue 
and sustain claims; in fact this might be identified as the essence of banking. The 
claims that banks issue can be invested with properties that allow activities that 
would not otherwise be possible. Claims on the commercial bank come to act as 
money, allowing efficiency in the use of money and the collection and on-lending 
of idle money. This claim that can act as money allows production of surplus 
value which otherwise would not be possible. Securities as a claim to the income 
of the borrower, made liquid by the markets that securities dealers make, also 
make possible the production of additional surplus value through collecting and 
lending-on otherwise idle money.  
Derivatives claims allow the trading of things that otherwise could not be traded 
because they do not require the actual exchange of the underlying asset; instead, 
they reference an index, which must be external to and agreed upon by the 
counterparts. So as part of making these markets, banks have to make what they 
are going to trade. Banks make their own indices to serve as an underlying 
reference price to the derivative. The largest and fastest-growing categories of 
derivative instruments, LIBOR instruments and CDS respectively (see Chapter 
1), illustrate this perfectly.  
LIBOR and its equivalents are measures, calculated mostly by private 
associations of bankers, that calculate an average (excluding outliers) of where 
banks say they think they can borrow from each other. No trades need to have 
actually occurred in these instruments or at these prices. This measure, calculated 
by banks, is then used by banks to form the underlying reference price index for 
hundreds of trillions of US dollars of notional amounts of derivative transactions, 
overwhelmingly transacted among banks themselves and between banks and 
institutional investors. CDS, the fastest growing derivative instrument in the 
2000s, continues to trade (even more overwhelmingly than other derivatives 
among only financial firms) as long as a panel of dealer banks and institutional 
investors decides that there has been no default. If they rule that there has been a 
default, trading ceases and outstanding trades are terminated and settled using an 
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auction process in which the principal participants are usually dealer banks and 
institutional investors. Banks make markets, and in derivatives markets they 
make them from top to bottom for themselves and for institutional investors. 
In many ways cash settlement based on an external measure that participants 
cannot individually affect (an aleatory contract) makes the derivative more akin 
to a wager than to insurance. In an insurance contract, loss is specific to the 
insured party and must be proved or the specific insured item must be delivered 
to the insurer. Derivatives differ from wagering because the intention is to 
repeatedly buy and sell with the aim of profiting from price moves, while a wager 
is typically a ‘take and hold’ position. If, among other things, they were not using 
our money as money capital (explored further below) we might dismiss these 
markets as a zero-sum game between dealers and institutional investors. 
Fourth, and finally, the derivative form that arises – the claim – entails a 
contradiction that in many ways acts as a limit or constraint to what otherwise 
appears to be a limitless process of growth with bigger trades on more things 
more often. As is often noted in this thesis, the derivative is an untraded claim to 
facilitate trading. The effect of this contradiction is mainly felt as a constraint to 
the growth of the market. Dealer’s practices in derivatives markets stem to a large 
degree from their efforts to build market infrastructure to overcome these 
constraints, and it is only thanks to these efforts that the markets have grown as 
they have. Once again, the fact of dealers making derivatives markets for 
themselves shines through the analysis of these practices.  
One form of constraint resulting from this contradiction is the counterparty risk 
contained in derivatives claims. For the market to keep growing, this risk must be 
mitigated. When banks made securities markets for borrowers and lenders they 
were paid, by both, out of the profits that their intermediation had made possible. 
By making a market for themselves, derivatives-market participants have cut 
themselves off from their source of profit; if they are not paid from the money 
capital of lenders or the profit that borrowers earn with their loans, they must be 
paid from each others’ money capital. So before trading a derivative, each 
counterpart must assess whether the other can pay. To sell out of a derivative 
position means to trade a second derivative and a third, and so on, as I have 
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described in this thesis. If these contracts were to stand alone they would 
dramatically increase the counterparty credit risk. Banks have developed legal 
documentation to try to minimise the effects of this piling up of claims, and in 
doing so they maximise the number of derivatives for a given credit risk. In a 
further step, derivatives are subject to central clearing, on which more below.  
The fact that banks make these markets for themselves also affects the other areas 
studied above. Valuation models and risk management practice generally assume 
that there is such a thing as ‘the market’.245 Starting with a category of the market 
and not asking how it is made, in practice or in theory, means that ‘the models of 
the market do not include the models in the market’246 (Holzer and Millo, 2005: 
241). Any performativity of valuation models and risk management in the 
markets surely stems from a market made up of participants all assuming there is 
something called ‘a market’ with which they trade and which is not one made up 
of and made by themselves.
247
 In fact, as Chapter 8 shows, the models are also 
very useful for overcoming a second constraint that arises from the contradiction: 
calculating what the next move in the market should be, i.e. trading calculations 
in the face of a growing mountain of (untraded) derivative claims and 
counterclaims.  
Finally, banking regulation under the Basel Accords has also been shaped by the 
insular nature of derivative markets. Regulation by an international committee of 
national representatives lacks autonomy from those it regulates, and with it 
authority over them. It is unduly influenced by bank practices – what else could it 
be affected by? These markets, made by banks for banks, appear to have few 
participants outside financial institutions, so there is little sense in canvassing the 
opinions of outsiders about how they should be run. As a result, they reflect 
banks’ practices in overcoming the problems and constraints of the piling up of 
                                                 
245 Albeit they are now beginning to include assumptions about the market being more or less liquid at 
different times 
246 Lukás says of economics that it is ‘a closed partial system. And this in turn is unable to penetrate its own 
material substratum, nor can it advance from there to an understanding of society in its entirety and so it is 
compelled to view that substratum as an immutable, eternal “datum”. Science is thereby debarred from 
comprehending the development and the demise, the social character of its own material base’ (Lukács, 
1971: 105) 
247 Once again it seems that traders themselves, as opposed to their management and the back office, know 
this. This could be why Haug and Taleb (2011)  rail against the models and can claim that ‘Option traders 
use (very) sophisticated heuristics, never the Black-Scholes-Merton formula’. 
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derivatives claims and counterclaims resulting from the contradictory nature of 
derivatives.  
Derivatives markets are somewhat insulated from the liquidity requirements of 
lenders and borrowers by the nature of institutional investors and of cash-settled 
derivatives. The most critical connection that remains with the rest of the 
economy is that banks and institutional investors, for the most part, do not use 
their own money to trade with. They must therefore continuously act to draw 
other people’s money into these markets, as commercial banks must continuously 
act to sustain their liabilities as bank credit money. Banking regulation duly sets 
out to convince liability holders that the risks of these activities are measured and 
controlled, that capital is set aside against them and that holding bank liabilities is 
safe as a result. Banks are making markets for themselves through regulation, too.  
9.3 Further research 
The inward-looking nature of derivatives markets explored in this analysis 
provides suggestions for further research looking outwards from derivatives 
markets and more fully investigating the relation of derivatives markets with the 
wider economy. The scope of analysis and the nature of derivatives markets 
presented here mirror one another in many ways, presenting an inward-looking 
view of derivatives markets and the bank practices therein. But part of the 
rationale for investigating these markets in the first place is their very large size 
in comparison to the broader economy (see Chapter1). These are not isolated 
practices on the margins of society; they have become a major part of advanced 
capitalism, not least through their role in the crisis that started in 2007/8.  
One point of contact between derivatives markets and the broader economy arises 
from the spread of derivatives markets, made possible by cash settlement, to 
reference more and more aspects of daily life. This analysis has shown 
derivatives emerging from agricultural markets to become overwhelmingly 
financial, principally referencing the other financial claims that banks and 
institutional investors were holding and trading with each other. Yet cash-settled 
derivatives provide the bridge that allows these markets to reference, and 
influence through arbitrage, many other areas of society, e.g. commodity markets, 
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where cash-settlement allows new market participants and new trading practices. 
Cash settlement also allows derivatives on such things as natural disasters and 
seems likely to affect government policy as policy makers turn to market-based 
solutions to mitigate the cost of such events. Similarly cash settlement allows 
products such as GDP warrants, which have recently been issued by Greece and 
Argentina (Dizard, 2012a, 2012b). Having emerged from commodity markets and 
become financial, there now seems to be an overflowing of derivative and trading 
practices back into the real economy. In LiPuma and Lee’s (2005: 409) terms: 
‘speculative capital emerges from existing forms of capital, first as its surplus and 
then as its competitor’. 
The most pervasive and critical point of contact between derivatives markets  and 
the rest of the economy, however, is that banks and institutional investors are 
using our money to make these markets in one way or another, whether we 
provide the money capital out of which they profit or pay for their losses. Further 
research might then investigate the ways in which banks and institutional 
investors profit in these markets using money drawn from the broader economy. 
This might include empirical comparison of returns to banks and institutional 
investors and returns to the providers of money capital. Similarly, and as a part of 
this, the ways in which the system appears to offer scant choice to individuals 
apart from becoming financialised might be investigated – which in turn raises 
questions about the links between politics and banks and the ways in which the 
growth of these markets appears to be associated with increased influence in 
political decisions.  
Regulation, presented above as part of the mediation between banks and the 
broader economy, is an obvious site for further research looking outwards from 
derivatives markets and locating bank-based derivatives markets in the broader 
context of capitalism more generally. First, this might mean developing a more 
fundamental theory of bank regulation armed with a theory of banks. This in turn 
could provide some analysis of how society arrived at the derivatives markets that 
provide enormous returns to one part of the economy, largely from the money 
capital of others. As touched on above, this might include analysis of 
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financialisation, particularly of individuals, and more generally the links between 
the state, neo-liberalism and financialisation.  
Much of the fragility of derivatives markets has appeared to come from banks’ 
efforts to overcome the constraints imposed by the contradictory nature of the 
derivative form (the untraded claim to facilitate trading). The motivation for these 
efforts, by definition, is based in bank profits that stem from the growth of these 
markets; hence the prioritisation of growth over safety. As discussed in the thesis, 
if trading stops, these markets become unmanageable. Systemic risk and too-big-
to-fail mean that the broader economy will bail out derivatives markets in such a 
situation. Regulation has repeatedly attempted to improve the safety of growing 
quantities of derivatives, but in doing so has only facilitated further growth. 
Further research might probe this problem and ask in particular if the move to 
central clearing is just another instance of this or marks a qualitative change that 
effectively makes derivative claims tradable. Moreover, it might go on to ask: 
‘What is the role of large but safe derivative markets?’ Measures such as central 
clearing improve participants’ safety and can be likened to improving road safety 
for Formula 1 drivers: putting in tyre walls, improving the surface and taking out 
the chicanes to allow faster speeds. But even if regulation protects the bystanders, 
it is legitimate to enquire into the purpose of such speed. Might it not be better to 
slow traffic down, putting in the equivalent of speed bumps, chicanes and speed 
cameras? Further still, might society not be better off with a pedestrian zone?  
This thesis started with and has focused heavily on banks; finally, then, further 
research could also focus on banks. In the realm of regulation and policy it might 
ask what society should demand of its banks if they were not so busy making 
markets for themselves with our money.  
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